Add tracing to allow us to figure out where any stale filehandle issues
may be originating from.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Return statements in functions returning bool should use true or false
instead of an integer value.
This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
In a traditional NFS deployment using auth_unix, the clients are trusted
to correctly report the credentials of their logged-in users. The
server assumes that only root on client machines is allowed to send
requests from low-numbered ports, so it can use the originating port
number to distinguish "real" NFS clients from NFS clients run by
ordinary users, to prevent ordinary users from spoofing credentials.
The originating port number on a gss-authenticated request is less
important. The authentication ties the request to a user, and we take
it as proof that that user authorized the request. The low port number
check no longer adds much.
So, don't enforce low port numbers in the auth_gss case.
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Create and other nfsd ops generally assume we can call lookup_one_len on
inodes with S_IFDIR set. Al says that this assumption isn't true in
general, though it should be for the filesystem objects nfsd sees.
Add a check just to make sure our assumption isn't violated.
Remove a couple checks for i_op->lookup in create code.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Silent a few smatch warnings about indentation
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Those are now defined in fs/nfsd/vfs.h
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Convert the following where appropriate:
(1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
(2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
(3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more
complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in
question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
a ->d_automount op.
In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a
case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
type of the lower dentry.
However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was
intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
use strict;
my @callers;
open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
@callers = <$fd>;
close($fd);
unless (@callers) {
print "No matches\n";
exit(0);
}
my @cocci = (
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_symlink(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_dir(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_reg(E)' );
my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
close($fd);
foreach my $file (@callers) {
chomp $file;
print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
die "spatch failed";
}
[AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In a later patch, we're going to need some atomic bit flags. Since that
field will need to be an unsigned long, we mitigate that space
consumption by migrating some other bitflags to the new field. Start
with the rq_secure flag.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
The filehandle structs all use host-endian values, but will sometimes
stuff big-endian values into those fields. This is OK since these
values are opaque to the client, but it confuses sparse. Add __force to
make it clear that we are doing this intentionally.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Don't using cache_get besides export.h, using exp_get for export.
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
When debugging, rpc prints messages from dprintk(KERN_WARNING ...)
with "^A4" prefixed,
[ 2780.339988] ^A4nfsd: connect from unprivileged port: 127.0.0.1, port=35316
Trond tells,
> dprintk != printk. We have NEVER supported dprintk(KERN_WARNING...)
This patch removes using of dprintk with KERN_WARNING.
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Use fh_fsid when reffering to the fsid part of the filehandle. The
variable length auth field envisioned in nfsfh wasn't ever implemented.
Also clean up some lose ends around this and document the file handle
format better.
Btw, why do we even export nfsfh.h to userspace? The file handle very
much is kernel private, and nothing in nfs-utils include the header
either.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
The reporter saw a NULL dereference when a filesystem's ->mknod returned
success but left the dentry negative, and then nfsd tried to dereference
d_inode (in this case because the CREATE was followed by a GETATTR in
the same nfsv4 compound).
fh_update already checks for this and another broken case, but for some
reason it returns success and leaves nfsd trying to soldier on. If it
failed we'd avoid the crash. There's only so much we can do with a
buggy filesystem, but it's easy enough to bail out here, so let's do
that.
Reported-by: Antti Tönkyrä <daedalus@pingtimeout.net>
Tested-by: Antti Tönkyrä <daedalus@pingtimeout.net>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
This commit adds FILEID_INVALID = 0xff in fid_type to
indicate invalid fid_type
It avoids using magic number 255
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Trivedi <vtrivedi018@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
When mnt_want_write() starts to handle freezing it will get a full lock
semantics requiring proper lock ordering. So push mnt_want_write() call
consistently outside of i_mutex.
CC: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
CC: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch replaces cache_put() call for svc_export_cache by exp_put() call.
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
We allow the fh_verify caller to specify that any object *except* those
of a given type is allowed, by passing a negative type. But only one
caller actually uses it. Open-code that check in the one caller.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
A typo in 12045a6ee9 "nfsd: let "insecure" flag vary by
pseudoflavor" reversed the sense of the "insecure" flag.
Reported-by: Michael Guntsche <mike@it-loops.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The new .h files have paths at the top that are now out of date. While
we're here, just remove all of those from fs/nfsd; they never served any
purpose.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
On V4ROOT exports, only accept filehandles that are the *root* of some
export. This allows mountd to allow or deny access to individual
directories and symlinks on the pseudofilesystem.
