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Author SHA1 Message Date

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Greg Kroah-Hartman	b24413180f	License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a /uapi/ one with no licensing information in it, - file was a /uapi/ one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non /uapi/ files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------\|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a /uapi/ path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------\|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the /uapi/ ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------\|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>	2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Horia Geantă	eb9ba37dc1	crypto: caam/qi - handle large number of S/Gs case For more than 16 S/G entries, driver currently corrupts memory on ARMv8, see below KASAN log. Note: this does not reproduce on PowerPC due to different (smaller) cache line size - 64 bytes on PPC vs. 128 bytes on ARMv8. One such use case is one of the cbc(aes) test vectors - with 8 S/G entries and src != dst. Driver needs 1 (IV) + 2 x 8 = 17 entries, which goes over the 16 S/G entries limit: (CAAM_QI_MEMCACHE_SIZE - offsetof(struct ablkcipher_edesc, sgt)) / sizeof(struct qm_sg_entry) = 256 / 16 = 16 S/Gs Fix this by: -increasing object size in caamqicache pool from 512 to 768; this means the maximum number of S/G entries grows from (at least) 16 to 32 (again, for ARMv8 case of 128-byte cache line) -add checks in the driver to fail gracefully (ENOMEM) in case the 32 S/G entries limit is exceeded ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ablkcipher_edesc_alloc+0x4ec/0xf60 Write of size 1 at addr ffff800021cb6003 by task cryptomgr_test/1394 CPU: 3 PID: 1394 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7-next-20170703-00023-g72badbcc1ea7-dirty #26 Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT) Call trace: [<ffff20000808ac6c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x290 [<ffff20000808b014>] show_stack+0x14/0x1c [<ffff200008d62c00>] dump_stack+0xa4/0xc8 [<ffff200008264e40>] print_address_description+0x110/0x26c [<ffff200008265224>] kasan_report+0x1d0/0x2fc [<ffff2000082637b8>] __asan_store1+0x4c/0x54 [<ffff200008b4884c>] ablkcipher_edesc_alloc+0x4ec/0xf60 [<ffff200008b49304>] ablkcipher_encrypt+0x44/0xcc [<ffff20000848a61c>] skcipher_encrypt_ablkcipher+0x120/0x138 [<ffff200008495014>] __test_skcipher+0xaec/0xe30 [<ffff200008497088>] test_skcipher+0x6c/0xd8 [<ffff200008497154>] alg_test_skcipher+0x60/0xe4 [<ffff2000084974c4>] alg_test.part.13+0x130/0x304 [<ffff2000084976d4>] alg_test+0x3c/0x68 [<ffff2000084938ac>] cryptomgr_test+0x54/0x5c [<ffff20000810276c>] kthread+0x188/0x1c8 [<ffff2000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50 Allocated by task 1394: save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x1ac save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20 kasan_kmalloc.part.5+0x48/0x110 kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x1c kmem_cache_alloc+0x124/0x1e8 qi_cache_alloc+0x28/0x58 ablkcipher_edesc_alloc+0x244/0xf60 ablkcipher_encrypt+0x44/0xcc skcipher_encrypt_ablkcipher+0x120/0x138 __test_skcipher+0xaec/0xe30 test_skcipher+0x6c/0xd8 alg_test_skcipher+0x60/0xe4 alg_test.part.13+0x130/0x304 alg_test+0x3c/0x68 cryptomgr_test+0x54/0x5c kthread+0x188/0x1c8 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50 Freed by task 0: (stack is not available) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff800021cb5e00 which belongs to the cache caamqicache of size 512 The buggy address is located 3 bytes to the right of 512-byte region [ffff800021cb5e00, ffff800021cb6000) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffff7e0000872d00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0xfffc00000008100(slab\|head) raw: 0fffc00000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180190019 raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff800931268200 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff800021cb5f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff800021cb5f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff800021cb6000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff800021cb6080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff800021cb6100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Fixes: `b189817cf7` ("crypto: caam/qi - add ablkcipher and authenc algorithms") Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>	2017-07-18 18:16:02 +08:00
Horia Geantă	67c2315def	crypto: caam - add Queue Interface (QI) backend support CAAM engine supports two interfaces for crypto job submission: -job ring interface - already existing caam/jr driver -Queue Interface (QI) - caam/qi driver added in current patch QI is present in CAAM engines found on DPAA platforms. QI gets its I/O (frame descriptors) from QMan (Queue Manager) queues. This patch adds a platform device for accessing CAAM's queue interface. The requests are submitted to CAAM using one frame queue per cryptographic context. Each crypto context has one shared descriptor. This shared descriptor is attached to frame queue associated with corresponding driver context using context_a. The driver hides the mechanics of FQ creation, initialisation from its applications. Each cryptographic context needs to be associated with driver context which houses the FQ to be used to transport the job to CAAM. The driver provides API for: (a) Context creation (b) Job submission (c) Context deletion (d) Congestion indication - whether path to/from CAAM is congested The driver supports affining its context to a particular CPU. This means that any responses from CAAM for the context in question would arrive at the given CPU. This helps in implementing one CPU per packet round trip in IPsec application. The driver processes CAAM responses under NAPI contexts. NAPI contexts are instantiated only on cores with affined portals since only cores having their own portal can receive responses from DQRR. The responses from CAAM for all cryptographic contexts ride on a fixed set of FQs. We use one response FQ per portal owning core. The response FQ is configured in each core's and thus portal's dedicated channel. This gives the flexibility to direct CAAM's responses for a crypto context on a given core. Signed-off-by: Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Porosanu <alexandru.porosanu@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>	2017-03-24 22:02:59 +08:00

Greg Kroah-Hartman

b24413180f

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00

Horia Geantă

eb9ba37dc1

crypto: caam/qi - handle large number of S/Gs case

For more than 16 S/G entries, driver currently corrupts memory
on ARMv8, see below KASAN log.
Note: this does not reproduce on PowerPC due to different (smaller)
cache line size - 64 bytes on PPC vs. 128 bytes on ARMv8.

