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https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git
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052497553e
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (45 commits) crypto: caam - add support for sha512 variants of existing AEAD algorithms crypto: caam - remove unused authkeylen from caam_ctx crypto: caam - fix decryption shared vs. non-shared key setting crypto: caam - platform_bus_type migration crypto: aesni-intel - fix aesni build on i386 crypto: aesni-intel - Merge with fpu.ko crypto: mv_cesa - make count_sgs() null-pointer proof crypto: mv_cesa - copy remaining bytes to SRAM only when needed crypto: mv_cesa - move digest state initialisation to a better place crypto: mv_cesa - fill inner/outer IV fields only in HMAC case crypto: mv_cesa - refactor copy_src_to_buf() crypto: mv_cesa - no need to save digest state after the last chunk crypto: mv_cesa - print a warning when registration of AES algos fail crypto: mv_cesa - drop this call to mv_hash_final from mv_hash_finup crypto: mv_cesa - the descriptor pointer register needs to be set just once crypto: mv_cesa - use ablkcipher_request_cast instead of the manual container_of crypto: caam - fix printk recursion for long error texts crypto: caam - remove unused keylen from session context hwrng: amd - enable AMD hw rnd driver for Maple PPC boards hwrng: amd - manage resource allocation ...
212 lines
4.8 KiB
C
212 lines
4.8 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright IBM Corp. 2006,2007
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* Author(s): Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
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* Driver for the s390 pseudo random number generator
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*/
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <asm/debug.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include "crypt_s390.h"
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MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
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MODULE_AUTHOR("Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>");
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MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 PRNG interface");
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static int prng_chunk_size = 256;
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module_param(prng_chunk_size, int, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
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MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_chunk_size, "PRNG read chunk size in bytes");
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static int prng_entropy_limit = 4096;
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module_param(prng_entropy_limit, int, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH | S_IWUSR);
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MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_entropy_limit,
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"PRNG add entropy after that much bytes were produced");
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/*
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* Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is,
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* of course, in a state of sin. -- John von Neumann
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*/
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struct s390_prng_data {
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unsigned long count; /* how many bytes were produced */
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char *buf;
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};
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static struct s390_prng_data *p;
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/* copied from libica, use a non-zero initial parameter block */
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static unsigned char parm_block[32] = {
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0x0F,0x2B,0x8E,0x63,0x8C,0x8E,0xD2,0x52,0x64,0xB7,0xA0,0x7B,0x75,0x28,0xB8,0xF4,
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0x75,0x5F,0xD2,0xA6,0x8D,0x97,0x11,0xFF,0x49,0xD8,0x23,0xF3,0x7E,0x21,0xEC,0xA0,
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};
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static int prng_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
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}
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static void prng_add_entropy(void)
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{
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__u64 entropy[4];
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unsigned int i;
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int ret;
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
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ret = crypt_s390_kmc(KMC_PRNG, parm_block, (char *)entropy,
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(char *)entropy, sizeof(entropy));
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BUG_ON(ret < 0 || ret != sizeof(entropy));
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memcpy(parm_block, entropy, sizeof(entropy));
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}
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}
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static void prng_seed(int nbytes)
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{
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char buf[16];
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int i = 0;
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BUG_ON(nbytes > 16);
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get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
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/* Add the entropy */
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while (nbytes >= 8) {
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*((__u64 *)parm_block) ^= *((__u64 *)(buf+i));
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prng_add_entropy();
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i += 8;
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nbytes -= 8;
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}
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prng_add_entropy();
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}
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static ssize_t prng_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf, size_t nbytes,
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loff_t *ppos)
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{
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int chunk, n;
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int ret = 0;
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int tmp;
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/* nbytes can be arbitrary length, we split it into chunks */
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while (nbytes) {
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/* same as in extract_entropy_user in random.c */
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if (need_resched()) {
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if (signal_pending(current)) {
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if (ret == 0)
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ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
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break;
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}
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schedule();
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}
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/*
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* we lose some random bytes if an attacker issues
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* reads < 8 bytes, but we don't care
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*/
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chunk = min_t(int, nbytes, prng_chunk_size);
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/* PRNG only likes multiples of 8 bytes */
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n = (chunk + 7) & -8;
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if (p->count > prng_entropy_limit)
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prng_seed(8);
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/* if the CPU supports PRNG stckf is present too */
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asm volatile(".insn s,0xb27c0000,%0"
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: "=m" (*((unsigned long long *)p->buf)) : : "cc");
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/*
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* Beside the STCKF the input for the TDES-EDE is the output
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* of the last operation. We differ here from X9.17 since we
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* only store one timestamp into the buffer. Padding the whole
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* buffer with timestamps does not improve security, since
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* successive stckf have nearly constant offsets.
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* If an attacker knows the first timestamp it would be
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* trivial to guess the additional values. One timestamp
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* is therefore enough and still guarantees unique input values.
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*
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* Note: you can still get strict X9.17 conformity by setting
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* prng_chunk_size to 8 bytes.
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*/
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tmp = crypt_s390_kmc(KMC_PRNG, parm_block, p->buf, p->buf, n);
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BUG_ON((tmp < 0) || (tmp != n));
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p->count += n;
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if (copy_to_user(ubuf, p->buf, chunk))
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return -EFAULT;
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nbytes -= chunk;
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ret += chunk;
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ubuf += chunk;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static const struct file_operations prng_fops = {
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.owner = THIS_MODULE,
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.open = &prng_open,
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.release = NULL,
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.read = &prng_read,
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.llseek = noop_llseek,
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};
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static struct miscdevice prng_dev = {
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.name = "prandom",
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.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
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.fops = &prng_fops,
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};
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static int __init prng_init(void)
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{
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int ret;
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/* check if the CPU has a PRNG */
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if (!crypt_s390_func_available(KMC_PRNG, CRYPT_S390_MSA))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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if (prng_chunk_size < 8)
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return -EINVAL;
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p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct s390_prng_data), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!p)
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return -ENOMEM;
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p->count = 0;
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p->buf = kmalloc(prng_chunk_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!p->buf) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_free;
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}
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/* initialize the PRNG, add 128 bits of entropy */
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prng_seed(16);
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ret = misc_register(&prng_dev);
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if (ret)
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goto out_buf;
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return 0;
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out_buf:
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kfree(p->buf);
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out_free:
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kfree(p);
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return ret;
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}
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static void __exit prng_exit(void)
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{
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/* wipe me */
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kzfree(p->buf);
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kfree(p);
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misc_deregister(&prng_dev);
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}
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module_init(prng_init);
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module_exit(prng_exit);
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