Now that we have the load_info struct all initialized (including
info->name, which contains the name of the module) before
module_sig_check(), make the load_info struct and hence module name
available to mod_verify_sig() so that we can log the module name in the
event of an error.
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it
can be used by code other than the module-signing code.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Emit the magic string that indicates a module has a signature after the
signature data instead of before it. This allows module_sig_check() to
be made simpler and faster by the elimination of the search for the
magic string. Instead we just need to do a single memcmp().
This works because at the end of the signature data there is the
fixed-length signature information block. This block then falls
immediately prior to the magic number.
From the contents of the information block, it is trivial to calculate
the size of the signature data and thus the size of the actual module
data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Include a PGP keyring containing the public keys required to perform module
verification in the kernel image during build and create a special keyring
during boot which is then populated with keys of crypto type holding the public
keys found in the PGP keyring.
These can be seen by root:
[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/keys
07ad4ee0 I----- 1 perm 3f010000 0 0 crypto modsign.0: RSA 87b9b3bd []
15c7f8c3 I----- 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .module_sign: 1/4
...
It is probably worth permitting root to invalidate these keys, resulting in
their removal and preventing further modules from being loaded with that key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We do a very simple search for a particular string appended to the module
(which is cache-hot and about to be SHA'd anyway). There's both a config
option and a boot parameter which control whether we accept or fail with
unsigned modules and modules that are signed with an unknown key.
If module signing is enabled, the kernel will be tainted if a module is
loaded that is unsigned or has a signature for which we don't have the
key.
(Useful feedback and tweaks by David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
