2
0
mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-15 08:44:14 +08:00
linux-next/kernel/panic.c

720 lines
18 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* linux/kernel/panic.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* This function is used through-out the kernel (including mm and fs)
* to indicate a major problem.
*/
#include <linux/debug_locks.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
kgdb: don't use a notifier to enter kgdb at panic; call directly Right now kgdb/kdb hooks up to debug panics by registering for the panic notifier. This works OK except that it means that kgdb/kdb gets called _after_ the CPUs in the system are taken offline. That means that if anything important was happening on those CPUs (like something that might have contributed to the panic) you can't debug them. Specifically I ran into a case where I got a panic because a task was "blocked for more than 120 seconds" which was detected on CPU 2. I nicely got shown stack traces in the kernel log for all CPUs including CPU 0, which was running 'PID: 111 Comm: kworker/0:1H' and was in the middle of __mmc_switch(). I then ended up at the kdb prompt where switched over to kgdb to try to look at local variables of the process on CPU 0. I found that I couldn't. Digging more, I found that I had no info on any tasks running on CPUs other than CPU 2 and that asking kdb for help showed me "Error: no saved data for this cpu". This was because all the CPUs were offline. Let's move the entry of kdb/kgdb to a direct call from panic() and stop using the generic notifier. Putting a direct call in allows us to order things more properly and it also doesn't seem like we're breaking any abstractions by calling into the debugger from the panic function. Daniel said: : This patch changes the way kdump and kgdb interact with each other. : However it would seem rather odd to have both tools simultaneously armed : and, even if they were, the user still has the option to use panic_timeout : to force a kdump to happen. Thus I think the change of order is : acceptable. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190703170354.217312-1-dianders@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-26 07:47:45 +08:00
#include <linux/kgdb.h>
#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
panic: avoid deadlocks in re-entrant console drivers From printk()/serial console point of view panic() is special, because it may force CPU to re-enter printk() or/and serial console driver. Therefore, some of serial consoles drivers are re-entrant. E.g. 8250: serial8250_console_write() { if (port->sysrq) locked = 0; else if (oops_in_progress) locked = spin_trylock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags); else spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags); ... } panic() does set oops_in_progress via bust_spinlocks(1), so in theory we should be able to re-enter serial console driver from panic(): CPU0 <NMI> uart_console_write() serial8250_console_write() // if (oops_in_progress) // spin_trylock_irqsave() call_console_drivers() console_unlock() console_flush_on_panic() bust_spinlocks(1) // oops_in_progress++ panic() <NMI/> spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags) // spin_lock_irqsave() serial8250_console_write() call_console_drivers() console_unlock() printk() ... However, this does not happen and we deadlock in serial console on port->lock spinlock. And the problem is that console_flush_on_panic() called after bust_spinlocks(0): void panic(const char *fmt, ...) { bust_spinlocks(1); ... bust_spinlocks(0); console_flush_on_panic(); ... } bust_spinlocks(0) decrements oops_in_progress, so oops_in_progress can go back to zero. Thus even re-entrant console drivers will simply spin on port->lock spinlock. Given that port->lock may already be locked either by a stopped CPU, or by the very same CPU we execute panic() on (for instance, NMI panic() on printing CPU) the system deadlocks and does not reboot. Fix this by removing bust_spinlocks(0), so oops_in_progress is always set in panic() now and, thus, re-entrant console drivers will trylock the port->lock instead of spinning on it forever, when we call them from console_flush_on_panic(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181025101036.6823-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Daniel Wang <wonderfly@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
2018-10-25 18:10:36 +08:00
#include <linux/vt_kern.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
kernel.h: split out panic and oops helpers kernel.h is being used as a dump for all kinds of stuff for a long time. Here is the attempt to start cleaning it up by splitting out panic and oops helpers. There are several purposes of doing this: - dropping dependency in bug.h - dropping a loop by moving out panic_notifier.h - unload kernel.h from something which has its own domain At the same time convert users tree-wide to use new headers, although for the time being include new header back to kernel.h to avoid twisted indirected includes for existing users. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: thread_info.h needs limits.h] [andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: ia64 fix] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210520130557.55277-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511074137.33666-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Acked-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org> Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 09:54:59 +08:00
#include <linux/panic_notifier.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sysrq.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-07 08:32:58 +08:00
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL. This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected, the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely. Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements, and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been rendered unexploitable: http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/ http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016 This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero (i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such conditions to remain universally silent. On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2 (which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no notification is performed (since the value was already saturated). On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before 0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no overflow-only race condition. As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path, located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0 to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to .text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the error reporting routine. Example assembly comparison: refcount_inc() before: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) refcount_inc() after: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3 ... .text.unlikely: ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad) These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1 to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL (refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast): 2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s: cycles protections atomic_t 82249267387 none refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this code to be a refcount-only protection. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arozansk@redhat.com Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-16 00:19:24 +08:00
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <trace/events/error_report.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
#define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18
