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Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hendrik Brueckner
62226983da KEYS: correct alignment of system_certificate_list content in assembly file
Apart from data-type specific alignment constraints, there are also
architecture-specific alignment requirements.
For example, on s390 symbols must be on even addresses implying a 2-byte
alignment.  If the system_certificate_list_end symbol is on an odd address
and if this address is loaded, the least-significant bit is ignored.  As a
result, the load_system_certificate_list() fails to load the certificates
because of a wrong certificate length calculation.

To be safe, align system_certificate_list on an 8-byte boundary.  Also improve
the length calculation of the system_certificate_list content.  Introduce a
system_certificate_list_size (8-byte aligned because of unsigned long) variable
that stores the length.  Let the linker calculate this size by introducing
a start and end label for the certificate content.

Signed-off-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-12-10 18:25:28 +00:00
Chen Gang
6ef4d2eaf5 kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL()
If a macro is only used within 2 times, and also its contents are
within 2 lines, recommend to expand it to shrink code line.

For our case, the macro is not portable either: some architectures'
assembler may use another character to mark newline in a macro (e.g.
'`' for arc), which will cause issue.

If still want to use macro and let it portable enough, it will also
need include additional header file (e.g "#include <linux/linkage.h>",
although it also need be fixed).


Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-10-30 12:58:00 +00:00
David Howells
b56e5a17b6 KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it
can be used by code other than the module-signing code.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-25 17:17:01 +01:00