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ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
When CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, the kexec_file_load syscall requires the kexec'd kernel image to be signed. Distros are concerned about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled. This patch disables the kexec_load syscall only for systems booted with secureboot enabled. [zohar@linux.ibm.com: add missing mesage on kexec_load failure] Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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@ -505,20 +505,26 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
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*/
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int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
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{
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bool sig_enforce;
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bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
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if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
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return 0;
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ima_enforce =
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(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
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switch (id) {
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case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
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if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) {
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG)
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&& arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
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pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
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return -EACCES;
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}
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if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) {
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pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
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return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
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}
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break;
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case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
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if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) {
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if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) {
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pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
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return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
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}
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@ -526,7 +532,8 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
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case LOADING_MODULE:
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sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
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if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) {
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if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce
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&& (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) {
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pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
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return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
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}
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