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Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds
17ae69aba8 Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
 "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.

  Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.

  From Mickaël's cover letter:
    "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
     global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
     is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
     sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
     system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
     help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
     behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
     process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
     themselves.

     Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
     syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
     use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
     kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
     sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
     Pledge/Unveil.

     In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
     This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
     series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
     combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
     init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"

  The cover letter and v34 posting is here:

      https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/

  See also:

      https://landlock.io/

  This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
  years"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]

* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
  landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
  samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
  landlock: Add syscall implementations
  arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
  fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  landlock: Add object management
2021-05-01 18:50:44 -07:00
Mickaël Salaün
265885daf3 landlock: Add syscall implementations
These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes
to sandbox themselves:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file
  descriptor.
* landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a
  ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor.
* landlock_restrict_self(2): Enforces a ruleset on the calling thread
  and its future children (similar to seccomp).  This syscall has the
  same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the
  no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user
  namespace.

All these syscalls have a "flags" argument (not currently used) to
enable extensibility.

Here are the motivations for these new syscalls:
* A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including
  /dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more
  restrictions to itself.
* Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version)
  fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy.

All passed structs (attributes) are checked at build time to ensure that
they don't contain holes and that they are aligned the same way for each
architecture.

See the user and kernel documentation for more details (provided by a
following commit):
* Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
* Documentation/security/landlock.rst

Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 12:22:11 -07:00
Sascha Hauer
fa8b90070a quota: wire up quotactl_path
Wire up the quotactl_path syscall added in the previous patch.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304123541.30749-3-s.hauer@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
2021-03-17 15:51:17 +01:00
Willem de Bruijn
b0a0c2615f epoll: wire up syscall epoll_pwait2
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-4-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-19 11:18:38 -08:00
Minchan Kim
ecb8ac8b1f mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.

The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app.  Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.

To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2).  It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint.  It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement.  I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).

Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations.  In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment.  With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.

ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.

I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky.  Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone.  Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.

If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint.  It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.

So finally, the API is as follows,

      ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
                unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);

    DESCRIPTION
      The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
      to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
      local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
      described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
      system or application performance.

      The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
      specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)

      The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
      <sys/uio.h> as:

        struct iovec {
            void *iov_base;         /* starting address */
            size_t iov_len;         /* number of bytes to be advised */
        };

      The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
      and with size length of bytes(iov_len).

      The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.

      The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
      following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
      external.

        MADV_COLD
        MADV_PAGEOUT

      Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
      ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).

      The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
      process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
      use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
      vector address ranges.

    RETURN VALUE
      On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
      This return value may be less than the total number of requested
      bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
      to determine whether a partial advice occurred.

FAQ:

Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?

Quote from Sandeep

"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote.  The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.

After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.

In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.

So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.

Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves.  We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.

So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.

- ssp

Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?

process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called.  If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect.  It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition.  For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called.  Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process.  Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm.  The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization.  It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.

The race isn't really a problem though.  Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner?  Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something.  Think about mmap.  It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before.  That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside.  It shouldn't be part of API itself.  If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3].  Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.

To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.

Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?

Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA.  Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill.  It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.

[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"

[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
    vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224

[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
    validation - Michal Hocko -
    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/

[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au

Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-18 09:27:10 -07:00
Christoph Hellwig
80bdad3d7e quota: simplify the quotactl compat handling
Fold the misaligned u64 workarounds into the main quotactl flow instead
of implementing a separate compat syscall handler.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-09-17 13:00:46 -04:00
Xiaoming Ni
88db0aa242 all arch: remove system call sys_sysctl
Since commit 61a47c1ad3 ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.

We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years
and believe there are no more users.  Even if there are users of this
interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they
probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any
longer.

So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures.

[nixiaoming@huawei.com: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu]
 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618141426.16884-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>		[arm/arm64]
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Bin Meng <bin.meng@windriver.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: chenzefeng <chenzefeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kars de Jong <jongk@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Zhou Yanjie <zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616030734.87257-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-14 19:56:56 -07:00
Arnd Bergmann
942437c97f y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls
At the moment, the compilation of the old time32 system calls depends
purely on the architecture. As systems with new libc based on 64-bit
time_t are getting deployed, even architectures that previously supported
these (notably x86-32 and arm32 but also many others) no longer depend on
them, and removing them from a kernel image results in a smaller kernel
binary, the same way we can leave out many other optional system calls.

More importantly, on an embedded system that needs to keep working
beyond year 2038, any user space program calling these system calls
is likely a bug, so removing them from the kernel image does provide
an extra debugging help for finding broken applications.

I've gone back and forth on hiding this option unless CONFIG_EXPERT
is set. This version leaves it visible based on the logic that
eventually it will be turned off indefinitely.

Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-11-15 14:38:30 +01:00
Christian Brauner
d68dbb0c9a
arch: handle arches who do not yet define clone3
This cleanly handles arches who do not yet define clone3.

clone3() was initially placed under __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE under the
assumption that this would cleanly handle all architectures. It does
not.
Architectures such as nios2 or h8300 simply take the asm-generic syscall
definitions and generate their syscall table from it. Since they don't
define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE the build would fail complaining about
sys_clone3 missing. The reason this doesn't happen for legacy clone is
that nios2 and h8300 provide assembly stubs for sys_clone. This seems to
be done for architectural reasons.

The build failures for nios2 and h8300 were caught int -next luckily.
The solution is to define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 that architectures can
add. Additionally, we need a cond_syscall(clone3) for architectures such
as nios2 or h8300 that generate their syscall table in the way I
explained above.

Fixes: 8f3220a806 ("arch: wire-up clone3() syscall")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
2019-06-21 01:54:53 +02:00
Christian Brauner
2151ad1b06
signal: support CLONE_PIDFD with pidfd_send_signal
Let pidfd_send_signal() use pidfds retrieved via CLONE_PIDFD.  With this
patch pidfd_send_signal() becomes independent of procfs.  This fullfils
the request made when we merged the pidfd_send_signal() patchset.  The
pidfd_send_signal() syscall is now always available allowing for it to
be used by users without procfs mounted or even users without procfs
support compiled into the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-05-07 14:31:03 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
a9dce6679d pidfd patches for v5.1-rc1
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Merge tag 'pidfd-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull pidfd system call from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces the ability to use file descriptors from /proc/<pid>/
  as stable handles on struct pid. Even if a pid is recycled the handle
  will not change. For a start these fds can be used to send signals to
  the processes they refer to.

  With the ability to use /proc/<pid> fds as stable handles on struct
  pid we can fix a long-standing issue where after a process has exited
  its pid can be reused by another process. If a caller sends a signal
  to a reused pid it will end up signaling the wrong process.

  With this patchset we enable a variety of use cases. One obvious
  example is that we can now safely delegate an important part of
  process management - sending signals - to processes other than the
  parent of a given process by sending file descriptors around via scm
  rights and not fearing that the given process will have been recycled
  in the meantime. It also allows for easy testing whether a given
  process is still alive or not by sending signal 0 to a pidfd which is
  quite handy.

  There has been some interest in this feature e.g. from systems
  management (systemd, glibc) and container managers. I have requested
  and gotten comments from glibc to make sure that this syscall is
  suitable for their needs as well. In the future I expect it to take on
  most other pid-based signal syscalls. But such features are left for
  the future once they are needed.

  This has been sitting in linux-next for quite a while and has not
  caused any issues. It comes with selftests which verify basic
  functionality and also test that a recycled pid cannot be signaled via
  a pidfd.

