Pull user namespace rlimit handling update from Eric Biederman:
"This is the work mainly by Alexey Gladkov to limit rlimits to the
rlimits of the user that created a user namespace, and to allow users
to have stricter limits on the resources created within a user
namespace."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failed
ucounts: Silence warning in dec_rlimit_ucounts
ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold
kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/legion-kernel-org/Count-rlimits-in-each-user-namespace/20210427-162857
> base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest.git next
> config: arc-randconfig-m031-20210426 (attached as .config)
> compiler: arceb-elf-gcc (GCC) 9.3.0
>
> If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
>
> smatch warnings:
> kernel/ucount.c:270 dec_rlimit_ucounts() error: uninitialized symbol 'new'.
>
> vim +/new +270 kernel/ucount.c
>
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 260 bool dec_rlimit_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long v)
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 261 {
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 262 struct ucounts *iter;
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 263 long new;
> ^^^^^^^^
>
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 264 for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 265 long dec = atomic_long_add_return(-v, &iter->ucount[type]);
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 266 WARN_ON_ONCE(dec < 0);
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 267 if (iter == ucounts)
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 268 new = dec;
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 269 }
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 @270 return (new == 0);
> ^^^^^^^^
> I don't know if this is a bug or not, but I can definitely tell why the
> static checker complains about it.
>
> 176ec2b092cc22 Alexey Gladkov 2021-04-22 271 }
In the only two cases that care about the return value of
dec_rlimit_ucounts the code first tests to see that ucounts is not
NULL. In those cases it is guaranteed at least one iteration of the
loop will execute guaranteeing the variable new will be initialized.
Initialize new to -1 so that the return value is well defined even
when the loop does not execute and the static checker is silenced.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/m1tunny77w.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
Changelog
v11:
* Fix issue found by lkp robot.
v8:
* Fix issues found by lkp-tests project.
v7:
* Keep only ucounts for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK checks instead of struct cred.
v6:
* Fix bug in hugetlb_file_setup() detected by trinity.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/970d50c70c71bfd4496e0e8d2a0a32feebebb350.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
Changelog
v11:
* Revert most of changes to fix performance issues.
v10:
* Fix memory leak on get_ucounts failure.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/df9d7764dddd50f28616b7840de74ec0f81711a8.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2531f42f7884bbfee56a978040b3e0d25cdf6cde.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that
does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in
multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to
set RLIMIT_NPROC=1.
service-A
\- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1)
\- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1)
The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1.
When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in
container2 it fails since user X already has one running process.
We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not
allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be
overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability.
Changelog
v11:
* Change inc_rlimit_ucounts() which now returns top value of ucounts.
* Drop inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test() because the return code of
inc_rlimit_ucounts() can be checked.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5286a8aa16d2d698c222f7532f3d735c82bc6bc.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The current implementation of the ucounts reference counter requires the
use of spin_lock. We're going to use get_ucounts() in more performance
critical areas like a handling of RLIMIT_SIGPENDING.
Now we need to use spin_lock only if we want to change the hashtable.
v10:
* Always try to put ucounts in case we cannot increase ucounts->count.
This will allow to cover the case when all consumers will return
ucounts at once.
v9:
* Use a negative value to check that the ucounts->count is close to
overflow.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/94d1dbecab060a6b116b0a2d1accd8ca1bbb4f5f.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the
global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it
in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will
allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for
user in the user_namespace.
Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we
cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function
cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify
cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds().
Changelog
v6:
* Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This
error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts
pointer empty.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE and RLIMIT_MEMLOCK use unsigned long to store their
counters. As a preparation for moving rlimits based on ucounts, we need
to increase the size of the variable to long.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/257aa5fb1a7d81cf0f4c34f39ada2320c4284771.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
fanotify has some hardcoded limits. The only APIs to escape those limits
are FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE and FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS.
Allow finer grained tuning of the system limits via sysfs tunables under
/proc/sys/fs/fanotify, similar to tunables under /proc/sys/fs/inotify,
with some minor differences.
- max_queued_events - global system tunable for group queue size limit.
Like the inotify tunable with the same name, it defaults to 16384 and
applies on initialization of a new group.
- max_user_marks - user ns tunable for marks limit per user.
Like the inotify tunable named max_user_watches, on a machine with
sufficient RAM and it defaults to 1048576 in init userns and can be
further limited per containing user ns.
- max_user_groups - user ns tunable for number of groups per user.
Like the inotify tunable named max_user_instances, it defaults to 128
in init userns and can be further limited per containing user ns.
The slightly different tunable names used for fanotify are derived from
the "group" and "mark" terminology used in the fanotify man pages and
throughout the code.
