If first_bad == this_sector when we get the WriteMostly disk
in read_balance(), valid disk will be returned with zero
max_sectors. It'll lead to a dead loop in make_request(), and
OOM will happen because of endless allocation of struct bio.
Since we can't get data from this disk in this case, so
continue for another disk.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
If raid1d is handling a mix of read and write errors, handle_read_error's
call to freeze_array can get stuck.
This can happen because, though the bio_end_io_list is initially drained,
writes can be added to it via handle_write_finished as the retry_list
is processed. These writes contribute to nr_pending but are not included
in nr_queued.
If a later entry on the retry_list triggers a call to handle_read_error,
freeze array hangs waiting for nr_pending == nr_queued+extra. The writes
on the bio_end_io_list aren't included in nr_queued so the condition will
never be satisfied.
To prevent the hang, include bio_end_io_list writes in nr_queued.
There's probably a better way to handle decrementing nr_queued, but this
seemed like the safest way to avoid breaking surrounding code.
I'm happy to supply the script I used to repro this hang.
Fixes: 55ce74d4bfe1b(md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v4.3+)
Signed-off-by: Nate Dailey <nate.dailey@stratus.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Since bitmap_start_sync will not return until
sync_blocks is not less than PAGE_SIZE>>9, so
the BUG_ON is not needed anymore.
Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
It is not safe for an integrity profile to be changed while i/o is
in-flight in the queue. Prevent adding new disks or otherwise online
spares to an array if the device has an incompatible integrity profile.
The original change to the blk_integrity_unregister implementation in
md, commmit c7bfced9a6 "md: suspend i/o during runtime
blk_integrity_unregister" introduced an immediate hang regression.
This policy of disallowing changes the integrity profile once one has
been established is shared with DM.
Here is an abbreviated log from a test run that:
1/ Creates a degraded raid1 with an integrity-enabled device (pmem0s) [ 59.076127]
2/ Tries to add an integrity-disabled device (pmem1m) [ 90.489209]
3/ Retries with an integrity-enabled device (pmem1s) [ 205.671277]
[ 59.076127] md/raid1:md0: active with 1 out of 2 mirrors
[ 59.078302] md: data integrity enabled on md0
[..]
[ 90.489209] md0: incompatible integrity profile for pmem1m
[..]
[ 205.671277] md: super_written gets error=-5
[ 205.677386] md/raid1:md0: Disk failure on pmem1m, disabling device.
[ 205.677386] md/raid1:md0: Operation continuing on 1 devices.
[ 205.683037] RAID1 conf printout:
[ 205.684699] --- wd:1 rd:2
[ 205.685972] disk 0, wo:0, o:1, dev:pmem0s
[ 205.687562] disk 1, wo:1, o:1, dev:pmem1s
[ 205.691717] md: recovery of RAID array md0
Fixes: c7bfced9a6 ("md: suspend i/o during runtime blk_integrity_unregister")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Two major components to this update.
1/ the clustered-raid1 support from SUSE is nearly
complete. There are a few outstanding issues being
worked on. Maybe half a dozen patches will bring
this to a usable state.
2/ The first stage of journalled-raid5 support from
Facebook makes an appearance. With a journal
device configured (typically NVRAM or SSD), the
"RAID5 write hole" should be closed - a crash
during degraded operations cannot result in data
corruption.
The next stage will be to use the journal as a
write-behind cache so that latency can be reduced
and in some cases throughput increased by
performing more full-stripe writes.
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Merge tag 'md/4.4' of git://neil.brown.name/md
Pull md updates from Neil Brown:
"Two major components to this update.
1) The clustered-raid1 support from SUSE is nearly complete. There
are a few outstanding issues being worked on. Maybe half a dozen
patches will bring this to a usable state.
2) The first stage of journalled-raid5 support from Facebook makes an
appearance. With a journal device configured (typically NVRAM or
SSD), the "RAID5 write hole" should be closed - a crash during
degraded operations cannot result in data corruption.
The next stage will be to use the journal as a write-behind cache
so that latency can be reduced and in some cases throughput
increased by performing more full-stripe writes.