  Jon has written about a prior version of this patchset. It should
  cover the basic functionality since not a lot has changed since then:

      https://lwn.net/Articles/773459/

  The commit message for the syscall itself is extensively documenting
  the syscall, including it's functionality and extensibility"

* tag 'pidfd-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  selftests: add tests for pidfd_send_signal()
  signal: add pidfd_send_signal() syscall
2019-03-16 13:47:14 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
38e7571c07 io_uring-2019-03-06
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Merge tag 'io_uring-2019-03-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block

Pull io_uring IO interface from Jens Axboe:
 "Second attempt at adding the io_uring interface.

  Since the first one, we've added basic unit testing of the three
  system calls, that resides in liburing like the other unit tests that
  we have so far. It'll take a while to get full coverage of it, but
  we're working towards it. I've also added two basic test programs to
  tools/io_uring. One uses the raw interface and has support for all the
  various features that io_uring supports outside of standard IO, like
  fixed files, fixed IO buffers, and polled IO. The other uses the
  liburing API, and is a simplified version of cp(1).

  This adds support for a new IO interface, io_uring.

  io_uring allows an application to communicate with the kernel through
  two rings, the submission queue (SQ) and completion queue (CQ) ring.
  This allows for very efficient handling of IOs, see the v5 posting for
  some basic numbers:

    https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20190116175003.17880-1-axboe@kernel.dk/

  Outside of just efficiency, the interface is also flexible and
  extendable, and allows for future use cases like the upcoming NVMe
  key-value store API, networked IO, and so on. It also supports async
  buffered IO, something that we've always failed to support in the
  kernel.

  Outside of basic IO features, it supports async polled IO as well.
  This particular feature has already been tested at Facebook months ago
  for flash storage boxes, with 25-33% improvements. It makes polled IO
  actually useful for real world use cases, where even basic flash sees
  a nice win in terms of efficiency, latency, and performance. These
  boxes were IOPS bound before, now they are not.

  This series adds three new system calls. One for setting up an
  io_uring instance (io_uring_setup(2)), one for submitting/completing
  IO (io_uring_enter(2)), and one for aux functions like registrating
  file sets, buffers, etc (io_uring_register(2)). Through the help of
  Arnd, I've coordinated the syscall numbers so merge on that front
  should be painless.

  Jon did a writeup of the interface a while back, which (except for
  minor details that have been tweaked) is still accurate. Find that
  here:

    https://lwn.net/Articles/776703/

  Huge thanks to Al Viro for helping getting the reference cycle code
  correct, and to Jann Horn for his extensive reviews focused on both
  security and bugs in general.

  There's a userspace library that provides basic functionality for
  applications that don't need or want to care about how to fiddle with
  the rings directly. It has helpers to allow applications to easily set
  up an io_uring instance, and submit/complete IO through it without
  knowing about the intricacies of the rings. It also includes man pages
  (thanks to Jeff Moyer), and will continue to grow support helper
  functions and features as time progresses. Find it here:

    git://git.kernel.dk/liburing

  Fio has full support for the raw interface, both in the form of an IO
  engine (io_uring), but also with a small test application (t/io_uring)
  that can exercise and benchmark the interface"

* tag 'io_uring-2019-03-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
  io_uring: add a few test tools
  io_uring: allow workqueue item to handle multiple buffered requests
  io_uring: add support for IORING_OP_POLL
  io_uring: add io_kiocb ref count
  io_uring: add submission polling
  io_uring: add file set registration
  net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files
  io_uring: add support for pre-mapped user IO buffers
  block: implement bio helper to add iter bvec pages to bio
  io_uring: batch io_kiocb allocation
  io_uring: use fget/fput_many() for file references
  fs: add fget_many() and fput_many()
  io_uring: support for IO polling
  io_uring: add fsync support
  Add io_uring IO interface
2019-03-08 14:48:40 -08:00
Arnd Bergmann
7e89a37c47 ipc: Fix building compat mode without sysvipc
As John Stultz noticed, my y2038 syscall series caused a link
failure when CONFIG_SYSVIPC is disabled but CONFIG_COMPAT is
enabled:

arch/arm64/kernel/sys32.o:(.rodata+0x960): undefined reference to `__arm64_compat_sys_old_semctl'
arch/arm64/kernel/sys32.o:(.rodata+0x980): undefined reference to `__arm64_compat_sys_old_msgctl'
arch/arm64/kernel/sys32.o:(.rodata+0x9a0): undefined reference to `__arm64_compat_sys_old_shmctl'

Add the missing entries in kernel/sys_ni.c for the new system
calls.

Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-03-06 16:00:56 +01:00
Christian Brauner
3eb39f4793
signal: add pidfd_send_signal() syscall
The kill() syscall operates on process identifiers (pid). After a process
has exited its pid can be reused by another process. If a caller sends a
signal to a reused pid it will end up signaling the wrong process. This
issue has often surfaced and there has been a push to address this problem [1].

This patch uses file descriptors (fd) from proc/<pid> as stable handles on
struct pid. Even if a pid is recycled the handle will not change. The fd
can be used to send signals to the process it refers to.
Thus, the new syscall pidfd_send_signal() is introduced to solve this
problem. Instead of pids it operates on process fds (pidfd).

/* prototype and argument /*
long pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, siginfo_t *info, unsigned int flags);

/* syscall number 424 */
The syscall number was chosen to be 424 to align with Arnd's rework in his
y2038 to minimize merge conflicts (cf. [25]).

In addition to the pidfd and signal argument it takes an additional
siginfo_t and flags argument. If the siginfo_t argument is NULL then
pidfd_send_signal() is equivalent to kill(<positive-pid>, <signal>). If it
is not NULL pidfd_send_signal() is equivalent to rt_sigqueueinfo().
The flags argument is added to allow for future extensions of this syscall.
It currently needs to be passed as 0. Failing to do so will cause EINVAL.

/* pidfd_send_signal() replaces multiple pid-based syscalls */
The pidfd_send_signal() syscall currently takes on the job of
rt_sigqueueinfo(2) and parts of the functionality of kill(2), Namely, when a
positive pid is passed to kill(2). It will however be possible to also
replace tgkill(2) and rt_tgsigqueueinfo(2) if this syscall is extended.

/* sending signals to threads (tid) and process groups (pgid) */
Specifically, the pidfd_send_signal() syscall does currently not operate on
process groups or threads. This is left for future extensions.
In order to extend the syscall to allow sending signal to threads and
process groups appropriately named flags (e.g. PIDFD_TYPE_PGID, and
PIDFD_TYPE_TID) should be added. This implies that the flags argument will
determine what is signaled and not the file descriptor itself. Put in other
words, grouping in this api is a property of the flags argument not a
property of the file descriptor (cf. [13]). Clarification for this has been
requested by Eric (cf. [19]).
When appropriate extensions through the flags argument are added then
pidfd_send_signal() can additionally replace the part of kill(2) which
operates on process groups as well as the tgkill(2) and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo(2) syscalls.
How such an extension could be implemented has been very roughly sketched
in [14], [15], and [16]. However, this should not be taken as a commitment
to a particular implementation. There might be better ways to do it.
Right now this is intentionally left out to keep this patchset as simple as
possible (cf. [4]).

/* naming */
The syscall had various names throughout iterations of this patchset:
- procfd_signal()
- procfd_send_signal()
- taskfd_send_signal()
In the last round of reviews it was pointed out that given that if the
flags argument decides the scope of the signal instead of different types
of fds it might make sense to either settle for "procfd_" or "pidfd_" as
prefix. The community was willing to accept either (cf. [17] and [18]).
Given that one developer expressed strong preference for the "pidfd_"
prefix (cf. [13]) and with other developers less opinionated about the name
we should settle for "pidfd_" to avoid further bikeshedding.