One such use case is one of the cbc(aes) test vectors - with 8 S/G
entries and src != dst. Driver needs 1 (IV) + 2 x 8 = 17 entries,
which goes over the 16 S/G entries limit:
(CAAM_QI_MEMCACHE_SIZE - offsetof(struct ablkcipher_edesc, sgt)) /
sizeof(struct qm_sg_entry) = 256 / 16 = 16 S/Gs

Fix this by:
-increasing object size in caamqicache pool from 512 to 768; this means
the maximum number of S/G entries grows from (at least) 16 to 32
(again, for ARMv8 case of 128-byte cache line)
-add checks in the driver to fail gracefully (ENOMEM) in case the 32 S/G
entries limit is exceeded

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ablkcipher_edesc_alloc+0x4ec/0xf60
Write of size 1 at addr ffff800021cb6003 by task cryptomgr_test/1394

CPU: 3 PID: 1394 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7-next-20170703-00023-g72badbcc1ea7-dirty #26
Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffff20000808ac6c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x290
[<ffff20000808b014>] show_stack+0x14/0x1c
[<ffff200008d62c00>] dump_stack+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff200008264e40>] print_address_description+0x110/0x26c
[<ffff200008265224>] kasan_report+0x1d0/0x2fc
[<ffff2000082637b8>] __asan_store1+0x4c/0x54
[<ffff200008b4884c>] ablkcipher_edesc_alloc+0x4ec/0xf60
[<ffff200008b49304>] ablkcipher_encrypt+0x44/0xcc
[<ffff20000848a61c>] skcipher_encrypt_ablkcipher+0x120/0x138
[<ffff200008495014>] __test_skcipher+0xaec/0xe30
[<ffff200008497088>] test_skcipher+0x6c/0xd8
[<ffff200008497154>] alg_test_skcipher+0x60/0xe4
[<ffff2000084974c4>] alg_test.part.13+0x130/0x304
[<ffff2000084976d4>] alg_test+0x3c/0x68
[<ffff2000084938ac>] cryptomgr_test+0x54/0x5c
[<ffff20000810276c>] kthread+0x188/0x1c8
[<ffff2000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50

Allocated by task 1394:
 save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x1ac
 save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20
 kasan_kmalloc.part.5+0x48/0x110
 kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0
 kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x1c
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x124/0x1e8
 qi_cache_alloc+0x28/0x58
 ablkcipher_edesc_alloc+0x244/0xf60
 ablkcipher_encrypt+0x44/0xcc
 skcipher_encrypt_ablkcipher+0x120/0x138
 __test_skcipher+0xaec/0xe30
 test_skcipher+0x6c/0xd8
 alg_test_skcipher+0x60/0xe4
 alg_test.part.13+0x130/0x304
 alg_test+0x3c/0x68
 cryptomgr_test+0x54/0x5c
 kthread+0x188/0x1c8
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50

Freed by task 0:
(stack is not available)

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff800021cb5e00
 which belongs to the cache caamqicache of size 512
The buggy address is located 3 bytes to the right of
 512-byte region [ffff800021cb5e00, ffff800021cb6000)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e0000872d00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null)
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xfffc00000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0fffc00000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180190019
raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff800931268200 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff800021cb5f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff800021cb5f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff800021cb6000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                   ^
 ffff800021cb6080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff800021cb6100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================

Fixes: b189817cf7 ("crypto: caam/qi - add ablkcipher and authenc algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

2017-07-18 18:16:02 +08:00

Horia Geantă

67c2315def

crypto: caam - add Queue Interface (QI) backend support

CAAM engine supports two interfaces for crypto job submission:
-job ring interface - already existing caam/jr driver
-Queue Interface (QI) - caam/qi driver added in current patch

QI is present in CAAM engines found on DPAA platforms.
QI gets its I/O (frame descriptors) from QMan (Queue Manager) queues.

This patch adds a platform device for accessing CAAM's queue interface.
The requests are submitted to CAAM using one frame queue per
cryptographic context. Each crypto context has one shared descriptor.
This shared descriptor is attached to frame queue associated with
corresponding driver context using context_a.

The driver hides the mechanics of FQ creation, initialisation from its
applications. Each cryptographic context needs to be associated with
driver context which houses the FQ to be used to transport the job to
CAAM. The driver provides API for:
(a) Context creation
(b) Job submission
(c) Context deletion
(d) Congestion indication - whether path to/from CAAM is congested

The driver supports affining its context to a particular CPU.
This means that any responses from CAAM for the context in question
would arrive at the given CPU. This helps in implementing one CPU
per packet round trip in IPsec application.

The driver processes CAAM responses under NAPI contexts.
NAPI contexts are instantiated only on cores with affined portals since
only cores having their own portal can receive responses from DQRR.

The responses from CAAM for all cryptographic contexts ride on a fixed
set of FQs. We use one response FQ per portal owning core. The response
FQ is configured in each core's and thus portal's dedicated channel.
This gives the flexibility to direct CAAM's responses for a crypto
context on a given core.

Signed-off-by: Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Porosanu <alexandru.porosanu@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

2017-03-24 22:02:59 +08:00

3 Commits