diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 473d17c431f3..933155c96922 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -665,21 +665,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cred_fscmp);
 
 int set_cred_ucounts(struct cred *new)
 {
-	struct task_struct *task = current;
-	const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
 	struct ucounts *new_ucounts, *old_ucounts = new->ucounts;
 
-	if (new->user == old->user && new->user_ns == old->user_ns)
-		return 0;
-
 	/*
 	 * This optimization is needed because alloc_ucounts() uses locks
 	 * for table lookups.
 	 */
-	if (old_ucounts->ns == new->user_ns && uid_eq(old_ucounts->uid, new->euid))
+	if (old_ucounts->ns == new->user_ns && uid_eq(old_ucounts->uid, new->uid))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!(new_ucounts = alloc_ucounts(new->user_ns, new->euid)))
+	if (!(new_ucounts = alloc_ucounts(new->user_ns, new->uid)))
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
 	new->ucounts = new_ucounts;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index d75a528f7b21..17d8a8c85e3b 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -2021,18 +2021,18 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
 	DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
 #endif
+	retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto bad_fork_free;
+
 	retval = -EAGAIN;
 	if (is_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
 		if (p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER &&
 		    !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-			goto bad_fork_free;
+			goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
 	}
 	current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
 
-	retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		goto bad_fork_free;
-
 	/*
 	 * If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check
 	 * triggers too late. This doesn't hurt, the check is only there
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index ecc4cf019242..97dc9e5d6bf9 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -472,6 +472,16 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)
 	if (!new_user)
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
+	free_uid(new->user);
+	new->user = new_user;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void flag_nproc_exceeded(struct cred *new)
+{
+	if (new->ucounts == current_ucounts())
+		return;
+
 	/*
 	 * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many
 	 * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming
@@ -480,15 +490,10 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)
 	 * failure to the execve() stage.
 	 */
 	if (is_ucounts_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
-			new_user != INIT_USER &&
-			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			new->user != INIT_USER)
 		current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
 	else
 		current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
-
-	free_uid(new->user);
-	new->user = new_user;
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -563,6 +568,7 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto error;
 
+	flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
 	return commit_creds(new);
 
 error:
@@ -625,6 +631,7 @@ long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto error;
 
+	flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
 	return commit_creds(new);
 
 error:
@@ -704,6 +711,7 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto error;
 
+	flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
 	return commit_creds(new);
 
 error:
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
index 65b597431c86..06ea04d44685 100644
--- a/kernel/ucount.c
+++ b/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ bool is_ucounts_overlimit(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, unsign
 	if (rlimit > LONG_MAX)
 		max = LONG_MAX;
 	for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
-		if (get_ucounts_value(iter, type) > max)
+		long val = get_ucounts_value(iter, type);
+		if (val < 0 || val > max)
 			return true;
 		max = READ_ONCE(iter->ns->ucount_max[type]);
 	}