Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2022-05-23
We've added 113 non-merge commits during the last 26 day(s) which contain
a total of 121 files changed, 7425 insertions(+), 1586 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Speed up symbol resolution for kprobes multi-link attachments, from Jiri Olsa.
2) Add BPF dynamic pointer infrastructure e.g. to allow for dynamically sized ringbuf
reservations without extra memory copies, from Joanne Koong.
3) Big batch of libbpf improvements towards libbpf 1.0 release, from Andrii Nakryiko.
4) Add BPF link iterator to traverse links via seq_file ops, from Dmitrii Dolgov.
5) Add source IP address to BPF tunnel key infrastructure, from Kaixi Fan.
6) Refine unprivileged BPF to disable only object-creating commands, from Alan Maguire.
7) Fix JIT blinding of ld_imm64 when they point to subprogs, from Alexei Starovoitov.
8) Add BPF access to mptcp_sock structures and their meta data, from Geliang Tang.
9) Add new BPF helper for access to remote CPU's BPF map elements, from Feng Zhou.
10) Allow attaching 64-bit cookie to BPF link of fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, from Kui-Feng Lee.
11) Follow-ups to typed pointer support in BPF maps, from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi.
12) Add busy-poll test cases to the XSK selftest suite, from Magnus Karlsson.
13) Improvements in BPF selftest test_progs subtest output, from Mykola Lysenko.
14) Fill bpf_prog_pack allocator areas with illegal instructions, from Song Liu.
15) Add generic batch operations for BPF map-in-map cases, from Takshak Chahande.
16) Make bpf_jit_enable more user friendly when permanently on 1, from Tiezhu Yang.
17) Fix an array overflow in bpf_trampoline_get_progs(), from Yuntao Wang.
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220523223805.27931-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
commit 68822bdf76 ("net: generalize skb freeing
deferral to per-cpu lists") added another per-cpu
cache of skbs. It was expected to be small,
and an IPI was forced whenever the list reached 128
skbs.
We might need to be able to control more precisely
queue capacity and added latency.
An IPI is generated whenever queue reaches half capacity.
Default value of the new limit is 64.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A user told me that bpf_jit_enable can be disabled on one system, but he
failed to disable bpf_jit_enable on the other system:
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
No useful info is available through the dmesg log, a quick analysis shows
that the issue is related with CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON.
When CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is enabled, bpf_jit_enable is permanently set
to 1 and setting any other value than that will return failure.
It is better to print some info to tell the user if disable bpf_jit_enable
failed.
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1652153703-22729-3-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
There's a number of functions and static variables used
under net/core/ but not from the outside. We currently
dump most of them into netdevice.h. That bad for many
reasons:
- netdevice.h is very cluttered, hard to figure out
what the APIs are;
- netdevice.h is very long;
- we have to touch netdevice.h more which causes expensive
incremental builds.
Create a header under net/core/ and move some declarations.
The new header is also a bit of a catch-all but that's
fine, if we create more specific headers people will
likely over-think where their declaration fit best.
And end up putting them in netdevice.h, again.
More work should be done on splitting netdevice.h into more
targeted headers, but that'd be more time consuming so small
steps.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Both rps_sock_flow_sysctl() and flow_limit_cpu_sysctl()
are using synchronize_rcu() right before freeing memory
either by vfree() or kfree()
They can switch to kvfree_rcu(ptr) and kfree_rcu(ptr) to benefit
from asynchronous mode, instead of blocking the current thread.
Note that kvfree_rcu(ptr) and kfree_rcu(ptr) eventually can
have to use synchronize_rcu() in some memory pressure cases.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a per ns sysctl that controls the txhash rethink behavior:
net.core.txrehash. When enabled, the same behavior is retained,
when disabled, rethink is not performed. Sysctl is enabled by default.
Signed-off-by: Akhmat Karakotov <hmukos@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
sock.h is pretty heavily used (5k objects rebuilt on x86 after
it's touched). We can drop the include of filter.h from it and
add a forward declaration of struct sk_filter instead.
This decreases the number of rebuilt objects when bpf.h
is touched from ~5k to ~1k.
