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x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()

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The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via
syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the
Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

The index can be controlled from:
    ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.

Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access
thread->ptrace_bps.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
This commit is contained in:
Dianzhang Chen 2019-06-25 23:30:17 +08:00 committed by Thomas Gleixner
parent ab3765a050
commit 31a2fbb390
1 changed files with 4 additions and 1 deletions
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5
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
{
struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
unsigned long val = 0;
int index = n;
if (n < HBP_NUM) {
struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
if (bp)
val = bp->hw.info.address;