mirror of
https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git
synced 2024-12-24 05:04:00 +08:00
xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl
The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall().
It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32)
elements. We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of
bounds access.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1246ae0bb9
("xen: add variable hypercall caller")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
ad94dc3a7e
commit
42d8644bd7
@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ xen_single_call(unsigned int call,
|
||||
__HYPERCALL_DECLS;
|
||||
__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
|
||||
|
||||
if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0]))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC
|
||||
: __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
|
||||
: [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user