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linux-next/fs/verity/open.c
Eric Biggers 672d6ef4c7 fsverity: improve documentation for builtin signature support
fsverity builtin signatures (CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) aren't
the only way to do signatures with fsverity, and they have some major
limitations.  Yet, more users have tried to use them, e.g. recently by
https://github.com/ostreedev/ostree/pull/2640.  In most cases this seems
to be because users aren't sufficiently familiar with the limitations of
this feature and what the alternatives are.

Therefore, make some updates to the documentation to try to clarify the
properties of this feature and nudge users in the right direction.

Note that the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM, which is not yet
upstream, is planned to use the builtin signatures.  (This differs from
IMA, which uses its own signature mechanism.)  For that reason, my
earlier patch "fsverity: mark builtin signatures as deprecated"
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221208033548.122704-1-ebiggers@kernel.org),
which marked builtin signatures as "deprecated", was controversial.

This patch therefore stops short of marking the feature as deprecated.
I've also revised the language to focus on better explaining the feature
and what its alternatives are.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230620041937.5809-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Reviewed-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2023-06-20 22:47:55 -07:00

426 lines
12 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Opening fs-verity files
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep;
/**
* fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params() - initialize Merkle tree parameters
* @params: the parameters struct to initialize
* @inode: the inode for which the Merkle tree is being built
* @hash_algorithm: number of hash algorithm to use
* @log_blocksize: log base 2 of block size to use
* @salt: pointer to salt (optional)
* @salt_size: size of salt, possibly 0
*
* Validate the hash algorithm and block size, then compute the tree topology
* (num levels, num blocks in each level, etc.) and initialize @params.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int hash_algorithm,
unsigned int log_blocksize,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size)
{
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
int err;
u64 blocks;
u64 blocks_in_level[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
u64 offset;
int level;
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
hash_alg = fsverity_get_hash_alg(inode, hash_algorithm);
if (IS_ERR(hash_alg))
return PTR_ERR(hash_alg);
params->hash_alg = hash_alg;
params->digest_size = hash_alg->digest_size;
params->hashstate = fsverity_prepare_hash_state(hash_alg, salt,
salt_size);
if (IS_ERR(params->hashstate)) {
err = PTR_ERR(params->hashstate);
params->hashstate = NULL;
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d preparing hash state", err);
goto out_err;
}
/*
* fs/verity/ directly assumes that the Merkle tree block size is a
* power of 2 less than or equal to PAGE_SIZE. Another restriction
* arises from the interaction between fs/verity/ and the filesystems
* themselves: filesystems expect to be able to verify a single
* filesystem block of data at a time. Therefore, the Merkle tree block
* size must also be less than or equal to the filesystem block size.
*
* The above are the only hard limitations, so in theory the Merkle tree
* block size could be as small as twice the digest size. However,
* that's not useful, and it would result in some unusually deep and
* large Merkle trees. So we currently require that the Merkle tree
* block size be at least 1024 bytes. That's small enough to test the
* sub-page block case on systems with 4K pages, but not too small.
*/
if (log_blocksize < 10 || log_blocksize > PAGE_SHIFT ||
log_blocksize > inode->i_blkbits) {
fsverity_warn(inode, "Unsupported log_blocksize: %u",
log_blocksize);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
params->log_blocksize = log_blocksize;
params->block_size = 1 << log_blocksize;
params->log_blocks_per_page = PAGE_SHIFT - log_blocksize;
params->blocks_per_page = 1 << params->log_blocks_per_page;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_power_of_2(params->digest_size))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
if (params->block_size < 2 * params->digest_size) {
fsverity_warn(inode,
"Merkle tree block size (%u) too small for hash algorithm \"%s\"",
params->block_size, hash_alg->name);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
params->log_digestsize = ilog2(params->digest_size);
params->log_arity = log_blocksize - params->log_digestsize;
params->hashes_per_block = 1 << params->log_arity;
/*
* Compute the number of levels in the Merkle tree and create a map from
* level to the starting block of that level. Level 'num_levels - 1' is
* the root and is stored first. Level 0 is the level directly "above"
* the data blocks and is stored last.
*/
/* Compute number of levels and the number of blocks in each level */
blocks = ((u64)inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >> log_blocksize;
while (blocks > 1) {
if (params->num_levels >= FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Too many levels in Merkle tree");
err = -EFBIG;
goto out_err;
}
blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
params->log_arity;
blocks_in_level[params->num_levels++] = blocks;
}
/* Compute the starting block of each level */
offset = 0;
for (level = (int)params->num_levels - 1; level >= 0; level--) {
params->level_start[level] = offset;
offset += blocks_in_level[level];
}
/*
* With block_size != PAGE_SIZE, an in-memory bitmap will need to be
* allocated to track the "verified" status of hash blocks. Don't allow
* this bitmap to get too large. For now, limit it to 1 MiB, which
* limits the file size to about 4.4 TB with SHA-256 and 4K blocks.
*
* Together with the fact that the data, and thus also the Merkle tree,
* cannot have more than ULONG_MAX pages, this implies that hash block
* indices can always fit in an 'unsigned long'. But to be safe, we
* explicitly check for that too. Note, this is only for hash block
* indices; data block indices might not fit in an 'unsigned long'.
*/
if ((params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE && offset > 1 << 23) ||
offset > ULONG_MAX) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Too many blocks in Merkle tree");
err = -EFBIG;
goto out_err;
}
params->tree_size = offset << log_blocksize;
params->tree_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(params->tree_size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
return 0;
out_err:
kfree(params->hashstate);
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
return err;
}
/*
* Compute the file digest by hashing the fsverity_descriptor excluding the
* builtin signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