The  "_send_signal" suffix was chosen to reflect the fact that the syscall
takes on the job of multiple syscalls. It is therefore intentional that the
name is not reminiscent of neither kill(2) nor rt_sigqueueinfo(2). Not the
fomer because it might imply that pidfd_send_signal() is a replacement for
kill(2), and not the latter because it is a hassle to remember the correct
spelling - especially for non-native speakers - and because it is not
descriptive enough of what the syscall actually does. The name
"pidfd_send_signal" makes it very clear that its job is to send signals.

/* zombies */
Zombies can be signaled just as any other process. No special error will be
reported since a zombie state is an unreliable state (cf. [3]). However,
this can be added as an extension through the @flags argument if the need
ever arises.

/* cross-namespace signals */
The patch currently enforces that the signaler and signalee either are in
the same pid namespace or that the signaler's pid namespace is an ancestor
of the signalee's pid namespace. This is done for the sake of simplicity
and because it is unclear to what values certain members of struct
siginfo_t would need to be set to (cf. [5], [6]).

/* compat syscalls */
It became clear that we would like to avoid adding compat syscalls
(cf. [7]).  The compat syscall handling is now done in kernel/signal.c
itself by adding __copy_siginfo_from_user_generic() which lets us avoid
compat syscalls (cf. [8]). It should be noted that the addition of
__copy_siginfo_from_user_any() is caused by a bug in the original
implementation of rt_sigqueueinfo(2) (cf. 12).
With upcoming rework for syscall handling things might improve
significantly (cf. [11]) and __copy_siginfo_from_user_any() will not gain
any additional callers.

/* testing */
This patch was tested on x64 and x86.

/* userspace usage */
An asciinema recording for the basic functionality can be found under [9].
With this patch a process can be killed via:

 #define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>

 static inline int do_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, siginfo_t *info,
                                         unsigned int flags)
 {
 #ifdef __NR_pidfd_send_signal
         return syscall(__NR_pidfd_send_signal, pidfd, sig, info, flags);
 #else
         return -ENOSYS;
 #endif
 }

 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
         int fd, ret, saved_errno, sig;

         if (argc < 3)
                 exit(EXIT_FAILURE);

         fd = open(argv[1], O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
         if (fd < 0) {
                 printf("%s - Failed to open \"%s\"\n", strerror(errno), argv[1]);
                 exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
         }

         sig = atoi(argv[2]);

         printf("Sending signal %d to process %s\n", sig, argv[1]);
         ret = do_pidfd_send_signal(fd, sig, NULL, 0);

         saved_errno = errno;
         close(fd);
         errno = saved_errno;

         if (ret < 0) {
                 printf("%s - Failed to send signal %d to process %s\n",
                        strerror(errno), sig, argv[1]);
                 exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
         }

         exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
 }

/* Q&A
 * Given that it seems the same questions get asked again by people who are
 * late to the party it makes sense to add a Q&A section to the commit
 * message so it's hopefully easier to avoid duplicate threads.
 *
 * For the sake of progress please consider these arguments settled unless
 * there is a new point that desperately needs to be addressed. Please make
 * sure to check the links to the threads in this commit message whether
 * this has not already been covered.
 */
Q-01: (Florian Weimer [20], Andrew Morton [21])
      What happens when the target process has exited?
A-01: Sending the signal will fail with ESRCH (cf. [22]).

Q-02:  (Andrew Morton [21])
       Is the task_struct pinned by the fd?
A-02:  No. A reference to struct pid is kept. struct pid - as far as I
       understand - was created exactly for the reason to not require to
       pin struct task_struct (cf. [22]).

Q-03: (Andrew Morton [21])
      Does the entire procfs directory remain visible? Just one entry
      within it?
A-03: The same thing that happens right now when you hold a file descriptor
      to /proc/<pid> open (cf. [22]).

Q-04: (Andrew Morton [21])
      Does the pid remain reserved?
A-04: No. This patchset guarantees a stable handle not that pids are not
      recycled (cf. [22]).

Q-05: (Andrew Morton [21])
      Do attempts to signal that fd return errors?
A-05: See {Q,A}-01.

Q-06: (Andrew Morton [22])
      Is there a cleaner way of obtaining the fd? Another syscall perhaps.
A-06: Userspace can already trivially retrieve file descriptors from procfs
      so this is something that we will need to support anyway. Hence,
      there's no immediate need to add another syscalls just to make
      pidfd_send_signal() not dependent on the presence of procfs. However,
      adding a syscalls to get such file descriptors is planned for a
      future patchset (cf. [22]).

Q-07: (Andrew Morton [21] and others)
      This fd-for-a-process sounds like a handy thing and people may well
      think up other uses for it in the future, probably unrelated to
      signals. Are the code and the interface designed to permit such
      future applications?
A-07: Yes (cf. [22]).

Q-08: (Andrew Morton [21] and others)
      Now I think about it, why a new syscall? This thing is looking
      rather like an ioctl?
A-08: This has been extensively discussed. It was agreed that a syscall is
      preferred for a variety or reasons. Here are just a few taken from
      prior threads. Syscalls are safer than ioctl()s especially when
      signaling to fds. Processes are a core kernel concept so a syscall
      seems more appropriate. The layout of the syscall with its four
      arguments would require the addition of a custom struct for the
      ioctl() thereby causing at least the same amount or even more
      complexity for userspace than a simple syscall. The new syscall will
      replace multiple other pid-based syscalls (see description above).
      The file-descriptors-for-processes concept introduced with this
      syscall will be extended with other syscalls in the future. See also
      [22], [23] and various other threads already linked in here.

Q-09: (Florian Weimer [24])
      What happens if you use the new interface with an O_PATH descriptor?
A-09:
      pidfds opened as O_PATH fds cannot be used to send signals to a
      process (cf. [2]). Signaling processes through pidfds is the
      equivalent of writing to a file. Thus, this is not an operation that
      operates "purely at the file descriptor level" as required by the
      open(2) manpage. See also [4].

/* References */
[1]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181029221037.87724-1-dancol@google.com/
[2]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/874lbtjvtd.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com/
[3]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181204132604.aspfupwjgjx6fhva@brauner.io/
[4]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181203180224.fkvw4kajtbvru2ku@brauner.io/
[5]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181121213946.GA10795@mail.hallyn.com/
[6]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181120103111.etlqp7zop34v6nv4@brauner.io/
[7]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/36323361-90BD-41AF-AB5B-EE0D7BA02C21@amacapital.net/
[8]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87tvjxp8pc.fsf@xmission.com/
[9]:  https://asciinema.org/a/IQjuCHew6bnq1cr78yuMv16cy
[11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/F53D6D38-3521-4C20-9034-5AF447DF62FF@amacapital.net/
[12]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87zhtjn8ck.fsf@xmission.com/
[13]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/871s6u9z6u.fsf@xmission.com/
[14]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181206231742.xxi4ghn24z4h2qki@brauner.io/
[15]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181207003124.GA11160@mail.hallyn.com/
[16]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181207015423.4miorx43l3qhppfz@brauner.io/
[17]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAGXu5jL8PciZAXvOvCeCU3wKUEB_dU-O3q0tDw4uB_ojMvDEew@mail.gmail.com/
[18]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181206222746.GB9224@mail.hallyn.com/
[19]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181208054059.19813-1-christian@brauner.io/
[20]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8736rebl9s.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com/
[21]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181228152012.dbf0508c2508138efc5f2bbe@linux-foundation.org/
[22]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181228233725.722tdfgijxcssg76@brauner.io/
[23]: https://lwn.net/Articles/773459/
[24]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8736rebl9s.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com/
[25]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK8P3a0ej9NcJM8wXNPbcGUyOUZYX+VLoDFdbenW3s3114oQZw@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
2019-03-05 17:03:53 +01:00
Jens Axboe
edafccee56 io_uring: add support for pre-mapped user IO buffers
If we have fixed user buffers, we can map them into the kernel when we
setup the io_uring. That avoids the need to do get_user_pages() for
each and every IO.

