mirror of
https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git
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7184487f14
Pull audit fix from Paul Moore: "Just one patch from the audit tree for v3.20, and a very minor one at that. The patch simply removes an old, unused field from the audit_krule structure, a private audit-only struct. In audit related news, we did a proper overhaul of the audit pathname code and removed the nasty getname()/putname() hacks for audit, you should see those patches in Al's vfs tree if you haven't already. That's it for audit this time, let's hope for a quiet -rcX series" * 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit: audit: remove vestiges of vers_ops
1417 lines
34 KiB
C
1417 lines
34 KiB
C
/* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
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*
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* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
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* Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
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* Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/kthread.h>
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#include <linux/mutex.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/netlink.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <net/net_namespace.h>
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#include <net/sock.h>
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#include "audit.h"
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/*
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* Locking model:
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*
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* audit_filter_mutex:
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* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
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* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
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* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
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* LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
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* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
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* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
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* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
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*/
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/* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */
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struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
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#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6
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#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
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#endif
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};
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static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
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};
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DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
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static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
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{
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switch (f->type) {
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
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kfree(f->lsm_str);
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security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
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}
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}
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static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
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{
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int i;
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struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule;
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/* some rules don't have associated watches */
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if (erule->watch)
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audit_put_watch(erule->watch);
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if (erule->fields)
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for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++)
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audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]);
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kfree(erule->fields);
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kfree(erule->filterkey);
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kfree(e);
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}
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void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
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{
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struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
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audit_free_rule(e);
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}
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/* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
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static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
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{
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struct audit_entry *entry;
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struct audit_field *fields;
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entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (unlikely(!entry))
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return NULL;
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fields = kcalloc(field_count, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (unlikely(!fields)) {
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kfree(entry);
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return NULL;
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}
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entry->rule.fields = fields;
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return entry;
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}
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/* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
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* buffer. */
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char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
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{
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char *str;
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if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain))
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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/* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX
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* defines the longest valid length.
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*/
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if (len > PATH_MAX)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
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str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (unlikely(!str))
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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memcpy(str, *bufp, len);
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str[len] = 0;
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*bufp += len;
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*remain -= len;
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return str;
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}
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/* Translate an inode field to kernel respresentation. */
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static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
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struct audit_field *f)
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{
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if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
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krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree ||
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(f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
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return -EINVAL;
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krule->inode_f = f;
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return 0;
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}
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static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES];
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int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
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{
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__u32 *p = kcalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE, sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!p)
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return -ENOMEM;
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while (*list != ~0U) {
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unsigned n = *list++;
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if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) {
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kfree(p);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n);
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}
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if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) {
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kfree(p);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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classes[class] = p;
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return 0;
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}
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int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall)
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{
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if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32))
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return 0;
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if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class]))
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return 0;
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return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
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static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask)
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{
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int i;
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if (classes[class]) {
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for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
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if (mask[i] & classes[class][i])
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry)
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{
