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linux-next/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
Eric Paris bade72d607 IMA: fix the ToMToU logic
Current logic looks like this:

        rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
        if (rc < 0)
                goto out;

        if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
                if (inode->i_readcount)
                        send_tomtou = true;
                goto out;
        }

        if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
                send_writers = true;

Lets assume we have a policy which states that all files opened for read
by root must be measured.

Lets assume the file has permissions 777.

Lets assume that root has the given file open for read.

Lets assume that a non-root process opens the file write.

The non-root process will get to ima_counts_get() and will check the
ima_must_measure().  Since it is not supposed to measure it will goto
out.

We should check the i_readcount no matter what since we might be causing
a ToMToU voilation!

This is close to correct, but still not quite perfect.  The situation
could have been that root, which was interested in the mesurement opened
and closed the file and another process which is not interested in the
measurement is the one holding the i_readcount ATM.  This is just overly
strict on ToMToU violations, which is better than not strict enough...

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-10-26 11:37:19 -07:00

345 lines
8.0 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
*
* Authors:
* Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
* Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
* Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*
* File: ima_main.c
* implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
* and ima_file_check.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "ima.h"
int ima_initialized;
char *ima_hash = "sha1";
static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
{
if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
ima_hash = "md5";
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
struct ima_imbalance {
struct hlist_node node;
unsigned long fsmagic;
};
/*
* ima_limit_imbalance - emit one imbalance message per filesystem type
*
* Maintain list of filesystem types that do not measure files properly.
* Return false if unknown, true if known.
*/
static bool ima_limit_imbalance(struct file *file)
{
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_imbalance_lock);
static HLIST_HEAD(ima_imbalance_list);
struct super_block *sb = file->f_dentry->d_sb;
struct ima_imbalance *entry;
struct hlist_node *node;
bool found = false;
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, node, &ima_imbalance_list, node) {
if (entry->fsmagic == sb->s_magic) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (found)
goto out;
entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
if (!entry)
goto out;
entry->fsmagic = sb->s_magic;
spin_lock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
/*
* we could have raced and something else might have added this fs
* to the list, but we don't really care
*/
hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->node, &ima_imbalance_list);
spin_unlock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
printk(KERN_INFO "IMA: unmeasured files on fsmagic: %lX\n",
entry->fsmagic);
out:
return found;
}
/*
* ima_counts_get - increment file counts
*
* Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only
* invalidate the PCR for measured files:
* - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
* results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
* - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
* could result in a file measurement error.
*
*/
void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
int rc;
bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (!ima_initialized)
goto out;
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
if (inode->i_readcount && IS_IMA(inode))
send_tomtou = true;
goto out;
}
rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
send_writers = true;
out:
/* remember the vfs deals with i_writecount */
if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
inode->i_readcount++;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
if (send_tomtou)
ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
"ToMToU");
if (send_writers)
ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
"open_writers");
}
/*
* Decrement ima counts
*/
static void ima_dec_counts(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) {
if (unlikely(inode->i_readcount == 0)) {
if (!ima_limit_imbalance(file)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%u)\n",
__func__, inode->i_readcount);
dump_stack();
}
return;
}
inode->i_readcount--;
}
}
static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
{
mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex));
assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
iint->version != inode->i_version)
iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
}
static void ima_file_free_iint(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
{
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
ima_dec_counts(inode, file);
ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
}
static void ima_file_free_noiint(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
ima_dec_counts(inode, file);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
/**
* ima_file_free - called on __fput()
* @file: pointer to file structure being freed
*
* Flag files that changed, based on i_version;
* and decrement the i_readcount.
*/
void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
if (iint)
ima_file_free_iint(iint, inode, file);
else
ima_file_free_noiint(inode, file);
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
int mask, int function)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
int rc = 0;
if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, mask, function);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
retry:
iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
if (!iint) {
rc = ima_inode_alloc(inode);
if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST)
goto retry;
return rc;
}
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
if (!rc)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
out:
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
return rc;
}
/**
* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
* @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
*
* Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
* policy decision.
*
* Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
* (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
int rc;
if (!file)
return 0;
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
return 0;
}
/**
* ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
*
* The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
* from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
* already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
* So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
* what is being executed.
*
* Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
* (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
*/
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int rc;
rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->filename,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
return 0;
}
/**
* ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured
* @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
*
* Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
*
* Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
* (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
int rc;
rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
FILE_CHECK);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
error = ima_init();
ima_initialized = 1;
return error;
}
static void __exit cleanup_ima(void)
{
ima_cleanup();
}
late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");