mirror of
https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git
synced 2024-12-16 17:23:55 +08:00
Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A bunch of fixes for perf and kprobes: - revert a commit that caused a perf group regression - silence dmesg spam - fix kprobe probing errors on ia64 and ppc64 - filter kprobe faults from userspace - lockdep fix for perf exit path - prevent perf #GP in KVM guest - correct perf event and filters" * 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: kprobes: Fix "Failed to find blacklist" probing errors on ia64 and ppc64 kprobes/x86: Don't try to resolve kprobe faults from userspace perf/x86/intel: Avoid spamming kernel log for BTS buffer failure perf/x86/intel: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying perf: Fix lockdep warning on process exit perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix SNB-EP/IVT Cbox filter mappings perf/x86/intel: Use proper dTLB-load-misses event on IvyBridge perf: Revert ("perf: Always destroy groups on exit")
This commit is contained in:
commit
9dae0a3fc4
@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static int x86_pmu_extra_regs(u64 config, struct perf_event *event)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if (event->attr.config1 & ~er->valid_mask)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
/* Check if the extra msrs can be safely accessed*/
|
||||
if (!er->extra_msr_access)
|
||||
return -ENXIO;
|
||||
|
||||
reg->idx = er->idx;
|
||||
reg->config = event->attr.config1;
|
||||
|
@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ struct extra_reg {
|
||||
u64 config_mask;
|
||||
u64 valid_mask;
|
||||
int idx; /* per_xxx->regs[] reg index */
|
||||
bool extra_msr_access;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#define EVENT_EXTRA_REG(e, ms, m, vm, i) { \
|
||||
@ -303,6 +304,7 @@ struct extra_reg {
|
||||
.config_mask = (m), \
|
||||
.valid_mask = (vm), \
|
||||
.idx = EXTRA_REG_##i, \
|
||||
.extra_msr_access = true, \
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define INTEL_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, vm, idx) \
|
||||
|
@ -2182,6 +2182,41 @@ static void intel_snb_check_microcode(void)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Under certain circumstances, access certain MSR may cause #GP.
|
||||
* The function tests if the input MSR can be safely accessed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static bool check_msr(unsigned long msr, u64 mask)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u64 val_old, val_new, val_tmp;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Read the current value, change it and read it back to see if it
|
||||
* matches, this is needed to detect certain hardware emulators
|
||||
* (qemu/kvm) that don't trap on the MSR access and always return 0s.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_old))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Only change the bits which can be updated by wrmsrl.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val_tmp = val_old ^ mask;
|
||||
if (wrmsrl_safe(msr, val_tmp) ||
|
||||
rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_new))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
if (val_new != val_tmp)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Here it's sure that the MSR can be safely accessed.
|
||||
* Restore the old value and return.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
wrmsrl(msr, val_old);
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static __init void intel_sandybridge_quirk(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
x86_pmu.check_microcode = intel_snb_check_microcode;
|
||||
@ -2271,7 +2306,8 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
|
||||
union cpuid10_ebx ebx;
|
||||
struct event_constraint *c;
|
||||
unsigned int unused;
|
||||
int version;
|
||||
struct extra_reg *er;
|
||||
int version, i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
|
||||
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
|
||||
@ -2474,6 +2510,9 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
|
||||
case 62: /* IvyBridge EP */
|
||||
memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, snb_hw_cache_event_ids,
|
||||
sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids));
|
||||
/* dTLB-load-misses on IVB is different than SNB */
|
||||
hw_cache_event_ids[C(DTLB)][C(OP_READ)][C(RESULT_MISS)] = 0x8108; /* DTLB_LOAD_MISSES.DEMAND_LD_MISS_CAUSES_A_WALK */
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, snb_hw_cache_extra_regs,
|
||||
sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs));
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2574,6 +2613,34 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Access LBR MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
|
||||
* E.g. KVM doesn't support LBR MSR
|
||||
* Check all LBT MSR here.
