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fsverity updates for 6.3

Browse Source 
Fix the longstanding implementation limitation that fsverity was only
 supported when the Merkle tree block size, filesystem block size, and
 PAGE_SIZE were all equal.  Specifically, add support for Merkle tree
 block sizes less than PAGE_SIZE, and make ext4 support fsverity on
 filesystems where the filesystem block size is less than PAGE_SIZE.
 
 Effectively, this means that fsverity can now be used on systems with
 non-4K pages, at least on ext4.  These changes have been tested using
 the verity group of xfstests, newly updated to cover the new code paths.
 
 Also update fs/verity/ to support verifying data from large folios.
 There's also a similar patch for fs/crypto/, to support decrypting data
 from large folios, which I'm including in this pull request to avoid a
 merge conflict between the fscrypt and fsverity branches.
 
 There will be a merge conflict in fs/buffer.c with some of the foliation
 work in the mm tree.  Please use the merge resolution from linux-next.
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Merge tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux

Pull fsverity updates from Eric Biggers:
 "Fix the longstanding implementation limitation that fsverity was only
  supported when the Merkle tree block size, filesystem block size, and
  PAGE_SIZE were all equal.

  Specifically, add support for Merkle tree block sizes less than
  PAGE_SIZE, and make ext4 support fsverity on filesystems where the
  filesystem block size is less than PAGE_SIZE.

  Effectively, this means that fsverity can now be used on systems with
  non-4K pages, at least on ext4. These changes have been tested using
  the verity group of xfstests, newly updated to cover the new code
  paths.

  Also update fs/verity/ to support verifying data from large folios.

  There's also a similar patch for fs/crypto/, to support decrypting
  data from large folios, which I'm including in here to avoid a merge
  conflict between the fscrypt and fsverity branches"

* tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux:
  fscrypt: support decrypting data from large folios
  fsverity: support verifying data from large folios
  fsverity.rst: update git repo URL for fsverity-utils
  ext4: allow verity with fs block size < PAGE_SIZE
  fs/buffer.c: support fsverity in block_read_full_folio()
  f2fs: simplify f2fs_readpage_limit()
  ext4: simplify ext4_readpage_limit()
  fsverity: support enabling with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE
  fsverity: support verification with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE
  fsverity: replace fsverity_hash_page() with fsverity_hash_block()
  fsverity: use EFBIG for file too large to enable verity
  fsverity: store log2(digest_size) precomputed
  fsverity: simplify Merkle tree readahead size calculation
  fsverity: use unsigned long for level_start
  fsverity: remove debug messages and CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG
  fsverity: pass pos and size to ->write_merkle_tree_block
  fsverity: optimize fsverity_cleanup_inode() on non-verity files
  fsverity: optimize fsverity_prepare_setattr() on non-verity files
  fsverity: optimize fsverity_file_open() on non-verity files
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2023-02-20 12:33:41 -08:00
commit 6639c3ce7f
22 changed files with 703 additions and 504 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
View File

@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ the file contents themselves, as described below:
For the read path (->read_folio()) of regular files, filesystems can
read the ciphertext into the page cache and decrypt it in-place. The
page lock must be held until decryption has finished, to prevent the
page from becoming visible to userspace prematurely.
folio lock must be held until decryption has finished, to prevent the
folio from becoming visible to userspace prematurely.
For the write path (->writepage()) of regular files, filesystems
cannot encrypt data in-place in the page cache, since the cached

96
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
View File

@ -118,10 +118,11 @@ as follows:
- ``hash_algorithm`` must be the identifier for the hash algorithm to
use for the Merkle tree, such as FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256. See
``include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h`` for the list of possible values.
- ``block_size`` must be the Merkle tree block size. Currently, this
must be equal to the system page size, which is usually 4096 bytes.
Other sizes may be supported in the future. This value is not
necessarily the same as the filesystem block size.
- ``block_size`` is the Merkle tree block size, in bytes. In Linux
v6.3 and later, this can be any power of 2 between (inclusively)
1024 and the minimum of the system page size and the filesystem
block size. In earlier versions, the page size was the only allowed
value.
- ``salt_size`` is the size of the salt in bytes, or 0 if no salt is
provided. The salt is a value that is prepended to every hashed
block; it can be used to personalize the hashing for a particular
@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
- ``EBUSY``: this ioctl is already running on the file
- ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled
- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory
- ``EFBIG``: the file is too large to enable verity on
- ``EINTR``: the operation was interrupted by a fatal signal
- ``EINVAL``: unsupported version, hash algorithm, or block size; or
reserved bits are set; or the file descriptor refers to neither a
@ -495,9 +497,11 @@ To create verity files on an ext4 filesystem, the filesystem must have
been formatted with ``-O verity`` or had ``tune2fs -O verity`` run on
it. "verity" is an RO_COMPAT filesystem feature, so once set, old
kernels will only be able to mount the filesystem readonly, and old
versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem. Moreover,
currently ext4 only supports mounting a filesystem with the "verity"
feature when its block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes).
versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem.
Originally, an ext4 filesystem with the "verity" feature could only be
mounted when its block size was equal to the system page size
(typically 4096 bytes). In Linux v6.3, this limitation was removed.
ext4 sets the EXT4_VERITY_FL on-disk inode flag on verity files. It
can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be cleared.
@ -518,9 +522,7 @@ support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support
encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted
when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
Currently, ext4 verity only supports the case where the Merkle tree
block size, filesystem block size, and page size are all the same. It
also only supports extent-based files.
ext4 only allows verity on extent-based files.
f2fs
----
@ -538,11 +540,10 @@ Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and
fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first
64K boundary beyond i_size. See explanation for ext4 above.
Moreover, f2fs supports at most 4096 bytes of xattr entries per inode
which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block.
which usually wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block.
Currently, f2fs verity only supports a Merkle tree block size of 4096.
Also, f2fs doesn't support enabling verity on files that currently
have atomic or volatile writes pending.
f2fs doesn't support enabling verity on files that currently have
atomic or volatile writes pending.
btrfs
-----
@ -567,51 +568,48 @@ Pagecache
~~~~~~~~~
For filesystems using Linux's pagecache, the ``->read_folio()`` and
``->readahead()`` methods must be modified to verify pages before they
are marked Uptodate. Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be
``->readahead()`` methods must be modified to verify folios before
they are marked Uptodate. Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be
insufficient, since ``->read_iter()`` is not used for memory maps.
Therefore, fs/verity/ provides a function fsverity_verify_page() which
verifies a page that has been read into the pagecache of a verity
inode, but is still locked and not Uptodate, so it's not yet readable
by userspace. As needed to do the verification,
fsverity_verify_page() will call back into the filesystem to read
Merkle tree pages via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page().
Therefore, fs/verity/ provides the function fsverity_verify_blocks()
which verifies data that has been read into the pagecache of a verity
inode. The containing folio must still be locked and not Uptodate, so
it's not yet readable by userspace. As needed to do the verification,
fsverity_verify_blocks() will call back into the filesystem to read
hash blocks via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page().
fsverity_verify_page() returns false if verification failed; in this
case, the filesystem must not set the page Uptodate. Following this,
fsverity_verify_blocks() returns false if verification failed; in this
case, the filesystem must not set the folio Uptodate. Following this,
as per the usual Linux pagecache behavior, attempts by userspace to
read() from the part of the file containing the page will fail with
EIO, and accesses to the page within a memory map will raise SIGBUS.
read() from the part of the file containing the folio will fail with
EIO, and accesses to the folio within a memory map will raise SIGBUS.
fsverity_verify_page() currently only supports the case where the
Merkle tree block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes).
