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3898b1b4eb
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0 based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually) possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain privilege via (set)uid-0. Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs. Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser from the process' tree of children. The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel. With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently fork()'d/exec()'d children with: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f); This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is enabled at configure time. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning] [serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
82 lines
3.1 KiB
C
82 lines
3.1 KiB
C
#ifndef _LINUX_PRCTL_H
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#define _LINUX_PRCTL_H
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/* Values to pass as first argument to prctl() */
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#define PR_SET_PDEATHSIG 1 /* Second arg is a signal */
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#define PR_GET_PDEATHSIG 2 /* Second arg is a ptr to return the signal */
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/* Get/set current->mm->dumpable */
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#define PR_GET_DUMPABLE 3
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#define PR_SET_DUMPABLE 4
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/* Get/set unaligned access control bits (if meaningful) */
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#define PR_GET_UNALIGN 5
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#define PR_SET_UNALIGN 6
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# define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user accesses */
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# define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user access */
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/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from
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* uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */
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#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7
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#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8
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/* Get/set floating-point emulation control bits (if meaningful) */
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#define PR_GET_FPEMU 9
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#define PR_SET_FPEMU 10
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# define PR_FPEMU_NOPRINT 1 /* silently emulate fp operations accesses */
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# define PR_FPEMU_SIGFPE 2 /* don't emulate fp operations, send SIGFPE instead */
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/* Get/set floating-point exception mode (if meaningful) */
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#define PR_GET_FPEXC 11
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#define PR_SET_FPEXC 12
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# define PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE 0x80 /* Use FPEXC for FP exception enables */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_DIV 0x010000 /* floating point divide by zero */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_OVF 0x020000 /* floating point overflow */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_UND 0x040000 /* floating point underflow */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_RES 0x080000 /* floating point inexact result */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_INV 0x100000 /* floating point invalid operation */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_DISABLED 0 /* FP exceptions disabled */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_NONRECOV 1 /* async non-recoverable exc. mode */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_ASYNC 2 /* async recoverable exception mode */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_PRECISE 3 /* precise exception mode */
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/* Get/set whether we use statistical process timing or accurate timestamp
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* based process timing */
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#define PR_GET_TIMING 13
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#define PR_SET_TIMING 14
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# define PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL 0 /* Normal, traditional,
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statistical process timing */
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# define PR_TIMING_TIMESTAMP 1 /* Accurate timestamp based
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process timing */
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#define PR_SET_NAME 15 /* Set process name */
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#define PR_GET_NAME 16 /* Get process name */
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/* Get/set process endian */
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#define PR_GET_ENDIAN 19
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#define PR_SET_ENDIAN 20
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# define PR_ENDIAN_BIG 0
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# define PR_ENDIAN_LITTLE 1 /* True little endian mode */
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# define PR_ENDIAN_PPC_LITTLE 2 /* "PowerPC" pseudo little endian */
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/* Get/set process seccomp mode */
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#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
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#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
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/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */
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#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
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#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
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/* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */
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#define PR_GET_TSC 25
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#define PR_SET_TSC 26
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# define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the timestamp counter */
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# define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of reading the TSC */
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/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */
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#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27
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#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28
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#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
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