|
||||
* Disable LBR access if any LBR MSRs can not be accessed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr && !check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos, 0x3UL))
|
||||
x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.lbr_nr; i++) {
|
||||
if (!(check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_from + i, 0xffffUL) &&
|
||||
check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_to + i, 0xffffUL)))
|
||||
x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Access extra MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
|
||||
* E.g. KVM doesn't support offcore event
|
||||
* Check all extra_regs here.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (x86_pmu.extra_regs) {
|
||||
for (er = x86_pmu.extra_regs; er->msr; er++) {
|
||||
er->extra_msr_access = check_msr(er->msr, 0x1ffUL);
|
||||
/* Disable LBR select mapping */
|
||||
if ((er->idx == EXTRA_REG_LBR) && !er->extra_msr_access)
|
||||
x86_pmu.lbr_sel_map = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Support full width counters using alternative MSR range */
|
||||
if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.full_width_write) {
|
||||
x86_pmu.max_period = x86_pmu.cntval_mask;
|
||||
|
@ -311,9 +311,11 @@ static int alloc_bts_buffer(int cpu)
|
||||
if (!x86_pmu.bts)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
buffer = kzalloc_node(BTS_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL, node);
|
||||
if (unlikely(!buffer))
|
||||
buffer = kzalloc_node(BTS_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN, node);
|
||||
if (unlikely(!buffer)) {
|
||||
WARN_ONCE(1, "%s: BTS buffer allocation failure\n", __func__);
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
max = BTS_BUFFER_SIZE / BTS_RECORD_SIZE;
|
||||
thresh = max / 16;
|
||||
|
@ -550,16 +550,16 @@ static struct extra_reg snbep_uncore_cbox_extra_regs[] = {
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4134, 0xffff, 0x6),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0135, 0xffff, 0x8),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0335, 0xffff, 0x8),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4135, 0xffff, 0xc),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4335, 0xffff, 0xc),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4135, 0xffff, 0xa),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4335, 0xffff, 0xa),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4435, 0xffff, 0x2),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4835, 0xffff, 0x2),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4a35, 0xffff, 0x2),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x5035, 0xffff, 0x2),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0136, 0xffff, 0x8),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0336, 0xffff, 0x8),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4136, 0xffff, 0xc),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4336, 0xffff, 0xc),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4136, 0xffff, 0xa),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4336, 0xffff, 0xa),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4436, 0xffff, 0x2),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4836, 0xffff, 0x2),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4a36, 0xffff, 0x2),
|
||||
@ -1222,6 +1222,7 @@ static struct extra_reg ivt_uncore_cbox_extra_regs[] = {
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(SNBEP_CBO_PMON_CTL_TID_EN,
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_PMON_CTL_TID_EN, 0x1),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x1031, 0x10ff, 0x2),
|
||||
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x1134, 0xffff, 0x4),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4134, 0xffff, 0xc),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x5134, 0xffff, 0xc),
|
||||
@ -1245,7 +1246,7 @@ static struct extra_reg ivt_uncore_cbox_extra_regs[] = {
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x8335, 0xffff, 0x10),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0136, 0xffff, 0x10),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x0336, 0xffff, 0x10),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x2336, 0xffff, 0x10),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x2136, 0xffff, 0x10),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x2336, 0xffff, 0x10),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4136, 0xffff, 0x18),
|
||||
SNBEP_CBO_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0x4336, 0xffff, 0x18),
|
||||
|
@ -574,6 +574,9 @@ int kprobe_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
struct kprobe *p;
|
||||
struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb;
|
||||
|
||||
if (user_mode_vm(regs))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *)(regs->ip - sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t));
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We don't want to be preempted for the entire
|
||||
|
@ -7458,7 +7458,19 @@ __perf_event_exit_task(struct perf_event *child_event,
|
||||
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx,
|
||||
struct task_struct *child)
|
||||
{
|
||||
perf_remove_from_context(child_event, true);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Do not destroy the 'original' grouping; because of the context
|
||||
* switch optimization the original events could've ended up in a
|
||||
* random child task.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If we were to destroy the original group, all group related
|
||||
* operations would cease to function properly after this random
|
||||
* child dies.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Do destroy all inherited groups, we don't care about those
|
||||
* and being thorough is better.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
perf_remove_from_context(child_event, !!child_event->parent);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* It can happen that the parent exits first, and has events
|
||||
@ -7474,7 +7486,7 @@ __perf_event_exit_task(struct perf_event *child_event,
|
||||
static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct perf_event *child_event, *next;
|
||||
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx;
|
||||
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx, *parent_ctx;
|
||||
unsigned long flags;
|
||||
|
||||
if (likely(!child->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn])) {
|
||||
@ -7499,6 +7511,15 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
|
||||
raw_spin_lock(&child_ctx->lock);
|
||||
task_ctx_sched_out(child_ctx);
|
||||
child->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn] = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* In order to avoid freeing: child_ctx->parent_ctx->task
|
||||
* under perf_event_context::lock, grab another reference.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
parent_ctx = child_ctx->parent_ctx;
|
||||
if (parent_ctx)
|
||||
get_ctx(parent_ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If this context is a clone; unclone it so it can't get
|
||||
* swapped to another process while we're removing all
|
||||
@ -7508,6 +7529,13 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
|
||||
update_context_time(child_ctx);
|
||||
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&child_ctx->lock, flags);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Now that we no longer hold perf_event_context::lock, drop
|
||||
* our extra child_ctx->parent_ctx reference.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (parent_ctx)
|
||||
put_ctx(parent_ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Report the task dead after unscheduling the events so that we
|
||||
* won't get any samples after PERF_RECORD_EXIT. We can however still
|
||||
|
@ -2037,19 +2037,23 @@ static int __init populate_kprobe_blacklist(unsigned long *start,
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long *iter;
|
||||
struct kprobe_blacklist_entry *ent;
|
||||
unsigned long offset = 0, size = 0;
|
||||
unsigned long entry, offset = 0, size = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (iter = start; iter < end; iter++) {
|
||||
if (!kallsyms_lookup_size_offset(*iter, &size, &offset)) {
|
||||
pr_err("Failed to find blacklist %p\n", (void *)*iter);
|
||||
entry = arch_deref_entry_point((void *)*iter);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!kernel_text_address(entry) ||
|
||||
!kallsyms_lookup_size_offset(entry, &size, &offset)) {
|
||||
pr_err("Failed to find blacklist at %p\n",
|
||||
(void *)entry);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ent = kmalloc(sizeof(*ent), GFP_KERNEL);
|
||||
if (!ent)
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
ent->start_addr = *iter;
|
||||
ent->end_addr = *iter + size;
|
||||
ent->start_addr = entry;
|
||||
ent->end_addr = entry + size;
|
||||
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ent->list);
|
||||
list_add_tail(&ent->list, &kprobe_blacklist);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user