panic: add sysctl to dump all CPUs backtraces on oops event Usually when the kernel reaches an oops condition, it's a point of no return; in case not enough debug information is available in the kernel splat, one of the last resorts would be to collect a kernel crash dump and analyze it. The problem with this approach is that in order to collect the dump, a panic is required (to kexec-load the crash kernel). When in an environment of multiple virtual machines, users may prefer to try living with the oops, at least until being able to properly shutdown their VMs / finish their important tasks. This patch implements a way to collect a bit more debug details when an oops event is reached, by printing all the CPUs backtraces through the usage of NMIs (on architectures that support that). The sysctl added (and documented) here was called "oops_all_cpu_backtrace", and when set will (as the name suggests) dump all CPUs backtraces. Far from ideal, this may be the last option though for users that for some reason cannot panic on oops. Most of times oopses are clear enough to indicate the kernel portion that must be investigated, but in virtual environments it's possible to observe hypervisor/KVM issues that could lead to oopses shown in other guests CPUs (like virtual APIC crashes). This patch hence aims to help debug such complex issues without resorting to kdump. Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200327224116.21030-1-gpiccoli@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 12:40:48 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* Should we dump all CPUs backtraces in an oops event?
* Defaults to 0, can be changed via sysctl.
*/
unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace;
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
int panic_on_oops = CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE;
static unsigned long tainted_mask =
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) ? (1 << TAINT_RANDSTRUCT) : 0;
static int pause_on_oops;
static int pause_on_oops_flag;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
kernel: add panic_on_warn There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-11 07:45:50 +08:00
int panic_on_warn __read_mostly;
kernel: add panic_on_taint Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given flag. This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids having to rebuild the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() into the code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest. For instance, if one is interested in proceeding with a post-mortem analysis at the point a given code path is hitting a bad page (i.e. unaccount_page_cache_page(), or slab_bug()), a coredump can be collected by rebooting the kernel with 'panic_on_taint=0x20' amended to the command line. Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be as a means for assuring a security policy case where only a subset of taints, or no single taint (in paranoid mode), is allowed for the running system. The optional switch 'nousertaint' is handy in this particular scenario, as it will avoid userspace induced crashes by writes to sysctl interface /proc/sys/kernel/tainted causing false positive hits for such policies. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak kernel-parameters.txt wording] Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200515175502.146720-1-aquini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 12:40:17 +08:00
unsigned long panic_on_taint;
bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint = false;
int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
#define PANIC_PRINT_TASK_INFO 0x00000001
#define PANIC_PRINT_MEM_INFO 0x00000002
#define PANIC_PRINT_TIMER_INFO 0x00000004
#define PANIC_PRINT_LOCK_INFO 0x00000008
#define PANIC_PRINT_FTRACE_INFO 0x00000010
#define PANIC_PRINT_ALL_PRINTK_MSG 0x00000020
unsigned long panic_print;
[PATCH] Notifier chain update: API changes The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2 We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage classes: "Blocking" chains are always called from a process context and the callout routines are allowed to sleep; "Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and the callout routines are not allowed to sleep. We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in kernel/sys.c. With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to handle these things in their own way.) There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code had to be changed to avoid it.) Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much less frequent that calling a chain. Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder. ATOMIC CHAINS ------------- arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain BLOCKING CHAINS --------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain kernel/module.c module_notify_list kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list net/core/dev.c netdev_chain net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are, please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems. (However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be atomic.) The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew Morton. [jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 17:16:30 +08:00
ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
static long no_blink(int state)
{
return 0;
}
/* Returns how long it waited in ms */
long (*panic_blink)(int state);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_blink);
/*
* Stop ourself in panic -- architecture code may override this
*/
void __weak panic_smp_self_stop(void)
{
while (1)
cpu_relax();
}
panic, x86: Allow CPUs to save registers even if looping in NMI context Currently, kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus(), a subroutine of crash_kexec(), sends an NMI IPI to CPUs which haven't called panic() to stop them, save their register information and do some cleanups for crash dumping. However, if such a CPU is infinitely looping in NMI context, we fail to save its register information into the crash dump. For example, this can happen when unknown NMIs are broadcast to all CPUs as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 =========================== ========================== receive an unknown NMI unknown_nmi_error() panic() receive an unknown NMI spin_trylock(&panic_lock) unknown_nmi_error() crash_kexec() panic() spin_trylock(&panic_lock) panic_smp_self_stop() infinite loop kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus() issue NMI IPI -----------> blocked until IRET infinite loop... Here, since CPU 1 is in NMI context, the second NMI from CPU 0 is blocked until CPU 1 executes IRET. However, CPU 1 never executes IRET, so the NMI is not handled and the callback function to save registers is never called. In practice, this can happen on some servers which broadcast NMIs to all CPUs when the NMI button is pushed. To save registers in this case, we need to: a) Return from NMI handler instead of looping infinitely or b) Call the callback function directly from the infinite loop Inherently, a) is risky because NMI is also used to prevent corrupted data from being propagated to devices. So, we chose b). This patch does the following: 1. Move the infinite looping of CPUs which haven't called panic() in NMI context (actually done by panic_smp_self_stop()) outside of panic() to enable us to refer pt_regs. Please note that panic_smp_self_stop() is still used for normal context. 2. Call a callback of kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus() directly to save registers and do some cleanups after setting waiting_for_crash_ipi which is used for counting down the number of CPUs which handled the callback Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014628.25437.75256.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:10 +08:00
/*
* Stop ourselves in NMI context if another CPU has already panicked. Arch code
* may override this to prepare for crash dumping, e.g. save regs info.