In principle, fsverity_verify_page() verifies the entire path in the
Merkle tree from the data page to the root hash. However, for
efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore,
fsverity_verify_page() only ascends the tree reading hash pages until
an already-verified hash page is seen, as indicated by the PageChecked
bit being set. It then verifies the path to that page.
In principle, verifying a data block requires verifying the entire
path in the Merkle tree from the data block to the root hash.
However, for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash blocks.
Therefore, fsverity_verify_blocks() only ascends the tree reading hash
blocks until an already-verified hash block is seen. It then verifies
the path to that block.
This optimization, which is also used by dm-verity, results in
excellent sequential read performance. This is because usually (e.g.
127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash page from the
127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash block from the
bottom level of the tree will already be cached and checked from
reading a previous data page. However, random reads perform worse.
reading a previous data block. However, random reads perform worse.
Block device based filesystems
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Block device based filesystems (e.g. ext4 and f2fs) in Linux also use
the pagecache, so the above subsection applies too. However, they
also usually read many pages from a file at once, grouped into a
also usually read many data blocks from a file at once, grouped into a
structure called a "bio". To make it easier for these types of
filesystems to support fs-verity, fs/verity/ also provides a function
fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all pages in a bio.
fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all data blocks in a bio.
ext4 and f2fs also support encryption. If a verity file is also
encrypted, the pages must be decrypted before being verified. To
encrypted, the data must be decrypted before being verified. To
support this, these filesystems allocate a "post-read context" for
each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``::
@ -626,14 +624,14 @@ each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``::
verity, or both is enabled. After the bio completes, for each needed
postprocessing step the filesystem enqueues the bio_post_read_ctx on a
workqueue, and then the workqueue work does the decryption or
verification. Finally, pages where no decryption or verity error
occurred are marked Uptodate, and the pages are unlocked.
verification. Finally, folios where no decryption or verity error
occurred are marked Uptodate, and the folios are unlocked.
On many filesystems, files can contain holes. Normally,
``->readahead()`` simply zeroes holes and sets the corresponding pages
Uptodate; no bios are issued. To prevent this case from bypassing
fs-verity, these filesystems use fsverity_verify_page() to verify hole
pages.
``->readahead()`` simply zeroes hole blocks and considers the
corresponding data to be up-to-date; no bios are issued. To prevent
this case from bypassing fs-verity, filesystems use
fsverity_verify_blocks() to verify hole blocks.
Filesystems also disable direct I/O on verity files, since otherwise
direct I/O would bypass fs-verity.
@ -644,7 +642,7 @@ Userspace utility
This document focuses on the kernel, but a userspace utility for
fs-verity can be found at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/fsverity-utils.git
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/fsverity-utils.git
See the README.md file in the fsverity-utils source tree for details,
including examples of setting up fs-verity protected files.
@ -793,9 +791,9 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
:A: There are many reasons why this is not possible or would be very
difficult, including the following:
- To prevent bypassing verification, pages must not be marked
- To prevent bypassing verification, folios must not be marked
Uptodate until they've been verified. Currently, each
filesystem is responsible for marking pages Uptodate via
filesystem is responsible for marking folios Uptodate via
``->readahead()``. Therefore, currently it's not possible for
the VFS to do the verification on its own. Changing this would
require significant changes to the VFS and all filesystems.

19
fs/btrfs/verity.c
View File

@ -783,30 +783,25 @@ again:
/*
* fsverity op that writes a Merkle tree block into the btree.
*
* @inode: inode to write a Merkle tree block for
* @buf: Merkle tree data block to write
* @index: index of the block in the Merkle tree
* @log_blocksize: log base 2 of the Merkle tree block size
*
* Note that the block size could be different from the page size, so it is not
* safe to assume that index is a page index.
* @inode: inode to write a Merkle tree block for
* @buf: Merkle tree block to write
* @pos: the position of the block in the Merkle tree (in bytes)
* @size: the Merkle tree block size (in bytes)
*
* Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure
*/
static int btrfs_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
u64 index, int log_blocksize)
u64 pos, unsigned int size)
{
u64 off = index << log_blocksize;
u64 len = 1ULL << log_blocksize;
loff_t merkle_pos = merkle_file_pos(inode);
if (merkle_pos < 0)
return merkle_pos;
if (merkle_pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - off - len)
if (merkle_pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - pos - size)
return -EFBIG;
return write_key_bytes(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY,
off, buf, len);
pos, buf, size);
}
const struct fsverity_operations btrfs_verityops = {

72
fs/buffer.c
View File

@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <trace/events/block.h>
#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include "internal.h"
@ -295,20 +296,53 @@ still_busy:
return;
}
struct decrypt_bh_ctx {
struct postprocess_bh_ctx {
struct work_struct work;
struct buffer_head *bh;
};
static void verify_bh(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx =
container_of(work, struct postprocess_bh_ctx, work);
struct buffer_head *bh = ctx->bh;
bool valid;
valid = fsverity_verify_blocks(page_folio(bh->b_page), bh->b_size,
bh_offset(bh));
end_buffer_async_read(bh, valid);
kfree(ctx);
}
static bool need_fsverity(struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct page *page = bh->b_page;
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
return fsverity_active(inode) &&
/* needed by ext4 */
page->index < DIV_ROUND_UP(inode->i_size, PAGE_SIZE);
}
static void decrypt_bh(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct decrypt_bh_ctx *ctx =
container_of(work, struct decrypt_bh_ctx, work);
struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx =
container_of(work, struct postprocess_bh_ctx, work);
struct buffer_head *bh = ctx->bh;
int err;
err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(bh->b_page, bh->b_size,
bh_offset(bh));
err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page_folio(bh->b_page),
bh->b_size, bh_offset(bh));
if (err == 0 && need_fsverity(bh)) {
/*
* We use different work queues for decryption and for verity
* because verity may require reading metadata pages that need
* decryption, and we shouldn't recurse to the same workqueue.