* tag 'md/4.4' of git://neil.brown.name/md: (66 commits)
MD: when RAID journal is missing/faulty, block RESTART_ARRAY_RW
MD: set journal disk ->raid_disk
MD: kick out journal disk if it's not fresh
raid5-cache: start raid5 readonly if journal is missing
MD: add new bit to indicate raid array with journal
raid5-cache: IO error handling
raid5: journal disk can't be removed
raid5-cache: add trim support for log
MD: fix info output for journal disk
raid5-cache: use bio chaining
raid5-cache: small log->seq cleanup
raid5-cache: new helper: r5_reserve_log_entry
raid5-cache: inline r5l_alloc_io_unit into r5l_new_meta
raid5-cache: take rdev->data_offset into account early on
raid5-cache: refactor bio allocation
raid5-cache: clean up r5l_get_meta
raid5-cache: simplify state machine when caches flushes are not needed
raid5-cache: factor out a helper to run all stripes for an I/O unit
raid5-cache: rename flushed_ios to finished_ios
raid5-cache: free I/O units earlier
...
Pull block integrity updates from Jens Axboe:
""This is the joint work of Dan and Martin, cleaning up and improving
the support for block data integrity"
* 'for-4.4/integrity' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
block, libnvdimm, nvme: provide a built-in blk_integrity nop profile
block: blk_flush_integrity() for bio-based drivers
block: move blk_integrity to request_queue
block: generic request_queue reference counting
nvme: suspend i/o during runtime blk_integrity_unregister
md: suspend i/o during runtime blk_integrity_unregister
md, dm, scsi, nvme, libnvdimm: drop blk_integrity_unregister() at shutdown
block: Inline blk_integrity in struct gendisk
block: Export integrity data interval size in sysfs
block: Reduce the size of struct blk_integrity
block: Consolidate static integrity profile properties
block: Move integrity kobject to struct gendisk
To incorporate --grow feature executed on one node, other nodes need to
acknowledge the change in number of disks. Call update_raid_disks()
to update internal data structures.
This leads to call check_reshape() -> md_allow_write() -> md_update_sb(),
this results in a deadlock. This is done so it can safely allocate memory
(which might trigger writeback which might write to raid1). This is
not required for md with a bitmap.
In the clustered case, we don't perform md_update_sb() in md_allow_write(),
but in do_md_run(). Also we disable safemode for clustered mode.
mddev->recovery_cp need not be set in check_sb_changes() because this
is required only when a node reads another node's bitmap. mddev->recovery_cp
(which is read from sb->resync_offset), is set only if mddev is in_sync.
Since we disabled safemode, in_sync is set to zero.
In a clustered environment, the MD may not be in sync because another
node could be writing to it. So make sure that in_sync is not set in
case of clustered node in __md_stop_writes().
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
When a write fails and a bad-block-list is present, we can
update the bad-block-list instead of writing the data. If
this succeeds then it is OK clear the relevant bitmap-bit as
no further 'sync' of the block is needed.
However if writing the bad-block-list fails then we need to
treat the write as failed and particularly must not clear
the bitmap bit. Otherwise the device can be re-added (after
any hardware connection issues are resolved) and because the
relevant bit in the bitmap is clear, that block will not be
resynced. This leads to data corruption.
We already delay the final bio_endio() on the write until
the bad-block-list is written so that when the write
returns: either that data is safe, the bad-block record is
safe, or the fact that the device is faulty is safe.
However we *don't* delay the clearing of the bitmap, so the
bitmap bit can be recorded as cleared before we know if the
bad-block-list was written safely.
So: delay that until the write really is safe.
i.e. move the call to close_write() until just before
calling bio_endio(), and recheck the 'is array degraded'
status before making that call.
This bug goes back to v3.1 when bad-block-lists were
introduced, though it only affects arrays created with
mdadm-3.3 or later as only those have bad-block lists.
Backports will require at least
Commit: 55ce74d4bf ("md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.")
as well. I'll send that to 'stable' separately.
Note that of the two tests of R1BIO_WriteError that this
patch adds, the first is certain to fail and the second is
certain to succeed. However doing it this way makes the
patch more obviously correct. I will tidy the code up in a
future merge window.
Reported-and-tested-by: Nate Dailey <nate.dailey@stratus.com>
Cc: Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@redhat.com>
Fixes: cd5ff9a16f ("md/raid1: Handle write errors by updating badblock log.")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Synchronize pending i/o against a change in the integrity profile to
avoid the possibility of spurious integrity errors. Given linear_add()
is suspending the mddev before manipulating the mddev, do the same for
the other personalities.