There's a lot of missing includes this was masking. Primarily
in networking tho, this time.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211229004913.513372-1-kuba@kernel.org
netdev_unregister_timeout_secs=0 can lead to printing the
"waiting for dev to become free" message every jiffy.
This is too frequent and unnecessary.
Set the min value to 1 second.
Also fix the merge issue introduced by
"net: make unregister netdev warning timeout configurable":
it changed "refcnt != 1" to "refcnt".
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 5aa3afe107 ("net: make unregister netdev warning timeout configurable")
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
netdev_wait_allrefs() issues a warning if refcount does not drop to 0
after 10 seconds. While 10 second wait generally should not happen
under normal workload in normal environment, it seems to fire falsely
very often during fuzzing and/or in qemu emulation (~10x slower).
At least it's not possible to understand if it's really a false
positive or not. Automated testing generally bumps all timeouts
to very high values to avoid flake failures.
Add net.core.netdev_unregister_timeout_secs sysctl to make
the timeout configurable for automated testing systems.
Lowering the timeout may also be useful for e.g. manual bisection.
The default value matches the current behavior.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=211877
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CONFIG_NET is a bool option, and this file is compiled only when
CONFIG_NET=y.
Remove #ifdef CONFIG_NET, which we know it is always met.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210125231421.105936-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The sysctl that was added earlier by commit 79134e6ce2 ("net: do
not create fallback tunnels for non-default namespaces") to create
fall-back only in root-ns. This patch enhances that behavior to provide
option not to create fallback tunnels in root-ns as well. Since modules
that create fallback tunnels could be built-in and setting the sysctl
value after booting is pointless, so added a kernel cmdline options to
change this default. The default setting is preseved for backward
compatibility. The kernel command line option of fb_tunnels=initns will
set the sysctl value to 1 and will create fallback tunnels only in initns
while kernel cmdline fb_tunnels=none will set the sysctl value to 2 and
fallback tunnels are skipped in every netns.
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Maciej Zenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Jian Yang <jianyang@google.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at
open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's
case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated
file->f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that
kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred.
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7105e828c0 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Pull sysctl fixes from Al Viro:
"Fixups to regressions in sysctl series"
* 'work.sysctl' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
sysctl: reject gigantic reads/write to sysctl files
cdrom: fix an incorrect __user annotation on cdrom_sysctl_info
trace: fix an incorrect __user annotation on stack_trace_sysctl
random: fix an incorrect __user annotation on proc_do_entropy
net/sysctl: remove leftover __user annotations on neigh_proc_dointvec*
net/sysctl: use cpumask_parse in flow_limit_cpu_sysctl
cpumask_parse_user works on __user pointers, so this is wrong now.
Fixes: 32927393dc ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler")
Reported-by: build test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The goal is to be able to inherit the initial devconf parameters from the
current netns, ie the netns where this new netns has been created.
This is useful in a containers environment where /proc/sys is read only.
For example, if a pod is created with specifics devconf parameters and has
the capability to create netns, the user expects to get the same parameters
than his 'init_net', which is not the real init_net in this case.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which
is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and
from userspace in common code. This also means that the strings are
always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit
safer.
As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers
a lot of the changes are mechnical.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() has been firstly introduced
in commit 2e4a30983b ("bpf: restrict access to core bpf sysctls")
under CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT. Then, this ifdef has been removed in
ede95a63b5 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv
allocations"), because a new sysctl, bpf_jit_limit, made use of it.
Finally, this parameter has become long instead of integer with
fdadd04931 ("bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K")
and thus, a new proc_dolongvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() has been
added.
With this last change, we got back to that
proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() is used only under
CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT, but the corresponding ifdef has not been
brought back.
So, in configurations like CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y && CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT=n
since v4.20 we have:
CC net/core/sysctl_net_core.o
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c:292:1: warning: ‘proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
292 | proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Suppress this by guarding it with CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT again.
Fixes: fdadd04931 ("bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191218091821.7080-1-alobakin@dlink.ru
When GRO decides not to coalesce a packet, in napi_frags_finish(), instead
of passing it to the stack immediately, place it on a list in the napi
struct. Then, at flush time (napi_complete_done(), napi_poll(), or
napi_busy_loop()), call netif_receive_skb_list_internal() on the list.
