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fscrypt: introduce helper function for filename matching
Introduce a helper function fscrypt_match_name() which tests whether a fscrypt_name matches a directory entry. Also clean up the magic numbers and document things properly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
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static const char *lookup_table =
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"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+,";
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#define BASE64_CHARS(nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3)
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/**
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* digest_encode() -
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*
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@ -230,11 +232,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size);
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int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *inode,
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u32 ilen, struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
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{
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unsigned int olen = fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(inode, ilen);
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u32 olen = fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(inode, ilen);
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const u32 max_encoded_len =
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max_t(u32, BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE),
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1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)));
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crypto_str->len = olen;
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if (olen < FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE * 2)
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olen = FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE * 2;
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olen = max(olen, max_encoded_len);
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/*
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* Allocated buffer can hold one more character to null-terminate the
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* string
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@ -266,6 +271,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_free_buffer);
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*
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* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
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*
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* If the key is available, we'll decrypt the disk name; otherwise, we'll encode
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* it for presentation. Short names are directly base64-encoded, while long
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* names are encoded in fscrypt_digested_name format.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
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@ -274,7 +283,7 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
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struct fscrypt_str *oname)
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{
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const struct qstr qname = FSTR_TO_QSTR(iname);
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char buf[24];
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struct fscrypt_digested_name digested_name;
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if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(&qname)) {
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oname->name[0] = '.';
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@ -289,20 +298,24 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
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if (inode->i_crypt_info)
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return fname_decrypt(inode, iname, oname);
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if (iname->len <= FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE) {
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if (iname->len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) {
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oname->len = digest_encode(iname->name, iname->len,
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oname->name);
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return 0;
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}
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if (hash) {
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memcpy(buf, &hash, 4);
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memcpy(buf + 4, &minor_hash, 4);
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digested_name.hash = hash;
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digested_name.minor_hash = minor_hash;
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} else {
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memset(buf, 0, 8);
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digested_name.hash = 0;
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digested_name.minor_hash = 0;
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}
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memcpy(buf + 8, iname->name + ((iname->len - 17) & ~15), 16);
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memcpy(digested_name.digest,
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FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(iname->name, iname->len),
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FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE);
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oname->name[0] = '_';
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oname->len = 1 + digest_encode(buf, 24, oname->name + 1);
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oname->len = 1 + digest_encode((const char *)&digested_name,
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sizeof(digested_name), oname->name + 1);
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr);
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@ -336,10 +349,35 @@ int fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(struct inode *inode,
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk);
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/**
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* fscrypt_setup_filename() - prepare to search a possibly encrypted directory
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* @dir: the directory that will be searched
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* @iname: the user-provided filename being searched for
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* @lookup: 1 if we're allowed to proceed without the key because it's
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* ->lookup() or we're finding the dir_entry for deletion; 0 if we cannot
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* proceed without the key because we're going to create the dir_entry.
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* @fname: the filename information to be filled in
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*
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* Given a user-provided filename @iname, this function sets @fname->disk_name
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* to the name that would be stored in the on-disk directory entry, if possible.
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* If the directory is unencrypted this is simply @iname. Else, if we have the
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* directory's encryption key, then @iname is the plaintext, so we encrypt it to
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* get the disk_name.
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*
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* Else, for keyless @lookup operations, @iname is the presented ciphertext, so
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* we decode it to get either the ciphertext disk_name (for short names) or the
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* fscrypt_digested_name (for long names). Non-@lookup operations will be
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* impossible in this case, so we fail them with ENOKEY.