To utilize this feature, the application must call io_uring_register()
after having setup an io_uring instance, passing in
IORING_REGISTER_BUFFERS as the opcode. The argument must be a pointer to
an iovec array, and the nr_args should contain how many iovecs the
application wishes to map.

If successful, these buffers are now mapped into the kernel, eligible
for IO. To use these fixed buffers, the application must use the
IORING_OP_READ_FIXED and IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED opcodes, and then
set sqe->index to the desired buffer index. sqe->addr..sqe->addr+seq->len
must point to somewhere inside the indexed buffer.

The application may register buffers throughout the lifetime of the
io_uring instance. It can call io_uring_register() with
IORING_UNREGISTER_BUFFERS as the opcode to unregister the current set of
buffers, and then register a new set. The application need not
unregister buffers explicitly before shutting down the io_uring
instance.

It's perfectly valid to setup a larger buffer, and then sometimes only
use parts of it for an IO. As long as the range is within the originally
mapped region, it will work just fine.

For now, buffers must not be file backed. If file backed buffers are
passed in, the registration will fail with -1/EOPNOTSUPP. This
restriction may be relaxed in the future.

RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is used to check how much memory we can pin. A somewhat
arbitrary 1G per buffer size is also imposed.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-02-28 08:24:23 -07:00
Jens Axboe
2b188cc1bb Add io_uring IO interface
The submission queue (SQ) and completion queue (CQ) rings are shared
between the application and the kernel. This eliminates the need to
copy data back and forth to submit and complete IO.

IO submissions use the io_uring_sqe data structure, and completions
are generated in the form of io_uring_cqe data structures. The SQ
ring is an index into the io_uring_sqe array, which makes it possible
to submit a batch of IOs without them being contiguous in the ring.
The CQ ring is always contiguous, as completion events are inherently
unordered, and hence any io_uring_cqe entry can point back to an
arbitrary submission.

Two new system calls are added for this:

io_uring_setup(entries, params)
	Sets up an io_uring instance for doing async IO. On success,
	returns a file descriptor that the application can mmap to
	gain access to the SQ ring, CQ ring, and io_uring_sqes.

io_uring_enter(fd, to_submit, min_complete, flags, sigset, sigsetsize)
	Initiates IO against the rings mapped to this fd, or waits for
	them to complete, or both. The behavior is controlled by the
	parameters passed in. If 'to_submit' is non-zero, then we'll
	try and submit new IO. If IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS is set, the
	kernel will wait for 'min_complete' events, if they aren't
	already available. It's valid to set IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS
	and 'min_complete' == 0 at the same time, this allows the
	kernel to return already completed events without waiting
	for them. This is useful only for polling, as for IRQ
	driven IO, the application can just check the CQ ring
	without entering the kernel.

With this setup, it's possible to do async IO with a single system
call. Future developments will enable polled IO with this interface,
and polled submission as well. The latter will enable an application
to do IO without doing ANY system calls at all.

For IRQ driven IO, an application only needs to enter the kernel for
completions if it wants to wait for them to occur.

Each io_uring is backed by a workqueue, to support buffered async IO
as well. We will only punt to an async context if the command would
need to wait for IO on the device side. Any data that can be accessed
directly in the page cache is done inline. This avoids the slowness
issue of usual threadpools, since cached data is accessed as quickly
as a sync interface.

Sample application: http://git.kernel.dk/cgit/fio/plain/t/io_uring.c

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-02-28 08:24:23 -07:00
Arnd Bergmann
8dabe7245b y2038: syscalls: rename y2038 compat syscalls
A lot of system calls that pass a time_t somewhere have an implementation
using a COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() on 64-bit architectures, and have
been reworked so that this implementation can now be used on 32-bit
architectures as well.

The missing step is to redefine them using the regular SYSCALL_DEFINEx()
to get them out of the compat namespace and make it possible to build them
on 32-bit architectures.

Any system call that ends in 'time' gets a '32' suffix on its name for
that version, while the others get a '_time32' suffix, to distinguish
them from the normal version, which takes a 64-bit time argument in the
future.

In this step, only 64-bit architectures are changed, doing this rename
first lets us avoid touching the 32-bit architectures twice.

Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-02-07 00:13:27 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
275f22148e ipc: rename old-style shmctl/semctl/msgctl syscalls
The behavior of these system calls is slightly different between
architectures, as determined by the CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
symbol. Most architectures that implement the split IPC syscalls don't set
that symbol and only get the modern version, but alpha, arm, microblaze,
mips-n32, mips-n64 and xtensa expect the caller to pass the IPC_64 flag.

For the architectures that so far only implement sys_ipc(), i.e. m68k,
mips-o32, powerpc, s390, sh, sparc, and x86-32, we want the new behavior
when adding the split syscalls, so we need to distinguish between the
two groups of architectures.

The method I picked for this distinction is to have a separate system call
entry point: sys_old_*ctl() now uses ipc_parse_version, while sys_*ctl()
does not. The system call tables of the five architectures are changed
accordingly.

As an additional benefit, we no longer need the configuration specific
definition for ipc_parse_version(), it always does the same thing now,
but simply won't get called on architectures with the modern interface.

A small downside is that on architectures that do set
ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION, we now have an extra set of entry points
that are never called. They only add a few bytes of bloat, so it seems
better to keep them compared to adding yet another Kconfig symbol.
I considered adding new syscall numbers for the IPC_64 variants for
consistency, but decided against that for now.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-01-25 17:22:50 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
58fa4a410f ipc: introduce ksys_ipc()/compat_ksys_ipc() for s390
The sys_ipc() and compat_ksys_ipc() functions are meant to only
be used from the system call table, not called by another function.

Introduce ksys_*() interfaces for this purpose, as we have done
for many other system calls.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190116131527.2071570-3-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
[heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: compile fix for !CONFIG_COMPAT]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-18 09:33:18 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
e11d4284e2 y2038: socket: Add compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64
recvmmsg() takes two arguments to pointers of structures that differ
between 32-bit and 64-bit architectures: mmsghdr and timespec.

For y2038 compatbility, we are changing the native system call from
timespec to __kernel_timespec with a 64-bit time_t (in another patch),
and use the existing compat system call on both 32-bit and 64-bit
architectures for compatibility with traditional 32-bit user space.

As we now have two variants of recvmmsg() for 32-bit tasks that are both
different from the variant that we use on 64-bit tasks, this means we
also require two compat system calls!

The solution I picked is to flip things around: The existing
compat_sys_recvmmsg() call gets moved from net/compat.c into net/socket.c
and now handles the case for old user space on all architectures that
have set CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME.  A new compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64()
call gets added in the old place for 64-bit architectures only, this
one handles the case of a compat mmsghdr structure combined with
__kernel_timespec.

In the indirect sys_socketcall(), we now need to call either
do_sys_recvmmsg() or __compat_sys_recvmmsg(), depending on what kind of
architecture we are on. For compat_sys_socketcall(), no such change is
needed, we always call __compat_sys_recvmmsg().

I decided to not add a new SYS_RECVMMSG_TIME64 socketcall: Any libc
implementation for 64-bit time_t will need significant changes including
an updated asm/unistd.h, and it seems better to consistently use the
separate syscalls that configuration, leaving the socketcall only for
backward compatibility with 32-bit time_t based libc.

The naming is asymmetric for the moment, so both existing syscalls
entry points keep their names, while the new ones are recvmmsg_time32
and compat_recvmmsg_time64 respectively. I expect that we will rename
the compat syscalls later as we start using generated syscall tables
everywhere and add these entry points.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-12-18 16:13:04 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
d82991a868 Merge branch 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull restartable sequence support from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The restartable sequences syscall (finally):

  After a lot of back and forth discussion and massive delays caused by
  the speculative distraction of maintainers, the core set of
  restartable sequences has finally reached a consensus.