*/
INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, verify_bh);
fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(&ctx->work);
return;
}
end_buffer_async_read(bh, err == 0);
kfree(ctx);
}
@ -319,15 +353,24 @@ static void decrypt_bh(struct work_struct *work)
*/
static void end_buffer_async_read_io(struct buffer_head *bh, int uptodate)
{
/* Decrypt if needed */
if (uptodate &&
fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(bh->b_page->mapping->host)) {
struct decrypt_bh_ctx *ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_ATOMIC);
struct inode *inode = bh->b_page->mapping->host;
bool decrypt = fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(inode);
bool verify = need_fsverity(bh);
/* Decrypt (with fscrypt) and/or verify (with fsverity) if needed. */
if (uptodate && (decrypt || verify)) {
struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx =
kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ctx) {
INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, decrypt_bh);
ctx->bh = bh;
fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(&ctx->work);
if (decrypt) {
INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, decrypt_bh);
fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(&ctx->work);
} else {
INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, verify_bh);
fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(&ctx->work);
}
return;
}
uptodate = 0;
@ -2245,6 +2288,11 @@ int block_read_full_folio(struct folio *folio, get_block_t *get_block)
int nr, i;
int fully_mapped = 1;
bool page_error = false;
loff_t limit = i_size_read(inode);
/* This is needed for ext4. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode))
limit = inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_test_large(folio), folio);
@ -2253,7 +2301,7 @@ int block_read_full_folio(struct folio *folio, get_block_t *get_block)
bbits = block_size_bits(blocksize);
iblock = (sector_t)folio->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - bbits);
lblock = (i_size_read(inode)+blocksize-1) >> bbits;
lblock = (limit+blocksize-1) >> bbits;
bh = head;
nr = 0;
i = 0;

10
fs/crypto/bio.c
View File

@ -30,13 +30,11 @@
*/
bool fscrypt_decrypt_bio(struct bio *bio)
{
struct bio_vec *bv;
struct bvec_iter_all iter_all;
struct folio_iter fi;
bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) {
struct page *page = bv->bv_page;
int err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page, bv->bv_len,
bv->bv_offset);
bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, bio) {
int err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(fi.folio, fi.length,
fi.offset);
if (err) {
bio->bi_status = errno_to_blk_status(err);

28
fs/crypto/crypto.c
View File

@ -237,41 +237,43 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace);
/**
* fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() - Decrypt filesystem blocks in a
* pagecache page
* @page: The locked pagecache page containing the block(s) to decrypt
* pagecache folio
* @folio: The locked pagecache folio containing the block(s) to decrypt
* @len: Total size of the block(s) to decrypt. Must be a nonzero
* multiple of the filesystem's block size.
* @offs: Byte offset within @page of the first block to decrypt. Must be
* @offs: Byte offset within @folio of the first block to decrypt. Must be
* a multiple of the filesystem's block size.
*
* The specified block(s) are decrypted in-place within the pagecache page,
* which must still be locked and not uptodate. Normally, blocksize ==
* PAGE_SIZE and the whole page is decrypted at once.
* The specified block(s) are decrypted in-place within the pagecache folio,
* which must still be locked and not uptodate.
*
* This is for use by the filesystem's ->readahead() method.
*
* Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure
*/
int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs)
int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len,
size_t offs)
{
const struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
const struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host;
const unsigned int blockbits = inode->i_blkbits;
const unsigned int blocksize = 1 << blockbits;
u64 lblk_num = ((u64)page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - blockbits)) +
u64 lblk_num = ((u64)folio->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - blockbits)) +
(offs >> blockbits);
unsigned int i;
size_t i;
int err;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(page)))
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!folio_test_locked(folio)))
return -EINVAL;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offs, blocksize)))
return -EINVAL;
for (i = offs; i < offs + len; i += blocksize, lblk_num++) {
struct page *page = folio_page(folio, i >> PAGE_SHIFT);
err = fscrypt_crypt_block(inode, FS_DECRYPT, lblk_num, page,
page, blocksize, i, GFP_NOFS);
page, blocksize, i & ~PAGE_MASK,
GFP_NOFS);
if (err)
return err;
}

6
fs/ext4/inode.c
View File

@ -1136,7 +1136,8 @@ static int ext4_block_write_begin(struct page *page, loff_t pos, unsigned len,
for (i = 0; i < nr_wait; i++) {
int err2;
err2 = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page, blocksize,
err2 = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page_folio(page),
blocksize,
bh_offset(wait[i]));
if (err2) {
clear_buffer_uptodate(wait[i]);
@ -3858,7 +3859,8 @@ static int __ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle_t *handle,
if (fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(inode)) {
/* We expect the key to be set. */
BUG_ON(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode));
err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page, blocksize,
err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page_folio(page),
blocksize,
bh_offset(bh));
if (err) {
clear_buffer_uptodate(bh);

3
fs/ext4/readpage.c
View File

@ -211,8 +211,7 @@ static void ext4_set_bio_post_read_ctx(struct bio *bio,
static inline loff_t ext4_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) &&
(IS_VERITY(inode) || ext4_verity_in_progress(inode)))
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode))
return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
return i_size_read(inode);

5
fs/ext4/super.c
View File

@ -5325,11 +5325,6 @@ static int __ext4_fill_super(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb)
}
}
if (ext4_has_feature_verity(sb) && sb->s_blocksize != PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported blocksize for fs-verity");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
/*
* Get the # of file system overhead blocks from the
* superblock if present.

6
fs/ext4/verity.c
View File

@ -381,11 +381,11 @@ static struct page *ext4_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,
}
static int ext4_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
u64 index, int log_blocksize)
u64 pos, unsigned int size)
{
loff_t pos = ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + (index << log_blocksize);
pos += ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode);
return pagecache_write(inode, buf, 1 << log_blocksize, pos);
return pagecache_write(inode, buf, size, pos);
}
const struct fsverity_operations ext4_verityops = {

3
fs/f2fs/data.c
View File

@ -2053,8 +2053,7 @@ out:
static inline loff_t f2fs_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) &&
(IS_VERITY(inode) || f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode)))
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode))
return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
return i_size_read(inode);

6
fs/f2fs/verity.c
View File

@ -276,11 +276,11 @@ static struct page *f2fs_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,
}
static int f2fs_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
u64 index, int log_blocksize)
u64 pos, unsigned int size)
{
loff_t pos = f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + (index << log_blocksize);
pos += f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode);
return pagecache_write(inode, buf, 1 << log_blocksize, pos);
return pagecache_write(inode, buf, size, pos);
}
const struct fsverity_operations f2fs_verityops = {

8
fs/verity/Kconfig
View File

@ -34,14 +34,6 @@ config FS_VERITY
If unsure, say N.
config FS_VERITY_DEBUG
bool "FS Verity debugging"
depends on FS_VERITY
help
Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default.
Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer.
config FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
bool "FS Verity builtin signature support"
depends on FS_VERITY

273
fs/verity/enable.c
View File

@ -7,138 +7,52 @@
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
/*
* Read a file data page for Merkle tree construction. Do aggressive readahead,
* since we're sequentially reading the entire file.