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struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f;
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if (!arch) {
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/* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch
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* as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */
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return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
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entry->rule.mask) &&
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audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
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entry->rule.mask));
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}
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switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
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case 0: /* native */
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return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
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entry->rule.mask));
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case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
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return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
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entry->rule.mask));
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default:
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return 1;
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}
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}
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#endif
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/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
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static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule)
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{
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unsigned listnr;
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struct audit_entry *entry;
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int i, err;
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err = -EINVAL;
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listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
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switch(listnr) {
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default:
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goto exit_err;
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#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
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case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY:
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if (rule->action == AUDIT_ALWAYS)
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goto exit_err;
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case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
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case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
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#endif
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case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
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case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
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;
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}
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if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) {
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pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n");
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goto exit_err;
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}
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if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
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goto exit_err;
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if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
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goto exit_err;
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err = -ENOMEM;
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entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
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if (!entry)
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goto exit_err;
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entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
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entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
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entry->rule.action = rule->action;
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entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
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for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
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entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
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for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) {
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int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1;
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__u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)];
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__u32 *class;
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if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit)))
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continue;
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*p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit);
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class = classes[i];
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if (class) {
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int j;
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for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++)
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entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j];
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}
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}
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return entry;
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exit_err:
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return ERR_PTR(err);
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}
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static u32 audit_ops[] =
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{
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[Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL,
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[Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL,
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[Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK,
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[Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST,
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[Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN,
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[Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN,
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[Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
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[Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
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};
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static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
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{
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u32 n;
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for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++)
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;
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return n;
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}
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/* check if an audit field is valid */
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static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
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{
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switch(f->type) {
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case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
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if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE &&
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entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
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return -EINVAL;
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break;
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};
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switch(f->type) {
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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case AUDIT_UID:
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case AUDIT_EUID:
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case AUDIT_SUID:
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case AUDIT_FSUID:
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case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
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case AUDIT_GID:
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case AUDIT_EGID:
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case AUDIT_SGID:
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case AUDIT_FSGID:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
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case AUDIT_PID:
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case AUDIT_PERS:
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case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
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case AUDIT_PPID:
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case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
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case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
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case AUDIT_EXIT:
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case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
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case AUDIT_INODE:
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/* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
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if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
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return -EINVAL;
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break;
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case AUDIT_ARG0:
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case AUDIT_ARG1:
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case AUDIT_ARG2:
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case AUDIT_ARG3:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
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case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
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case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
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case AUDIT_WATCH:
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case AUDIT_DIR:
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case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
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break;
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case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
|
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if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
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return -EINVAL;
|
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/* FALL THROUGH */
|
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case AUDIT_ARCH:
|
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if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
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return -EINVAL;
|
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break;
|
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case AUDIT_PERM:
|
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if (f->val & ~15)
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return -EINVAL;
|
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break;
|
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case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
|
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if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
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return -EINVAL;
|
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break;
|
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case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
|
|
if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
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break;
|
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};
|
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return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */
|
|
static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
|
|
size_t datasz)
|
|
{
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
struct audit_entry *entry;
|
|
void *bufp;
|
|
size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
|
|
int i;
|
|
char *str;
|
|
|
|
entry = audit_to_entry_common(data);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(entry))
|
|
goto exit_nofree;
|
|
|
|
bufp = data->buf;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
|
|
struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]);
|
|
if (f->op == Audit_bad)
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
|
|
f->type = data->fields[i];
|
|
f->val = data->values[i];
|
|
|
|
/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
|
|
if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
|
|
f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
|
|
f->val = 0;
|
|
entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
switch (f->type) {
|
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
|
|
case AUDIT_UID:
|
|
case AUDIT_EUID:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUID:
|
|
case AUDIT_FSUID:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
|
|
f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
|
|
if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_GID:
|
|
case AUDIT_EGID:
|
|
case AUDIT_SGID:
|
|
case AUDIT_FSGID:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
|
|
f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
|
|
if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_ARCH:
|
|
entry->rule.arch_f = f;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
|
|
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(str))
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
|
|
|
|
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
|
|
(void **)&f->lsm_rule);
|
|
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
|
|
* become valid after a policy reload. */
|
|
if (err == -EINVAL) {
|
|
pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
|
|
str);
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
kfree(str);
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
} else
|
|
f->lsm_str = str;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_WATCH:
|
|
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(str))
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
|
|
|
|
err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
kfree(str);
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_DIR:
|
|
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(str))
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
|
|
|
|
err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
|
|
kfree(str);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_INODE:
|
|
err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
|
|
if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(str))
|
|
goto exit_free;
|
|
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
|
|
entry->rule.filterkey = str;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
|
|
entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
|
|
|
|
exit_nofree:
|
|
return entry;
|
|
|
|
exit_free:
|
|
if (entry->rule.watch)
|
|
audit_put_watch(entry->rule.watch); /* matches initial get */
|
|
if (entry->rule.tree)
|
|
audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */
|
|
audit_free_rule(entry);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(err);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
|
|
static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len = strlen(str);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(*bufp, str, len);
|
|
*bufp += len;
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */
|
|
static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_rule_data *data;
|
|
void *bufp;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (unlikely(!data))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
|
|
|
|
data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
|
|
data->action = krule->action;
|
|
data->field_count = krule->field_count;
|
|
bufp = data->buf;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
|
|
struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
|
|
|
|
data->fields[i] = f->type;
|
|
data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op];
|
|
switch(f->type) {
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
|
|
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
|
|
audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_WATCH:
|
|
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
|
|
audit_pack_string(&bufp,
|
|
audit_watch_path(krule->watch));
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_DIR:
|
|
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
|
|
audit_pack_string(&bufp,
|
|
audit_tree_path(krule->tree));
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
|
|
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
|
|
audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
|
|
if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
|
|
data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
|
|
data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* fallthrough if set */
|
|
default:
|
|
data->values[i] = f->val;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
|
|
|
|
return data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compare two rules in kernel format. Considered success if rules
|
|
* don't match. */
|
|
static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (a->flags != b->flags ||
|
|
a->pflags != b->pflags ||
|
|
a->listnr != b->listnr ||
|
|
a->action != b->action ||
|
|
a->field_count != b->field_count)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
|
|
if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type ||
|
|
a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
switch(a->fields[i].type) {
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
|
|
if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_WATCH:
|
|
if (strcmp(audit_watch_path(a->watch),
|
|
audit_watch_path(b->watch)))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_DIR:
|
|
if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree),
|
|
audit_tree_path(b->tree)))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
|
|
/* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
|
|
if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_UID:
|
|
case AUDIT_EUID:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUID:
|
|
case AUDIT_FSUID:
|
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
|
|
if (!uid_eq(a->fields[i].uid, b->fields[i].uid))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_GID:
|
|
case AUDIT_EGID:
|
|
case AUDIT_SGID:
|
|
case AUDIT_FSGID:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
|
|
if (!gid_eq(a->fields[i].gid, b->fields[i].gid))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
|
|
if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
|
|
* re-initialized. */
|
|
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
|
|
struct audit_field *sf)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
char *lsm_str;
|
|
|
|
/* our own copy of lsm_str */
|
|
lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
|
|
|
|
/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
|
|
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
|
|
(void **)&df->lsm_rule);
|
|
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
|
|
* become valid after a policy reload. */
|
|
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
|
|
pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
|
|
df->lsm_str);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
|
|
* of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
|
|
* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
|
|
* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
|
|
* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
|
|
* the initial copy. */
|
|
struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 fcount = old->field_count;
|
|
struct audit_entry *entry;
|
|
struct audit_krule *new;
|
|
char *fk;
|
|
int i, err = 0;
|
|
|
|
entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
|
|
if (unlikely(!entry))
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
new = &entry->rule;
|
|
new->flags = old->flags;
|
|
new->pflags = old->pflags;
|
|
new->listnr = old->listnr;
|
|
new->action = old->action;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
|
|
new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
|
|
new->prio = old->prio;
|
|
new->buflen = old->buflen;
|
|
new->inode_f = old->inode_f;
|
|
new->field_count = old->field_count;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree()
|
|
* never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there
|
|
* since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed
|
|
* before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before
|
|
* the beginning of list scan.
|
|
*/
|
|
new->tree = old->tree;
|
|
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
|
|
|
|
/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
|
|
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
|
|
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
|
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
|
|
err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
|
|
&old->fields[i]);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
|
|
fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (unlikely(!fk))
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
else
|
|
new->filterkey = fk;
|
|
}
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
audit_free_rule(entry);
|
|
return ERR_PTR(err);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (old->watch) {
|
|
audit_get_watch(old->watch);
|
|
new->watch = old->watch;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return entry;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Find an existing audit rule.