  It comes with the basic non disputed core implementation along with
  support for arm, powerpc and x86 and a full set of selftests

  It was exposed to linux-next earlier this week, so it does not fully
  comply with the merge window requirements, but there is really no
  point to drag it out for yet another cycle"

* 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  rseq/selftests: Provide Makefile, scripts, gitignore
  rseq/selftests: Provide parametrized tests
  rseq/selftests: Provide basic percpu ops test
  rseq/selftests: Provide basic test
  rseq/selftests: Provide rseq library
  selftests/lib.mk: Introduce OVERRIDE_TARGETS
  powerpc: Wire up restartable sequences system call
  powerpc: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences
  powerpc: Add support for restartable sequences
  x86: Wire up restartable sequence system call
  x86: Add support for restartable sequences
  arm: Wire up restartable sequences system call
  arm: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences
  arm: Add restartable sequences support
  rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call
  uapi/headers: Provide types_32_64.h
2018-06-10 10:17:09 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
c90fca951e powerpc updates for 4.18
Notable changes:
 
  - Support for split PMD page table lock on 64-bit Book3S (Power8/9).
 
  - Add support for HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, so we properly support live
    patching again.
 
  - Add support for patching barrier_nospec in copy_from_user() and syscall entry.
 
  - A couple of fixes for our data breakpoints on Book3S.
 
  - A series from Nick optimising TLB/mm handling with the Radix MMU.
 
  - Numerous small cleanups to squash sparse/gcc warnings from Mathieu Malaterre.
 
  - Several series optimising various parts of the 32-bit code from Christophe Leroy.
 
  - Removal of support for two old machines, "SBC834xE" and "C2K" ("GEFanuc,C2K"),
    which is why the diffstat has so many deletions.
 
 And many other small improvements & fixes.
 
 There's a few out-of-area changes. Some minor ftrace changes OK'ed by Steve, and
 a fix to our powernv cpuidle driver. Then there's a series touching mm, x86 and
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c, which cleans up some details around pkey support. It was
 ack'ed/reviewed by Ingo & Dave and has been in next for several weeks.
 
 Thanks to:
   Akshay Adiga, Alastair D'Silva, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Al Viro, Andrew
   Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
   Cédric Le Goater, Christophe Leroy, Christophe Lombard, Colin Ian King, Dave
   Hansen, Fabio Estevam, Finn Thain, Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Haren
   Myneni, Hari Bathini, Ingo Molnar, Jonathan Neuschäfer, Josh Poimboeuf,
   Kamalesh Babulal, Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mark Greer, Mathieu
   Malaterre, Matthew Wilcox, Michael Neuling, Michal Suchanek, Naveen N. Rao,
   Nicholas Piggin, Nicolai Stange, Olof Johansson, Paul Gortmaker, Paul
   Mackerras, Peter Rosin, Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi, Ram Pai, Rashmica Gupta, Ravi
   Bangoria, Russell Currey, Sam Bobroff, Samuel Mendoza-Jonas, Segher
   Boessenkool, Shilpasri G Bhat, Simon Guo, Souptick Joarder, Stewart Smith,
   Thiago Jung Bauermann, Torsten Duwe, Vaibhav Jain, Wei Yongjun, Wolfram Sang,
   Yisheng Xie, YueHaibing.
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Merge tag 'powerpc-4.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux

Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
 "Notable changes:

   - Support for split PMD page table lock on 64-bit Book3S (Power8/9).

   - Add support for HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, so we properly support
     live patching again.

   - Add support for patching barrier_nospec in copy_from_user() and
     syscall entry.

   - A couple of fixes for our data breakpoints on Book3S.

   - A series from Nick optimising TLB/mm handling with the Radix MMU.

   - Numerous small cleanups to squash sparse/gcc warnings from Mathieu
     Malaterre.

   - Several series optimising various parts of the 32-bit code from
     Christophe Leroy.

   - Removal of support for two old machines, "SBC834xE" and "C2K"
     ("GEFanuc,C2K"), which is why the diffstat has so many deletions.

  And many other small improvements & fixes.

  There's a few out-of-area changes. Some minor ftrace changes OK'ed by
  Steve, and a fix to our powernv cpuidle driver. Then there's a series
  touching mm, x86 and fs/proc/task_mmu.c, which cleans up some details
  around pkey support. It was ack'ed/reviewed by Ingo & Dave and has
  been in next for several weeks.

  Thanks to: Akshay Adiga, Alastair D'Silva, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Al
  Viro, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Arnd
  Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe Leroy, Christophe
  Lombard, Colin Ian King, Dave Hansen, Fabio Estevam, Finn Thain,
  Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Haren Myneni, Hari Bathini, Ingo
  Molnar, Jonathan Neuschäfer, Josh Poimboeuf, Kamalesh Babulal,
  Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mark Greer, Mathieu Malaterre,
  Matthew Wilcox, Michael Neuling, Michal Suchanek, Naveen N. Rao,
  Nicholas Piggin, Nicolai Stange, Olof Johansson, Paul Gortmaker, Paul
  Mackerras, Peter Rosin, Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi, Ram Pai, Rashmica
  Gupta, Ravi Bangoria, Russell Currey, Sam Bobroff, Samuel
  Mendoza-Jonas, Segher Boessenkool, Shilpasri G Bhat, Simon Guo,
  Souptick Joarder, Stewart Smith, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Torsten Duwe,
  Vaibhav Jain, Wei Yongjun, Wolfram Sang, Yisheng Xie, YueHaibing"

* tag 'powerpc-4.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (251 commits)
  powerpc/64s/radix: Fix missing ptesync in flush_cache_vmap
  cpuidle: powernv: Fix promotion from snooze if next state disabled
  powerpc: fix build failure by disabling attribute-alias warning in pci_32
  ocxl: Fix missing unlock on error in afu_ioctl_enable_p9_wait()
  powerpc-opal: fix spelling mistake "Uniterrupted" -> "Uninterrupted"
  powerpc: fix spelling mistake: "Usupported" -> "Unsupported"
  powerpc/pkeys: Detach execute_only key on !PROT_EXEC
  powerpc/powernv: copy/paste - Mask SO bit in CR
  powerpc: Remove core support for Marvell mv64x60 hostbridges
  powerpc/boot: Remove core support for Marvell mv64x60 hostbridges
  powerpc/boot: Remove support for Marvell mv64x60 i2c controller
  powerpc/boot: Remove support for Marvell MPSC serial controller
  powerpc/embedded6xx: Remove C2K board support
  powerpc/lib: optimise PPC32 memcmp
  powerpc/lib: optimise 32 bits __clear_user()
  powerpc/time: inline arch_vtime_task_switch()
  powerpc/Makefile: set -mcpu=860 flag for the 8xx
  powerpc: Implement csum_ipv6_magic in assembly
  powerpc/32: Optimise __csum_partial()
  powerpc/lib: Adjust .balign inside string functions for PPC32
  ...
2018-06-07 10:23:33 -07:00
Mathieu Desnoyers
d7822b1e24 rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call
Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace
memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two
purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the
current CPU number value from user-space.

* Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics)

Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on
per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations.

The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started
by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of
critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a
few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other
architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path.

Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases.

Test hardware:

arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core
x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading

The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread.

