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There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
173 lines
5.7 KiB
Plaintext
173 lines
5.7 KiB
Plaintext
#
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# Security configuration
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#
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menu "Security options"
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source security/keys/Kconfig
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config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
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bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
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default n
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help
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This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
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syslog via dmesg(8).
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If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
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unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITY
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bool "Enable different security models"
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depends on SYSFS
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depends on MULTIUSER
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help
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This allows you to choose different security modules to be
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configured into your kernel.
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If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
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model will be used.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITYFS
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bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
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help
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This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
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the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
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not used by SELinux or SMACK.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITY_NETWORK
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bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
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depends on SECURITY
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help
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This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
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If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
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implement socket and networking access controls.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
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bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
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depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
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help
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This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
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If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
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implement per-packet access controls based on labels
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derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
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designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
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to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
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IPSec.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config SECURITY_PATH
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bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
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depends on SECURITY
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help
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This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
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If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
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implement pathname based access controls.
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If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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config INTEL_TXT
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bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
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depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
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help
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This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
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Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
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Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
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of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
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will have no effect.
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Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
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initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
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create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
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helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
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correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
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of the kernel itself.
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Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
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confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
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it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
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providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
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See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
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about Intel(R) TXT.
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See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
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See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
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Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
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If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
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config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
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int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
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depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
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default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
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default 65536
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help
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This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
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from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
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can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
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For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
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a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
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On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
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Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
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this low address space will need the permission specific to the
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systems running LSM.
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source security/selinux/Kconfig
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source security/smack/Kconfig
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source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
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source security/apparmor/Kconfig
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source security/yama/Kconfig
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source security/integrity/Kconfig
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choice
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prompt "Default security module"
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default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
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default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
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default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
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default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
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default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
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default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
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help
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Select the security module that will be used by default if the
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kernel parameter security= is not specified.
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config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
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bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
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config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
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bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
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config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
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bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
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config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
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bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
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config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
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bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
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config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
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bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
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endchoice
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config DEFAULT_SECURITY
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string
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default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
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default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
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default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
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default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
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default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
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default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
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endmenu
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