*/
void __weak nmi_panic_self_stop(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
panic_smp_self_stop();
}
x86/panic: replace smp_send_stop() with kdump friendly version in panic path Daniel Walker reported problems which happens when crash_kexec_post_notifiers kernel option is enabled (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/24/44). In that case, smp_send_stop() is called before entering kdump routines which assume other CPUs are still online. As the result, for x86, kdump routines fail to save other CPUs' registers and disable virtualization extensions. To fix this problem, call a new kdump friendly function, crash_smp_send_stop(), instead of the smp_send_stop() when crash_kexec_post_notifiers is enabled. crash_smp_send_stop() is a weak function, and it just call smp_send_stop(). Architecture codes should override it so that kdump can work appropriately. This patch only provides x86-specific version. For Xen's PV kernel, just keep the current behavior. NOTES: - Right solution would be to place crash_smp_send_stop() before __crash_kexec() invocation in all cases and remove smp_send_stop(), but we can't do that until all architectures implement own crash_smp_send_stop() - crash_smp_send_stop()-like work is still needed by machine_crash_shutdown() because crash_kexec() can be called without entering panic() Fixes: f06e5153f4ae (kernel/panic.c: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160810080948.11028.15344.stgit@sysi4-13.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Reported-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Xunlei Pang <xpang@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Cc: "Steven J. Hill" <steven.hill@cavium.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-12 04:54:23 +08:00
/*
* Stop other CPUs in panic. Architecture dependent code may override this
* with more suitable version. For example, if the architecture supports
* crash dump, it should save registers of each stopped CPU and disable
* per-CPU features such as virtualization extensions.
*/
void __weak crash_smp_send_stop(void)
{
static int cpus_stopped;
/*
* This function can be called twice in panic path, but obviously
* we execute this only once.
*/
if (cpus_stopped)
return;
/*
* Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which
* unfortunately means it may not be hardened to work in a panic
* situation.
*/
smp_send_stop();
cpus_stopped = 1;
}
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
atomic_t panic_cpu = ATOMIC_INIT(PANIC_CPU_INVALID);
panic: change nmi_panic from macro to function Commit 1717f2096b54 ("panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI") and commit 58c5661f2144 ("panic, x86: Allow CPUs to save registers even if looping in NMI context") introduced nmi_panic() which prevents concurrent/recursive execution of panic(). It also saves registers for the crash dump on x86. However, there are some cases where NMI handlers still use panic(). This patch set partially replaces them with nmi_panic() in those cases. Even this patchset is applied, some NMI or similar handlers (e.g. MCE handler) continue to use panic(). This is because I can't test them well and actual problems won't happen. For example, the possibility that normal panic and panic on MCE happen simultaneously is very low. This patch (of 3): Convert nmi_panic() to a proper function and export it instead of exporting internal implementation details to modules, for obvious reasons. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-23 05:27:17 +08:00
/*
* A variant of panic() called from NMI context. We return if we've already
* panicked on this CPU. If another CPU already panicked, loop in
* nmi_panic_self_stop() which can provide architecture dependent code such
* as saving register state for crash dump.
