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57fe93b374
There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by hostile user. Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is expensive since most filters dont even use this array. Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of the jumps. This might be done later. In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks. For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction. [ Since we access fentry->k a lot now, cache it in a local variable and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ] Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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| .. | ||
| datagram.c | ||
| dev_addr_lists.c | ||
| dev.c | ||
| drop_monitor.c | ||
| dst.c | ||
| ethtool.c | ||
| fib_rules.c | ||
| filter.c | ||
| flow.c | ||
| gen_estimator.c | ||
| gen_stats.c | ||
| iovec.c | ||
| kmap_skb.h | ||
| link_watch.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| neighbour.c | ||
| net_namespace.c | ||
| net-sysfs.c | ||
| net-sysfs.h | ||
| net-traces.c | ||
| netevent.c | ||
| netpoll.c | ||
| pktgen.c | ||
| request_sock.c | ||
| rtnetlink.c | ||
| scm.c | ||
| skbuff.c | ||
| sock.c | ||
| stream.c | ||
| sysctl_net_core.c | ||
| timestamping.c | ||
| user_dma.c | ||
| utils.c | ||