We'd like to do that in napi_gro_flush(), but it's not called if
!napi->gro_bitmask, so we have to do it in the callers instead. (There are
a handful of drivers that call napi_gro_flush() themselves, but it's not
clear why, or whether this will affect them.)
Because a full 64 packets is an inefficiently large batch, also consume the
list whenever it exceeds gro_normal_batch, a new net/core sysctl that
defaults to 8.
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.
On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.
The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:
$ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
248
Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.
This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:
# scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
Data old new delta
sysctl_vals - 12 +12
__kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12
max 14 10 -4
int_max 16 - -16
one 68 - -68
zero 128 28 -100
Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%
[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
>From linux-3.7, (commit 5640f76858 "net: use a per task frag
allocator") TCP sendmsg() has preferred using order-3 allocations.
While it gives good results for most cases, we had reports
that heavy uses of TCP over loopback were hitting a spinlock
contention in page allocations/freeing.
This commits adds a sysctl so that admins can opt-in
for order-0 allocations. Hopefully mm layer might optimize
order-3 allocations in the future since it could give us
a nice boost (see 8 lines of following benchmark)
The following benchmark shows a win when more than 8 TCP_STREAM
threads are running (56 x86 cores server in my tests)
for thr in {1..30}
do
sysctl -wq net.core.high_order_alloc_disable=0
T0=`./super_netperf $thr -H 127.0.0.1 -l 15`
sysctl -wq net.core.high_order_alloc_disable=1
T1=`./super_netperf $thr -H 127.0.0.1 -l 15`
echo $thr:$T0:$T1
done
1: 49979: 37267
2: 98745: 76286
3: 141088: 110051
4: 177414: 144772
5: 197587: 173563
6: 215377: 208448
7: 241061: 234087
8: 267155: 263373
9: 295069: 297402
10: 312393: 335213
11: 340462: 368778
12: 371366: 403954
13: 412344: 443713
14: 426617: 473580
15: 474418: 507861
16: 503261: 538539
17: 522331: 563096
18: 532409: 567084
19: 550824: 605240
20: 525493: 641988
21: 564574: 665843
22: 567349: 690868
23: 583846: 710917
24: 588715: 736306
25: 603212: 763494
26: 604083: 792654
27: 602241: 796450
28: 604291: 797993
29: 611610: 833249
30: 577356: 841062
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We prefer static_branch_unlikely() over static_key_false() these days.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There have been many people complaining about the inconsistent
behaviors of IPv4 and IPv6 devconf when creating new network
namespaces. Currently, for IPv4, we inherit all current settings
from init_net, but for IPv6 we reset all setting to default.
This patch introduces a new /proc file
/proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net to control the
behavior of whether to inhert sysctl current settings from init_net.
This file itself is only available in init_net.
As demonstrated below:
Initial setup in init_net:
# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
2
# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad
1
Default value 0 (current behavior):
# ip netns del test
# ip netns add test
# ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
2
# ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad
0
Set to 1 (inherit from init_net):
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net
# ip netns del test
# ip netns add test
# ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
2
# ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad
1
Set to 2 (reset to default):
# echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net
# ip netns del test
# ip netns add test
# ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
0
# ip netns exec test cat /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_dad
0
Set to a value out of range (invalid):
# echo 3 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
# echo -1 > /proc/sys/net/core/devconf_inherit_init_net
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
Reported-by: Zhu Yanjun <Yanjun.Zhu@windriver.com>
Reported-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com>
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Michael and Sandipan report:
Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF
JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000,
and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined.
For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with
the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when
using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit
value:
root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit
-1673527296
and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network
stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported:
setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8},
16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524)
and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't
always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent
failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9
host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC
with no noticeable errors in the logs.
Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like
arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should
get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For
4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec()
so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper
function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving
the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init().
Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new
bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default
JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom
module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for
vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}.
Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change
the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions
in future.
Fixes: ede95a63b5 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations")
Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.
Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.
Fixes: 290af86629 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious
reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source
files that do not use it.
This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig. It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes. I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.
Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms. Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).
[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
combine all of those. ]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> [2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Synchronous pernet_operations are not allowed anymore.
