From 312eb712e15868236dd03c67971ab2c1d79b4ce6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tobias Klauser Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2017 18:44:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] cgroup: Fix indenting in PID controller documentation Follow the common documentation style in the file and indent the interface file description by a tab instead of just a space. Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo --- Documentation/cgroup-v2.txt | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/cgroup-v2.txt b/Documentation/cgroup-v2.txt index 3b8449f8ac7e..49d7c997fa1e 100644 --- a/Documentation/cgroup-v2.txt +++ b/Documentation/cgroup-v2.txt @@ -1142,16 +1142,17 @@ used by the kernel. pids.max - A read-write single value file which exists on non-root cgroups. The - default is "max". + A read-write single value file which exists on non-root + cgroups. The default is "max". - Hard limit of number of processes. + Hard limit of number of processes. pids.current - A read-only single value file which exists on all cgroups. + A read-only single value file which exists on all cgroups. - The number of processes currently in the cgroup and its descendants. + The number of processes currently in the cgroup and its + descendants. Organisational operations are not blocked by cgroup policies, so it is possible to have pids.current > pids.max. This can be done by either From 1d18c2747f937f1b5ec65ce6bf4ccb9ca1aea9e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2017 15:39:07 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] cgroup/pids: remove spurious suspicious RCU usage warning pids_can_fork() is special in that the css association is guaranteed to be stable throughout the function and thus doesn't need RCU protection around task_css access. When determining the css to charge the pid, task_css_check() is used to override the RCU sanity check. While adding a warning message on fork rejection from pids limit, 135b8b37bd91 ("cgroup: Add pids controller event when fork fails because of pid limit") incorrectly added a task_css access which is neither RCU protected or explicitly annotated. This triggers the following suspicious RCU usage warning when RCU debugging is enabled. cgroup: fork rejected by pids controller in =============================== [ ERR: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0-work+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------- ./include/linux/cgroup.h:435 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by bash/1748: #0: (&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem){+++++.}, at: [] _do_fork+0xe6/0x6e0 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 1748 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.10.0-work+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.fc25 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x68/0x93 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xd7/0x110 pids_can_fork+0x1c7/0x1d0 cgroup_can_fork+0x67/0xc0 copy_process.part.58+0x1709/0x1e90 _do_fork+0xe6/0x6e0 SyS_clone+0x19/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x140 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 RIP: 0033:0x7f7853fab93a RSP: 002b:00007ffc12d05c90 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7853fab93a RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011 RBP: 00007ffc12d05cc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f78548db700 R10: 00007f78548db9d0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000006d4 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055e3ebe2c04d /asdf There's no reason to dereference task_css again here when the associated css is already available. Fix it by replacing the task_cgroup() call with css->cgroup. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Reported-by: Mike Galbraith Fixes: 135b8b37bd91 ("cgroup: Add pids controller event when fork fails because of pid limit") Cc: Kenny Yu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+ Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo --- kernel/cgroup/pids.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/pids.c b/kernel/cgroup/pids.c index e756dae49300..2237201d66d5 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/pids.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/pids.c @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int pids_can_fork(struct task_struct *task) /* Only log the first time events_limit is incremented. */ if (atomic64_inc_return(&pids->events_limit) == 1) { pr_info("cgroup: fork rejected by pids controller in "); - pr_cont_cgroup_path(task_cgroup(current, pids_cgrp_id)); + pr_cont_cgroup_path(css->cgroup); pr_cont("\n"); } cgroup_file_notify(&pids->events_file); From b6a6759daf55dade2b65089957832759d502acfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2017 01:56:48 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through the cgroup debug entries. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo --- kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c index 56eba9caa632..1dc22f6b49f5 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c @@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct task_struct *task; int count = 0; - seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset); + seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset); list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) { if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS)