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mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-28 15:13:55 +08:00
linux-next/security/keys
Mathieu Desnoyers 8aec0f5d41 Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, writev, and security keys
Looking at mm/process_vm_access.c:process_vm_rw() and comparing it to
compat_process_vm_rw() shows that the compatibility code requires an
explicit "access_ok()" check before calling
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(). The same difference seems to appear when
we compare fs/read_write.c:do_readv_writev() to
fs/compat.c:compat_do_readv_writev().

This subtle difference between the compat and non-compat requirements
should probably be debated, as it seems to be error-prone. In fact,
there are two others sites that use this function in the Linux kernel,
and they both seem to get it wrong:

Now shifting our attention to fs/aio.c, we see that aio_setup_iocb()
also ends up calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() through
aio_setup_vectored_rw(). Unfortunately, the access_ok() check appears to
be missing. Same situation for
security/keys/compat.c:compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov().

I propose that we add the access_ok() check directly into
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(), so callers don't have to worry about it,
and it therefore makes the compat call code similar to its non-compat
counterpart. Place the access_ok() check in the same location where
copy_from_user() can trigger a -EFAULT error in the non-compat code, so
the ABI behaviors are alike on both compat and non-compat.

While we are here, fix compat_do_readv_writev() so it checks for
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() negative return values.

And also, fix a memory leak in compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() error
handling.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-03-12 11:05:45 -07:00
..
encrypted-keys KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update 2012-10-08 13:49:48 +10:30
compat.c Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, writev, and security keys 2013-03-12 11:05:45 -07:00
gc.c workqueue: deprecate system_nrt[_freezable]_wq 2012-08-20 14:51:24 -07:00
internal.h userns: Convert security/keys to the new userns infrastructure 2012-09-13 18:28:02 -07:00
Kconfig KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig 2012-05-11 10:56:56 +01:00
key.c Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2012-12-16 15:40:50 -08:00
keyctl.c Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2012-12-16 15:40:50 -08:00
keyring.c Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2012-12-16 15:40:50 -08:00
Makefile KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile 2012-05-11 10:56:56 +01:00
permission.c userns: Convert security/keys to the new userns infrastructure 2012-09-13 18:28:02 -07:00
proc.c userns: Convert security/keys to the new userns infrastructure 2012-09-13 18:28:02 -07:00
process_keys.c keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings() 2013-03-12 16:44:31 +11:00
request_key_auth.c KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update 2012-10-08 13:49:48 +10:30
request_key.c Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2012-12-16 15:40:50 -08:00
sysctl.c sysctl: Drop & in front of every proc_handler. 2009-11-18 08:37:40 -08:00
trusted.c Merge branch 'modules-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux 2012-10-14 13:39:34 -07:00
trusted.h trusted-keys: rename trusted_defined files to trusted 2011-01-24 10:14:22 +11:00
user_defined.c KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update 2012-10-08 13:49:48 +10:30