*/
static struct page *read_file_data_page(struct file *file, pgoff_t index,
struct file_ra_state *ra,
unsigned long remaining_pages)
{
DEFINE_READAHEAD(ractl, file, ra, file->f_mapping, index);
struct folio *folio;
struct block_buffer {
u32 filled;
u8 *data;
};
folio = __filemap_get_folio(ractl.mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED, 0);
if (!folio || !folio_test_uptodate(folio)) {
if (folio)
folio_put(folio);
else
page_cache_sync_ra(&ractl, remaining_pages);
folio = read_cache_folio(ractl.mapping, index, NULL, file);
if (IS_ERR(folio))
return &folio->page;
}
if (folio_test_readahead(folio))
page_cache_async_ra(&ractl, folio, remaining_pages);
return folio_file_page(folio, index);
}
static int build_merkle_tree_level(struct file *filp, unsigned int level,
u64 num_blocks_to_hash,
const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
u8 *pending_hashes,
struct ahash_request *req)
/* Hash a block, writing the result to the next level's pending block buffer. */
static int hash_one_block(struct inode *inode,
const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
struct ahash_request *req, struct block_buffer *cur)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop;
struct file_ra_state ra = { 0 };
unsigned int pending_size = 0;
u64 dst_block_num;
u64 i;
struct block_buffer *next = cur + 1;
int err;
if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE)) /* checked earlier too */
return -EINVAL;
/* Zero-pad the block if it's shorter than the block size. */
memset(&cur->data[cur->filled], 0, params->block_size - cur->filled);
if (level < params->num_levels) {
dst_block_num = params->level_start[level];
} else {
if (WARN_ON(num_blocks_to_hash != 1))
return -EINVAL;
dst_block_num = 0; /* unused */
}
file_ra_state_init(&ra, filp->f_mapping);
for (i = 0; i < num_blocks_to_hash; i++) {
struct page *src_page;
if ((pgoff_t)i % 10000 == 0 || i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash)
pr_debug("Hashing block %llu of %llu for level %u\n",
i + 1, num_blocks_to_hash, level);
if (level == 0) {
/* Leaf: hashing a data block */
src_page = read_file_data_page(filp, i, &ra,
num_blocks_to_hash - i);
if (IS_ERR(src_page)) {
err = PTR_ERR(src_page);
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d reading data page %llu",
err, i);
return err;
}
} else {
unsigned long num_ra_pages =
min_t(unsigned long, num_blocks_to_hash - i,
inode->i_sb->s_bdi->io_pages);
/* Non-leaf: hashing hash block from level below */
src_page = vops->read_merkle_tree_page(inode,
params->level_start[level - 1] + i,
num_ra_pages);
if (IS_ERR(src_page)) {
err = PTR_ERR(src_page);
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d reading Merkle tree page %llu",
err, params->level_start[level - 1] + i);
return err;
}
}
err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, src_page,
&pending_hashes[pending_size]);
put_page(src_page);
if (err)
return err;
pending_size += params->digest_size;
if (level == params->num_levels) /* Root hash? */
return 0;
if (pending_size + params->digest_size > params->block_size ||
i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash) {
/* Flush the pending hash block */
memset(&pending_hashes[pending_size], 0,
params->block_size - pending_size);
err = vops->write_merkle_tree_block(inode,
pending_hashes,
dst_block_num,
params->log_blocksize);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d writing Merkle tree block %llu",
err, dst_block_num);
return err;
}
dst_block_num++;
pending_size = 0;
}
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
return -EINTR;
cond_resched();
}
err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, req, virt_to_page(cur->data),
offset_in_page(cur->data),
&next->data[next->filled]);
if (err)
return err;
next->filled += params->digest_size;
cur->filled = 0;
return 0;
}
static int write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const u8 *buf,
unsigned long index,
const struct merkle_tree_params *params)
{
u64 pos = (u64)index << params->log_blocksize;
int err;
err = inode->i_sb->s_vop->write_merkle_tree_block(inode, buf, pos,
params->block_size);
if (err)
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d writing Merkle tree block %lu",
err, index);
return err;
}
/*
* Build the Merkle tree for the given file using the given parameters, and
* return the root hash in @root_hash.
@ -152,13 +66,17 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp,
u8 *root_hash)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
u8 *pending_hashes;
const u64 data_size = inode->i_size;
const int num_levels = params->num_levels;
struct ahash_request *req;
u64 blocks;
unsigned int level;
int err = -ENOMEM;
struct block_buffer _buffers[1 + FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS + 1] = {};
struct block_buffer *buffers = &_buffers[1];
unsigned long level_offset[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
int level;
u64 offset;
int err;
if (inode->i_size == 0) {
if (data_size == 0) {
/* Empty file is a special case; root hash is all 0's */
memset(root_hash, 0, params->digest_size);
return 0;
@ -167,29 +85,95 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp,
/* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */
req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(params->hash_alg, GFP_KERNEL);
pending_hashes = kmalloc(params->block_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pending_hashes)
goto out;
/*
* Build each level of the Merkle tree, starting at the leaf level
* (level 0) and ascending to the root node (level 'num_levels - 1').
* Then at the end (level 'num_levels'), calculate the root hash.
* Allocate the block buffers. Buffer "-1" is for data blocks.
* Buffers 0 <= level < num_levels are for the actual tree levels.
* Buffer 'num_levels' is for the root hash.
*/
blocks = ((u64)inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >>
params->log_blocksize;
for (level = 0; level <= params->num_levels; level++) {
err = build_merkle_tree_level(filp, level, blocks, params,
pending_hashes, req);
for (level = -1; level < num_levels; level++) {
buffers[level].data = kzalloc(params->block_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffers[level].data) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
buffers[num_levels].data = root_hash;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(level_offset) != sizeof(params->level_start));
memcpy(level_offset, params->level_start, sizeof(level_offset));
/* Hash each data block, also hashing the tree blocks as they fill up */
for (offset = 0; offset < data_size; offset += params->block_size) {
ssize_t bytes_read;
loff_t pos = offset;
buffers[-1].filled = min_t(u64, params->block_size,
data_size - offset);
bytes_read = __kernel_read(filp, buffers[-1].data,
buffers[-1].filled, &pos);
if (bytes_read < 0) {
err = bytes_read;
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d reading file data", err);
goto out;
}
if (bytes_read != buffers[-1].filled) {
err = -EINVAL;
fsverity_err(inode, "Short read of file data");
goto out;
}
err = hash_one_block(inode, params, req, &buffers[-1]);
if (err)
goto out;
blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
params->log_arity;
for (level = 0; level < num_levels; level++) {
if (buffers[level].filled + params->digest_size <=
params->block_size) {
/* Next block at @level isn't full yet */
break;
}
/* Next block at @level is full */
err = hash_one_block(inode, params, req,
&buffers[level]);
if (err)
goto out;
err = write_merkle_tree_block(inode,
buffers[level].data,
level_offset[level],
params);
if (err)
goto out;
level_offset[level]++;
}
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
err = -EINTR;
goto out;
}
cond_resched();
}
/* Finish all nonempty pending tree blocks. */
for (level = 0; level < num_levels; level++) {
if (buffers[level].filled != 0) {
err = hash_one_block(inode, params, req,
&buffers[level]);
if (err)
goto out;
err = write_merkle_tree_block(inode,
buffers[level].data,
level_offset[level],
params);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
/* The root hash was filled by the last call to hash_one_block(). */
if (WARN_ON(buffers[num_levels].filled != params->digest_size)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(root_hash, pending_hashes, params->digest_size);
err = 0;
out:
kfree(pending_hashes);
for (level = -1; level < num_levels; level++)
kfree(buffers[level].data);
fsverity_free_hash_request(params->hash_alg, req);
return err;
}
@ -263,15 +247,12 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,
* ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity() using the inode
* lock and only allow one process to be here at a time on a given file.
*/
pr_debug("Building Merkle tree...\n");
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(desc->root_hash) < FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
err = build_merkle_tree(filp, &params, desc->root_hash);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d building Merkle tree", err);
goto rollback;
}
pr_debug("Done building Merkle tree. Root hash is %s:%*phN\n",
params.hash_alg->name, params.digest_size, desc->root_hash);
/*
* Create the fsverity_info. Don't bother trying to save work by
@ -286,10 +267,6 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,
goto rollback;
}
if (arg->sig_size)
pr_debug("Storing a %u-byte PKCS#7 signature alongside the file\n",
arg->sig_size);
/*
* Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file.
