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Sanitize 'move_pages()' permission checks

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The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the
same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using
CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability).

That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really
only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other
capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map
out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that
still shares your uid.

So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()'
model instead.

This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively
changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that
anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter
NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice.

Famous last words.

Reported-by: Otto Ebeling <otto.ebeling@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2017-08-20 13:26:27 -07:00
parent 7f680d7ec3
commit 197e7e5213
1 changed files with 3 additions and 8 deletions
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11
mm/migrate.c
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@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include <linux/page_idle.h>
#include <linux/page_owner.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@ -1652,7 +1653,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages,
const int __user *, nodes,
int __user *, status, int, flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
struct task_struct *task;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
@ -1676,14 +1676,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages,
/*
* Check if this process has the right to modify the specified
* process. The right exists if the process has administrative
* capabilities, superuser privileges or the same
* userid as the target process.
* process. Use the regular "ptrace_may_access()" checks.
*/
tcred = __task_cred(task);
if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
!uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && !uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
err = -EPERM;
goto out;