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f73b12812a
Currently, TIPC transports intra-node user data messages directly
socket to socket, hence shortcutting all the lower layers of the
communication stack. This gives TIPC very good intra node performance,
both regarding throughput and latency.
We now introduce a similar mechanism for TIPC data traffic across
network namespaces located in the same kernel. On the send path, the
call chain is as always accompanied by the sending node's network name
space pointer. However, once we have reliably established that the
receiving node is represented by a namespace on the same host, we just
replace the namespace pointer with the receiving node/namespace's
ditto, and follow the regular socket receive patch though the receiving
node. This technique gives us a throughput similar to the node internal
throughput, several times larger than if we let the traffic go though
the full network stacks. As a comparison, max throughput for 64k
messages is four times larger than TCP throughput for the same type of
traffic.
To meet any security concerns, the following should be noted.
- All nodes joining a cluster are supposed to have been be certified
and authenticated by mechanisms outside TIPC. This is no different for
nodes/namespaces on the same host; they have to auto discover each
other using the attached interfaces, and establish links which are
supervised via the regular link monitoring mechanism. Hence, a kernel
local node has no other way to join a cluster than any other node, and
have to obey to policies set in the IP or device layers of the stack.
- Only when a sender has established with 100% certainty that the peer
node is located in a kernel local namespace does it choose to let user
data messages, and only those, take the crossover path to the receiving
node/namespace.
- If the receiving node/namespace is removed, its namespace pointer
is invalidated at all peer nodes, and their neighbor link monitoring
will eventually note that this node is gone.
- To ensure the "100% certainty" criteria, and prevent any possible
spoofing, received discovery messages must contain a proof that the
sender knows a common secret. We use the hash mix of the sending
node/namespace for this purpose, since it can be accessed directly by
all other namespaces in the kernel. Upon reception of a discovery
message, the receiver checks this proof against all the local
namespaces'hash_mix:es. If it finds a match, that, along with a
matching node id and cluster id, this is deemed sufficient proof that
the peer node in question is in a local namespace, and a wormhole can
be opened.
- We should also consider that TIPC is intended to be a cluster local
IPC mechanism (just like e.g. UNIX sockets) rather than a network
protocol, and hence we think it can justified to allow it to shortcut the
lower protocol layers.
Regarding traceability, we should notice that since commit
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| .. | ||
| addr.c | ||
| addr.h | ||
| bcast.c | ||
| bcast.h | ||
| bearer.c | ||
| bearer.h | ||
| core.c | ||
| core.h | ||
| diag.c | ||
| discover.c | ||
| discover.h | ||
| eth_media.c | ||
| group.c | ||
| group.h | ||
| ib_media.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| link.c | ||
| link.h | ||
| Makefile | ||
| monitor.c | ||
| monitor.h | ||
| msg.c | ||
| msg.h | ||
| name_distr.c | ||
| name_distr.h | ||
| name_table.c | ||
| name_table.h | ||
| net.c | ||
| net.h | ||
| netlink_compat.c | ||
| netlink.c | ||
| netlink.h | ||
| node.c | ||
| node.h | ||
| socket.c | ||
| socket.h | ||
| subscr.c | ||
| subscr.h | ||
| sysctl.c | ||
| topsrv.c | ||
| topsrv.h | ||
| trace.c | ||
| trace.h | ||
| udp_media.c | ||
| udp_media.h | ||