mirror of
https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git
synced 2024-12-18 02:04:05 +08:00
17ae69aba8
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEgycj0O+d1G2aycA8rZhLv9lQBTwFAmCInP4ACgkQrZhLv9lQ BTza0g//dTeb9woC9H7qlEhK4l9yk62lTss60Q8X7m7ZSNfdL4tiEbi64SgK+iOW OOegbrOEb8Kzh4KJJYmVlVZ5YUWyH4szgmee1wnylBdsWiWaPLPF3Cflz77apy6T TiiBsJd7rRE29FKheaMt34B41BMh8QHESN+DzjzJWsFoi/uNxjgSs2W16XuSupKu bpRmB1pYNXMlrkzz7taL05jndZYE5arVriqlxgAsuLOFOp/ER7zecrjImdCM/4kL W6ej0R1fz2Geh6CsLBJVE+bKWSQ82q5a4xZEkSYuQHXgZV5eywE5UKu8ssQcRgQA VmGUY5k73rfY9Ofupf2gCaf/JSJNXKO/8Xjg0zAdklKtmgFjtna5Tyg9I90j7zn+ 5swSpKuRpilN8MQH+6GWAnfqQlNoviTOpFeq3LwBtNVVOh08cOg6lko/bmebBC+R TeQPACKS0Q0gCDPm9RYoU1pMUuYgfOwVfVRZK1prgi2Co7ZBUMOvYbNoKYoPIydr ENBYljlU1OYwbzgR2nE+24fvhU8xdNOVG1xXYPAEHShu+p7dLIWRLhl8UCtRQpSR 1ofeVaJjgjrp29O+1OIQjB2kwCaRdfv/Gq1mztE/VlMU/r++E62OEzcH0aS+mnrg yzfyUdI8IFv1q6FGT9yNSifWUWxQPmOKuC8kXsKYfqfJsFwKmHM= =uCN4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris: "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün. Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing. From Mickaël's cover letter: "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features. This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]" The cover letter and v34 posting is here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/ See also: https://landlock.io/ This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several years" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2] * tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features landlock: Add user and kernel documentation samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example selftests/landlock: Add user space tests landlock: Add syscall implementations arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock landlock: Add ptrace restrictions landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Add object management
530 lines
14 KiB
C
530 lines
14 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
|
|
*
|
|
* Author:
|
|
* Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SECURITY_SMACK_H
|
|
#define _SECURITY_SMACK_H
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/capability.h>
|
|
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
|
|
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
|
|
#include <linux/in.h>
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
|
|
#include <linux/in6.h>
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
|
|
#include <net/netlabel.h>
|
|
#include <linux/list.h>
|
|
#include <linux/rculist.h>
|
|
#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
|
|
#include <linux/msg.h>
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use IPv6 port labeling if IPv6 is enabled and secmarks
|
|
* are not being used.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
|
|
#define SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
|
|
#define SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Smack labels were limited to 23 characters for a long time.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SMK_LABELLEN 24
|
|
#define SMK_LONGLABEL 256
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
|
|
* not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
|
|
* and so that they can be shared.
|
|
*
|
|
* Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
|
|
* is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
|
|
* for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
|
|
* is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
|
|
* never deleted.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
|
|
* hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
|
|
* where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
|
|
* interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
|
|
* these components have been repaired.
|
|
*
|
|
* The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too.