* Serialized with ->begin_enable_verity() by the inode lock.
@ -352,7 +329,7 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
memchr_inv(arg.__reserved2, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved2)))
return -EINVAL;
if (arg.block_size != PAGE_SIZE)
if (!is_power_of_2(arg.block_size))
return -EINVAL;
if (arg.salt_size > sizeof_field(struct fsverity_descriptor, salt))

24
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
View File

@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
#ifndef _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
#define _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG
#define DEBUG
#endif
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
@ -46,17 +42,20 @@ struct merkle_tree_params {
unsigned int digest_size; /* same as hash_alg->digest_size */
unsigned int block_size; /* size of data and tree blocks */
unsigned int hashes_per_block; /* number of hashes per tree block */
unsigned int log_blocksize; /* log2(block_size) */
unsigned int log_arity; /* log2(hashes_per_block) */
unsigned int blocks_per_page; /* PAGE_SIZE / block_size */
u8 log_digestsize; /* log2(digest_size) */
u8 log_blocksize; /* log2(block_size) */
u8 log_arity; /* log2(hashes_per_block) */
u8 log_blocks_per_page; /* log2(blocks_per_page) */
unsigned int num_levels; /* number of levels in Merkle tree */
u64 tree_size; /* Merkle tree size in bytes */
unsigned long level0_blocks; /* number of blocks in tree level 0 */
unsigned long tree_pages; /* Merkle tree size in pages */
/*
* Starting block index for each tree level, ordered from leaf level (0)
* to root level ('num_levels - 1')
*/
u64 level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
unsigned long level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
};
/*
@ -73,9 +72,10 @@ struct fsverity_info {
u8 root_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
u8 file_digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
const struct inode *inode;
unsigned long *hash_block_verified;
spinlock_t hash_page_init_lock;
};
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE (FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE - \
sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor))
@ -91,9 +91,9 @@ void fsverity_free_hash_request(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
struct ahash_request *req);
const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);
int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out);
int fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode, struct ahash_request *req,
struct page *page, unsigned int offset, u8 *out);
int fsverity_hash_buffer(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out);
void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void);

24
fs/verity/hash_algs.c
View File

@ -220,35 +220,33 @@ err_free:
}
/**
* fsverity_hash_page() - hash a single data or hash page
* fsverity_hash_block() - hash a single data or hash block
* @params: the Merkle tree's parameters
* @inode: inode for which the hashing is being done
* @req: preallocated hash request
* @page: the page to hash
* @page: the page containing the block to hash
* @offset: the offset of the block within @page
* @out: output digest, size 'params->digest_size' bytes
*
* Hash a single data or hash block, assuming block_size == PAGE_SIZE.
* The hash is salted if a salt is specified in the Merkle tree parameters.
* Hash a single data or hash block. The hash is salted if a salt is specified
* in the Merkle tree parameters.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out)
int fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode, struct ahash_request *req,
struct page *page, unsigned int offset, u8 *out)
{
struct scatterlist sg;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
int err;
if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
sg_set_page(&sg, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
sg_set_page(&sg, page, params->block_size, offset);
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, PAGE_SIZE);
ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, params->block_size);
if (params->hashstate) {
err = crypto_ahash_import(req, params->hashstate);
@ -264,7 +262,7 @@ int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
if (err)
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing page hash", err);
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing block hash", err);
return err;
}

1
fs/verity/init.c
View File

@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ static int __init fsverity_init(void)
if (err)
goto err_exit_workqueue;
pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n");
return 0;
err_exit_workqueue:

163
fs/verity/open.c
View File

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep;
@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
int err;
u64 blocks;
u64 blocks_in_level[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
u64 offset;
int level;
@ -54,7 +56,23 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
goto out_err;
}
if (log_blocksize != PAGE_SHIFT) {
/*
* fs/verity/ directly assumes that the Merkle tree block size is a
* power of 2 less than or equal to PAGE_SIZE. Another restriction
* arises from the interaction between fs/verity/ and the filesystems
* themselves: filesystems expect to be able to verify a single
* filesystem block of data at a time. Therefore, the Merkle tree block
* size must also be less than or equal to the filesystem block size.
*
* The above are the only hard limitations, so in theory the Merkle tree
* block size could be as small as twice the digest size. However,
* that's not useful, and it would result in some unusually deep and
* large Merkle trees. So we currently require that the Merkle tree
* block size be at least 1024 bytes. That's small enough to test the
* sub-page block case on systems with 4K pages, but not too small.
*/
if (log_blocksize < 10 || log_blocksize > PAGE_SHIFT ||
log_blocksize > inode->i_blkbits) {
fsverity_warn(inode, "Unsupported log_blocksize: %u",
log_blocksize);
err = -EINVAL;
@ -62,6 +80,8 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
}
params->log_blocksize = log_blocksize;
params->block_size = 1 << log_blocksize;
params->log_blocks_per_page = PAGE_SHIFT - log_blocksize;
params->blocks_per_page = 1 << params->log_blocks_per_page;
if (WARN_ON(!is_power_of_2(params->digest_size))) {
err = -EINVAL;
@ -74,13 +94,10 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
params->log_arity = params->log_blocksize - ilog2(params->digest_size);
params->log_digestsize = ilog2(params->digest_size);
params->log_arity = log_blocksize - params->log_digestsize;
params->hashes_per_block = 1 << params->log_arity;
pr_debug("Merkle tree uses %s with %u-byte blocks (%u hashes/block), salt=%*phN\n",
hash_alg->name, params->block_size, params->hashes_per_block,
(int)salt_size, salt);
/*
* Compute the number of levels in the Merkle tree and create a map from
* level to the starting block of that level. Level 'num_levels - 1' is
@ -90,31 +107,45 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
/* Compute number of levels and the number of blocks in each level */
blocks = ((u64)inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >> log_blocksize;
pr_debug("Data is %lld bytes (%llu blocks)\n", inode->i_size, blocks);
while (blocks > 1) {
if (params->num_levels >= FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Too many levels in Merkle tree");
err = -EINVAL;
err = -EFBIG;
goto out_err;
}
blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
params->log_arity;
/* temporarily using level_start[] to store blocks in level */
params->level_start[params->num_levels++] = blocks;
blocks_in_level[params->num_levels++] = blocks;
}
params->level0_blocks = params->level_start[0];
/* Compute the starting block of each level */
offset = 0;
for (level = (int)params->num_levels - 1; level >= 0; level--) {
blocks = params->level_start[level];
params->level_start[level] = offset;
pr_debug("Level %d is %llu blocks starting at index %llu\n",
level, blocks, offset);
offset += blocks;
offset += blocks_in_level[level];
}
/*
* With block_size != PAGE_SIZE, an in-memory bitmap will need to be
* allocated to track the "verified" status of hash blocks. Don't allow
* this bitmap to get too large. For now, limit it to 1 MiB, which
* limits the file size to about 4.4 TB with SHA-256 and 4K blocks.
*
* Together with the fact that the data, and thus also the Merkle tree,
* cannot have more than ULONG_MAX pages, this implies that hash block
* indices can always fit in an 'unsigned long'. But to be safe, we
* explicitly check for that too. Note, this is only for hash block
* indices; data block indices might not fit in an 'unsigned long'.