All are asynchronous. So, drop the structure member.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
fallback tunnels (like tunl0, gre0, gretap0, erspan0, sit0,
ip6tnl0, ip6gre0) are automatically created when the corresponding
module is loaded.
These tunnels are also automatically created when a new network
namespace is created, at a great cost.
In many cases, netns are used for isolation purposes, and these
extra network devices are a waste of resources. We are using
thousands of netns per host, and hit the netns creation/delete
bottleneck a lot. (Many thanks to Kirill for recent work on this)
Add a new sysctl so that we can opt-out from this automatic creation.
Note that these tunnels are still created for the initial namespace,
to be the least intrusive for typical setups.
Tested:
lpk43:~# cat add_del_unshare.sh
for i in `seq 1 40`
do
(for j in `seq 1 100` ; do unshare -n /bin/true >/dev/null ; done) &
done
wait
lpk43:~# echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/core/fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net
lpk43:~# time ./add_del_unshare.sh
real 0m37.521s
user 0m0.886s
sys 7m7.084s
lpk43:~# echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/core/fb_tunnels_only_for_init_net
lpk43:~# time ./add_del_unshare.sh
real 0m4.761s
user 0m0.851s
sys 1m8.343s
lpk43:~#
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
These pernet_operations register and destroy sysctl
directory, and it's not interesting for foreign
pernet_operations.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Given BPF reaches far beyond just networking these days, it was
never intended to allow setting and in some cases reading those
knobs out of a user namespace root running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
thus tighten such access.
Also the bpf_jit_enable = 2 debugging mode should only be allowed
if kptr_restrict is not set since it otherwise can leak addresses
to the kernel log. Dump a note to the kernel log that this is for
debugging JITs only when enabled.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Having a pure_initcall() callback just to permanently enable BPF
JITs under CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is unnecessary and could leave
a small race window in future where JIT is still disabled on boot.
Since we know about the setting at compilation time anyway, just
initialize it properly there. Also consolidate all the individual
bpf_jit_enable variables into a single one and move them under one
location. Moreover, don't allow for setting unspecified garbage
values on them.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.
A quote from goolge project zero blog:
"At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in
the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading
from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result
appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an
attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together
and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying.
So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into
the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside
a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient
to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."
To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode.
So far eBPF JIT is supported by:
x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64
The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only.
In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden
v2->v3:
- move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)
v1->v2:
- fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback)
- fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback)
- add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func
- retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk.
It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next
Considered doing:
int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT;
but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove
bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place
and remove this jit_init() function.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The default value for somaxconn is set in sysctl_core_net_init(), but this
function is not called when kernel is configured without CONFIG_SYSCTL.
This results in the kernel not being able to accept TCP connections,
because the backlog has zero size. Usually, the user ends up with:
"TCP: request_sock_TCP: Possible SYN flooding on port 7. Dropping request. Check SNMP counters."
If SYN cookies are not enabled the connection is rejected.
Before ef547f2ac1 (tcp: remove max_qlen_log), the effects were less
severe, because the backlog was always at least eight slots long.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kapl <roman.kapl@sysgo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Constants used for tuning are generally a bad idea, especially as hardware
changes over time. Replace the constant 2 jiffies with sysctl variable
netdev_budget_usecs to enable sysadmins to tune the softirq processing.
Also document the variable.
For example, a very fast machine might tune this to 1000 microseconds,
while my regression testing 486DX-25 needs it to be 4000 microseconds on
a nearly idle network to prevent time_squeeze from being incremented.
Version 2: changed jiffies to microseconds for predictable units.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This change basically codifies what I think was already the limitations on
the busy_poll and busy_read sysctl interfaces. We weren't checking the
lower bounds and as such could input negative values. The behavior when
that was used was dependent on the architecture. In order to prevent any
issues with that I am just disabling support for values less than 0 since
this way we don't have to worry about any odd behaviors.