*/
static int compute_file_digest(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
u8 *file_digest)
{
__le32 sig_size = desc->sig_size;
int err;
desc->sig_size = 0;
err = fsverity_hash_buffer(hash_alg, desc, sizeof(*desc), file_digest);
desc->sig_size = sig_size;
return err;
}
/*
* Create a new fsverity_info from the given fsverity_descriptor (with optional
* appended builtin signature), and check the signature if present. The
* fsverity_descriptor must have already undergone basic validation.
*/
struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc)
{
struct fsverity_info *vi;
int err;
vi = kmem_cache_zalloc(fsverity_info_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vi)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
vi->inode = inode;
err = fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(&vi->tree_params, inode,
desc->hash_algorithm,
desc->log_blocksize,
desc->salt, desc->salt_size);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d initializing Merkle tree parameters",
err);
goto fail;
}
memcpy(vi->root_hash, desc->root_hash, vi->tree_params.digest_size);
err = compute_file_digest(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, desc,
vi->file_digest);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing file digest", err);
goto fail;
}
err = fsverity_verify_signature(vi, desc->signature,
le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size));
if (err)
goto fail;
if (vi->tree_params.block_size != PAGE_SIZE) {
/*
* When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use
* a bitmap to keep track of which hash blocks have been
* verified. This bitmap must contain one bit per hash block,
* including alignment to a page boundary at the end.
*
* Eventually, to support extremely large files in an efficient
* way, it might be necessary to make pages of this bitmap
* reclaimable. But for now, simply allocating the whole bitmap
* is a simple solution that works well on the files on which
* fsverity is realistically used. E.g., with SHA-256 and 4K
* blocks, a 100MB file only needs a 24-byte bitmap, and the
* bitmap for any file under 17GB fits in a 4K page.
*/
unsigned long num_bits =
vi->tree_params.tree_pages <<
vi->tree_params.log_blocks_per_page;
vi->hash_block_verified = kvcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(num_bits),
sizeof(unsigned long),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vi->hash_block_verified) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
spin_lock_init(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
}
return vi;
fail:
fsverity_free_info(vi);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi)
{
/*
* Multiple tasks may race to set ->i_verity_info, so use
* cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in
* fsverity_get_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_verity_info with a
* RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it.
*/
if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL) {
/* Lost the race, so free the fsverity_info we allocated. */
fsverity_free_info(vi);
/*
* Afterwards, the caller may access ->i_verity_info directly,
* so make sure to ACQUIRE the winning fsverity_info.
*/
(void)fsverity_get_info(inode);
}
}
void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)
{
if (!vi)
return;
kfree(vi->tree_params.hashstate);
kvfree(vi->hash_block_verified);
kmem_cache_free(fsverity_info_cachep, vi);
}
static bool validate_fsverity_descriptor(struct inode *inode,
const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
size_t desc_size)
{
if (desc_size < sizeof(*desc)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Unrecognized descriptor size: %zu bytes",
desc_size);
return false;
}
if (desc->version != 1) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Unrecognized descriptor version: %u",
desc->version);
return false;
}
if (memchr_inv(desc->__reserved, 0, sizeof(desc->__reserved))) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Reserved bits set in descriptor");
return false;
}
if (desc->salt_size > sizeof(desc->salt)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Invalid salt_size: %u", desc->salt_size);
return false;
}
if (le64_to_cpu(desc->data_size) != inode->i_size) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Wrong data_size: %llu (desc) != %lld (inode)",
le64_to_cpu(desc->data_size), inode->i_size);
return false;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size) > desc_size - sizeof(*desc)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Signature overflows verity descriptor");
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Read the inode's fsverity_descriptor (with optional appended builtin
* signature) from the filesystem, and do basic validation of it.
*/
int fsverity_get_descriptor(struct inode *inode,
struct fsverity_descriptor **desc_ret)
{
int res;
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc;
res = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_verity_descriptor(inode, NULL, 0);
if (res < 0) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d getting verity descriptor size", res);
return res;
}
if (res > FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Verity descriptor is too large (%d bytes)",
res);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
desc = kmalloc(res, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
return -ENOMEM;
res = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_verity_descriptor(inode, desc, res);
if (res < 0) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d reading verity descriptor", res);
kfree(desc);
return res;
}
if (!validate_fsverity_descriptor(inode, desc, res)) {
kfree(desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
*desc_ret = desc;
return 0;
}
/* Ensure the inode has an ->i_verity_info */
static int ensure_verity_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fsverity_info *vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc;
int err;
if (vi)
return 0;
err = fsverity_get_descriptor(inode, &desc);
if (err)
return err;
vi = fsverity_create_info(inode, desc);
if (IS_ERR(vi)) {
err = PTR_ERR(vi);
goto out_free_desc;
}
fsverity_set_info(inode, vi);
err = 0;
out_free_desc:
kfree(desc);
return err;
}
int __fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
return -EPERM;
return ensure_verity_info(inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_file_open);
int __fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_prepare_setattr);
void __fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
fsverity_free_info(inode->i_verity_info);
inode->i_verity_info = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_cleanup_inode);
int __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void)
{
fsverity_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE_USERCOPY(fsverity_info,
SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT,
file_digest);
if (!fsverity_info_cachep)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(fsverity_info_cachep);
fsverity_info_cachep = NULL;
}