|
|
*
|
|
* Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that
|
|
* the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every
|
|
* time.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct smack_known {
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
|
struct hlist_node smk_hashed;
|
|
char *smk_known;
|
|
u32 smk_secid;
|
|
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr smk_netlabel; /* on wire labels */
|
|
struct list_head smk_rules; /* access rules */
|
|
struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for rules */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
|
|
* Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
|
|
* bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
|
|
* of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
|
|
* aside for the terminating null byte.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SMK_CIPSOLEN 24
|
|
|
|
struct superblock_smack {
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_root;
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_floor;
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_hat;
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_default;
|
|
int smk_flags;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Superblock flags
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SMK_SB_INITIALIZED 0x01
|
|
#define SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED 0x02
|
|
|
|
struct socket_smack {
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */
|
|
int smk_state; /* netlabel socket states */
|
|
};
|
|
#define SMK_NETLBL_UNSET 0
|
|
#define SMK_NETLBL_UNLABELED 1
|
|
#define SMK_NETLBL_LABELED 2
|
|
#define SMK_NETLBL_REQSKB 3
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Inode smack data
|
|
*/
|
|
struct inode_smack {
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label of the task */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */
|
|
int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct task_smack {
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label for access control */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
|
|
struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */
|
|
struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */
|
|
struct list_head smk_relabel; /* transit allowed labels */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
|
|
#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */
|
|
#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted */
|
|
#define SMK_INODE_IMPURE 0x08 /* involved in an impure transaction */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A label access rule.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct smack_rule {
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_subject;
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_object;
|
|
int smk_access;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* An entry in the table identifying IPv4 hosts.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct smk_net4addr {
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
|
struct in_addr smk_host; /* network address */
|
|
struct in_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
|
|
int smk_masks; /* mask size */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_label; /* label */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* An entry in the table identifying IPv6 hosts.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct smk_net6addr {
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
|
struct in6_addr smk_host; /* network address */
|
|
struct in6_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
|
|
int smk_masks; /* mask size */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_label; /* label */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* An entry in the table identifying ports.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct smk_port_label {
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
|
struct sock *smk_sock; /* socket initialized on */
|
|
unsigned short smk_port; /* the port number */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */
|
|
short smk_sock_type; /* Socket type */
|
|
short smk_can_reuse;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct smack_known_list_elem {
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_label;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
|
|
#define FSDEFAULT_MNT 0x01
|
|
#define FSFLOOR_MNT 0x02
|
|
#define FSHAT_MNT 0x04
|
|
#define FSROOT_MNT 0x08
|
|
#define FSTRANS_MNT 0x10
|
|
|
|
#define NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS 5
|
|
|
|
enum {
|
|
Opt_error = -1,
|
|
Opt_fsdefault = 0,
|
|
Opt_fsfloor = 1,
|
|
Opt_fshat = 2,
|
|
Opt_fsroot = 3,
|
|
Opt_fstransmute = 4,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define SMACK_DELETE_OPTION "-DELETE"
|
|
#define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION "-CIPSO"
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* CIPSO defaults.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT 3 /* Historical */
|
|
#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_INVALID -1 /* Not a DOI */
|
|
#define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT 250 /* Arbitrary */
|
|
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT 251 /* Also arbitrary */
|
|
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL 255 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
|
|
/*
|
|
* CIPSO 2.2 standard is 239, but Smack wants to use the
|
|
* categories in a structured way that limits the value to
|
|
* the bits in 23 bytes, hence the unusual number.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM 184 /* 23 * 8 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ptrace rules
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT 0
|
|
#define SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT 1
|
|
#define SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN 2
|
|
#define SMACK_PTRACE_MAX SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flags for untraditional access modes.
|
|
* It shouldn't be necessary to avoid conflicts with definitions
|
|
* in fs.h, but do so anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define MAY_TRANSMUTE 0x00001000 /* Controls directory labeling */
|
|
#define MAY_LOCK 0x00002000 /* Locks should be writes, but ... */
|
|
#define MAY_BRINGUP 0x00004000 /* Report use of this rule */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The policy for delivering signals is configurable.
|
|
* It is usually "write", but can be "append".