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
This was introduced with 9e882242c6
which changed the return value of submit_bio_wait() to return != 0 on
error, but didn't update the caller accordingly.
Fixes: 9e882242c6 ("block: Add submit_bio_wait(), remove from md")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.10)
Reported-by: Bill Kuzeja <William.Kuzeja@stratus.com>
Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
md-cluster: A better way for METADATA_UPDATED processing
The processing of METADATA_UPDATED message is too simple and prone to
errors. Besides, it would not update the internal data structures as
required.
This set of patches reads the superblock from one of the device of the MD
and checks for changes in the in-memory data structures. If there is a change,
it performs the necessary actions to keep the internal data structures
as it would be in the primary node.
An example is if a devices turns faulty. The algorithm is:
1. The initiator node marks the device as faulty and updates the superblock
2. The initiator node sends METADATA_UPDATED with an advisory device number to the rest of the nodes.
3. The receiving node on receiving the METADATA_UPDATED message
3.1 Reads the superblock
3.2 Detects a device has failed by comparing with memory structure
3.3 Calls the necessary functions to record the failure and get the device out of the active array.
3.4 Acknowledges the message.
The patch series also fixes adding the disk which was impacted because of
the changes.
Patches can also be found at
https://github.com/goldwynr/linux branch md-next
Changes since V2:
- Fix status synchrnoization after --add and --re-add operations
- Included Guoqing's patches on endian correctness, zeroing cmsg etc
- Restructure add_new_disk() and cancel()
Resync or recovery must be performed by only one node at a time.
A DLM lock resource, resync_lockres provides the mutual exclusion
so that only one node performs the recovery/resync at a time.
If a node is unable to get the resync_lockres, because recovery is
being performed by another node, it set MD_RECOVER_NEEDED so as
to schedule recovery in the future.
Remove the debug message in resync_info_update()
used during development.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
md_reload_sb is too simplistic and it explicitly needs to determine
the changes made by the writing node. However, there are multiple areas
where a simple reload could fail.
Instead, read the superblock of one of the "good" rdevs and update
the necessary information:
- read the superblock into a newly allocated page, by temporarily
swapping out rdev->sb_page and calling ->load_super.
- if that fails return
- if it succeeds, call check_sb_changes
1. iterates over list of active devices and checks the matching
dev_roles[] value.
If that is 'faulty', the device must be marked as faulty
- call md_error to mark the device as faulty. Make sure
not to set CHANGE_DEVS and wakeup mddev->thread or else
it would initiate a resync process, which is the responsibility
of the "primary" node.
- clear the Blocked bit
- Call remove_and_add_spares() to hot remove the device.
If the device is 'spare':
- call remove_and_add_spares() to get the number of spares
added in this operation.
- Reduce mddev->degraded to mark the array as not degraded.
2. reset recovery_cp
- read the rest of the rdevs to update recovery_offset. If recovery_offset
is equal to MaxSector, call spare_active() to set it In_sync
This required that recovery_offset be initialized to MaxSector, as
opposed to zero so as to communicate the end of sync for a rdev.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Suspending the entire device for resync could take too long. Resync
in small chunks.
cluster's resync window (32M) is maintained in r1conf as
cluster_sync_low and cluster_sync_high and processed in
raid1's sync_request(). If the current resync is outside the cluster
resync window:
1. Set the cluster_sync_low to curr_resync_completed.
2. Check if the sync will fit in the new window, if not issue a
wait_barrier() and set cluster_sync_low to sector_nr.
3. Set cluster_sync_high to cluster_sync_low + resync_window.
4. Send a message to all nodes so they may add it in their suspension
list.
bitmap_cond_end_sync is modified to allow to force a sync inorder
to get the curr_resync_completed uptodate with the sector passed.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
The commit 55ce74d4bf (md/raid1: ensure
device failure recorded before write request returns) is causing crash in
the LVM2 testsuite test shell/lvchange-raid.sh. For me the crash is 100%
reproducible.
The reason for the crash is that the newly added code in raid1d moves the
list from conf->bio_end_io_list to tmp, then tests if tmp is non-empty and
then incorrectly pops the bio from conf->bio_end_io_list (which is empty
because the list was alrady moved).
Raid-10 has a similar bug.
Kernel Fault: Code=15 regs=000000006ccb8640 (Addr=0000000100000000)
CPU: 3 PID: 1930 Comm: mdX_raid1 Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-bisect+ #35
task: 000000006cc1f258 ti: 000000006ccb8000 task.ti: 000000006ccb8000
YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
PSW: 00001000000001001111111000001111 Not tainted
r00-03 000000ff0804fe0f 000000001059d000 000000001059f818 000000007f16be38
r04-07 000000001059d000 000000007f16be08 0000000000200200 0000000000000001
r08-11 000000006ccb8260 000000007b7934d0 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
r12-15 000000004056f320 0000000000000000 0000000000013dd0 0000000000000000
r16-19 00000000f0d00ae0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
r20-23 000000000800000f 0000000042200390 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
r24-27 0000000000000001 000000000800000f 000000007f16be08 000000001059d000
r28-31 0000000100000000 000000006ccb8560 000000006ccb8640 0000000000000000
sr00-03 0000000000249800 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000249800
sr04-07 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 000000001059f61c 000000001059f620
IIR: 0f8010c6 ISR: 0000000000000000 IOR: 0000000100000000
CPU: 3 CR30: 000000006ccb8000 CR31: 0000000000000000
ORIG_R28: 000000001059d000
IAOQ[0]: call_bio_endio+0x34/0x1a8 [raid1]
IAOQ[1]: call_bio_endio+0x38/0x1a8 [raid1]
RP(r2): raid_end_bio_io+0x88/0x168 [raid1]
Backtrace:
[<000000001059f818>] raid_end_bio_io+0x88/0x168 [raid1]
[<00000000105a4f64>] raid1d+0x144/0x1640 [raid1]
[<000000004017fd5c>] kthread+0x144/0x160
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Fixes: 55ce74d4bf ("md/raid1: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.")
Fixes: 95af587e95 ("md/raid10: ensure device failure recorded before write request returns.")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
close_sync() needs to set conf->next_resync to a large, but safe value
below MaxSector and use it to determine whether or not to set
start_next_window in wait_barrier()
Solution suggested by Neil Brown.
Reported-by: Nate Dailey <nate.dailey@stratus.com>
Tested-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Remove unneeded NULL test.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@ expression x; @@
-if (x != NULL)
\(kmem_cache_destroy\|mempool_destroy\|dma_pool_destroy\)(x);
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Pull core block updates from Jens Axboe:
"This first core part of the block IO changes contains:
- Cleanup of the bio IO error signaling from Christoph. We used to
rely on the uptodate bit and passing around of an error, now we
store the error in the bio itself.
- Improvement of the above from myself, by shrinking the bio size
down again to fit in two cachelines on x86-64.
- Revert of the max_hw_sectors cap removal from a revision again,
from Jeff Moyer. This caused performance regressions in various
tests. Reinstate the limit, bump it to a more reasonable size
instead.
- Make /sys/block/<dev>/queue/discard_max_bytes writeable, by me.
Most devices have huge trim limits, which can cause nasty latencies
when deleting files. Enable the admin to configure the size down.
We will look into having a more sane default instead of UINT_MAX
sectors.
- Improvement of the SGP gaps logic from Keith Busch.
- Enable the block core to handle arbitrarily sized bios, which
enables a nice simplification of bio_add_page() (which is an IO hot
path). From Kent.
- Improvements to the partition io stats accounting, making it
faster. From Ming Lei.
- Also from Ming Lei, a basic fixup for overflow of the sysfs pending
file in blk-mq, as well as a fix for a blk-mq timeout race
condition.
- Ming Lin has been carrying Kents above mentioned patches forward
for a while, and testing them. Ming also did a few fixes around
that.
- Sasha Levin found and fixed a use-after-free problem introduced by
the bio->bi_error changes from Christoph.
- Small blk cgroup cleanup from Viresh Kumar"
* 'for-4.3/core' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (26 commits)
blk: Fix bio_io_vec index when checking bvec gaps
block: Replace SG_GAPS with new queue limits mask
block: bump BLK_DEF_MAX_SECTORS to 2560
Revert "block: remove artifical max_hw_sectors cap"
blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
blk-mq: fix buffer overflow when reading sysfs file of 'pending'
Documentation: update notes in biovecs about arbitrarily sized bios
block: remove bio_get_nr_vecs()
fs: use helper bio_add_page() instead of open coding on bi_io_vec
block: kill merge_bvec_fn() completely
md/raid5: get rid of bio_fits_rdev()
md/raid5: split bio for chunk_aligned_read
block: remove split code in blkdev_issue_{discard,write_same}
btrfs: remove bio splitting and merge_bvec_fn() calls
bcache: remove driver private bio splitting code
block: simplify bio_add_page()
block: make generic_make_request handle arbitrarily sized bios
blk-cgroup: Drop unlikely before IS_ERR(_OR_NULL)
block: don't access bio->bi_error after bio_put()
block: shrink struct bio down to 2 cache lines again
...