* Per-CPU statistic counter increment

                getcpu+atomic (ns/op)    rseq (ns/op)    speedup
arm32:                344.0                 31.4          11.0
x86-64:                15.3                  2.0           7.7

* LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer
             per-cpu buffer

                getcpu+atomic (ns/op)    rseq (ns/op)    speedup
arm32:               2502.0                 2250.0         1.1
x86-64:               117.4                   98.0         1.2

* liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word

                getcpu+atomic (ns/op)    rseq (ns/op)    speedup
arm32:                751.0                 128.5          5.8
x86-64:                53.4                  28.6          1.9

* jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq

Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on
rseq 2016 implementation):

The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and
the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%.

* Reading the current CPU number

Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is
running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the
cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done
by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the
current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler
updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory
area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from
memory.

Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and
user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read
the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over
alternative approaches:

- 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc
- 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso
  executing a "lsl" instruction,
- 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction,
- Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline
  assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable
  sequences.
- The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared
  between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the
  case for the lsl-based x86 vdso.

On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment
selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs
similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is
not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already
using the gs segment selector for other purposes.

Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number:

ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l)
Machine model: Cubietruck
- Baseline (empty loop):                                    8.4 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id:                               16.7 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register):               19.8 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu:                           301.8 ns
- getcpu system call:                                     234.9 ns

x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz:
- Baseline (empty loop):                                    0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id:                                0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register):                0.8 ns
- Read using gs segment selector:                           0.8 ns
- "lsl" inline assembly:                                   13.0 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu:                              16.6 ns
- getcpu system call:                                      53.9 ns

- Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset)

Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to
expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the
scheduler:

Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @
2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy
saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1
kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig,
restartable sequences series applied.

* CONFIG_RSEQ=n

avg.:      41.37 s
std.dev.:   0.36 s

* CONFIG_RSEQ=y

avg.:      40.46 s
std.dev.:   0.33 s

- Size

On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is
567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes.

[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/
[2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
2018-06-06 11:58:31 +02:00
Al Viro
4c392e6591 powerpc/syscalls: switch rtas(2) to SYSCALL_DEFINE
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[mpe: Update sys_ni.c for s/ppc_rtas/sys_rtas/]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-05-10 23:25:14 +10:00
Christoph Hellwig
7a074e96de aio: implement io_pgetevents
This is the io_getevents equivalent of ppoll/pselect and allows to
properly mix signals and aio completions (especially with IOCB_CMD_POLL)
and atomically executes the following sequence:

	sigset_t origmask;

	pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, &origmask);
	ret = io_getevents(ctx, min_nr, nr, events, timeout);
	pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &origmask, NULL);

Note that unlike many other signal related calls we do not pass a sigmask
size, as that would get us to 7 arguments, which aren't easily supported
by the syscall infrastructure.  It seems a lot less painful to just add a
new syscall variant in the unlikely case we're going to increase the
sigset size.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
2018-05-02 19:57:24 +02:00
Dominik Brodowski
7303e30ec1 syscalls/core: Prepare CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER=y for compat syscalls
It may be useful for an architecture to override the definitions of the
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE0() and __COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() macros in
<linux/compat.h>, in particular to use a different calling convention
for syscalls. This patch provides a mechanism to do so, based on the
previously introduced CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER. If it is enabled,
<asm/sycall_wrapper.h> is included in <linux/compat.h> and may be used
to define the macros mentioned above. Moreover, as the syscall calling
convention may be different if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER is set,
the compat syscall function prototypes in <linux/compat.h> are #ifndef'd
out in that case.

As some of the syscalls and/or compat syscalls may not be present,
the COND_SYSCALL() and COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT() macros in kernel/sys_ni.c
as well as the SYS_NI() and COMPAT_SYS_NI() macros in
kernel/time/posix-stubs.c can be re-defined in <asm/syscall_wrapper.h> iff
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180405095307.3730-5-linux@dominikbrodowski.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-05 16:59:38 +02:00
Dominik Brodowski
67a7acd377 kernel/sys_ni: remove {sys_,sys_compat} from cond_syscall definitions
This keeps it in line with the SYSCALL_DEFINEx() / COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx()
calling convention.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-04-02 20:16:20 +02:00
Dominik Brodowski
70dd4b3160 kernel/sys_ni: sort cond_syscall() entries
Shuffle the cond_syscall() entries in kernel/sys_ni.c around so that they
are kept in the same order as in include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h. For
better structuring, add the same comments as in that file, but keep a few
additional comments and extend the commentary where it seems useful.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-04-02 20:16:19 +02:00
Dominik Brodowski
ab0d1e85bf fs/quota: use COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE for sys32_quotactl()
While sys32_quotactl() is only needed on x86, it can use the recommended
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() machinery for its setup.

Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-04-02 20:15:47 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Al Viro
c00d2c7e89 move aio compat to fs/aio.c
... and fix the minor buglet in compat io_submit() - native one
kills ioctx as cleanup when put_user() fails.  Get rid of
bogus compat_... in !CONFIG_AIO case, while we are at it - they
should simply fail with ENOSYS, same as for native counterparts.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-22 22:58:37 -05:00
Dave Hansen
e2753293ac x86/pkeys: Fix pkeys build breakage for some non-x86 arches
Guenter Roeck reported breakage on the h8300 and c6x architectures (among
others) caused by the new memory protection keys syscalls.  This patch does
what Arnd suggested and adds them to kernel/sys_ni.c.

Fixes: a60f7b69d9 ("generic syscalls: Wire up memory protection keys syscalls")
Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160912203842.48E7AC50@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2016-09-13 14:41:36 +02:00
Zach Brown
29732938a6 vfs: add copy_file_range syscall and vfs helper
Add a copy_file_range() system call for offloading copies between
regular files.

This gives an interface to underlying layers of the storage stack which
can copy without reading and writing all the data.  There are a few
candidates that should support copy offloading in the nearer term:

- btrfs shares extent references with its clone ioctl
- NFS has patches to add a COPY command which copies on the server
- SCSI has a family of XCOPY commands which copy in the device

This system call avoids the complexity of also accelerating the creation
of the destination file by operating on an existing destination file
descriptor, not a path.

Currently the high level vfs entry point limits copy offloading to files
on the same mount and super (and not in the same file).  This can be
relaxed if we get implementations which can copy between file systems
safely.

Signed-off-by: Zach Brown <zab@redhat.com>
[Anna Schumaker: Change -EINVAL to -EBADF during file verification,
                 Change flags parameter from int to unsigned int,
                 Add function to include/linux/syscalls.h,
                 Check copy len after file open mode,
                 Don't forbid ranges inside the same file,
                 Use rw_verify_area() to veriy ranges,
                 Use file_out rather than file_in,
                 Add COPY_FR_REFLINK flag]
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-12-01 14:00:53 -05:00
Eric B Munson
a8ca5d0ecb mm: mlock: add new mlock system call
With the refactored mlock code, introduce a new system call for mlock.
The new call will allow the user to specify what lock states are being
added.  mlock2 is trivial at the moment, but a follow on patch will add a
new mlock state making it useful.

Signed-off-by: Eric B Munson <emunson@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Mathieu Desnoyers
5b25b13ab0 sys_membarrier(): system-wide memory barrier (generic, x86)
Here is an implementation of a new system call, sys_membarrier(), which
executes a memory barrier on all threads running on the system.  It is
implemented by calling synchronize_sched().  It can be used to
distribute the cost of user-space memory barriers asymmetrically by
transforming pairs of memory barriers into pairs consisting of
sys_membarrier() and a compiler barrier.  For synchronization primitives
that distinguish between read-side and write-side (e.g.  userspace RCU
[1], rwlocks), the read-side can be accelerated significantly by moving
the bulk of the memory barrier overhead to the write-side.