*/
if ((params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE && offset > 1 << 23) ||
offset > ULONG_MAX) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Too many blocks in Merkle tree");
err = -EFBIG;
goto out_err;
}
params->tree_size = offset << log_blocksize;
params->tree_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(params->tree_size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
return 0;
out_err:
@ -165,7 +196,7 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d initializing Merkle tree parameters",
err);
goto out;
goto fail;
}
memcpy(vi->root_hash, desc->root_hash, vi->tree_params.digest_size);
@ -174,20 +205,48 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
vi->file_digest);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing file digest", err);
goto out;
goto fail;
}
pr_debug("Computed file digest: %s:%*phN\n",
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name,
vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->file_digest);
err = fsverity_verify_signature(vi, desc->signature,
le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size));
out:
if (err) {
fsverity_free_info(vi);
vi = ERR_PTR(err);
if (err)
goto fail;
if (vi->tree_params.block_size != PAGE_SIZE) {
/*
* When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use
* a bitmap to keep track of which hash blocks have been
* verified. This bitmap must contain one bit per hash block,
* including alignment to a page boundary at the end.
*
* Eventually, to support extremely large files in an efficient
* way, it might be necessary to make pages of this bitmap
* reclaimable. But for now, simply allocating the whole bitmap
* is a simple solution that works well on the files on which
* fsverity is realistically used. E.g., with SHA-256 and 4K
* blocks, a 100MB file only needs a 24-byte bitmap, and the
* bitmap for any file under 17GB fits in a 4K page.
*/
unsigned long num_bits =
vi->tree_params.tree_pages <<
vi->tree_params.log_blocks_per_page;
vi->hash_block_verified = kvcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(num_bits),
sizeof(unsigned long),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vi->hash_block_verified) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
spin_lock_init(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
}
return vi;
fail:
fsverity_free_info(vi);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi)
@ -214,6 +273,7 @@ void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)
if (!vi)
return;
kfree(vi->tree_params.hashstate);
kvfree(vi->hash_block_verified);
kmem_cache_free(fsverity_info_cachep, vi);
}
@ -325,67 +385,28 @@ out_free_desc:
return err;
}
/**
* fsverity_file_open() - prepare to open a verity file
* @inode: the inode being opened
* @filp: the struct file being set up
*
* When opening a verity file, deny the open if it is for writing. Otherwise,
* set up the inode's ->i_verity_info if not already done.
*
* When combined with fscrypt, this must be called after fscrypt_file_open().
* Otherwise, we won't have the key set up to decrypt the verity metadata.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
int __fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if (!IS_VERITY(inode))
return 0;
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
pr_debug("Denying opening verity file (ino %lu) for write\n",
inode->i_ino);
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
return -EPERM;
}
return ensure_verity_info(inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_file_open);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_file_open);
/**
* fsverity_prepare_setattr() - prepare to change a verity inode's attributes
* @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed
* @attr: attributes to change
*
* Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates. This isn't covered by the
* open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a path, not a file descriptor.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
int __fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
if (IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) {
pr_debug("Denying truncate of verity file (ino %lu)\n",
d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_prepare_setattr);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_prepare_setattr);
/**
* fsverity_cleanup_inode() - free the inode's verity info, if present
* @inode: an inode being evicted
*
* Filesystems must call this on inode eviction to free ->i_verity_info.
*/
void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
void __fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
fsverity_free_info(inode->i_verity_info);
inode->i_verity_info = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_cleanup_inode);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_cleanup_inode);
int __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void)
{

2
fs/verity/signature.c
View File

@ -82,8 +82,6 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
return err;
}
pr_debug("Valid signature for file digest %s:%*phN\n",
hash_alg->name, hash_alg->digest_size, vi->file_digest);
return 0;
}

352
fs/verity/verify.c
View File

@ -9,39 +9,12 @@
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/bio.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
static struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue;
/**
* hash_at_level() - compute the location of the block's hash at the given level
*
* @params: (in) the Merkle tree parameters
* @dindex: (in) the index of the data block being verified
* @level: (in) the level of hash we want (0 is leaf level)
* @hindex: (out) the index of the hash block containing the wanted hash
* @hoffset: (out) the byte offset to the wanted hash within the hash block
*/
static void hash_at_level(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
pgoff_t dindex, unsigned int level, pgoff_t *hindex,
unsigned int *hoffset)
{
pgoff_t position;
/* Offset of the hash within the level's region, in hashes */
position = dindex >> (level * params->log_arity);
/* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */
*hindex = params->level_start[level] + (position >> params->log_arity);
/* Offset of the wanted hash (in bytes) within the hash block */
*hoffset = (position & ((1 << params->log_arity) - 1)) <<
(params->log_blocksize - params->log_arity);
}
static inline int cmp_hashes(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const u8 *want_hash, const u8 *real_hash,
pgoff_t index, int level)
u64 data_pos, int level)
{
const unsigned int hsize = vi->tree_params.digest_size;
@ -49,159 +22,312 @@ static inline int cmp_hashes(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
return 0;
fsverity_err(vi->inode,
"FILE CORRUPTED! index=%lu, level=%d, want_hash=%s:%*phN, real_hash=%s:%*phN",
index, level,
"FILE CORRUPTED! pos=%llu, level=%d, want_hash=%s:%*phN, real_hash=%s:%*phN",
data_pos, level,
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash,
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, hsize, real_hash);
return -EBADMSG;
}
static bool data_is_zeroed(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offset)
{
void *virt = kmap_local_page(page);
if (memchr_inv(virt + offset, 0, len)) {
kunmap_local(virt);
fsverity_err(inode,
"FILE CORRUPTED! Data past EOF is not zeroed");
return false;
}
kunmap_local(virt);
return true;
}
/*
* Verify a single data page against the file's Merkle tree.
* Returns true if the hash block with index @hblock_idx in the tree, located in
* @hpage, has already been verified.
*/
static bool is_hash_block_verified(struct fsverity_info *vi, struct page *hpage,
unsigned long hblock_idx)
{
bool verified;
unsigned int blocks_per_page;
unsigned int i;
/*
* When the Merkle tree block size and page size are the same, then the
* ->hash_block_verified bitmap isn't allocated, and we use PG_checked
* to directly indicate whether the page's block has been verified.
*
* Using PG_checked also guarantees that we re-verify hash pages that
* get evicted and re-instantiated from the backing storage, as new
* pages always start out with PG_checked cleared.
*/
if (!vi->hash_block_verified)
return PageChecked(hpage);
/*
* When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use a bitmap
* to indicate whether each hash block has been verified.
*
* However, we still need to ensure that hash pages that get evicted and
* re-instantiated from the backing storage are re-verified. To do
* this, we use PG_checked again, but now it doesn't really mean
* "checked". Instead, now it just serves as an indicator for whether
* the hash page is newly instantiated or not.
*
* The first thread that sees PG_checked=0 must clear the corresponding
* bitmap bits, then set PG_checked=1. This requires a spinlock. To
* avoid having to take this spinlock in the common case of
* PG_checked=1, we start with an opportunistic lockless read.
*/
if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
/*
* A read memory barrier is needed here to give ACQUIRE
* semantics to the above PageChecked() test.