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*
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* If successful, fscrypt_free_filename() must be called later to clean up.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
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int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
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{
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int ret = 0, bigname = 0;
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int ret;
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int digested;
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memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
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fname->usr_fname = iname;
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@ -373,25 +411,37 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
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* We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
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* user-supplied name
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*/
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if (iname->name[0] == '_')
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bigname = 1;
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if ((bigname && (iname->len != 33)) || (!bigname && (iname->len > 43)))
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return -ENOENT;
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if (iname->name[0] == '_') {
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if (iname->len !=
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1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)))
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return -ENOENT;
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digested = 1;
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} else {
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if (iname->len >
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BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE))
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return -ENOENT;
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digested = 0;
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}
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fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
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fname->crypto_buf.name =
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kmalloc(max_t(size_t, FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE,
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sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)),
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = digest_decode(iname->name + bigname, iname->len - bigname,
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ret = digest_decode(iname->name + digested, iname->len - digested,
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fname->crypto_buf.name);
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if (ret < 0) {
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ret = -ENOENT;
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goto errout;
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}
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fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
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if (bigname) {
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memcpy(&fname->hash, fname->crypto_buf.name, 4);
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memcpy(&fname->minor_hash, fname->crypto_buf.name + 4, 4);
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if (digested) {
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const struct fscrypt_digested_name *n =
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(const void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;
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fname->hash = n->hash;
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fname->minor_hash = n->minor_hash;
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} else {
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fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
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fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
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@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
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#include <linux/fscrypt_supp.h>
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#define FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE 32
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/* Encryption parameters */
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#define FS_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE 16
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#define FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE 16
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@ -147,6 +147,15 @@ static inline int fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(struct inode *inode,
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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}
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static inline bool fscrypt_match_name(const struct fscrypt_name *fname,
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const u8 *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
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{
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/* Encryption support disabled; use standard comparison */
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if (de_name_len != fname->disk_name.len)
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return false;
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return !memcmp(de_name, fname->disk_name.name, fname->disk_name.len);
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}
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/* bio.c */
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static inline void fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx,
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struct bio *bio)
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@ -57,6 +57,84 @@ extern int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *, u32, u32,
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extern int fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(struct inode *, const struct qstr *,
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struct fscrypt_str *);
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#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE 32
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/* Extracts the second-to-last ciphertext block; see explanation below */
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#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(name, len) \
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((name) + round_down((len) - FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE - 1, \
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FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE))
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#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE
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/**
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* fscrypt_digested_name - alternate identifier for an on-disk filename
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*
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* When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key,
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* filenames whose ciphertext is longer than FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE
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* bytes are shown in this abbreviated form (base64-encoded) rather than as the
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* full ciphertext (base64-encoded). This is necessary to allow supporting
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* filenames up to NAME_MAX bytes, since base64 encoding expands the length.
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*
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* To make it possible for filesystems to still find the correct directory entry
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* despite not knowing the full on-disk name, we encode any filesystem-specific
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* 'hash' and/or 'minor_hash' which the filesystem may need for its lookups,
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* followed by the second-to-last ciphertext block of the filename. Due to the
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* use of the CBC-CTS encryption mode, the second-to-last ciphertext block
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* depends on the full plaintext. (Note that ciphertext stealing causes the
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* last two blocks to appear "flipped".) This makes collisions very unlikely:
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* just a 1 in 2^128 chance for two filenames to collide even if they share the
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* same filesystem-specific hashes.
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*
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* This scheme isn't strictly immune to intentional collisions because it's
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* basically like a CBC-MAC, which isn't secure on variable-length inputs.
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* However, generating a CBC-MAC collision requires the ability to choose
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* arbitrary ciphertext, which won't normally be possible with filename
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* encryption since it would require write access to the raw disk.
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*
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* Taking a real cryptographic hash like SHA-256 over the full ciphertext would
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* be better in theory but would be less efficient and more complicated to
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* implement, especially since the filesystem would need to calculate it for
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* each directory entry examined during a search.
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*/
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struct fscrypt_digested_name {
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u32 hash;
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u32 minor_hash;
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u8 digest[FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE];
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};
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/**
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* fscrypt_match_name() - test whether the given name matches a directory entry
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* @fname: the name being searched for
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* @de_name: the name from the directory entry
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* @de_name_len: the length of @de_name in bytes
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*
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* Normally @fname->disk_name will be set, and in that case we simply compare
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* that to the name stored in the directory entry. The only exception is that
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* if we don't have the key for an encrypted directory and a filename in it is
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* very long, then we won't have the full disk_name and we'll instead need to
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* match against the fscrypt_digested_name.
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*
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* Return: %true if the name matches, otherwise %false.
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*/
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static inline bool fscrypt_match_name(const struct fscrypt_name *fname,
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const u8 *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
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{
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if (unlikely(!fname->disk_name.name)) {
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const struct fscrypt_digested_name *n =
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(const void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(fname->usr_fname->name[0] != '_'))
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return false;
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if (de_name_len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE)
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return false;
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return !memcmp(FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(de_name, de_name_len),
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n->digest, FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE);
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}
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if (de_name_len != fname->disk_name.len)
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return false;
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return !memcmp(de_name, fname->disk_name.name, fname->disk_name.len);
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}
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/* bio.c */
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extern void fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages(struct fscrypt_ctx *, struct bio *);
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extern void fscrypt_pullback_bio_page(struct page **, bool);
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