Andrey Ryabinin 936bb4bbbb mm/kasan: print name of mem[set,cpy,move]() caller in report ... When bogus memory access happens in mem[set,cpy,move]() it's usually caller's fault. So don't blame mem[set,cpy,move]() in bug report, blame the caller instead. Before: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds access in memset+0x23/0x40 at <address> After: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds access in <memset_caller> at <address> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462538722-1574-2-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>		2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
..
kasan_init.c	x86/kasan, mm: Introduce generic kasan_populate_zero_shadow()	2015-08-22 14:54:55 +02:00
kasan.c	mm/kasan: print name of mem[set,cpy,move]() caller in report	2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
kasan.h	mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation	2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
Makefile	mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation	2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
quarantine.c	mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation	2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
report.c	mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation	2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00