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577eebeae3
-fstack-protector uses a special per-cpu "stack canary" value. gcc generates special code in each function to test the canary to make sure that the function's stack hasn't been overrun. On x86-64, this is simply an offset of %gs, which is the usual per-cpu base segment register, so setting it up simply requires loading %gs's base as normal. On i386, the stack protector segment is %gs (rather than the usual kernel percpu %fs segment register). This requires setting up the full kernel GDT and then loading %gs accordingly. We also need to make sure %gs is initialized when bringing up secondary cpus too. To keep things consistent, we do the full GDT/segment register setup on both architectures. Because we need to avoid -fstack-protected code before setting up the GDT and because there's no way to disable it on a per-function basis, several files need to have stack-protector inhibited. [ Impact: allow Xen booting with stack-protector enabled ] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
12 lines
403 B
Makefile
12 lines
403 B
Makefile
obj-y += grant-table.o features.o events.o manage.o
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obj-y += xenbus/
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nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
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CFLAGS_features.o := $(nostackp)
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obj-$(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU) += cpu_hotplug.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_XENCOMM) += xencomm.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON) += balloon.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_DEV_EVTCHN) += evtchn.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_XENFS) += xenfs/
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obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_SYS_HYPERVISOR) += sys-hypervisor.o
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