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mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-25 21:54:06 +08:00
linux-next/kernel/ucount.c
Randy Dunlap 514c603249 headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.h
Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious
reason.  It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it.  Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source
files that do not use it.

This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig.  It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes.  I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.

Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms.  Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).

[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
  right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
  counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
  combine all of those. ]

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>	[2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>	[2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 21:36:27 -07:00

247 lines
5.7 KiB
C

/*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#define UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS 10
static struct hlist_head ucounts_hashtable[(1 << UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS)];
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ucounts_lock);
#define ucounts_hashfn(ns, uid) \
hash_long((unsigned long)__kuid_val(uid) + (unsigned long)(ns), \
UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS)
#define ucounts_hashentry(ns, uid) \
(ucounts_hashtable + ucounts_hashfn(ns, uid))
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static struct ctl_table_set *
set_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root)
{
return &current_user_ns()->set;
}
static int set_is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set)
{
return &current_user_ns()->set == set;
}
static int set_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns =
container_of(head->set, struct user_namespace, set);
int mode;
/* Allow users with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE unrestrained access */
if (ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
mode = (table->mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
else
/* Allow all others at most read-only access */
mode = table->mode & S_IROTH;
return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
}
static struct ctl_table_root set_root = {
.lookup = set_lookup,
.permissions = set_permissions,
};
static int zero = 0;
static int int_max = INT_MAX;
#define UCOUNT_ENTRY(name) \
{ \
.procname = name, \
.maxlen = sizeof(int), \
.mode = 0644, \
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, \
.extra1 = &zero, \
.extra2 = &int_max, \
}
static struct ctl_table user_table[] = {
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_user_namespaces"),
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_pid_namespaces"),
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_uts_namespaces"),
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_ipc_namespaces"),
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_net_namespaces"),
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_mnt_namespaces"),
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_cgroup_namespaces"),
#ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_instances"),
UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"),
#endif
{ }
};
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
bool setup_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
struct ctl_table *tbl;
setup_sysctl_set(&ns->set, &set_root, set_is_seen);
tbl = kmemdup(user_table, sizeof(user_table), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tbl) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) {
tbl[i].data = &ns->ucount_max[i];
}
ns->sysctls = __register_sysctl_table(&ns->set, "user", tbl);
}
if (!ns->sysctls) {
kfree(tbl);
retire_sysctl_set(&ns->set);
return false;
}
#endif
return true;
}
void retire_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
struct ctl_table *tbl;
tbl = ns->sysctls->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_sysctl_table(ns->sysctls);
retire_sysctl_set(&ns->set);
kfree(tbl);
#endif
}
static struct ucounts *find_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
{
struct ucounts *ucounts;
hlist_for_each_entry(ucounts, hashent, node) {
if (uid_eq(ucounts->uid, uid) && (ucounts->ns == ns))
return ucounts;
}
return NULL;
}
static struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
{
struct hlist_head *hashent = ucounts_hashentry(ns, uid);
struct ucounts *ucounts, *new;
spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
if (!ucounts) {
spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
new->ns = ns;
new->uid = uid;
new->count = 0;
spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
if (ucounts) {
kfree(new);
} else {
hlist_add_head(&new->node, hashent);
ucounts = new;
}
}
if (ucounts->count == INT_MAX)
ucounts = NULL;
else
ucounts->count += 1;
spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
return ucounts;
}
static void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ucounts_lock, flags);
ucounts->count -= 1;
if (!ucounts->count)
hlist_del_init(&ucounts->node);
else
ucounts = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ucounts_lock, flags);
kfree(ucounts);
}
static inline bool atomic_inc_below(atomic_t *v, int u)
{
int c, old;
c = atomic_read(v);
for (;;) {
if (unlikely(c >= u))
return false;
old = atomic_cmpxchg(v, c, c+1);
if (likely(old == c))
return true;
c = old;
}
}
struct ucounts *inc_ucount(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
enum ucount_type type)
{
struct ucounts *ucounts, *iter, *bad;
struct user_namespace *tns;
ucounts = get_ucounts(ns, uid);
for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = tns->ucounts) {
int max;
tns = iter->ns;
max = READ_ONCE(tns->ucount_max[type]);
if (!atomic_inc_below(&iter->ucount[type], max))
goto fail;
}
return ucounts;
fail:
bad = iter;
for (iter = ucounts; iter != bad; iter = iter->ns->ucounts)
atomic_dec(&iter->ucount[type]);
put_ucounts(ucounts);
return NULL;
}
void dec_ucount(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type)
{
struct ucounts *iter;
for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
int dec = atomic_dec_if_positive(&iter->ucount[type]);
WARN_ON_ONCE(dec < 0);
}
put_ucounts(ucounts);
}
static __init int user_namespace_sysctl_init(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static struct ctl_table_header *user_header;
static struct ctl_table empty[1];
/*
* It is necessary to register the user directory in the
* default set so that registrations in the child sets work
* properly.
*/
user_header = register_sysctl("user", empty);
kmemleak_ignore(user_header);
BUG_ON(!user_header);
BUG_ON(!setup_userns_sysctls(&init_user_ns));
#endif
return 0;
}
subsys_initcall(user_namespace_sysctl_init);