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mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-23 12:43:55 +08:00
linux-next/include/linux/cache.h
Kees Cook c74ba8b348 arch: Introduce post-init read-only memory
One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
attack surface.

Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.

This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and adds
some documentation about the existing __read_mostly marking.

This improves the security of the Linux kernel by marking formerly
read-write memory regions as read-only on a fully booted up system.

Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455748879-21872-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-22 08:51:38 +01:00

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2.1 KiB
C

#ifndef __LINUX_CACHE_H
#define __LINUX_CACHE_H
#include <uapi/linux/kernel.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
#ifndef L1_CACHE_ALIGN
#define L1_CACHE_ALIGN(x) __ALIGN_KERNEL(x, L1_CACHE_BYTES)
#endif
#ifndef SMP_CACHE_BYTES
#define SMP_CACHE_BYTES L1_CACHE_BYTES
#endif
/*
* __read_mostly is used to keep rarely changing variables out of frequently
* updated cachelines. If an architecture doesn't support it, ignore the
* hint.
*/
#ifndef __read_mostly
#define __read_mostly
#endif
/*
* __ro_after_init is used to mark things that are read-only after init (i.e.
* after mark_rodata_ro() has been called). These are effectively read-only,
* but may get written to during init, so can't live in .rodata (via "const").
*/
#ifndef __ro_after_init
#define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init")))
#endif
#ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
#define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
#endif
#ifndef ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
#define ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp ____cacheline_aligned
#else
#define ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
#endif
#ifndef __cacheline_aligned
#define __cacheline_aligned \
__attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES), \
__section__(".data..cacheline_aligned")))
#endif /* __cacheline_aligned */
#ifndef __cacheline_aligned_in_smp
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
#define __cacheline_aligned_in_smp __cacheline_aligned
#else
#define __cacheline_aligned_in_smp
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
#endif
/*
* The maximum alignment needed for some critical structures
* These could be inter-node cacheline sizes/L3 cacheline
* size etc. Define this in asm/cache.h for your arch
*/
#ifndef INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT
#define INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT L1_CACHE_SHIFT
#endif
#if !defined(____cacheline_internodealigned_in_smp)
#if defined(CONFIG_SMP)
#define ____cacheline_internodealigned_in_smp \
__attribute__((__aligned__(1 << (INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT))))
#else
#define ____cacheline_internodealigned_in_smp
#endif
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
#define cache_line_size() L1_CACHE_BYTES
#endif
#endif /* __LINUX_CACHE_H */