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mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-26 14:14:01 +08:00
linux-next/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h
Masahiro Yamada fa60ce2cb4 treewide: remove editor modelines and cruft
The section "19) Editor modelines and other cruft" in
Documentation/process/coding-style.rst clearly says, "Do not include any
of these in source files."

I recently receive a patch to explicitly add a new one.

Let's do treewide cleanups, otherwise some people follow the existing code
and attempt to upstream their favoriate editor setups.

It is even nicer if scripts/checkpatch.pl can check it.

If we like to impose coding style in an editor-independent manner, I think
editorconfig (patch [1]) is a saner solution.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200703073143.423557-1-danny@kdrag0n.dev/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210324054457.1477489-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>	[auxdisplay]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-05-07 00:26:34 -07:00

89 lines
3.0 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* xattr.h
*
* Copyright (C) 2004, 2008 Oracle. All rights reserved.
*/
#ifndef OCFS2_XATTR_H
#define OCFS2_XATTR_H
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
enum ocfs2_xattr_type {
OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_USER = 1,
OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS,
OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT,
OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED,
OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
OCFS2_XATTR_MAX
};
struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info {
int enable;
const char *name;
void *value;
size_t value_len;
};
extern const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_user_handler;
extern const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_trusted_handler;
extern const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_security_handler;
extern const struct xattr_handler *ocfs2_xattr_handlers[];
ssize_t ocfs2_listxattr(struct dentry *, char *, size_t);
int ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock(struct inode *, struct buffer_head *, int,
const char *, void *, size_t);
int ocfs2_xattr_set(struct inode *, int, const char *, const void *,
size_t, int);
int ocfs2_xattr_set_handle(handle_t *, struct inode *, struct buffer_head *,
int, const char *, const void *, size_t, int,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *);
int ocfs2_has_inline_xattr_value_outside(struct inode *inode,
struct ocfs2_dinode *di);
int ocfs2_xattr_remove(struct inode *, struct buffer_head *);
int ocfs2_init_security_get(struct inode *, struct inode *,
const struct qstr *,
struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *);
int ocfs2_init_security_set(handle_t *, struct inode *,
struct buffer_head *,
struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *);
int ocfs2_calc_security_init(struct inode *,
struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *,
int *, int *, struct ocfs2_alloc_context **);
int ocfs2_calc_xattr_init(struct inode *, struct buffer_head *,
umode_t, struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *,
int *, int *, int *);
/*
* xattrs can live inside an inode, as part of an external xattr block,
* or inside an xattr bucket, which is the leaf of a tree rooted in an
* xattr block. Some of the xattr calls, especially the value setting
* functions, want to treat each of these locations as equal. Let's wrap
* them in a structure that we can pass around instead of raw buffer_heads.
*/
struct ocfs2_xattr_value_buf {
struct buffer_head *vb_bh;
ocfs2_journal_access_func vb_access;
struct ocfs2_xattr_value_root *vb_xv;
};
int ocfs2_xattr_attach_refcount_tree(struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *fe_bh,
struct ocfs2_caching_info *ref_ci,
struct buffer_head *ref_root_bh,
struct ocfs2_cached_dealloc_ctxt *dealloc);
int ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(struct inode *old_inode,
struct buffer_head *old_bh,
struct inode *new_inode,
struct buffer_head *new_bh,
bool preserve_security);
int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,
struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *qstr);
#endif /* OCFS2_XATTR_H */