When a write to one of the legs of a RAID1 fails, the failure is
recorded in the metadata of the other leg(s) so that after a restart
the data on the failed drive wont be trusted even if that drive seems
to be working again (maybe a cable was unplugged).
Similarly when we record a bad-block in response to a write failure,
we must not let the write complete until the bad-block update is safe.
Currently there is no interlock between the write request completing
and the metadata update. So it is possible that the write will
complete, the app will confirm success in some way, and then the
machine will crash before the metadata update completes.
This is an extremely small hole for a racy to fit in, but it is
theoretically possible and so should be closed.
So:
- set MD_CHANGE_PENDING when requesting a metadata update for a
failed device, so we can know with certainty when it completes
- queue requests that experienced an error on a new queue which
is only processed after the metadata update completes
- call raid_end_bio_io() on bios in that queue when the time comes.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
When checking sync_action in a script, we want to be sure it is
as accurate as possible.
As resync/reshape etc doesn't always start immediately (a separate
thread is scheduled to do it), it is best if 'action_show'
checks if MD_RECOVER_NEEDED is set (which it does) and in that
case reports what is likely to start soon (which it only sometimes
does).
So:
- report 'reshape' if reshape_position suggests one might start.
- set MD_RECOVERY_RECOVER in raid1_reshape(), because that is very
likely to happen next.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
As generic_make_request() is now able to handle arbitrarily sized bios,
it's no longer necessary for each individual block driver to define its
own ->merge_bvec_fn() callback. Remove every invocation completely.
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Lars Ellenberg <drbd-dev@lists.linbit.com>
Cc: drbd-user@lists.linbit.com
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@inktank.com>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Cc: Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org>
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> (for the 'md' bits)
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
[dpark: also remove ->merge_bvec_fn() in dm-thin as well as
dm-era-target, and resolve merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park <dpark@posteo.net>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lin <ming.l@ssi.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
raid1_end_read_request() assumes that the In_sync bits are consistent
with the ->degaded count.
raid1_spare_active updates the In_sync bit before the ->degraded count
and so exposes an inconsistency, as does error()
So extend the spinlock in raid1_spare_active() and error() to hide those
inconsistencies.
This should probably be part of
Commit: 34cab6f420 ("md/raid1: fix test for 'was read error from
last working device'.")
as it addresses the same issue. It fixes the same bug and should go
to -stable for same reasons.
Fixes: 76073054c9 ("md/raid1: clean up read_balance.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.0+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Some places use helpers now, others don't. We only have the 'is set'
helper, add helpers for setting and clearing flags too.
It was a bit of a mess of atomic vs non-atomic access. With
BIO_UPTODATE gone, we don't have any risk of concurrent access to the
flags. So relax the restriction and don't make any of them atomic. The
flags that do have serialization issues (reffed and chained), we
already handle those separately.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Currently we have two different ways to signal an I/O error on a BIO:
(1) by clearing the BIO_UPTODATE flag
(2) by returning a Linux errno value to the bi_end_io callback
The first one has the drawback of only communicating a single possible
error (-EIO), and the second one has the drawback of not beeing persistent
when bios are queued up, and are not passed along from child to parent
bio in the ever more popular chaining scenario. Having both mechanisms
available has the additional drawback of utterly confusing driver authors
and introducing bugs where various I/O submitters only deal with one of
them, and the others have to add boilerplate code to deal with both kinds
of error returns.
So add a new bi_error field to store an errno value directly in struct
bio and remove the existing mechanisms to clean all this up.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
During a node failure, We need to suspend read balancing so that the
reads are directed to the first device and stale data is not read.
Suspending writes is not required because these would be recorded and
synced eventually.