|
|
* Caller must hold audit_filter_mutex to prevent stale rule data. */
|
|
static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
|
|
struct list_head **p)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_entry *e, *found = NULL;
|
|
struct list_head *list;
|
|
int h;
|
|
|
|
if (entry->rule.inode_f) {
|
|
h = audit_hash_ino(entry->rule.inode_f->val);
|
|
*p = list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
|
|
} else if (entry->rule.watch) {
|
|
/* we don't know the inode number, so must walk entire hash */
|
|
for (h = 0; h < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; h++) {
|
|
list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
|
|
list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
|
|
if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
|
|
found = e;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
goto out;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
|
|
if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
|
|
found = e;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
return found;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2;
|
|
static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */
|
|
static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_entry *e;
|
|
struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
|
|
struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
|
|
struct list_head *list;
|
|
int err;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
|
|
int dont_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If either of these, don't count towards total */
|
|
if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
|
|
entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
|
|
dont_count = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
|
|
if (e) {
|
|
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
err = -EEXIST;
|
|
/* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
audit_put_tree(tree);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (watch) {
|
|
/* audit_filter_mutex is dropped and re-taken during this call */
|
|
err = audit_add_watch(&entry->rule, &list);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
/*
|
|
* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it
|
|
* on failure
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
audit_put_tree(tree);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (tree) {
|
|
err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL;
|
|
if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) {
|
|
if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND)
|
|
entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high;
|
|
else
|
|
entry->rule.prio = --prio_low;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
|
|
list_add(&entry->rule.list,
|
|
&audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
|
|
list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
|
|
entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
|
|
} else {
|
|
list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list,
|
|
&audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
|
|
list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
|
|
if (!dont_count)
|
|
audit_n_rules++;
|
|
|
|
if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
|
|
audit_signals++;
|
|
#endif
|
|
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
if (watch)
|
|
audit_put_watch(watch); /* tmp watch, matches initial get */
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
|
|
static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_entry *e;
|
|
struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
|
|
struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
|
|
struct list_head *list;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
|
|
int dont_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If either of these, don't count towards total */
|
|
if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
|
|
entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
|
|
dont_count = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
|
|
if (!e) {
|
|
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
ret = -ENOENT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (e->rule.watch)
|
|
audit_remove_watch_rule(&e->rule);
|
|
|
|
if (e->rule.tree)
|
|
audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
|
|
|
|
list_del_rcu(&e->list);
|
|
list_del(&e->rule.list);
|
|
call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
|
|
if (!dont_count)
|
|
audit_n_rules--;
|
|
|
|
if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
|
|
audit_signals--;
|
|
#endif
|
|
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (watch)
|
|
audit_put_watch(watch); /* match initial get */
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
|
|
static void audit_list_rules(__u32 portid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb;
|
|
struct audit_krule *r;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
|
|
* iterator to sync with list writers. */
|
|
for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
|
|
list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
|
|
struct audit_rule_data *data;
|
|
|
|
data = audit_krule_to_data(r);
|
|
if (unlikely(!data))
|
|
break;
|
|
skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES,
|
|
0, 1, data,
|
|
sizeof(*data) + data->buflen);
|
|
if (skb)
|
|
skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
|
|
kfree(data);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (skb)
|
|
skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Log rule additions and removals */
|
|
static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_buffer *ab;
|
|
uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
|
|
unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
|
|
|
|
if (!audit_enabled)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
return;
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid);
|
|
audit_log_task_context(ab);
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
|
|
audit_log_string(ab, action);
|
|
audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_rule_change - apply all rules to the specified message type
|
|
* @type: audit message type
|
|
* @portid: target port id for netlink audit messages
|
|
* @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
|
|
* @data: payload data
|
|
* @datasz: size of payload data
|
|
*/
|
|
int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data,
|
|
size_t datasz)
|
|
{
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
struct audit_entry *entry;
|
|
|
|
entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(entry))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(entry);
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
|
|
err = audit_add_rule(entry);
|
|
audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
|
|
err = audit_del_rule(entry);
|
|
audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
WARN_ON(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE)
|
|
audit_free_rule(entry);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_list_rules_send - list the audit rules
|
|
* @request_skb: skb of request we are replying to (used to target the reply)
|
|
* @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
|
|
*/
|
|
int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
|
|
struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk);
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk;
|
|
struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
|
|
* the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
|
|
* auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
|
|
* happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