By limiting the sysctl values this way it also makes it consistent with how
we handle the SO_BUSY_POLL socket option since the value appears to be
reported as a signed integer value and negative values are rejected.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Long standing issue with JITed programs is that stack traces from
function tracing check whether a given address is kernel code
through {__,}kernel_text_address(), which checks for code in core
kernel, modules and dynamically allocated ftrace trampolines. But
what is still missing is BPF JITed programs (interpreted programs
are not an issue as __bpf_prog_run() will be attributed to them),
thus when a stack trace is triggered, the code walking the stack
won't see any of the JITed ones. The same for address correlation
done from user space via reading /proc/kallsyms. This is read by
tools like perf, but the latter is also useful for permanent live
tracing with eBPF itself in combination with stack maps when other
eBPF types are part of the callchain. See offwaketime example on
dumping stack from a map.
This work tries to tackle that issue by making the addresses and
symbols known to the kernel. The lookup from *kernel_text_address()
is implemented through a latched RB tree that can be read under
RCU in fast-path that is also shared for symbol/size/offset lookup
for a specific given address in kallsyms. The slow-path iteration
through all symbols in the seq file done via RCU list, which holds
a tiny fraction of all exported ksyms, usually below 0.1 percent.
Function symbols are exported as bpf_prog_<tag>, in order to aide
debugging and attribution. This facility is currently enabled for
root-only when bpf_jit_kallsyms is set to 1, and disabled if hardening
is active in any mode. The rationale behind this is that still a lot
of systems ship with world read permissions on kallsyms thus addresses
should not get suddenly exposed for them. If that situation gets
much better in future, we always have the option to change the
default on this. Likewise, unprivileged programs are not allowed
to add entries there either, but that is less of a concern as most
such programs types relevant in this context are for root-only anyway.
If enabled, call graphs and stack traces will then show a correct
attribution; one example is illustrated below, where the trace is
now visible in tooling such as perf script --kallsyms=/proc/kallsyms
and friends.
Before:
7fff8166889d bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f0020ed (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff006451f1a007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so)
After:
7fff816688b7 bpf_clone_redirect+0x80007f002107 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fffa0575728 bpf_prog_33c45a467c9e061a+0x8000600020fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fffa07ef1fc cls_bpf_classify+0x8000600020dc (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff81678b68 tc_classify+0x80007f002078 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff8164d40b __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80007f0025fb (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff8164d718 __netif_receive_skb+0x80007f002018 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff8164e565 process_backlog+0x80007f002095 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff8164dc71 net_rx_action+0x80007f002231 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff81767461 __softirqentry_text_start+0x80007f0020d1 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff817658ac do_softirq_own_stack+0x80007f00201c (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff810a2c20 do_softirq+0x80007f002050 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff810a2cb5 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x80007f002085 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff8168d452 ip_finish_output2+0x80007f002152 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff8168ea3d ip_finish_output+0x80007f00217d (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff8168f2af ip_output+0x80007f00203f (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
[...]
7fff81005854 do_syscall_64+0x80007f002054 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
7fff817649eb return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x80007f002000 (/lib/modules/4.9.0-rc8+/build/vmlinux)
f5d80 __sendmsg_nocancel+0xffff01c484812007 (/usr/lib64/libc-2.18.so)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Oftenly, introducing side effects on packet processing on the other half
of the stack by adjusting one of TX/RX via sysctl is not desirable.
There are cases of demand for asymmetric, orthogonal configurability.
This holds true especially for nodes where RPS for RFS usage on top is
configured and therefore use the 'old dev_weight'. This is quite a
common base configuration setup nowadays, even with NICs of superior processing
support (e.g. aRFS).
A good example use case are nodes acting as noSQL data bases with a
large number of tiny requests and rather fewer but large packets as responses.
It's affordable to have large budget and rx dev_weights for the
requests. But as a side effect having this large a number on TX
processed in one run can overwhelm drivers.
This patch therefore introduces an independent configurability via sysctl to
userland.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Tafelmeier <matthias.tafelmeier@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
RFS is not commonly used, so add a jump label to avoid some conditionals
in fast path.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers
that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through
blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT
spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were
changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset
in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We
have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers.
Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read
only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86,
arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by
default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore,
we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our
todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and
first implementation since around netconf 2016.
We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF
code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit
to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger
programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some
part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved
guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase
to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test
case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which
can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this,
additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump
(and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally
the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default.
