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KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver #2]

This patch implements the verify_signature operation.  The public key
portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used.  The operation is
performed entirely in software using the crypto API.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This commit is contained in:
Denis Kenzior 2018-10-09 17:49:20 +01:00 committed by James Morris
parent a335974ae0
commit e08e689123

View File

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/trusted.h> #include <keys/trusted.h>
#include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h> #include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#define TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC 186 #define TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC 186
#define TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2 65 #define TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2 65
@ -286,12 +287,16 @@ static uint32_t derive_pub_key(const void *pub_key, uint32_t len, uint8_t *buf)
static int determine_akcipher(const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo, static int determine_akcipher(const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo,
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME])
{ {
/* TODO: We don't support hashing yet */
if (hash_algo)
return -ENOPKG;
if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
strcpy(alg_name, "pkcs1pad(rsa)"); if (!hash_algo) {
strcpy(alg_name, "pkcs1pad(rsa)");
return 0;
}
if (snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)",
hash_algo) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return -EINVAL;
return 0; return 0;
} }
@ -342,7 +347,8 @@ static int tpm_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
info->max_dec_size = tk->key_len / 8; info->max_dec_size = tk->key_len / 8;
info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT | info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |
KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT; KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT |
KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY;
ret = 0; ret = 0;
error_free_tfm: error_free_tfm:
@ -487,6 +493,93 @@ static int tpm_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
return ret; return ret;
} }
/*
* Verify a signature using a public key.
*/
static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
const struct tpm_key *tk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
struct crypto_wait cwait;
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
struct akcipher_request *req;
struct scatterlist sig_sg, digest_sg;
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
uint8_t der_pub_key[PUB_KEY_BUF_SIZE];
uint32_t der_pub_key_len;
void *output;
unsigned int outlen;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
BUG_ON(!tk);
BUG_ON(!sig);
BUG_ON(!sig->s);
if (!sig->digest)
return -ENOPKG;
ret = determine_akcipher(sig->encoding, sig->hash_algo, alg_name);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
der_pub_key_len = derive_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len,
der_pub_key);
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, der_pub_key, der_pub_key_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_tfm;
ret = -ENOMEM;
req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
goto error_free_tfm;
ret = -ENOMEM;
outlen = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
output = kmalloc(outlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!output)
goto error_free_req;
sg_init_one(&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size);
sg_init_one(&digest_sg, output, outlen);
akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size,
outlen);
crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &cwait);
/* Perform the verification calculation. This doesn't actually do the
* verification, but rather calculates the hash expected by the
* signature and returns that to us.
*/
ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait);
if (ret)
goto out_free_output;
/* Do the actual verification step. */
if (req->dst_len != sig->digest_size ||
memcmp(sig->digest, output, sig->digest_size) != 0)
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
out_free_output:
kfree(output);
error_free_req:
akcipher_request_free(req);
error_free_tfm:
crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0))
ret = -EINVAL;
return ret;
}
/* /*
* Parse enough information out of TPM_KEY structure: * Parse enough information out of TPM_KEY structure:
* TPM_STRUCT_VER -> 4 bytes * TPM_STRUCT_VER -> 4 bytes
@ -645,6 +738,7 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype asym_tpm_subtype = {
.destroy = asym_tpm_destroy, .destroy = asym_tpm_destroy,
.query = tpm_key_query, .query = tpm_key_query,
.eds_op = tpm_key_eds_op, .eds_op = tpm_key_eds_op,
.verify_signature = tpm_key_verify_signature,
}; };
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asym_tpm_subtype); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asym_tpm_subtype);