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_APPEND_SIGNALS
|
|
#define MAY_DELIVER MAY_APPEND /* Signal delivery requires append */
|
|
#else
|
|
#define MAY_DELIVER MAY_WRITE /* Signal delivery requires write */
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#define SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW 1 /* Allow bringup mode */
|
|
#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT 2 /* Allow unconfined label */
|
|
#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT 3 /* Allow unconfined label */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
|
|
*/
|
|
#define MAY_ANYREAD (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
|
|
#define MAY_READWRITE (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
|
|
#define MAY_NOT 0
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Number of access types used by Smack (rwxatlb)
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 7
|
|
|
|
/* SMACK data */
|
|
struct smack_audit_data {
|
|
const char *function;
|
|
char *subject;
|
|
char *object;
|
|
char *request;
|
|
int result;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set
|
|
* to save some stack
|
|
*/
|
|
struct smk_audit_info {
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
struct common_audit_data a;
|
|
struct smack_audit_data sad;
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* These functions are in smack_access.c
|
|
*/
|
|
int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
|
|
int smk_access(struct smack_known *, struct smack_known *,
|
|
int, struct smk_audit_info *);
|
|
int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *, struct smack_known *,
|
|
u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
|
|
int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
|
|
struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
|
|
char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
|
|
int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
|
|
void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
|
|
struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
|
|
bool smack_privileged(int cap);
|
|
bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred);
|
|
void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
|
|
int smack_populate_secattr(struct smack_known *skp);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Shared data.
|
|
*/
|
|
extern int smack_enabled;
|
|
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
|
|
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
|
|
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
|
|
extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
|
|
extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
|
|
#endif
|
|
extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
|
|
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes;
|
|
|
|
extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
|
|
extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
|
|
extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
|
|
extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
|
|
extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
|
|
|
|
extern struct mutex smack_known_lock;
|
|
extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
|
|
extern struct list_head smk_net4addr_list;
|
|
extern struct list_head smk_net6addr_list;
|
|
|
|
extern struct mutex smack_onlycap_lock;
|
|
extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
|
|
|
|
#define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
|
|
extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
|
|
extern struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
|
|
|
|
static inline struct task_smack *smack_cred(const struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
return cred->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline struct smack_known **smack_file(const struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return (struct smack_known **)(file->f_security +
|
|
smack_blob_sizes.lbs_file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline struct inode_smack *smack_inode(const struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
return inode->i_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline struct smack_known **smack_msg_msg(const struct msg_msg *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
return msg->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
|
|
{
|
|
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
|
|
const struct super_block *superblock)
|
|
{
|
|
return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Is the directory transmuting?
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode_smack *sip = smack_inode(isp);
|
|
return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an inode blob.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode_smack *sip = smack_inode(isp);
|
|
return sip->smk_inode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an task blob.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
|
|
{
|
|
return tsp->smk_task;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct_subj(
|
|
const struct task_struct *t)
|
|
{
|
|
struct smack_known *skp;
|
|
const struct cred *cred;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
cred = rcu_dereference(t->cred);
|
|
skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return skp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct_obj(
|
|
const struct task_struct *t)
|
|
{
|
|
struct smack_known *skp;
|
|
const struct cred *cred;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
cred = __task_cred(t);
|
|
skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return skp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
|
|
{
|
|
return tsp->smk_forked;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* logging functions
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
|
|
#define SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT 0x2
|
|
extern int log_policy;
|
|
|
|
void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
|
|
int request,
|
|
int result, struct smk_audit_info *auditdata);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* some inline functions to set up audit data
|
|
* they do nothing if CONFIG_AUDIT is not set
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
|
|
char type)
|
|
{
|
|
memset(&a->sad, 0, sizeof(a->sad));
|
|
a->a.type = type;
|
|
a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad;
|
|
a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_init_net(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
|
|
char type, struct lsm_network_audit *net)
|
|
{
|
|
smk_ad_init(a, func, type);
|
|
memset(net, 0, sizeof(*net));
|
|
a->a.u.net = net;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct task_struct *t)
|
|
{
|
|
a->a.u.tsk = t;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct dentry *d)
|
|
{
|
|
a->a.u.dentry = d;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct inode *i)
|
|
{
|
|
a->a.u.inode = i;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct path p)
|
|
{
|
|
a->a.u.path = p;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
a->a.u.net->sk = sk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else /* no AUDIT */
|
|
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
|
|
char type)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct task_struct *t)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct dentry *d)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct inode *i)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct path p)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
|
|
struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */
|