Considering the fact that the default value for max_user_instances was
increased in kernel v5.10 from 8192 to 1048576, leaving the legacy
fanotify limit of 8192 marks per group in addition to the max_user_marks
limit makes little sense, so the per group marks limit has been removed.
Note that when a group is initialized with FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS, its own
marks are not accounted in the per user marks account, so in effect the
limit of max_user_marks is only for the collection of groups that are
not initialized with FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304112921.3996419-2-amir73il@gmail.com
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Commit 769071ac9f "ns: Introduce Time Namespace" broke reporting of
inotify ucounts (max_inotify_instances, max_inotify_watches) in
/proc/sys/user because it has added UCOUNT_TIME_NAMESPACES into enum
ucount_type but didn't properly update reporting in
kernel/ucount.c:setup_userns_sysctls(). This problem got fixed in commit
eeec26d5da "time/namespace: Add max_time_namespaces ucount".
Add BUILD_BUG_ON to catch a similar problem in the future.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407154643.10102-1-jack@suse.cz
Michael noticed that userns limit for number of time namespaces is missing.
Furthermore, time namespace introduced UCOUNT_TIME_NAMESPACES, but didn't
introduce an array member in user_table[]. It would make array's
initialisation OOB write, but by luck the user_table array has an excessive
empty member (all accesses to the array are limited with UCOUNT_COUNTS - so
it silently reuses the last free member.
Fixes user-visible regression: max_inotify_instances by reason of the
missing UCOUNT_ENTRY() has limited max number of namespaces instead of the
number of inotify instances.
Fixes: 769071ac9f ("ns: Introduce Time Namespace")
Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200406171342.128733-1-dima@arista.com
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.
On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.
The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:
$ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
248
Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.
This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:
# scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
Data old new delta
sysctl_vals - 12 +12
__kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12
max 14 10 -4
int_max 16 - -16
one 68 - -68
zero 128 28 -100
Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%
[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2 of the license
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious
reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source
files that do not use it.
This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig. It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes. I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.
Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms. Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).
[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
combine all of those. ]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> [2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Always increment/decrement ucount->count under the ucounts_lock. The
increments are there already and moving the decrements there means the
locking logic of the code is simpler. This simplification in the
locking logic fixes a race between put_ucounts and get_ucounts that
could result in a use-after-free because the count could go zero then
be found by get_ucounts and then be freed by put_ucounts.
A bug presumably this one was found by a combination of syzkaller and
KASAN. JongWhan Kim reported the syzkaller failure and Dmitry Vyukov
spotted the race in the code.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f6b2db1a3e ("userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.
Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
The user_header gets caught by kmemleak with the following splat as
missing a free:
unreferenced object 0xffff99667a733d80 (size 96):
comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294892317 (age 62191.468s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
a0 b6 92 b4 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
__kmalloc+0x144/0x260
__register_sysctl_table+0x54/0x5e0
register_sysctl+0x1b/0x20
user_namespace_sysctl_init+0x17/0x34
do_one_initcall+0x52/0x1a0
kernel_init_freeable+0x173/0x200
kernel_init+0xe/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
The BUG_ON()s are intended to crash so no need to clean up after
ourselves on error there. This is also a kernel/ subsys_init() we don't
need a respective exit call here as this is never modular, so just white
list it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170203211404.31458-1-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patchset converts inotify to using the newly introduced
per-userns sysctl infrastructure.
Currently the inotify instances/watches are being accounted in the
user_struct structure. This means that in setups where multiple
users in unprivileged containers map to the same underlying
real user (i.e. pointing to the same user_struct) the inotify limits
are going to be shared as well, allowing one user(or application) to exhaust
all others limits.
Fix this by switching the inotify sysctls to using the
per-namespace/per-user limits. This will allow the server admin to
set sensible global limits, which can further be tuned inside every
individual user namespace. Additionally, in order to preserve the
sysctl ABI make the existing inotify instances/watches sysctls
modify the values of the initial user namespace.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
v2: Fixed the very obvious lack of setting ucounts
on struct mnt_ns reported by Andrei Vagin, and the kbuild
test report.
Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The same kind of recursive sane default limit and policy
countrol that has been implemented for the user namespace
is desirable for the other namespaces, so generalize
the user namespace refernce count into a ucount.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Add a structure that is per user and per user ns and use it to hold
the count of user namespaces. This makes prevents one user from
creating denying service to another user by creating the maximum
number of user namespaces.
Rename the sysctl export of the maximum count from
/proc/sys/userns/max_user_namespaces to /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces
to reflect that the count is now per user.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Export the export the maximum number of user namespaces as
/proc/sys/userns/max_user_namespaces.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Limit per userns sysctls to only be opened for write by a holder
of CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
Add all of the necessary boilerplate for having per user namespace
sysctls.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
