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mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-20 03:04:01 +08:00

Merge git://git.linaro.org/nico/arm_security into devel-stable

This commit is contained in:
Russell King 2010-06-30 11:00:01 +01:00
commit fc4978b796
8 changed files with 85 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -1375,6 +1375,18 @@ config UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY
However, if the CPU data cache is using a write-allocate mode,
this option is unlikely to provide any performance gain.
config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)"
help
This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This
feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
the stack just before the return address, and validates
the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
neutralized via a kernel panic.
This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above.
endmenu
menu "Boot options"

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@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),y)
KBUILD_CFLAGS +=-fno-omit-frame-pointer -mapcs -mno-sched-prolog
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y)
KBUILD_CFLAGS +=-fstack-protector
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN),y)
KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian
AS += -EB

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@ -121,4 +121,7 @@ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t, elf_gregset_t *elfregs);
extern void elf_set_personality(const struct elf32_hdr *);
#define SET_PERSONALITY(ex) elf_set_personality(&(ex))
extern unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm);
#define arch_randomize_brk arch_randomize_brk
#endif

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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
/*
* GCC stack protector support.
*
* Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of
* the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when
* returning from the function. The pattern is called stack canary
* and gcc expects it to be defined by a global variable called
* "__stack_chk_guard" on ARM. This unfortunately means that on SMP
* we cannot have a different canary value per task.
*/
#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H
#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/version.h>
extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
/*
* Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
*
* NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return,
* and it must always be inlined.
*/
static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
{
unsigned long canary;
/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
current->stack_canary = canary;
__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
}
#endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */

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@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
int main(void)
{
DEFINE(TSK_ACTIVE_MM, offsetof(struct task_struct, active_mm));
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
DEFINE(TSK_STACK_CANARY, offsetof(struct task_struct, stack_canary));
#endif
BLANK();
DEFINE(TI_FLAGS, offsetof(struct thread_info, flags));
DEFINE(TI_PREEMPT, offsetof(struct thread_info, preempt_count));

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@ -745,6 +745,11 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to)
mov r4, #0xffff0fff
str r3, [r4, #-15] @ TLS val at 0xffff0ff0
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP)
ldr r7, [r2, #TI_TASK]
ldr r8, =__stack_chk_guard
ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY]
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
mcr p15, 0, r6, c3, c0, 0 @ Set domain register
#endif
@ -753,6 +758,9 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to)
ldr r0, =thread_notify_head
mov r1, #THREAD_NOTIFY_SWITCH
bl atomic_notifier_call_chain
#if defined(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP)
str r7, [r8]
#endif
THUMB( mov ip, r4 )
mov r0, r5
ARM( ldmia r4, {r4 - sl, fp, sp, pc} ) @ Load all regs saved previously

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@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/tick.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/leds.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@ -36,6 +37,12 @@
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
#include <asm/mach/time.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
#include <linux/stackprotector.h>
unsigned long __stack_chk_guard __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard);
#endif
static const char *processor_modes[] = {
"USER_26", "FIQ_26" , "IRQ_26" , "SVC_26" , "UK4_26" , "UK5_26" , "UK6_26" , "UK7_26" ,
"UK8_26" , "UK9_26" , "UK10_26", "UK11_26", "UK12_26", "UK13_26", "UK14_26", "UK15_26",
@ -421,3 +428,9 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p)
} while (count ++ < 16);
return 0;
}
unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long range_end = mm->brk + 0x02000000;
return randomize_range(mm->brk, range_end, 0) ? : mm->brk;
}

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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
@ -80,6 +81,9 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
}
/* 8 bits of randomness in 20 address space bits */
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
addr += (get_random_int() % (1 << 8)) << PAGE_SHIFT;
full_search:
if (do_align)