2
0
mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-25 05:34:00 +08:00
linux-next/certs/system_keyring.c
Linus Torvalds e6f0bf09f0 integrity-v5.13
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEEjSMCCC7+cjo3nszSa3kkZrA+cVoFAmCIuMgUHHpvaGFyQGxp
 bnV4LmlibS5jb20ACgkQa3kkZrA+cVqCew//SHwZ3LuqZUyqX1lCeW0eUsJQmf9P
 Rc++pK5+cigaYwg/LpLXBtIthOO91KJ+p4UrXIttlz6wRWqH5Enm/nQk3ngIIrWJ
 g4HsU4LoXeE5V1QZgDdUWM+ViaNvZuzT8enaUt4VvelHTRMoAgeTu7/amjx01t9L
 R8Qhmg2tBI5ehRgocNfEApNfaDyOcJhR14wAnGFhQH1pH2o0e+O+L5E6ke3Z2N0D
 oa9LBkA2wZFlTXkYHAYBdZjPW0BXX55brIusLHhrvFC16Ad9IVwcxRvRwYy4v2IK
 p8kO7EwGO4IkqsuL6FApgbW8/dTZXo3pD8YmplXhQdvAd9L/LshYhDePX7UsEp+O
 CL3rFvNFzZKC5qTx0UXLqjcktosOLTTFkAzRMg5taTljbTWBp9ziI8X0nTgoThLH
 fTs41Ol5v5veiq8JbZ1VixCoDJVOWtED/FuSZD41OyXJb7yGNpTnmvP6QJNIa1Yo
 vWsxSWmEX62xT85CzYLBR1Ow5+9t9+IjoCRt0pu0SRSps4gYcg1BjS+gIFnuCtB/
 B9Ysh+rHo9ne9iojFd9TrEYQSAXebVEYSOjqPWV3E7gd0EXuF+JY0akj8JBduHt3
 mfogxVtJdaHDjHtpHoHhBTpHG8l/E2n/47eFDmCiTsBGdL54R4jJSkOu8QmWBgzz
 HVNX+f86SJ2haUw=
 =gkFF
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin
  keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well.

  Also six trivial changes and bug fixes"

* tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies
  ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
  integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments.
  ima: Fix function name error in comment.
  ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring
  ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key
  keys: cleanup build time module signing keys
  ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value
  ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
2021-05-01 15:32:18 -07:00

300 lines
8.5 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include "common.h"
static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
static struct key *platform_trusted_keys;
#endif
extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
extern __initconst const unsigned long module_cert_size;
/**
* restrict_link_to_builtin_trusted - Restrict keyring addition by built in CA
*
* Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
* being vouched for by a key in the built in system keyring.
*/
int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload,
struct key *restriction_key)
{
return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload,
builtin_trusted_keys);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
/**
* restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted - Restrict keyring
* addition by both builtin and secondary keyrings
*
* Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
* being vouched for by a key in either the built-in or the secondary system
* keyrings.
*/
int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload,
struct key *restrict_key)
{
/* If we have a secondary trusted keyring, then that contains a link
* through to the builtin keyring and the search will follow that link.
*/
if (type == &key_type_keyring &&
dest_keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
payload == &builtin_trusted_keys->payload)
/* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */
return 0;
return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload,
secondary_trusted_keys);
}
/**
* Allocate a struct key_restriction for the "builtin and secondary trust"
* keyring. Only for use in system_trusted_keyring_init().
*/
static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void)
{
struct key_restriction *restriction;
restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!restriction)
panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring restriction\n");
restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted;
return restriction;
}
#endif
/*
* Create the trusted keyrings
*/
static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
{
pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyrings\n");
builtin_trusted_keys =
keyring_alloc(".builtin_trusted_keys",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys))
panic("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
secondary_trusted_keys =
keyring_alloc(".secondary_trusted_keys",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_WRITE),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(),
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys))
panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n");
if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0)
panic("Can't link trusted keyrings\n");
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
*/
device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
__init int load_module_cert(struct key *keyring)
{
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG))
return 0;
pr_notice("Loading compiled-in module X.509 certificates\n");
return load_certificate_list(system_certificate_list, module_cert_size, keyring);
}
/*
* Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
*/
static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
{
const u8 *p;
unsigned long size;
pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
p = system_certificate_list;
size = system_certificate_list_size;
#else
p = system_certificate_list + module_cert_size;
size = system_certificate_list_size - module_cert_size;
#endif
return load_certificate_list(p, size, builtin_trusted_keys);
}
late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
/**
* verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
* @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
* @len: Size of @data.
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
* (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
* @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
* @ctx: Context for callback.
*/
int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct key *trusted_keys,
enum key_being_used_for usage,
int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
const void *data, size_t len,
size_t asn1hdrlen),
void *ctx)
{
int ret;
/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
}
ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (!trusted_keys) {
trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
} else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys;
#else
trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
#endif
} else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) {
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys;
#else
trusted_keys = NULL;
#endif
if (!trusted_keys) {
ret = -ENOKEY;
pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n");
goto error;
}
ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n");
goto error;
}
}
ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOKEY)
pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
goto error;
}
if (view_content) {
size_t asn1hdrlen;
ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &len, &asn1hdrlen);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENODATA)
pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
goto error;
}
ret = view_content(ctx, data, len, asn1hdrlen);
}
error:
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
/**
* verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
* @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
* @len: Size of @data.
* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
* (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
* @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
* @ctx: Context for callback.
*/
int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
struct key *trusted_keys,
enum key_being_used_for usage,
int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
const void *data, size_t len,
size_t asn1hdrlen),
void *ctx)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
int ret;
pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
ret = verify_pkcs7_message_sig(data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage,
view_content, ctx);
pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
{
platform_trusted_keys = keyring;
}
#endif