Note that the checks in readdir and lookup are not enough, since a
malicious host with access to the network could guess filehandles that
they weren't able to obtain through lookup or readdir.
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
This was an oversight; it should be among the export flags that can be
allowed to vary by pseudoflavor. This allows an administrator to (for
example) allow auth_sys mounts only from low ports, but allow auth_krb5
mounts to use any port.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Lots of include/linux/nfsd/* headers are only used by
nfsd module. Move them to the source directory
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Now that the headers are fixed and carry their own wait, all fs/nfsd/
source files can include a minimal set of headers. and still compile just
fine.
This patch should improve the compilation speed of the nfsd module.
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
All nfsd security depends on the security checks in fh_verify, and
especially on nfsd_setuser().
It therefore bothers me that the nfsd_setuser call may be made from
three different places, depending on whether the filehandle has already
been mapped to a dentry, and on whether subtreechecking is in force.
Instead, make an unconditional call in fh_verify(), so it's trivial to
verify that the call always occurs.
That leaves us with a redundant nfsd_setuser() call in the subtreecheck
case--it needs the correct user set earlier in order to check execute
permissions on the path to this filehandle--but I'm willing to accept
that minor inefficiency in the subtreecheck case in return for more
straightforward permission checking.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
None of this stuff is used outside nfsd, so move it out of the common
linux include directory.
Actually, probably none of the stuff in include/linux/nfsd/nfsd.h really
belongs there, so later we may remove that file entirely.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
A number of callers (nfsd4_encode_fattr(), at least) don't bother to
release the filehandle returned to fh_compose() if fh_compose() returns
an error. So, modify fh_compose() to release the filehandle before
returning an error.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
The file nfsfh.c contains two static variables nfsd_nr_verified and
nfsd_nr_put. These are counters which are incremented as a side
effect of the fh_verify() fh_compose() and fh_put() operations,
i.e. at least twice per NFS call for any non-trivial workload.
Needless to say this makes the cacheline that contains them (and any
other innocent victims) a very hot contention point indeed under high
call-rate workloads on multiprocessor NFS server. It also turns out
that these counters are not used anywhere. They're not reported to
userspace, they're not used in logic, they're not even exported from
the object file (let alone the module). All they do is waste CPU time.
So this patch removes them.
Tests on a 16 CPU Altix A4700 with 2 10gige Myricom cards, configured
separately (no bonding). Workload is 640 client threads doing directory
traverals with random small reads, from server RAM.
Before
======
Kernel profile:
% cumulative self self total
time samples samples calls 1/call 1/call name
6.05 2716.00 2716.00 30406 0.09 1.02 svc_process
4.44 4706.00 1990.00 1975 1.01 1.01 spin_unlock_irqrestore
3.72 6376.00 1670.00 1666 1.00 1.00 svc_export_put
3.41 7907.00 1531.00 1786 0.86 1.02 nfsd_ofcache_lookup
3.25 9363.00 1456.00 10965 0.13 1.01 nfsd_dispatch
3.10 10752.00 1389.00 1376 1.01 1.01 nfsd_cache_lookup
2.57 11907.00 1155.00 4517 0.26 1.03 svc_tcp_recvfrom
...
2.21 15352.00 1003.00 1081 0.93 1.00 nfsd_choose_ofc <----
^^^^
Here the function nfsd_choose_ofc() reads a global variable
which by accident happened to be located in the same cacheline as
nfsd_nr_verified.
Call rate:
nullarbor:~ # pmdumptext nfs3.server.calls
...
Thu Dec 13 00:15:27 184780.663
Thu Dec 13 00:15:28 184885.881
Thu Dec 13 00:15:29 184449.215
Thu Dec 13 00:15:30 184971.058
Thu Dec 13 00:15:31 185036.052
Thu Dec 13 00:15:32 185250.475
Thu Dec 13 00:15:33 184481.319
Thu Dec 13 00:15:34 185225.737
Thu Dec 13 00:15:35 185408.018
Thu Dec 13 00:15:36 185335.764
After
=====
kernel profile:
% cumulative self self total
time samples samples calls 1/call 1/call name
6.33 2813.00 2813.00 29979 0.09 1.01 svc_process
4.66 4883.00 2070.00 2065 1.00 1.00 spin_unlock_irqrestore
4.06 6687.00 1804.00 2182 0.83 1.00 nfsd_ofcache_lookup
3.20 8110.00 1423.00 10932 0.13 1.00 nfsd_dispatch
3.03 9456.00 1346.00 1343 1.00 1.00 nfsd_cache_lookup
2.62 10622.00 1166.00 4645 0.25 1.01 svc_tcp_recvfrom
[...]