The existing applications of which I am aware that would be improved by
this system call are as follows:

* Through Userspace RCU library (http://urcu.so)
  - DNS server (Knot DNS) https://www.knot-dns.cz/
  - Network sniffer (http://netsniff-ng.org/)
  - Distributed object storage (https://sheepdog.github.io/sheepdog/)
  - User-space tracing (http://lttng.org)
  - Network storage system (https://www.gluster.org/)
  - Virtual routers (https://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/DPDK_RCU_0MQ.pdf)
  - Financial software (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/23/189)

Those projects use RCU in userspace to increase read-side speed and
scalability compared to locking.  Especially in the case of RCU used by
libraries, sys_membarrier can speed up the read-side by moving the bulk of
the memory barrier cost to synchronize_rcu().

* Direct users of sys_membarrier
  - core dotnet garbage collector (https://github.com/dotnet/coreclr/issues/198)

Microsoft core dotnet GC developers are planning to use the mprotect()
side-effect of issuing memory barriers through IPIs as a way to implement
Windows FlushProcessWriteBuffers() on Linux.  They are referring to
sys_membarrier in their github thread, specifically stating that
sys_membarrier() is what they are looking for.

To explain the benefit of this scheme, let's introduce two example threads:

Thread A (non-frequent, e.g. executing liburcu synchronize_rcu())
Thread B (frequent, e.g. executing liburcu
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock())

In a scheme where all smp_mb() in thread A are ordering memory accesses
with respect to smp_mb() present in Thread B, we can change each
smp_mb() within Thread A into calls to sys_membarrier() and each
smp_mb() within Thread B into compiler barriers "barrier()".

Before the change, we had, for each smp_mb() pairs:

Thread A                    Thread B
previous mem accesses       previous mem accesses
smp_mb()                    smp_mb()
following mem accesses      following mem accesses

After the change, these pairs become:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

As we can see, there are two possible scenarios: either Thread B memory
accesses do not happen concurrently with Thread A accesses (1), or they
do (2).

1) Non-concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses:

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()
follow mem accesses
                            prev mem accesses
                            barrier()
                            follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses will be weakly ordered. This is OK,
because at that point, thread A is not particularly interested in
ordering them with respect to its own accesses.

2) Concurrent Thread A vs Thread B accesses

Thread A                    Thread B
prev mem accesses           prev mem accesses
sys_membarrier()            barrier()
follow mem accesses         follow mem accesses

In this case, thread B accesses, which are ensured to be in program
order thanks to the compiler barrier, will be "upgraded" to full
smp_mb() by synchronize_sched().

* Benchmarks

On Intel Xeon E5405 (8 cores)
(one thread is calling sys_membarrier, the other 7 threads are busy
looping)

1000 non-expedited sys_membarrier calls in 33s =3D 33 milliseconds/call.

* User-space user of this system call: Userspace RCU library

Both the signal-based and the sys_membarrier userspace RCU schemes
permit us to remove the memory barrier from the userspace RCU
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() primitives, thus significantly
accelerating them. These memory barriers are replaced by compiler
barriers on the read-side, and all matching memory barriers on the
write-side are turned into an invocation of a memory barrier on all
active threads in the process. By letting the kernel perform this
synchronization rather than dumbly sending a signal to every process
threads (as we currently do), we diminish the number of unnecessary wake
ups and only issue the memory barriers on active threads. Non-running
threads do not need to execute such barrier anyway, because these are
implied by the scheduler context switches.

Results in liburcu:

Operations in 10s, 6 readers, 2 writers:

memory barriers in reader:    1701557485 reads, 2202847 writes
signal-based scheme:          9830061167 reads,    6700 writes
sys_membarrier:               9952759104 reads,     425 writes
sys_membarrier (dyn. check):  7970328887 reads,     425 writes

The dynamic sys_membarrier availability check adds some overhead to
the read-side compared to the signal-based scheme, but besides that,
sys_membarrier slightly outperforms the signal-based scheme. However,
this non-expedited sys_membarrier implementation has a much slower grace
period than signal and memory barrier schemes.

Besides diminishing the number of wake-ups, one major advantage of the
membarrier system call over the signal-based scheme is that it does not
need to reserve a signal. This plays much more nicely with libraries,
and with processes injected into for tracing purposes, for which we
cannot expect that signals will be unused by the application.

An expedited version of this system call can be added later on to speed
up the grace period. Its implementation will likely depend on reading
the cpu_curr()->mm without holding each CPU's rq lock.

This patch adds the system call to x86 and to asm-generic.

[1] http://urcu.so

membarrier(2) man page:

MEMBARRIER(2)              Linux Programmer's Manual             MEMBARRIER(2)

NAME
       membarrier - issue memory barriers on a set of threads

SYNOPSIS
       #include <linux/membarrier.h>

       int membarrier(int cmd, int flags);

DESCRIPTION
       The cmd argument is one of the following:

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY
              Query  the  set  of  supported commands. It returns a bitmask of
              supported commands.

       MEMBARRIER_CMD_SHARED
              Execute a memory barrier on all threads running on  the  system.
              Upon  return from system call, the caller thread is ensured that
              all running threads have passed through a state where all memory
              accesses  to  user-space  addresses  match program order between
              entry to and return from the system  call  (non-running  threads
              are de facto in such a state). This covers threads from all pro=E2=80=90
              cesses running on the system.  This command returns 0.

       The flags argument needs to be 0. For future extensions.

       All memory accesses performed  in  program  order  from  each  targeted
       thread is guaranteed to be ordered with respect to sys_membarrier(). If
       we use the semantic "barrier()" to represent a compiler barrier forcing
       memory  accesses  to  be performed in program order across the barrier,
       and smp_mb() to represent explicit memory barriers forcing full  memory
       ordering  across  the barrier, we have the following ordering table for
       each pair of barrier(), sys_membarrier() and smp_mb():

       The pair ordering is detailed as (O: ordered, X: not ordered):

                              barrier()   smp_mb() sys_membarrier()
              barrier()          X           X            O
              smp_mb()           X           O            O
              sys_membarrier()   O           O            O

RETURN VALUE
       On success, these system calls return zero.  On error, -1 is  returned,
       and errno is set appropriately. For a given command, with flags
       argument set to 0, this system call is guaranteed to always return the
       same value until reboot.

ERRORS
       ENOSYS System call is not implemented.

       EINVAL Invalid arguments.

Linux                             2015-04-15                     MEMBARRIER(2)

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Nicholas Miell <nmiell@comcast.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-11 15:21:34 -07:00
Andrea Arcangeli
1380fca084 userfaultfd: activate syscall
This activates the userfaultfd syscall.

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: activate syscall fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: don't enable userfaultfd on powerpc]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04 16:54:41 -07:00
Andy Lutomirski
a5b9e5a2f1 x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt() optional
The modify_ldt syscall exposes a large attack surface and is
unnecessary for modern userspace.  Make it optional.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: security@kernel.org <security@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a605166a771c343fd64802dece77a903507333bd.1438291540.git.luto@kernel.org
[ Made MATH_EMULATION dependent on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-31 13:30:45 +02:00
Iulia Manda
2813893f8b kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root.  For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.

This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional.  It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.

When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.

The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.

Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.

In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.

This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build.  The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB.  (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.

The kernel was booted in Qemu.  All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.

Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 16:35:22 -07:00
David Drysdale
51f39a1f0c syscalls: implement execveat() system call
This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).

The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts).  The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.

Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.

Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns.  The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).

Related history:
 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
   realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
 - http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
   documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
   "prevent other people from wasting their time".
 - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
   problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
   because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
   been fixed.

This patch (of 4):

Add a new execveat(2) system call.  execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.

In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers.  This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/<fd>" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).

The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/<fd>"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found.  This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).

Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.

Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 12:42:51 -08:00
Alexey Ishchuk
4eafad7feb s390/kernel: add system calls for PCI memory access
Add the new __NR_s390_pci_mmio_write and __NR_s390_pci_mmio_read
system calls to allow user space applications to access device PCI I/O
memory pages on s390x platform.

[ Martin Schwidefsky: some code beautification ]

Signed-off-by: Alexey Ishchuk <aishchuk@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2014-11-19 09:46:43 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
35a9ad8af0 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Most notable changes in here:

   1) By far the biggest accomplishment, thanks to a large range of
      contributors, is the addition of multi-send for transmit.  This is
      the result of discussions back in Chicago, and the hard work of
      several individuals.

      Now, when the ->ndo_start_xmit() method of a driver sees
      skb->xmit_more as true, it can choose to defer the doorbell
      telling the driver to start processing the new TX queue entires.

      skb->xmit_more means that the generic networking is guaranteed to
      call the driver immediately with another SKB to send.

      There is logic added to the qdisc layer to dequeue multiple
      packets at a time, and the handling mis-predicted offloads in
      software is now done with no locks held.

      Finally, pktgen is extended to have a "burst" parameter that can
      be used to test a multi-send implementation.

      Several drivers have xmit_more support: i40e, igb, ixgbe, mlx4,
      virtio_net

      Adding support is almost trivial, so export more drivers to
      support this optimization soon.

      I want to thank, in no particular or implied order, Jesper
      Dangaard Brouer, Eric Dumazet, Alexander Duyck, Tom Herbert, Jamal
      Hadi Salim, John Fastabend, Florian Westphal, Daniel Borkmann,
      David Tat, Hannes Frederic Sowa, and Rusty Russell.

   2) PTP and timestamping support in bnx2x, from Michal Kalderon.

   3) Allow adjusting the rx_copybreak threshold for a driver via
      ethtool, and add rx_copybreak support to enic driver.  From
      Govindarajulu Varadarajan.

   4) Significant enhancements to the generic PHY layer and the bcm7xxx
      driver in particular (EEE support, auto power down, etc.) from
      Florian Fainelli.

   5) Allow raw buffers to be used for flow dissection, allowing drivers
      to determine the optimal "linear pull" size for devices that DMA
      into pools of pages.  The objective is to get exactly the
      necessary amount of headers into the linear SKB area pre-pulled,
      but no more.  The new interface drivers use is eth_get_headlen().
      From WANG Cong, with driver conversions (several had their own
      by-hand duplicated implementations) by Alexander Duyck and Eric
      Dumazet.

   6) Support checksumming more smoothly and efficiently for
      encapsulations, and add "foo over UDP" facility.  From Tom
      Herbert.

   7) Add Broadcom SF2 switch driver to DSA layer, from Florian
      Fainelli.

   8) eBPF now can load programs via a system call and has an extensive
      testsuite.  Alexei Starovoitov and Daniel Borkmann.

   9) Major overhaul of the packet scheduler to use RCU in several major
      areas such as the classifiers and rate estimators.  From John
      Fastabend.

  10) Add driver for Intel FM10000 Ethernet Switch, from Alexander
      Duyck.

  11) Rearrange TCP_SKB_CB() to reduce cache line misses, from Eric
      Dumazet.

  12) Add Datacenter TCP congestion control algorithm support, From
      Florian Westphal.

  13) Reorganize sk_buff so that __copy_skb_header() is significantly
      faster.  From Eric Dumazet"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1558 commits)
  netlabel: directly return netlbl_unlabel_genl_init()
  net: add netdev_txq_bql_{enqueue, complete}_prefetchw() helpers
  net: description of dma_cookie cause make xmldocs warning
  cxgb4: clean up a type issue
  cxgb4: potential shift wrapping bug
  i40e: skb->xmit_more support
  net: fs_enet: Add NAPI TX
  net: fs_enet: Remove non NAPI RX
  r8169:add support for RTL8168EP
  net_sched: copy exts->type in tcf_exts_change()
  wimax: convert printk to pr_foo()
  af_unix: remove 0 assignment on static
  ipv6: Do not warn for informational ICMP messages, regardless of type.
  Update Intel Ethernet Driver maintainers list
  bridge: Save frag_max_size between PRE_ROUTING and POST_ROUTING
  tipc: fix bug in multicast congestion handling
  net: better IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE support
  net/mlx4_en: remove NETDEV_TX_BUSY
  3c59x: fix bad split of cpu_to_le32(pci_map_single())
  net: bcmgenet: fix Tx ring priority programming
  ...
2014-10-08 21:40:54 -04:00
Alexei Starovoitov
749730ce42 bpf: enable bpf syscall on x64 and i386
done as separate commit to ease conflict resolution

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:05:14 -04:00
Josh Triplett
d3ac21cacc mm: Support compiling out madvise and fadvise
Many embedded systems will not need these syscalls, and omitting them
saves space.  Add a new EXPERT config option CONFIG_ADVISE_SYSCALLS
(default y) to support compiling them out.

bloat-o-meter:
add/remove: 0/3 grow/shrink: 0/0 up/down: 0/-2250 (-2250)
function                                     old     new   delta
sys_fadvise64                                 57       -     -57
sys_fadvise64_64                             691       -    -691
sys_madvise                                 1502       -   -1502

Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
2014-08-17 19:44:24 -05:00
Vivek Goyal
f0895685c7 kexec: new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration
This is the new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration/interface.  I have
reserved the syscall number only for x86_64 so far.  Other architectures
(including i386) can reserve syscall number when they enable the support
for this new syscall.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-08 15:57:32 -07:00
David Herrmann
9183df25fe shm: add memfd_create() syscall
memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
that you can pass to mmap().  It can support sealing and avoids any
connection to user-visible mount-points.  Thus, it's not subject to quotas
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
a file-descriptor to it.

memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
be used to modify the underlying inode.  Also calls like fstat() will
return proper information and mark the file as regular file.  If you want
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING.  Otherwise, sealing is not
supported (like on all other regular files).

Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
subject to a filesystem size limit.  It is still properly accounted to
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
accounting as all user memory.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-08 15:57:31 -07:00
Kees Cook
48dc92b9fc seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall
This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).

In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-07-18 12:13:37 -07:00
Fabian Frederick
f6187769da sys_sgetmask/sys_ssetmask: add CONFIG_SGETMASK_SYSCALL
sys_sgetmask and sys_ssetmask are obsolete system calls no longer
supported in libc.

This patch replaces architecture related __ARCH_WANT_SYS_SGETMAX by expert
mode configuration.That option is enabled by default for those
architectures.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 16:54:14 -07:00
Josh Triplett
69369a7003 fs, kernel: permit disabling the uselib syscall
uselib hasn't been used since libc5; glibc does not use it.  Support
turning it off.

When disabled, also omit the load_elf_library implementation from
binfmt_elf.c, which only uselib invokes.

bloat-o-meter:
add/remove: 0/4 grow/shrink: 0/1 up/down: 0/-785 (-785)
function                                     old     new   delta
padzero                                       39      36      -3
uselib_flags                                  20       -     -20
sys_uselib                                   168       -    -168
SyS_uselib                                   168       -    -168
load_elf_library                             426       -    -426

The new CONFIG_USELIB defaults to `y'.

Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-03 16:21:05 -07:00
Fabian Frederick
6af9f7bf3c sys_sysfs: Add CONFIG_SYSFS_SYSCALL
sys_sysfs is an obsolete system call no longer supported by libc.

 - This patch adds a default CONFIG_SYSFS_SYSCALL=y

 - Option can be turned off in expert mode.

 - cond_syscall added to kernel/sys_ni.c

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak Kconfig help text]
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-03 16:21:05 -07:00
Al Viro
91c2e0bcae unify compat fanotify_mark(2), switch to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-05-09 13:46:38 -04:00