|
|
* trying to _send_ the stuff */
|
|
|
|
dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!dest)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
dest->net = get_net(net);
|
|
dest->portid = portid;
|
|
skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
audit_list_rules(portid, seq, &dest->q);
|
|
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
|
|
tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
|
|
skb_queue_purge(&dest->q);
|
|
kfree(dest);
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (op) {
|
|
case Audit_equal:
|
|
return (left == right);
|
|
case Audit_not_equal:
|
|
return (left != right);
|
|
case Audit_lt:
|
|
return (left < right);
|
|
case Audit_le:
|
|
return (left <= right);
|
|
case Audit_gt:
|
|
return (left > right);
|
|
case Audit_ge:
|
|
return (left >= right);
|
|
case Audit_bitmask:
|
|
return (left & right);
|
|
case Audit_bittest:
|
|
return ((left & right) == right);
|
|
default:
|
|
BUG();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (op) {
|
|
case Audit_equal:
|
|
return uid_eq(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_not_equal:
|
|
return !uid_eq(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_lt:
|
|
return uid_lt(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_le:
|
|
return uid_lte(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_gt:
|
|
return uid_gt(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_ge:
|
|
return uid_gte(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_bitmask:
|
|
case Audit_bittest:
|
|
default:
|
|
BUG();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (op) {
|
|
case Audit_equal:
|
|
return gid_eq(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_not_equal:
|
|
return !gid_eq(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_lt:
|
|
return gid_lt(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_le:
|
|
return gid_lte(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_gt:
|
|
return gid_gt(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_ge:
|
|
return gid_gte(left, right);
|
|
case Audit_bitmask:
|
|
case Audit_bittest:
|
|
default:
|
|
BUG();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* parent_len - find the length of the parent portion of a pathname
|
|
* @path: pathname of which to determine length
|
|
*/
|
|
int parent_len(const char *path)
|
|
{
|
|
int plen;
|
|
const char *p;
|
|
|
|
plen = strlen(path);
|
|
|
|
if (plen == 0)
|
|
return plen;
|
|
|
|
/* disregard trailing slashes */
|
|
p = path + plen - 1;
|
|
while ((*p == '/') && (p > path))
|
|
p--;
|
|
|
|
/* walk backward until we find the next slash or hit beginning */
|
|
while ((*p != '/') && (p > path))
|
|
p--;
|
|
|
|
/* did we find a slash? Then increment to include it in path */
|
|
if (*p == '/')
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
return p - path;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* audit_compare_dname_path - compare given dentry name with last component in
|
|
* given path. Return of 0 indicates a match.
|
|
* @dname: dentry name that we're comparing
|
|
* @path: full pathname that we're comparing
|
|
* @parentlen: length of the parent if known. Passing in AUDIT_NAME_FULL
|
|
* here indicates that we must compute this value.
|
|
*/
|
|
int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int parentlen)
|
|
{
|
|
int dlen, pathlen;
|
|
const char *p;
|
|
|
|
dlen = strlen(dname);
|
|
pathlen = strlen(path);
|
|
if (pathlen < dlen)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
parentlen = parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL ? parent_len(path) : parentlen;
|
|
if (pathlen - parentlen != dlen)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
p = path + parentlen;
|
|
|
|
return strncmp(p, dname, dlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule, int type,
|
|
enum audit_state *state)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
|
|
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
|
|
pid_t pid;
|
|
int result = 0;
|
|
u32 sid;
|
|
|
|
switch (f->type) {
|
|
case AUDIT_PID:
|
|
pid = task_pid_nr(current);
|
|
result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_UID:
|
|
result = audit_uid_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->uid);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_GID:
|
|
result = audit_gid_comparator(current_gid(), f->op, f->gid);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
|
|
result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current),
|
|
f->op, f->uid);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
|
|
result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current),
|
|
f->op, f->val);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
|
|
result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
|
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
|
|
if (f->lsm_rule) {
|
|
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
|
|
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
|
|
f->type,
|
|
f->op,
|
|
f->lsm_rule,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
switch (rule->action) {
|
|
case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
|
|
case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int audit_filter_user(int type)
|
|
{
|
|
enum audit_state state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
|
|
struct audit_entry *e;
|
|
int rc, ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1; /* Audit by default */
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
|
|
rc = audit_filter_user_rules(&e->rule, type, &state);
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
if (rc > 0 && state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int audit_filter_type(int type)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_entry *e;
|
|
int result = 0;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE]))
|
|
goto unlock_and_return;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE],
|
|
list) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
|
|
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
|
|
if (f->type == AUDIT_MSGTYPE) {
|
|
result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val);
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (result)
|
|
goto unlock_and_return;
|
|
}
|
|
unlock_and_return:
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
|
|
struct audit_entry *nentry;
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!security_audit_rule_known(r))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
|
|
/* save the first error encountered for the
|
|
* return value */
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
|
|
audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
|
|
if (r->watch)
|
|
list_del(&r->rlist);
|
|
list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
|
|
list_del(&r->list);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (r->watch || r->tree)
|
|
list_replace_init(&r->rlist, &nentry->rule.rlist);
|
|
list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
|
|
list_replace(&r->list, &nentry->rule.list);
|
|
}
|
|
call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
|
|
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
|
|
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
|
|
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
|
|
* updated rule. */
|
|
int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct audit_krule *r, *n;
|
|
int i, err = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */
|
|
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
|
|
int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
err = res;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|