Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem. The reason
being it's better to consolidate all the trusted keys code to a single
location so that it can be maintained sanely.
Also, utilize existing tpm_send() exported API which wraps the internal
tpm_transmit_cmd() API.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with
"tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Switch to utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM based trusted
and asymmetric keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also,
remove tpm1_buf code.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can
be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc.
Also rename trusted keys and asymmetric keys usage of TPM 1.x buffer
implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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Merge tag 'keys-request-20190626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull request_key improvements from David Howells:
"These are all request_key()-related, including a fix and some improvements:
- Fix the lack of a Link permission check on a key found by
request_key(), thereby enabling request_key() to link keys that
don't grant this permission to the target keyring (which must still
grant Write permission).
Note that the key must be in the caller's keyrings already to be
found.
- Invalidate used request_key authentication keys rather than
revoking them, so that they get cleaned up immediately rather than
hanging around till the expiry time is passed.
- Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so
that a request_key_rcu() can be provided. This can be called in RCU
mode, so it can't sleep and can't upcall - but it can be called
from LOOKUP_RCU pathwalk mode.
- Cache the latest positive result of request_key*() temporarily in
task_struct so that filesystems that make a lot of request_key()
calls during pathwalk can take advantage of it to avoid having to
redo the searching. This requires CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE=y.
It is assumed that the key just found is likely to be used multiple
times in each step in an RCU pathwalk, and is likely to be reused
for the next step too.
Note that the cleanup of the cache is done on TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME,
just before userspace resumes, and on exit"
* tag 'keys-request-20190626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}
keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct
keys: Provide request_key_rcu()
keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions
keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys
keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key
Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it
will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key()
function in a later commit.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2 of the license
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes the warning reported by Clang:
security/keys/trusted.c:146:17: warning: passing an object that
undergoes default
argument promotion to 'va_start' has undefined behavior [-Wvarargs]
va_start(argp, h3);
^
security/keys/trusted.c:126:37: note: parameter of type 'unsigned
char' is declared here
unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
^
Specifically, it seems that both the C90 (4.8.1.1) and C11 (7.16.1.4)
standards explicitly call this out as undefined behavior:
The parameter parmN is the identifier of the rightmost parameter in
the variable parameter list in the function definition (the one just
before the ...). If the parameter parmN is declared with ... or with a
type that is not compatible with the type that results after
application of the default argument promotions, the behavior is
undefined.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/41
Link: https://www.eskimo.com/~scs/cclass/int/sx11c.html
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Suggested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"Mimi Zohar says:
'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup'"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
Align the payload of "user" and "logon" keys so that users of the
keyrings service can access it as a struct that requires more than
2-byte alignment. fscrypt currently does this which results in the read
of fscrypt_key::size being misaligned as it needs 4-byte alignment.
Align to __alignof__(u64) rather than __alignof__(long) since in the
future it's conceivable that people would use structs beginning with
u64, which on some platforms would require more than 'long' alignment.
Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Fixes: 2aa349f6e3 ("[PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operations")
Fixes: 88bd6ccdcd ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.
Fix this by the following changes:
(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.
(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
payload available outside of security/keys/.
(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
record and operation name.
Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.
Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
commit 9dc92c4517 ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for
verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able
to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature
stored in xattr.
This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for
verifying PE signed kernel images as well.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature
already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this:
int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *enc, void *data);
int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Since the 'expiry' variable of 'struct key_preparsed_payload' has been
changed to 'time64_t' type, which is year 2038 safe on 32bits system.
In net/rxrpc subsystem, we need convert 'u32' type to 'time64_t' type
when copying ticket expires time to 'prep->expiry', then this patch
introduces two helper functions to help convert 'u32' to 'time64_t'
type.
This patch also uses ktime_get_real_seconds() to get current time instead
of get_seconds() which is not year 2038 safe on 32bits system.
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Add the following:
(1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about
blacklisted certificates and signatures.
(2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a
blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string. The key accepts
no payload.
(3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel
at build time. This is done by setting
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes
that are in the form:
"<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>"
where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must
include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size.
The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING.
Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed:
root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist
Keyring
723359729 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .blacklist
676257228 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46
The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be
possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database.
A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in
here too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY)
that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by
userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the
system trusted keyrings.
EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if
no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the
signature doesn't match. Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned.
If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is
the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled. Intermediate keys
between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to
the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain -
provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings.
The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its
own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the
system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key
built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring.
Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more
obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys).
The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.
If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to
.builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched
too if the secondary keyring is searched.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.
Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().
Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.
What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.
Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.
With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.
Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.
To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.
If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any
dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the
public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.
If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.
The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th
element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed.
For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically
allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in
tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue.
Fixes: 5beb0c435b ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.
IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted
before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing
trusted keys.
This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for
TPM 2.0:
* Seal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value.
* Unseal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields
can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes
that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that
signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself
signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then
contributes to the signature.
Further, we already require the master message content type to be
pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data
itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the
authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1].
We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them
entirely as appropriate. To this end:
(1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one
signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one
that does not.
(2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them.
Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are
rejected:
(a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the
content type in the SignedData object.
(b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data.
(c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable
UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within
the validity window of the matching X.509 cert.
(d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents.
(e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents.
(f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents.
The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is
an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if
not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present.
The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed
to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only
affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP).
The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or
if it contains more than one element in its set of values.
(3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following
restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers:
(*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more
flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal
content.
(*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute
holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but
allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE
This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type
and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the
minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and
an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't
remove these).
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE
These are invalid in this context but are included for later use
when limiting the use of X.509 certs.
(4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between
the above options for testing purposes. For example:
echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage
keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7
will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a
firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE).
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Extract the function that drives the PKCS#7 signature verification given a
data blob and a PKCS#7 blob out from the module signing code and lump it with
the system keyring code as it's generic. This makes it independent of module
config options and opens it to use by the firmware loader.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>
Bring back the functionality whereby an asymmetric key can be matched with a
partial match on one of its IDs.
Whilst we're at it, allow for the possibility of having an increased number of
IDs.
Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Implement the first step in using binary key IDs for asymmetric keys rather
than hex string keys.
The previously added match data preparsing will be able to convert hex
criterion strings into binary which can then be compared more rapidly.
Further, we actually want more then one ID string per public key. The problem
is that X.509 certs refer to other X.509 certs by matching Issuer + AuthKeyId
to Subject + SubjKeyId, but PKCS#7 messages match against X.509 Issuer +
SerialNumber.
This patch just provides facilities for a later patch to make use of.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages:
(1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.
(2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the
asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).
(3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means
that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.
(4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Make use of key preparsing in the big key type so that quota size determination
can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Make use of key preparsing in user-defined and logon keys so that quota size
determination can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being
added.
Also the idmapper key types need to change to match as they use the
user-defined key type routines.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing
'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added
to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying
a certificate's signature.
This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch.
Changelog v6:
- on error free key - Dmitry
- validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry
- formatting cleanup
Changelog:
- define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it
can be used by code other than the module-signing code.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