*/
smp_rmb();
return test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
}
spin_lock(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
verified = test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
} else {
blocks_per_page = vi->tree_params.blocks_per_page;
hblock_idx = round_down(hblock_idx, blocks_per_page);
for (i = 0; i < blocks_per_page; i++)
clear_bit(hblock_idx + i, vi->hash_block_verified);
/*
* A write memory barrier is needed here to give RELEASE
* semantics to the below SetPageChecked() operation.
*/
smp_wmb();
SetPageChecked(hpage);
verified = false;
}
spin_unlock(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
return verified;
}
/*
* Verify a single data block against the file's Merkle tree.
*
* In principle, we need to verify the entire path to the root node. However,
* for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore we need
* only ascend the tree until an already-verified page is seen, as indicated by
* the PageChecked bit being set; then verify the path to that page.
* for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash blocks. Therefore we need
* only ascend the tree until an already-verified hash block is seen, and then
* verify the path to that block.
*
* This code currently only supports the case where the verity block size is
* equal to PAGE_SIZE. Doing otherwise would be possible but tricky, since we
* wouldn't be able to use the PageChecked bit.
*
* Note that multiple processes may race to verify a hash page and mark it
* Checked, but it doesn't matter; the result will be the same either way.
*
* Return: true if the page is valid, else false.
* Return: %true if the data block is valid, else %false.
*/
static bool verify_page(struct inode *inode, const struct fsverity_info *vi,
struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page,
unsigned long level0_ra_pages)
static bool
verify_data_block(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi,
struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page,
u64 data_pos, unsigned int dblock_offset_in_page,
unsigned long max_ra_pages)
{
const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params;
const unsigned int hsize = params->digest_size;
const pgoff_t index = data_page->index;
int level;
u8 _want_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
const u8 *want_hash;
u8 real_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
struct page *hpages[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
unsigned int hoffsets[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
/* The hash blocks that are traversed, indexed by level */
struct {
/* Page containing the hash block */
struct page *page;
/* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */
unsigned long index;
/* Byte offset of the hash block within @page */
unsigned int offset_in_page;
/* Byte offset of the wanted hash within @page */
unsigned int hoffset;
} hblocks[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
/*
* The index of the previous level's block within that level; also the
* index of that block's hash within the current level.
*/
u64 hidx = data_pos >> params->log_blocksize;
int err;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(data_page) || PageUptodate(data_page)))
return false;
pr_debug_ratelimited("Verifying data page %lu...\n", index);
if (unlikely(data_pos >= inode->i_size)) {
/*
* This can happen in the data page spanning EOF when the Merkle
* tree block size is less than the page size. The Merkle tree
* doesn't cover data blocks fully past EOF. But the entire
* page spanning EOF can be visible to userspace via a mmap, and
* any part past EOF should be all zeroes. Therefore, we need
* to verify that any data blocks fully past EOF are all zeroes.
*/
return data_is_zeroed(inode, data_page, params->block_size,
dblock_offset_in_page);
}
/*
* Starting at the leaf level, ascend the tree saving hash pages along
* the way until we find a verified hash page, indicated by PageChecked;
* or until we reach the root.
* Starting at the leaf level, ascend the tree saving hash blocks along
* the way until we find a hash block that has already been verified, or
* until we reach the root.
*/
for (level = 0; level < params->num_levels; level++) {
pgoff_t hindex;
unsigned long next_hidx;
unsigned long hblock_idx;
pgoff_t hpage_idx;
unsigned int hblock_offset_in_page;
unsigned int hoffset;
struct page *hpage;
hash_at_level(params, index, level, &hindex, &hoffset);
/*
* The index of the block in the current level; also the index
* of that block's hash within the next level.
*/
next_hidx = hidx >> params->log_arity;
pr_debug_ratelimited("Level %d: hindex=%lu, hoffset=%u\n",
level, hindex, hoffset);
/* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */
hblock_idx = params->level_start[level] + next_hidx;
hpage = inode->i_sb->s_vop->read_merkle_tree_page(inode, hindex,
level == 0 ? level0_ra_pages : 0);
/* Index of the hash page in the tree overall */
hpage_idx = hblock_idx >> params->log_blocks_per_page;
/* Byte offset of the hash block within the page */
hblock_offset_in_page =
(hblock_idx << params->log_blocksize) & ~PAGE_MASK;
/* Byte offset of the hash within the page */
hoffset = hblock_offset_in_page +
((hidx << params->log_digestsize) &
(params->block_size - 1));
hpage = inode->i_sb->s_vop->read_merkle_tree_page(inode,
hpage_idx, level == 0 ? min(max_ra_pages,
params->tree_pages - hpage_idx) : 0);
if (IS_ERR(hpage)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hpage);
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d reading Merkle tree page %lu",
err, hindex);
err, hpage_idx);
goto out;
}
if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
if (is_hash_block_verified(vi, hpage, hblock_idx)) {
memcpy_from_page(_want_hash, hpage, hoffset, hsize);
want_hash = _want_hash;
put_page(hpage);
pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page already checked, want %s:%*phN\n",
params->hash_alg->name,
hsize, want_hash);
goto descend;
}
pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page not yet checked\n");
hpages[level] = hpage;
hoffsets[level] = hoffset;
hblocks[level].page = hpage;
hblocks[level].index = hblock_idx;
hblocks[level].offset_in_page = hblock_offset_in_page;
hblocks[level].hoffset = hoffset;
hidx = next_hidx;
}
want_hash = vi->root_hash;
pr_debug("Want root hash: %s:%*phN\n",
params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash);
descend:
/* Descend the tree verifying hash pages */
/* Descend the tree verifying hash blocks. */
for (; level > 0; level--) {
struct page *hpage = hpages[level - 1];
unsigned int hoffset = hoffsets[level - 1];
struct page *hpage = hblocks[level - 1].page;
unsigned long hblock_idx = hblocks[level - 1].index;
unsigned int hblock_offset_in_page =
hblocks[level - 1].offset_in_page;
unsigned int hoffset = hblocks[level - 1].hoffset;
err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, hpage, real_hash);
err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, req, hpage,
hblock_offset_in_page, real_hash);
if (err)
goto out;
err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, index, level - 1);
err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, data_pos, level - 1);
if (err)
goto out;
SetPageChecked(hpage);
/*
* Mark the hash block as verified. This must be atomic and
* idempotent, as the same hash block might be verified by
* multiple threads concurrently.
*/
if (vi->hash_block_verified)
set_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified);
else
SetPageChecked(hpage);
memcpy_from_page(_want_hash, hpage, hoffset, hsize);
want_hash = _want_hash;
put_page(hpage);
pr_debug("Verified hash page at level %d, now want %s:%*phN\n",
level - 1, params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash);
}
/* Finally, verify the data page */
err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, data_page, real_hash);
/* Finally, verify the data block. */
err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, req, data_page,
dblock_offset_in_page, real_hash);
if (err)
goto out;
err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, index, -1);
err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, data_pos, -1);
out:
for (; level > 0; level--)
put_page(hpages[level - 1]);
put_page(hblocks[level - 1].page);
return err == 0;
}
/**
* fsverity_verify_page() - verify a data page
* @page: the page to verity
*
* Verify a page that has just been read from a verity file. The page must be a
* pagecache page that is still locked and not yet uptodate.
