Add support for extending the newest data block. For this, introduce
a new finalization state (desc_finalized) denoting a committed
descriptor that cannot be extended.
Until a record is finalized, a writer can reopen that record to
append new data. Reopening a record means transitioning from the
desc_committed state back to the desc_reserved state.
A writer can explicitly finalize a record if there is no intention
of extending it. Also, records are automatically finalized when a
new record is reserved. This relieves writers of needing to
explicitly finalize while also making such records available to
readers sooner. (Readers can only traverse finalized records.)
Four new memory barrier pairs are introduced. Two of them are
insignificant additions (data_realloc:A/desc_read:D and
data_realloc:A/data_push_tail:B) because they are alternate path
memory barriers that exactly match the purpose, pairing, and
context of the two existing memory barrier pairs they provide an
alternate path for. The other two new memory barrier pairs are
significant additions:
desc_reopen_last:A / _prb_commit:B - When reopening a descriptor,
ensure the state transitions back to desc_reserved before
fully trusting the descriptor data.
_prb_commit:B / desc_reserve:D - When committing a descriptor,
ensure the state transitions to desc_committed before checking
the head ID to see if the descriptor needs to be finalized.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914123354.832-6-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Rather than deriving the state by evaluating bits within the flags
area of the state variable, assign the states explicit values and
set those values in the flags area. Introduce macros to make it
simple to read and write state values for the state variable.
Although the functionality is preserved, the binary representation
for the states is changed.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914123354.832-5-john.ogness@linutronix.de
With the introduction of the lockless printk ringbuffer, the data
structure for the kernel log buffer was changed. Update the gdb
scripts to be able to parse/print the new log buffer structure.
Fixes: 896fbe20b4 ("printk: use the lockless ringbuffer")
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: A typo fix.]
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200814212525.6118-3-john.ogness@linutronix.de
With the introduction of the lockless printk ringbuffer, the
VMCOREINFO relating to the kernel log buffer was changed. Update the
documentation to match those changes.
Fixes: 896fbe20b4 ("printk: use the lockless ringbuffer")
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200814213316.6394-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch introduces
a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to provide a simple and
generic way to stop execution and catch a coredump when the kernel gets
tainted by any given flag.
This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids having to rebuild the
kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() into the code sites that
introduce the taint flags of interest.
For instance, if one is interested in proceeding with a post-mortem
analysis at the point a given code path is hitting a bad page (i.e.
unaccount_page_cache_page(), or slab_bug()), a coredump can be collected
by rebooting the kernel with 'panic_on_taint=0x20' amended to the
command line.
Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be as a means
for assuring a security policy case where only a subset of taints, or no
single taint (in paranoid mode), is allowed for the running system. The
optional switch 'nousertaint' is handy in this particular scenario, as
it will avoid userspace induced crashes by writes to sysctl interface
/proc/sys/kernel/tainted causing false positive hits for such policies.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak kernel-parameters.txt wording]
Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200515175502.146720-1-aquini@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add documentation for KERNELPACMASK variable being added to the vmcoreinfo.
It indicates the PAC bits mask information of signed kernel pointers if
Armv8.3-A Pointer Authentication feature is present.
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1589202116-18265-2-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The Kdump documentation describes procedures with admins use
in order to solve issues on their systems.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
