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linux-next/net/mac80211/wpa.c
Christian Lamparter 816c04fe7e mac80211: consolidate MIC failure report handling
Currently, mac80211 handles MIC failures differently
depending on whenever they are detected by the stack's
own software crypto or when are handed down from the
driver.

This patch tries to unify both by moving the special
branch out of mac80211 rx hotpath and into into the
software crypto part. This has the advantage that we
can run a few more sanity checks on the data and verify
if the key type was TKIP. This is very handy because
several devices generate false postive MIC failure
reports. Like carl9170, ath9k and wl12xx:
<http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-wireless/msg68494.html>
"mac80211: report MIC failure for truncated packets in AP mode"

Cc: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Cc: Arik Nemtsov <arik@wizery.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-05-02 14:49:14 -04:00

615 lines
15 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
* Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/ieee80211.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/mac80211.h>
#include "ieee80211_i.h"
#include "michael.h"
#include "tkip.h"
#include "aes_ccm.h"
#include "aes_cmac.h"
#include "wpa.h"
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
u8 *data, *key, *mic;
size_t data_len;
unsigned int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
int tail;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
return TX_CONTINUE;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (skb->len < hdrlen)
return TX_DROP;
data = skb->data + hdrlen;
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
/* Need to use software crypto for the test */
info->control.hw_key = NULL;
}
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) &&
!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
if (!info->control.hw_key)
tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
return TX_DROP;
key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
mic[0]++;
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
u8 *data, *key = NULL;
size_t data_len;
unsigned int hdrlen;
u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
/*
* it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
* than data frames.
*/
if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
/*
* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
* the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
* on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
* MIC failure report.
*/
if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
goto mic_fail;
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
goto update_iv;
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
* though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
* MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
*/
if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
return RX_CONTINUE;
if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
/*
* APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
* errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
* group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
* frames in the BSS. (
*/
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
goto mic_fail;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
data = skb->data + hdrlen;
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
goto mic_fail;
/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
update_iv:
/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
return RX_CONTINUE;
mic_fail:
mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata, rx->key->conf.keyidx,
(void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
unsigned int hdrlen;
int len, tail;
u8 *pos;
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
return 0;
}
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
len = skb->len - hdrlen;
if (info->control.hw_key)
tail = 0;
else
tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
return -1;
pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
pos += hdrlen;
/* Increase IV for the frame */
key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key, key->u.tkip.tx.iv16);
/* hwaccel - with software IV */
if (info->control.hw_key)
return 0;
/* Add room for ICV */
skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
key, pos, len, hdr->addr2);
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
do {
if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
return TX_DROP;
} while ((skb = skb->next));
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
/*
* Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
* In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
* we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
*/
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
hwaccel = 1;
res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
key, skb->data + hdrlen,
skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue,
&rx->tkip_iv32,
&rx->tkip_iv16);
if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
/* Trim ICV */
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
/* Remove IV */
memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
int encrypted)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
int a4_included, mgmt;
u8 qos_tid;
u8 *b_0, *aad;
u16 data_len, len_a;
unsigned int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_LEN;
/*
* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
* Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
*/
mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
if (!mgmt)
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
len_a = hdrlen - 2;
a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
else
qos_tid = 0;
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
if (encrypted)
data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
/* First block, b_0 */
b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
* Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
*/
b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
/* l(m) */
put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
aad[23] = 0;
if (a4_included) {
memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
aad[30] = qos_tid;
aad[31] = 0;
} else {
memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
aad[24] = qos_tid;
}
}
static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
{
hdr[0] = pn[5];
hdr[1] = pn[4];
hdr[2] = 0;
hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
hdr[4] = pn[3];
hdr[5] = pn[2];
hdr[6] = pn[1];
hdr[7] = pn[0];
}
static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
{
pn[0] = hdr[7];
pn[1] = hdr[6];
pn[2] = hdr[5];
pn[3] = hdr[4];
pn[4] = hdr[1];
pn[5] = hdr[0];
}
static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
int hdrlen, len, tail;
u8 *pos, *pn;
int i;
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
/*
* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
* header or MIC fields
*/
return 0;
}
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
len = skb->len - hdrlen;
if (info->control.hw_key)
tail = 0;
else
tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
return -1;
pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
pos += hdrlen;
/* PN = PN + 1 */
pn = key->u.ccmp.tx_pn;
for (i = CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
pn[i]++;
if (pn[i])
break;
}
ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
/* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
if (info->control.hw_key)
return 0;
pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, 0);
ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.tx_crypto_buf, pos, len,
pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
return 0;
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
do {
if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
return TX_DROP;
} while ((skb = skb->next));
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
int data_len;
int queue;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
!ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
return RX_CONTINUE;
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
queue = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) ?
NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES : rx->queue;
if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
key->u.ccmp.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf, 1);
if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN);
memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
{
/* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
/* FC type/subtype */
aad[0] = skb->data[0];
/* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
aad[1] = skb->data[1] & ~(BIT(4) | BIT(5) | BIT(6));
/* A1 || A2 || A3 */
memcpy(aad + 2, skb->data + 4, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
}
static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
{
*d++ = s[5];
*d++ = s[4];
*d++ = s[3];
*d++ = s[2];
*d++ = s[1];
*d = s[0];
}
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
u8 *pn, aad[20];
int i;
if (info->control.hw_key)
return 0;
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
return TX_DROP;
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
/* PN = PN + 1 */
pn = key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn;
for (i = sizeof(key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
pn[i]++;
if (pn[i])
break;
}
bip_ipn_swap(mmie->sequence_number, pn);
bip_aad(skb, aad);
/*
* MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
*/
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, key->u.aes_cmac.tx_crypto_buf,
aad, skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
bip_aad(skb, aad);
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm,
key->u.aes_cmac.rx_crypto_buf, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
}
memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
/* Remove MMIE */
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
return RX_CONTINUE;
}