*
* Return: true if the page is valid, else false.
*/
bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
static bool
verify_data_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi,
struct ahash_request *req, struct folio *data_folio,
size_t len, size_t offset, unsigned long max_ra_pages)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
const struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info;
const unsigned int block_size = vi->tree_params.block_size;
u64 pos = (u64)data_folio->index << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offset, block_size)))
return false;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!folio_test_locked(data_folio) ||
folio_test_uptodate(data_folio)))
return false;
do {
struct page *data_page =
folio_page(data_folio, offset >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (!verify_data_block(inode, vi, req, data_page, pos + offset,
offset & ~PAGE_MASK, max_ra_pages))
return false;
offset += block_size;
len -= block_size;
} while (len);
return true;
}
/**
* fsverity_verify_blocks() - verify data in a folio
* @folio: the folio containing the data to verify
* @len: the length of the data to verify in the folio
* @offset: the offset of the data to verify in the folio
*
* Verify data that has just been read from a verity file. The data must be
* located in a pagecache folio that is still locked and not yet uptodate. The
* length and offset of the data must be Merkle tree block size aligned.
*
* Return: %true if the data is valid, else %false.
*/
bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len, size_t offset)
{
struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host;
struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info;
struct ahash_request *req;
bool valid;
/* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */
req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, GFP_NOFS);
valid = verify_page(inode, vi, req, page, 0);
valid = verify_data_blocks(inode, vi, req, folio, len, offset, 0);
fsverity_free_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, req);
return valid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_page);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_blocks);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
/**
* fsverity_verify_bio() - verify a 'read' bio that has just completed
* @bio: the bio to verify
*
* Verify a set of pages that have just been read from a verity file. The pages
* must be pagecache pages that are still locked and not yet uptodate. If a
* page fails verification, then bio->bi_status is set to an error status.
* Verify the bio's data against the file's Merkle tree. All bio data segments
* must be aligned to the file's Merkle tree block size. If any data fails
* verification, then bio->bi_status is set to an error status.
*
* This is a helper function for use by the ->readahead() method of filesystems
* that issue bios to read data directly into the page cache. Filesystems that
@ -212,15 +338,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_page);
void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio)
{
struct inode *inode = bio_first_page_all(bio)->mapping->host;
const struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info;
const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params;
struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info;
struct ahash_request *req;
struct bio_vec *bv;
struct bvec_iter_all iter_all;
struct folio_iter fi;
unsigned long max_ra_pages = 0;
/* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */
req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(params->hash_alg, GFP_NOFS);
req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, GFP_NOFS);
if (bio->bi_opf & REQ_RAHEAD) {
/*
@ -232,24 +356,18 @@ void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio)
* This improves sequential read performance, as it greatly
* reduces the number of I/O requests made to the Merkle tree.
*/
bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all)
max_ra_pages++;
max_ra_pages /= 4;
max_ra_pages = bio->bi_iter.bi_size >> (PAGE_SHIFT + 2);
}
bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) {
struct page *page = bv->bv_page;
unsigned long level0_index = page->index >> params->log_arity;
unsigned long level0_ra_pages =
min(max_ra_pages, params->level0_blocks - level0_index);
if (!verify_page(inode, vi, req, page, level0_ra_pages)) {
bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, bio) {
if (!verify_data_blocks(inode, vi, req, fi.folio, fi.length,
fi.offset, max_ra_pages)) {
bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
break;
}
}
fsverity_free_hash_request(params->hash_alg, req);
fsverity_free_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, req);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_bio);
#endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */

9
include/linux/fscrypt.h
View File

@ -257,8 +257,8 @@ int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
u64 lblk_num, gfp_t gfp_flags);
int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs);
int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len,
size_t offs);
int fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
u64 lblk_num);
@ -420,9 +420,8 @@ static inline int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs)
static inline int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio,
size_t len, size_t offs)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}

93
include/linux/fsverity.h
View File

@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#define _LINUX_FSVERITY_H
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
@ -93,8 +94,7 @@ struct fsverity_operations {
* isn't already cached. Implementations may ignore this
* argument; it's only a performance optimization.
*
* This can be called at any time on an open verity file, as well as
* between ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity(). It may be
* This can be called at any time on an open verity file. It may be
* called by multiple processes concurrently, even with the same page.
*
* Note that this must retrieve a *page*, not necessarily a *block*.
@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ struct fsverity_operations {
* Write a Merkle tree block to the given inode.
*
* @inode: the inode for which the Merkle tree is being built
* @buf: block to write
* @index: 0-based index of the block within the Merkle tree
* @log_blocksize: log base 2 of the Merkle tree block size
* @buf: the Merkle tree block to write
* @pos: the position of the block in the Merkle tree (in bytes)
* @size: the Merkle tree block size (in bytes)
*
* This is only called between ->begin_enable_verity() and
* ->end_enable_verity().
@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ struct fsverity_operations {
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int (*write_merkle_tree_block)(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
u64 index, int log_blocksize);
u64 pos, unsigned int size);
};
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
@ -148,9 +148,21 @@ int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
/* open.c */
int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);
int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode);
int __fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);
int __fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
void __fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode);
/**
* fsverity_cleanup_inode() - free the inode's verity info, if present
* @inode: an inode being evicted
*
* Filesystems must call this on inode eviction to free ->i_verity_info.
*/
static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
if (inode->i_verity_info)
__fsverity_cleanup_inode(inode);
}
/* read_metadata.c */
@ -158,7 +170,7 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg);
/* verify.c */
bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page);
bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len, size_t offset);
void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio);
void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work);
@ -193,15 +205,15 @@ static inline int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
/* open.c */
static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
static inline int __fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
return IS_VERITY(inode) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0;
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
static inline int __fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
{
return IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0;
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
@ -218,7 +230,8 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp,
/* verify.c */
static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
static inline bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len,
size_t offset)
{
WARN_ON(1);
return false;
@ -236,6 +249,16 @@ static inline void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work)
#endif /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY */
static inline bool fsverity_verify_folio(struct folio *folio)
{
return fsverity_verify_blocks(folio, folio_size(folio), 0);
}
static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
{
return fsverity_verify_blocks(page_folio(page), PAGE_SIZE, 0);
}
/**
* fsverity_active() - do reads from the inode need to go through fs-verity?
* @inode: inode to check
@ -254,4 +277,42 @@ static inline bool fsverity_active(const struct inode *inode)
return fsverity_get_info(inode) != NULL;
}
/**
* fsverity_file_open() - prepare to open a verity file
* @inode: the inode being opened
* @filp: the struct file being set up
*
* When opening a verity file, deny the open if it is for writing. Otherwise,
* set up the inode's ->i_verity_info if not already done.
*
* When combined with fscrypt, this must be called after fscrypt_file_open().
* Otherwise, we won't have the key set up to decrypt the verity metadata.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if (IS_VERITY(inode))
return __fsverity_file_open(inode, filp);
return 0;
}
/**
* fsverity_prepare_setattr() - prepare to change a verity inode's attributes
* @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed
* @attr: attributes to change
*
* Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates. This isn't covered by the
* open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a path, not a file descriptor.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
{
if (IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)))
return __fsverity_prepare_setattr(dentry, attr);
return 0;
}
#endif /* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */