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linux-next/net/mac80211/key.h
Lior Cohen 624ff4b210 mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable
In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to
non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending
counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value.

The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational
for the delayed tailroom needed:

	/*
	* The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
	* make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
	* and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
	* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
	* the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
	* by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
	* key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
	* zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
	*
	* The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
	* to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
	* longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
	* within an ESS this usually won't happen.
	*/

The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug:
1. Disconnect from encrypted AP
2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key
3. Schedule work
4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP
5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1
6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning

While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into
its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called
ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
and remove the counters warning as we just reset both.

Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-09-11 09:33:28 +02:00

168 lines
4.6 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
* Copyright 2005, Devicescape Software, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation
*/
#ifndef IEEE80211_KEY_H
#define IEEE80211_KEY_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <crypto/arc4.h>
#include <net/mac80211.h>
#define NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS 4
#define NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS 2
#define INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX 2 /* Keyidx always pointing to a NULL key for PTK */
struct ieee80211_local;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data;
struct sta_info;
/**
* enum ieee80211_internal_key_flags - internal key flags
*
* @KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE: Indicates that this key is present
* in the hardware for TX crypto hardware acceleration.
* @KEY_FLAG_TAINTED: Key is tainted and packets should be dropped.
* @KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME: This key is for a hardware cipher scheme
*/
enum ieee80211_internal_key_flags {
KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE = BIT(0),
KEY_FLAG_TAINTED = BIT(1),
KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME = BIT(2),
};
enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state {
TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT,
TKIP_STATE_PHASE1_DONE,
TKIP_STATE_PHASE1_HW_UPLOADED,
};
struct tkip_ctx {
u16 p1k[5]; /* p1k cache */
u32 p1k_iv32; /* iv32 for which p1k computed */
enum ieee80211_internal_tkip_state state;
};
struct tkip_ctx_rx {
struct tkip_ctx ctx;
u32 iv32; /* current iv32 */
u16 iv16; /* current iv16 */
};
struct ieee80211_key {
struct ieee80211_local *local;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
struct sta_info *sta;
/* for sdata list */
struct list_head list;
/* protected by key mutex */
unsigned int flags;
union {
struct {
/* protects tx context */
spinlock_t txlock;
/* last used TSC */
struct tkip_ctx tx;
/* last received RSC */
struct tkip_ctx_rx rx[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
/* number of mic failures */
u32 mic_failures;
} tkip;
struct {
/*
* Last received packet number. The first
* IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS counters are used with Data
* frames and the last counter is used with Robust
* Management frames.
*/
u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1][IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
} ccmp;
struct {
u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN];
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays */
u32 icverrors; /* dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors */
} aes_cmac;
struct {
u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN];
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCMACReplays */
u32 icverrors; /* dot11RSNAStatsCMACICVErrors */
} aes_gmac;
struct {
/* Last received packet number. The first
* IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS counters are used with Data
* frames and the last counter is used with Robust
* Management frames.
*/
u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1][IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
struct crypto_aead *tfm;
u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsGCMPReplays */
} gcmp;
struct {
/* generic cipher scheme */
u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1][IEEE80211_MAX_PN_LEN];
} gen;
} u;
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUGFS
struct {
struct dentry *stalink;
struct dentry *dir;
int cnt;
} debugfs;
#endif
/*
* key config, must be last because it contains key
* material as variable length member
*/
struct ieee80211_key_conf conf;
};
struct ieee80211_key *
ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len,
const u8 *key_data,
size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq,
const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs);
/*
* Insert a key into data structures (sdata, sta if necessary)
* to make it used, free old key. On failure, also free the new key.
*/
int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
struct sta_info *sta);
int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key);
void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom);
void ieee80211_key_free_unused(struct ieee80211_key *key);
void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx,
bool uni, bool multi);
void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
int idx);
void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
bool force_synchronize);
void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local,
struct sta_info *sta);
void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata);
#define key_mtx_dereference(local, ref) \
rcu_dereference_protected(ref, lockdep_is_held(&((local)->key_mtx)))
void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct work_struct *wk);
#endif /* IEEE80211_KEY_H */