A new flag MD_CLUSTER_SUSPEND_READ_BALANCING is set in recover_prep().
area_resyncing() will respond true for the entire devices if this
flag is set and the request type is READ. The flag is cleared
in recover_done().
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Reported-By: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
When we get a read error from the last working device, we don't
try to repair it, and don't fail the device. We simple report a
read error to the caller.
However the current test for 'is this the last working device' is
wrong.
When there is only one fully working device, it assumes that a
non-faulty device is that device. However a spare which is rebuilding
would be non-faulty but so not the only working device.
So change the test from "!Faulty" to "In_sync". If ->degraded says
there is only one fully working device and this device is in_sync,
this must be the one.
This bug has existed since we allowed read_balance to read from
a recovering spare in v3.0
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Fixes: 76073054c9 ("md/raid1: clean up read_balance.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.0+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Currently, a bdi (backing_dev_info) embeds single wb (bdi_writeback)
and the role of the separation is unclear. For cgroup support for
writeback IOs, a bdi will be updated to host multiple wb's where each
wb serves writeback IOs of a different cgroup on the bdi. To achieve
that, a wb should carry all states necessary for servicing writeback
IOs for a cgroup independently.
This patch moves bdi->state into wb.
* enum bdi_state is renamed to wb_state and the prefix of all enums is
changed from BDI_ to WB_.
* Explicit zeroing of bdi->state is removed without adding zeoring of
wb->state as the whole data structure is zeroed on init anyway.
* As there's still only one bdi_writeback per backing_dev_info, all
uses of bdi->state are mechanically replaced with bdi->wb.state
introducing no behavior changes.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: drbd-dev@lists.linbit.com
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
This option is not well justified and testing suggests that
it hardly ever makes any difference.
The comment suggests there might be a need to wait for non-resync
activity indicated by ->nr_waiting, however raise_barrier()
already waits for all of that.
So just remove it to simplify reasoning about speed limiting.
This allows us to remove a 'FIXME' comment from raid5.c as that
never used the flag.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
When a drive is marked write-mostly it should only be the
target of reads if there is no other option.
This behaviour was broken by
commit 9dedf60313
md/raid1: read balance chooses idlest disk for SSD
which causes a write-mostly device to be *preferred* is some cases.
Restore correct behaviour by checking and setting
best_dist_disk and best_pending_disk rather than best_disk.
We only need to test one of these as they are both changed
from -1 or >=0 at the same time.
As we leave min_pending and best_dist unchanged, any non-write-mostly
device will appear better than the write-mostly device.
Reported-by: Tomáš Hodek <tomas.hodek@volny.cz>
Reported-by: Dark Penguin <darkpenguin@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-raid&m=135982797322422
Fixes: 9dedf60313
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.6+)
Algorithm:
1. Node 1 issues mdadm --manage /dev/mdX --add /dev/sdYY which issues
ioctl(ADD_NEW_DISC with disc.state set to MD_DISK_CLUSTER_ADD)
2. Node 1 sends NEWDISK with uuid and slot number
3. Other nodes issue kobject_uevent_env with uuid and slot number
(Steps 4,5 could be a udev rule)
4. In userspace, the node searches for the disk, perhaps
using blkid -t SUB_UUID=""
5. Other nodes issue either of the following depending on whether the disk
was found:
ioctl(ADD_NEW_DISK with disc.state set to MD_DISK_CANDIDATE and
disc.number set to slot number)
ioctl(CLUSTERED_DISK_NACK)
6. Other nodes drop lock on no-new-devs (CR) if device is found
7. Node 1 attempts EX lock on no-new-devs
8. If node 1 gets the lock, it sends METADATA_UPDATED after unmarking the disk
as SpareLocal
9. If not (get no-new-dev lock), it fails the operation and sends METADATA_UPDATED
10. Other nodes understand if the device is added or not by reading the superblock again after receiving the METADATA_UPDATED message.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Zhong <lzhong@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
set choose_first true for cluster read in read balance when the area
is resyncing.
Signed-off-by: Lidong Zhong <lzhong@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
If there is a resync going on, all nodes must suspend writes to the
range. This is recorded in the suspend_info/suspend_list.
If there is an I/O within the ranges of any of the suspend_info,
should_suspend will return 1.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
This modifies raid1's narrow_write_error to round up block_sectors to the
device's logical block size.
This prevents sd complaining about "Bad block number requested" for non-512-byte
sector disks.
Signed-off-by: Nate Dailey <nate.dailey@stratus.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Now that the ->stop function only frees the private data,
rename is accordingly.
Also pass in the private pointer as an arg rather than using
mddev->private. This flexibility will be useful in level_store().
Finally, don't clear ->private. It doesn't make sense to clear
it seeing that isn't what we free, and it is no longer necessary
to clear ->private (it was some time ago before ->to_remove was
introduced).
Setting ->to_remove in ->free() is a bit of a wart, but not a
big problem at the moment.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Each md personality has a 'stop' operation which does two
things:
1/ it finalizes some aspects of the array to ensure nothing
is accessing the ->private data
2/ it frees the ->private data.
All the steps in '1' can apply to all arrays and so can be
performed in common code.
This is useful as in the case where we change the personality which
manages an array (in level_store()), it would be helpful to do
step 1 early, and step 2 later.
So split the 'step 1' functionality out into a new mddev_detach().
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
There is no locking around calls to merge_bvec_fn(), so
it is possible that calls which coincide with a level (or personality)
change could go wrong.
So create a central dispatch point for these functions and use
rcu_read_lock().
If the array is suspended, reject any merge that can be rejected.
If not, we know it is safe to call the function.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
There is currently no locking around calls to the 'congested'
bdi function. If called at an awkward time while an array is
being converted from one level (or personality) to another, there
is a tiny chance of running code in an unreferenced module etc.
So add a 'congested' function to the md_personality operations
structure, and call it with appropriate locking from a central
'mddev_congested'.
When the array personality is changing the array will be 'suspended'
so no IO is processed.
If mddev_congested detects this, it simply reports that the
array is congested, which is a safe guess.
As mddev_suspend calls synchronize_rcu(), mddev_congested can
avoid races by included the whole call inside an rcu_read_lock()
region.
This require that the congested functions for all subordinate devices
can be run under rcu_lock. Fortunately this is the case.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.
If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices. So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.
It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices. So fix it.
This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered. It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.
Fixes: da8840a747
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.5+)
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Both normal IO and resync IO can be retried with reschedule_retry()
and so be counted into ->nr_queued, but only normal IO gets counted in
->nr_pending.
Before the recent improvement to RAID1 resync there could only
possibly have been one or the other on the queue. When handling a
read failure it could only be normal IO. So when handle_read_error()
called freeze_array() the fact that freeze_array only compares
->nr_queued against ->nr_pending was safe.
But now that these two types can interleave, we can have both normal
and resync IO requests queued, so we need to count them both in
nr_pending.
This error can lead to freeze_array() hanging if there is a read
error, so it is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Reported-by: Brassow Jonathan <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
raise_barrier() uses next_resync as part of its calculations, so it
really should be updated first, instead of afterwards.
next_resync is always used under resync_lock so update it under
resync lock to, just before it is used. That is safest.
This could cause normal IO and resync IO to interact badly so
it suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
next_resync is (approximately) the location for the next resync request.
However it does *not* reliably determine the earliest location
at which resync might be happening.
This is because resync requests can complete out of order, and
we only limit the number of current requests, not the distance
from the earliest pending request to the latest.
mddev->curr_resync_completed is a reliable indicator of the earliest
position at which resync could be happening. It is updated less
frequently, but is actually reliable which is more important.
So use it to determine if a write request is before the region
being resynced and so safe from conflict.
This error can allow resync IO to interfere with normal IO which
could lead to data corruption. Hence: stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
The resync/recovery process for raid1 was recently changed
so that writes could happen in parallel with resync providing
they were in different regions of the device.
There is a problem though: While a write request will always
wait for conflicting resync to complete, a resync request
will *not* always wait for conflicting writes to complete.
Two changes are needed to fix this:
1/ raise_barrier (which waits until it is safe to do resync)
must wait until current_window_requests is zero
2/ wait_battier (which waits at the start of a new write request)
must update current_window_requests if the request could
possible conflict with a concurrent resync.
As concurrent writes and resync can lead to data loss,
this patch is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Cc: majianpeng <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
If there are outstanding writes when close_sync is called,
the change to ->start_next_window might cause them to
decrement the wrong counter when they complete. Fix this
by merging the two counters into the one that will be decremented.
Having an incorrect value in a counter can cause raise_barrier()
to hangs, so this is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