0.10 42586.00 44.00 74 0.59 1.00 nfsd_choose_ofc <--- HA!!
^^^^
Call rate:
nullarbor:~ # pmdumptext nfs3.server.calls
...
Thu Dec 13 01:45:28 194677.118
Thu Dec 13 01:45:29 193932.692
Thu Dec 13 01:45:30 194294.364
Thu Dec 13 01:45:31 194971.276
Thu Dec 13 01:45:32 194111.207
Thu Dec 13 01:45:33 194999.635
Thu Dec 13 01:45:34 195312.594
Thu Dec 13 01:45:35 195707.293
Thu Dec 13 01:45:36 194610.353
Thu Dec 13 01:45:37 195913.662
Thu Dec 13 01:45:38 194808.675
i.e. about a 5.3% improvement in call rate.
Signed-off-by: Greg Banks <gnb@melbourne.sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: David Chinner <dgc@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
When determining the fsid_type in fh_compose(), the setting of the FID
via fsid= export option needs to take precedence over using the UUID
device id.
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
RFC 2623 section 2.3.2 permits the server to bypass gss authentication
checks for certain operations that a client may perform when mounting.
In the case of a client that doesn't have some form of credentials
available to it on boot, this allows it to perform the mount unattended.
(Presumably real file access won't be needed until a user with
credentials logs in.)
Being slightly more lenient allows lots of old clients to access
krb5-only exports, with the only loss being a small amount of
information leaked about the root directory of the export.
This affects only v2 and v3; v4 still requires authentication for all
access.
Thanks to Peter Staubach testing against a Solaris client, which
suggesting addition of v3 getattr, to the list, and to Trond for noting
that doing so exposes no additional information.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Peter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Thanks to Frank Van Maarseveen for the original problem report: "A
privileged process on an NFS client which drops privileges after using
them to change the current working directory, will experience incorrect
EACCES after an NFS server reboot. This problem can also occur after
memory pressure on the server, particularly when the client side is
quiet for some time."
This occurs because the filehandle points to a directory whose parents
are no longer in the dentry cache, and we're attempting to reconnect the
directory to its parents without adequate permissions to perform lookups
in the parent directories.
We can therefore fix the problem by acquiring the necessary capabilities
before attempting the reconnection. We do this only in the
no_subtree_check case, since the documented behavior of the
subtree_check export option requires the server to check that the user
has lookup permissions on all parents.
The subtree_check case still has a problem, since reconnect_path()
unnecessarily requires both read and lookup permissions on all parent
directories. However, a fix in that case would be more delicate, and
use of subtree_check is already discouraged for other reasons.
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Frank van Maarseveen <frankvm@frankvm.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Rename nfsd_permission() specific MAY_* flags to NFSD_MAY_* to make it
clear, that these are not used outside nfsd, and to avoid name and
number space conflicts with the VFS.
[comment from hch: rename MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE and MAY_EXEC as well]
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Move the code that actually parses the filehandle and looks up the
dentry and export to a separate function. This simplifies the reference
counting a little and moves fh_verify() a little closer to the kernel
ideal of small, minimally-indentended functions. Clean up a few other
minor style sins along the way.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
This bug was always here, but before my commit 6fa02839bf
("recheck for secure ports in fh_verify"), it could only be triggered by
failure of a kmalloc(). After that commit it could be triggered by a
client making a request from a non-reserved port for access to an export
marked "secure". (Exports are "secure" by default.)
The result is a struct svc_export with a reference count one too low,
resulting in likely oopses next time the export is accessed.
The reference counting here is not straightforward; a later patch will
clean up fh_verify().
Thanks to Lukas Hejtmanek for the bug report and followup.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Lukas Hejtmanek <xhejtman@ics.muni.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Sorry for the noise, but here's the v3 of this compilation fix :)
There are some places, which declare the char buf[...] on the stack
to push it later into dprintk(). Since the dprintk sometimes (if the
CONFIG_SYSCTL=n) becomes an empty do { } while (0) stub, these buffers
cause gcc to produce appropriate warnings.
Wrap these buffers with RPC_IFDEBUG macro, as Trond proposed, to
compile them out when not needed.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
