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- Add new CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG to test -fstack-protector-strong, since

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the existing CORRUPT_STACK test only tested regular -fstack-protector.
 - Add pair of tests for checking kernel stack leading/trailing guard pages
   under VMAP_STACK: STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING and STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING.
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Merge tag 'lkdtm-next-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux into char-misc-next

Kees writes:

- Add new CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG to test -fstack-protector-strong, since
  the existing CORRUPT_STACK test only tested regular -fstack-protector.
- Add pair of tests for checking kernel stack leading/trailing guard pages
  under VMAP_STACK: STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING and STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING.
This commit is contained in:
Greg Kroah-Hartman 2017-08-15 18:11:23 -07:00
commit 5f972797b1
3 changed files with 54 additions and 3 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
View File

@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ void lkdtm_EXCEPTION(void);
void lkdtm_LOOP(void);
void lkdtm_OVERFLOW(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG(void);
void lkdtm_UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE(void);
void lkdtm_SOFTLOCKUP(void);
void lkdtm_HARDLOCKUP(void);
@ -22,6 +23,8 @@ void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);
void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void);
void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void);
/* lkdtm_heap.c */
void lkdtm_OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION(void);

51
drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
View File

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
struct lkdtm_list {
@ -84,16 +85,31 @@ void lkdtm_OVERFLOW(void)
static noinline void __lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(void *stack)
{
memset(stack, 'a', 64);
memset(stack, '\xff', 64);
}
/* This should trip the stack canary, not corrupt the return address. */
noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(void)
{
/* Use default char array length that triggers stack protection. */
char data[8];
char data[8] __aligned(sizeof(void *));
__lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(&data);
pr_info("Corrupted stack with '%16s'...\n", data);
pr_info("Corrupted stack containing char array ...\n");
}
/* Same as above but will only get a canary with -fstack-protector-strong */
noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG(void)
{
union {
unsigned short shorts[4];
unsigned long *ptr;
} data __aligned(sizeof(void *));
__lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(&data);
pr_info("Corrupted stack containing union ...\n");
}
void lkdtm_UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE(void)
@ -199,6 +215,7 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void)
pr_err("list_del() corruption not detected!\n");
}
/* Test if unbalanced set_fs(KERNEL_DS)/set_fs(USER_DS) check exists. */
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
{
pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
@ -207,3 +224,31 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
/* Make sure we do not keep running with a KERNEL_DS! */
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
}
/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a leading guard page */
void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void)
{
const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
const unsigned char *ptr = stack - 1;
volatile unsigned char byte;
pr_info("attempting bad read from page below current stack\n");
byte = *ptr;
pr_err("FAIL: accessed page before stack!\n");
}
/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a trailing guard page */
void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void)
{
const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
const unsigned char *ptr = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
volatile unsigned char byte;
pr_info("attempting bad read from page above current stack\n");
byte = *ptr;
pr_err("FAIL: accessed page after stack!\n");
}

3
drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
View File

@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_DEL),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_USER_DS),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG),
CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING),
CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING),
CRASHTYPE(UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE),
CRASHTYPE(OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION),
CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),