$(shell ...) expands to empty. There is no need to assign it to _dummy.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"173 patches.
Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug,
pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure,
hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock,
oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits)
mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value
mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation
mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments
mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated()
selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages
selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test
mm: KSM: fix data type
selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test
selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test
selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test
selftests: vm: add KSM merge test
mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
mm: introduce process_mrelease system call
memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private
mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node()
mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies
mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
...
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210809185259.405936-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The bdflush system call has been deprecated for a very long time.
Recently Michael Schmitz tested[1] and found that the last known
caller of of the bdflush system call is unaffected by it's removal.
Since the code is not needed delete it.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36123b5d-daa0-6c2b-f2d4-a942f069fd54@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87sg10quue.fsf_-_@disp2133
Tested-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
In commit fa8b90070a ("quota: wire up quotactl_path") we have wired up
new quotactl_path syscall. However some people in LWN discussion have
objected that the path based syscall is missing dirfd and flags argument
which is mostly standard for contemporary path based syscalls. Indeed
they have a point and after a discussion with Christian Brauner and
Sascha Hauer I've decided to disable the syscall for now and update its
API. Since there is no userspace currently using that syscall and it
hasn't been released in any major release, we should be fine.
CC: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CC: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210512153621.n5u43jsytbik4yze@wittgenstein
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
- Switch to generic syscall scripts
- Some small fixes
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Merge tag 'microblaze-v5.13' of git://git.monstr.eu/linux-2.6-microblaze
Pull Microblaze updates from Michal Simek:
"No new features, just about cleaning up some code and moving to
generic syscall solution used by other architectures:
- Switch to generic syscall scripts
- Some small fixes"
* tag 'microblaze-v5.13' of git://git.monstr.eu/linux-2.6-microblaze:
microblaze: add 'fallthrough' to memcpy/memset/memmove
microblaze: Fix a typo
microblaze: tag highmem_setup() with __meminit
microblaze: syscalls: switch to generic syscallhdr.sh
microblaze: syscalls: switch to generic syscalltbl.sh
Many architectures duplicate similar shell scripts.
This commit converts microblaze to use scripts/syscallhdr.sh.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301142303.343727-2-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Many architectures duplicate similar shell scripts.
This commit converts microblaze to use scripts/syscalltbl.sh.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301142303.343727-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
- Fix false-positive build warnings for ARCH=ia64 builds
- Optimize dictionary size for module compression with xz
- Check the compiler and linker versions in Kconfig
- Fix misuse of extra-y
- Support DWARF v5 debug info
- Clamp SUBLEVEL to 255 because stable releases 4.4.x and 4.9.x
exceeded the limit
- Add generic syscall{tbl,hdr}.sh for cleanups across arches
- Minor cleanups of genksyms
- Minor cleanups of Kconfig
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Merge tag 'kbuild-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Fix false-positive build warnings for ARCH=ia64 builds
- Optimize dictionary size for module compression with xz
- Check the compiler and linker versions in Kconfig
- Fix misuse of extra-y
- Support DWARF v5 debug info
- Clamp SUBLEVEL to 255 because stable releases 4.4.x and 4.9.x
exceeded the limit
- Add generic syscall{tbl,hdr}.sh for cleanups across arches
- Minor cleanups of genksyms
- Minor cleanups of Kconfig
* tag 'kbuild-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (38 commits)
initramfs: Remove redundant dependency of RD_ZSTD on BLK_DEV_INITRD
kbuild: remove deprecated 'always' and 'hostprogs-y/m'
kbuild: parse C= and M= before changing the working directory
kbuild: reuse this-makefile to define abs_srctree
kconfig: unify rule of config, menuconfig, nconfig, gconfig, xconfig
kconfig: omit --oldaskconfig option for 'make config'
kconfig: fix 'invalid option' for help option
kconfig: remove dead code in conf_askvalue()
kconfig: clean up nested if-conditionals in check_conf()
kconfig: Remove duplicate call to sym_get_string_value()
Makefile: Remove # characters from compiler string
Makefile: reuse CC_VERSION_TEXT
kbuild: check the minimum linker version in Kconfig
kbuild: remove ld-version macro
scripts: add generic syscallhdr.sh
scripts: add generic syscalltbl.sh
arch: syscalls: remove $(srctree)/ prefix from syscall tables
arch: syscalls: add missing FORCE and fix 'targets' to make if_changed work
gen_compile_commands: prune some directories
kbuild: simplify access to the kernel's version
...
The 'syscall' variables are not directly used in the commands.
Remove the $(srctree)/ prefix because we can rely on VPATH.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
The rules in these Makefiles cannot detect the command line change
because the prerequisite 'FORCE' is missing.
Adding 'FORCE' will result in the headers being rebuilt every time
because the 'targets' additions are also wrong; the file paths in
'targets' must be relative to the current Makefile.
Fix all of them so the if_changed rules work correctly.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.
The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:
int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);
Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.
The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:
struct mount_attr {
__u64 attr_set;
__u64 attr_clr;
__u64 propagation;
__u64 userns_fd;
};
The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.
Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_<atime> values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.
The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.
The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.
[1]: commit 2e4b7fcd92 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: honor mount writer counts at remount")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-35-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-4-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.
The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.
To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).
Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.
ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.
I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.
If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.
So finally, the API is as follows,
ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
system or application performance.
The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)
The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
<sys/uio.h> as:
struct iovec {
void *iov_base; /* starting address */
size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */
};
The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
and with size length of bytes(iov_len).
The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.
The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
external.
MADV_COLD
MADV_PAGEOUT
Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).
The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
vector address ranges.
RETURN VALUE
On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
This return value may be less than the total number of requested
bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
to determine whether a partial advice occurred.
FAQ:
Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?
Quote from Sandeep
"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.
After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.
In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.
So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.
Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.
So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.
- ssp
Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?
process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.
The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.
To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.
Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?
Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.
[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"
[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224
[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
validation - Michal Hocko -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/
[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since commit 61a47c1ad3 ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.
We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years
and believe there are no more users. Even if there are users of this
interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they
probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any
longer.
So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures.
[nixiaoming@huawei.com: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618141426.16884-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [arm/arm64]
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Bin Meng <bin.meng@windriver.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: chenzefeng <chenzefeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kars de Jong <jongk@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Zhou Yanjie <zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616030734.87257-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
POSIX defines faccessat() as having a fourth "flags" argument, while the
linux syscall doesn't have it. Glibc tries to emulate AT_EACCESS and
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, but AT_EACCESS emulation is broken.
Add a new faccessat(2) syscall with the added flags argument and implement
both flags.
The value of AT_EACCESS is defined in glibc headers to be the same as
AT_REMOVEDIR. Use this value for the kernel interface as well, together
with the explanatory comment.
Also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, which is not documented by POSIX, but can
be useful and is trivial to implement.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Generated files are also checked by sparse that's why add newline to
remove sparse (C=1) warning.
The issue was found on Microblaze and reported like this:
./arch/microblaze/include/generated/uapi/asm/unistd_32.h:438:45: warning:
no newline at end of file
Mips and PowerPC have it already but let's align with style used by m68k.
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Asserhall <stefan.asserhall@xilinx.com>
Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> (xtensa)
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4d32ab4e1fb2edb691d2e1687e8fb303c09fd023.1581504803.git.michal.simek@xilinx.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull thread management updates from Christian Brauner:
"Sargun Dhillon over the last cycle has worked on the pidfd_getfd()
syscall.
This syscall allows for the retrieval of file descriptors of a process
based on its pidfd. A task needs to have ptrace_may_access()
permissions with PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (suggested by Oleg and
Andy) on the target.
One of the main use-cases is in combination with seccomp's user
notification feature. As a reminder, seccomp's user notification
feature was made available in v5.0. It allows a task to retrieve a
file descriptor for its seccomp filter. The file descriptor is usually
handed of to a more privileged supervising process. The supervisor can
then listen for syscall events caught by the seccomp filter of the
supervisee and perform actions in lieu of the supervisee, usually
emulating syscalls. pidfd_getfd() is needed to expand its uses.
There are currently two major users that wait on pidfd_getfd() and one
future user:
- Netflix, Sargun said, is working on a service mesh where users
should be able to connect to a dns-based VIP. When a user connects
to e.g. 1.2.3.4:80 that runs e.g. service "foo" they will be
redirected to an envoy process. This service mesh uses seccomp user
notifications and pidfd to intercept all connect calls and instead
of connecting them to 1.2.3.4:80 connects them to e.g.
127.0.0.1:8080.
- LXD uses the seccomp notifier heavily to intercept and emulate
mknod() and mount() syscalls for unprivileged containers/processes.
With pidfd_getfd() more uses-cases e.g. bridging socket connections
will be possible.
- The patchset has also seen some interest from the browser corner.
Right now, Firefox is using a SECCOMP_RET_TRAP sandbox managed by a
broker process. In the future glibc will start blocking all signals
during dlopen() rendering this type of sandbox impossible. Hence,
in the future Firefox will switch to a seccomp-user-nofication
based sandbox which also makes use of file descriptor retrieval.
The thread for this can be found at
https://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-12/msg00079.html
With pidfd_getfd() it is e.g. possible to bridge socket connections
for the supervisee (binding to a privileged port) and taking actions
on file descriptors on behalf of the supervisee in general.
Sargun's first version was using an ioctl on pidfds but various people
pushed for it to be a proper syscall which he duely implemented as
well over various review cycles. Selftests are of course included.
I've also added instructions how to deal with merge conflicts below.
There's also a small fix coming from the kernel mentee project to
correctly annotate struct sighand_struct with __rcu to fix various
sparse warnings. We've received a few more such fixes and even though
they are mostly trivial I've decided to postpone them until after -rc1
since they came in rather late and I don't want to risk introducing
build warnings.
Finally, there's a new prctl() command PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER which is
needed to avoid allocation recursions triggerable by storage drivers
that have userspace parts that run in the IO path (e.g. dm-multipath,
iscsi, etc). These allocation recursions deadlock the device.
The new prctl() allows such privileged userspace components to avoid
allocation recursions by setting the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and
PF_LESS_THROTTLE flags. The patch carries the necessary acks from the
relevant maintainers and is routed here as part of prctl()
thread-management."
* tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
prctl: PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER to support controlling memory reclaim
sched.h: Annotate sighand_struct with __rcu
test: Add test for pidfd getfd
arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscall
pid: Implement pidfd_getfd syscall
vfs, fdtable: Add fget_task helper
/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).
Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.
In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.
Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).
/* Syscall Prototype. */
/*
* open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
* clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
* sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
* extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
* acting as a no-op default.
*/
struct open_how { /* ... */ };
int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
struct open_how *how, size_t size);
/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:
flags
Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).
mode
The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
resolve
Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).
RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT
open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.
Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).
After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.
/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.
In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).
/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).
Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.
Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).
[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb8 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This wires up the pidfd_getfd syscall for all architectures.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107175927.4558-4-sargun@sargun.me
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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Merge tag 'clone3-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull clone3 system call from Christian Brauner:
"This adds the clone3 syscall which is an extensible successor to clone
after we snagged the last flag with CLONE_PIDFD during the 5.2 merge
window for clone(). It cleanly supports all of the flags from clone()
and thus all legacy workloads.
There are few user visible differences between clone3 and clone.
First, CLONE_DETACHED will cause EINVAL with clone3 so we can reuse
this flag. Second, the CSIGNAL flag is deprecated and will cause
EINVAL to be reported. It is superseeded by a dedicated "exit_signal"
argument in struct clone_args thus freeing up even more flags. And
third, clone3 gives CLONE_PIDFD a dedicated return argument in struct
clone_args instead of abusing CLONE_PARENT_SETTID's parent_tidptr
argument.
The clone3 uapi is designed to be easy to handle on 32- and 64 bit:
/* uapi */
struct clone_args {
__aligned_u64 flags;
__aligned_u64 pidfd;
__aligned_u64 child_tid;
__aligned_u64 parent_tid;
__aligned_u64 exit_signal;
__aligned_u64 stack;
__aligned_u64 stack_size;
__aligned_u64 tls;
};
and a separate kernel struct is used that uses proper kernel typing:
/* kernel internal */
struct kernel_clone_args {
u64 flags;
int __user *pidfd;
int __user *child_tid;
int __user *parent_tid;
int exit_signal;
unsigned long stack;
unsigned long stack_size;
unsigned long tls;
};
The system call comes with a size argument which enables the kernel to
detect what version of clone_args userspace is passing in. clone3
validates that any additional bytes a given kernel does not know about
are set to zero and that the size never exceeds a page.
A nice feature is that this patchset allowed us to cleanup and
simplify various core kernel codepaths in kernel/fork.c by making the
internal _do_fork() function take struct kernel_clone_args even for
legacy clone().
This patch also unblocks the time namespace patchset which wants to
introduce a new CLONE_TIMENS flag.
Note, that clone3 has only been wired up for x86{_32,64}, arm{64}, and
xtensa. These were the architectures that did not require special
massaging.
Other architectures treat fork-like system calls individually and
after some back and forth neither Arnd nor I felt confident that we
dared to add clone3 unconditionally to all architectures. We agreed to
leave this up to individual architecture maintainers. This is why
there's an additional patch that introduces __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3
which any architecture can set once it has implemented support for
clone3. The patch also adds a cond_syscall(clone3) for architectures
such as nios2 or h8300 that generate their syscall table by simply
including asm-generic/unistd.h. The hope is to get rid of
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 and cond_syscall() rather soon"
* tag 'clone3-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
arch: handle arches who do not yet define clone3
arch: wire-up clone3() syscall
fork: add clone3
Wire up the clone3() call on all arches that don't require hand-rolled
assembly.
Some of the arches look like they need special assembly massaging and it is
probably smarter if the appropriate arch maintainers would do the actual
wiring. Arches that are wired-up are:
- x86{_32,64}
- arm{64}
- xtensa
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Wire up the mount API syscalls on non-x86 arches.
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add the io_uring and pidfd_send_signal system calls to all architectures.
These system calls are designed to handle both native and compat tasks,
so all entries are the same across architectures, only arm-compat and
the generic tale still use an old format.
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> (s390)
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
This adds 21 new system calls on each ABI that has 32-bit time_t
today. All of these have the exact same semantics as their existing
counterparts, and the new ones all have macro names that end in 'time64'
for clarification.
This gets us to the point of being able to safely use a C library
that has 64-bit time_t in user space. There are still a couple of
loose ends to tie up in various areas of the code, but this is the
big one, and should be entirely uncontroversial at this point.
In particular, there are four system calls (getitimer, setitimer,
waitid, and getrusage) that don't have a 64-bit counterpart yet,
but these can all be safely implemented in the C library by wrapping
around the existing system calls because the 32-bit time_t they
pass only counts elapsed time, not time since the epoch. They
will be dealt with later.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
This is the big flip, where all 32-bit architectures set COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
and use the _time32 system calls from the former compat layer instead
of the system calls that take __kernel_timespec and similar arguments.
The temporary redirects for __kernel_timespec, __kernel_itimerspec
and __kernel_timex can get removed with this.
It would be easy to split this commit by architecture, but with the new
generated system call tables, it's easy enough to do it all at once,
which makes it a little easier to check that the changes are the same
in each table.
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The behavior of these system calls is slightly different between
architectures, as determined by the CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
symbol. Most architectures that implement the split IPC syscalls don't set
that symbol and only get the modern version, but alpha, arm, microblaze,
mips-n32, mips-n64 and xtensa expect the caller to pass the IPC_64 flag.
For the architectures that so far only implement sys_ipc(), i.e. m68k,
mips-o32, powerpc, s390, sh, sparc, and x86-32, we want the new behavior
when adding the split syscalls, so we need to distinguish between the
two groups of architectures.
The method I picked for this distinction is to have a separate system call
entry point: sys_old_*ctl() now uses ipc_parse_version, while sys_*ctl()
does not. The system call tables of the five architectures are changed
accordingly.
As an additional benefit, we no longer need the configuration specific
definition for ipc_parse_version(), it always does the same thing now,
but simply won't get called on architectures with the modern interface.
A small downside is that on architectures that do set
ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION, we now have an extra set of entry points
that are never called. They only add a few bytes of bloat, so it seems
better to keep them compared to adding yet another Kconfig symbol.
I considered adding new syscall numbers for the IPC_64 variants for
consistency, but decided against that for now.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The system call tables are in different format in all
architecture and it will be difficult to manually add,
modify or delete the syscall table entries in the res-
pective files. To make it easy by keeping a script and
which will generate the uapi header and syscall table
file. This change will also help to unify the implemen-
tation across all architectures.
The system call table generation script is added in
kernel/syscalls directory which contain the scripts to
generate both uapi header file and system call table
files. The syscall.tbl will be input for the scripts.
syscall.tbl contains the list of available system calls
along with system call number and corresponding entry
point. Add a new system call in this architecture will
be possible by adding new entry in the syscall.tbl file.
Adding a new table entry consisting of:
- System call number.
- ABI.
- System call name.
- Entry point name.
syscallhdr.sh and syscalltbl.sh will generate uapi header
unistd_32.h and syscall_table.h files respectively. Both
.sh files will parse the content syscall.tbl to generate
the header and table files. unistd_32.h will be included
by uapi/asm/unistd.h and syscall_table.h is included by
kernel/syscall_table.S - the real system call table.
ARM, s390 and x86 architecuture does have similar support.
I leverage their implementation to come up with a generic
solution.
Signed-off-by: Firoz Khan <firoz.khan@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>