For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option
bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so
that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons,
the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants
for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off
performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added
the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which
is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no
further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended,
rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this
functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT
compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a
generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is
then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few
changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one.
This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390
without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF
can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can
be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that
bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(),
and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the
passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the
process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter.
Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we
return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning,
interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as
usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of
a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal
to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like
in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers
when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one
abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT
phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written
program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture.
The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32
and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a
small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this
is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND,
and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register
is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on
BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is
newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction.
64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and
patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to
call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other()
pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register.
Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT:
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden
ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>:
[...]
39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax
3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax
43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax
48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax
4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax
52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax
57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax
5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax
[...]
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden
ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>:
[...]
39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d
3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d
46: mov %r10d,%eax
49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d
4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d
56: mov %r10d,%eax
59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d
5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d
66: mov %r10d,%eax
69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d
6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d
76: mov %r10d,%eax
79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d
7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d
86: mov %r10d,%eax
89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d
8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d
96: mov %r10d,%eax
[...]
As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden
when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based
to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective.
Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and
over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded.
Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just
JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we
still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal
use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing
up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko
suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding
was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in
the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance
for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case,
f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT),
35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter).
BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various
bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were
running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and
redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests
pass.
[1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html
[2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/
[3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Devices may have limits on the number of fragments in an skb they support.
Current codebase uses a constant as maximum for number of fragments one
skb can hold and use.
When enabling scatter/gather and running traffic with many small messages
the codebase uses the maximum number of fragments and may thereby violate
the max for certain devices.
The patch introduces a global variable as max number of fragments.
Signed-off-by: Hans Westgaard Ry <hans.westgaard.ry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
net/ipv4/inet_diag.c
The be_main.c conflict resolution was really tricky. The conflict
hunks generated by GIT were very unhelpful, to say the least. It
split functions in half and moved them around, when the real actual
conflict only existed solely inside of one function, that being
be_map_pci_bars().
So instead, to resolve this, I checked out be_main.c from the top
of net-next, then I applied the be_main.c changes from 'net' since
the last time I merged. And this worked beautifully.
The inet_diag.c and sysctl_net_core.c conflicts were simple
overlapping changes, and were easily to resolve.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
sk_ack_backlog & sk_max_ack_backlog were 16bit fields, meaning
listen() backlog was limited to 65535.
It is time to increase the width to allow much bigger backlog,
if admins change /proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn &
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_syn_backlog default values.
Tested:
echo 5000000 >/proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn
echo 5000000 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_syn_backlog
Ran a SYNFLOOD test against a listener using listen(fd, 5000000)
myhost~# grep request_sock_TCP /proc/slabinfo
request_sock_TCP 4185642 4411940 304 13 1 : tunables 54 27 8 : slabdata 339380 339380 0
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
printk and friends can now format bitmaps using '%*pb[l]'. cpumask
and nodemask also provide cpumask_pr_args() and nodemask_pr_args()
respectively which can be used to generate the two printf arguments
necessary to format the specified cpu/nodemask.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make sure root user does not try something stupid.
Also make sure mask field in struct rps_sock_flow_table
does not share a cache line with the potentially often dirtied
flow table.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 567e4b7973 ("net: rfs: add hash collision detection")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Receive Flow Steering is a nice solution but suffers from
hash collisions when a mix of connected and unconnected traffic
is received on the host, when flow hash table is populated.
Also, clearing flow in inet_release() makes RFS not very good
for short lived flows, as many packets can follow close().
(FIN , ACK packets, ...)
This patch extends the information stored into global hash table
to not only include cpu number, but upper part of the hash value.
I use a 32bit value, and dynamically split it in two parts.
For host with less than 64 possible cpus, this gives 6 bits for the
cpu number, and 26 (32-6) bits for the upper part of the hash.
Since hash bucket selection use low order bits of the hash, we have
a full hash match, if /proc/sys/net/core/rps_sock_flow_entries is big
enough.
If the hash found in flow table does not match, we fallback to RPS (if
it is enabled for the rxqueue).
This means that a packet for an non connected flow can avoid the
IPI through a unrelated/victim CPU.
This also means we no longer have to clear the table at socket
close time, and this helps short lived flows performance.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
