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Allow access to /proc/$PID/fd after setuid()
/proc/$PID/fd has r-x------ permissions, so if process does setuid(), it will not be able to access /proc/*/fd/. This breaks fstatat() emulation in glibc. open("foo", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY) = 4 setuid32(65534) = 0 stat64("/proc/self/fd/4/bar", 0xbfafb298) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Acked-By: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -1447,11 +1447,29 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = {
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.readdir = proc_readfd,
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};
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/*
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* /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
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* access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
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*/
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static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
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struct nameidata *nd)
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{
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int rv;
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rv = generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
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if (rv == 0)
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return 0;
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if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode))
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rv = 0;
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return rv;
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}
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/*
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* proc directories can do almost nothing..
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*/
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static const struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = {
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.lookup = proc_lookupfd,
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.permission = proc_fd_permission,
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.setattr = proc_setattr,
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};
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