*/
void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg)
{
int old_cpu, cpu;
cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
old_cpu = atomic_cmpxchg(&panic_cpu, PANIC_CPU_INVALID, cpu);
if (old_cpu == PANIC_CPU_INVALID)
panic("%s", msg);
else if (old_cpu != cpu)
nmi_panic_self_stop(regs);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nmi_panic);
static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
{
if (panic_print & PANIC_PRINT_ALL_PRINTK_MSG)
console_flush_on_panic(CONSOLE_REPLAY_ALL);
if (panic_print & PANIC_PRINT_TASK_INFO)
show_state();
if (panic_print & PANIC_PRINT_MEM_INFO)
show_mem(0, NULL);
if (panic_print & PANIC_PRINT_TIMER_INFO)
sysrq_timer_list_show();
if (panic_print & PANIC_PRINT_LOCK_INFO)
debug_show_all_locks();
if (panic_print & PANIC_PRINT_FTRACE_INFO)
ftrace_dump(DUMP_ALL);
}
/**
* panic - halt the system
* @fmt: The text string to print
*
* Display a message, then perform cleanups.
*
* This function never returns.
*/
void panic(const char *fmt, ...)
{
static char buf[1024];
va_list args;
long i, i_next = 0, len;
int state = 0;
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
int old_cpu, this_cpu;
bool _crash_kexec_post_notifiers = crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
/*
* Disable local interrupts. This will prevent panic_smp_self_stop
* from deadlocking the first cpu that invokes the panic, since
* there is nothing to prevent an interrupt handler (that runs
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
* after setting panic_cpu) from invoking panic() again.
*/
local_irq_disable();
panic: ensure preemption is disabled during panic() Calling 'panic()' on a kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT=y can leave the calling CPU in an infinite loop, but with interrupts and preemption enabled. From this state, userspace can continue to be scheduled, despite the system being "dead" as far as the kernel is concerned. This is easily reproducible on arm64 when booting with "nosmp" on the command line; a couple of shell scripts print out a periodic "Ping" message whilst another triggers a crash by writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger: | sysrq: Trigger a crash | Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.2.15 #1 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x0/0x148 | show_stack+0x14/0x20 | dump_stack+0xa0/0xc4 | panic+0x140/0x32c | sysrq_handle_reboot+0x0/0x20 | __handle_sysrq+0x124/0x190 | write_sysrq_trigger+0x64/0x88 | proc_reg_write+0x60/0xa8 | __vfs_write+0x18/0x40 | vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b8 | ksys_write+0x64/0xf0 | __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 | el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x168 | el0_svc_handler+0x28/0x78 | el0_svc+0x8/0xc | Kernel Offset: disabled | CPU features: 0x0002,24002004 | Memory Limit: none | ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash ]--- | Ping 2! | Ping 1! | Ping 1! | Ping 2! The issue can also be triggered on x86 kernels if CONFIG_SMP=n, otherwise local interrupts are disabled in 'smp_send_stop()'. Disable preemption in 'panic()' before re-enabling interrupts. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002123538.22609-1-will@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/BX1W47JXPMR8.58IYW53H6M5N@dragonstone Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reported-by: Xogium <contact@xogium.me> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 08:58:00 +08:00
preempt_disable_notrace();
/*
* It's possible to come here directly from a panic-assertion and
* not have preempt disabled. Some functions called from here want
* preempt to be disabled. No point enabling it later though...
*
* Only one CPU is allowed to execute the panic code from here. For
* multiple parallel invocations of panic, all other CPUs either
* stop themself or will wait until they are stopped by the 1st CPU
* with smp_send_stop().
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
*
* `old_cpu == PANIC_CPU_INVALID' means this is the 1st CPU which
* comes here, so go ahead.
* `old_cpu == this_cpu' means we came from nmi_panic() which sets
* panic_cpu to this CPU. In this case, this is also the 1st CPU.
*/
panic, x86: Fix re-entrance problem due to panic on NMI If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire panic_lock. To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've already entered panic(). For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU already panicked. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs [ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:09 +08:00
this_cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
old_cpu = atomic_cmpxchg(&panic_cpu, PANIC_CPU_INVALID, this_cpu);
if (old_cpu != PANIC_CPU_INVALID && old_cpu != this_cpu)
panic_smp_self_stop();
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
va_start(args, fmt);
len = vscnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (len && buf[len - 1] == '\n')
buf[len - 1] = '\0';
pr_emerg("Kernel panic - not syncing: %s\n", buf);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
/*
* Avoid nested stack-dumping if a panic occurs during oops processing
*/
if (!test_taint(TAINT_DIE) && oops_in_progress <= 1)
dump_stack();
#endif
kgdb: don't use a notifier to enter kgdb at panic; call directly Right now kgdb/kdb hooks up to debug panics by registering for the panic notifier. This works OK except that it means that kgdb/kdb gets called _after_ the CPUs in the system are taken offline. That means that if anything important was happening on those CPUs (like something that might have contributed to the panic) you can't debug them. Specifically I ran into a case where I got a panic because a task was "blocked for more than 120 seconds" which was detected on CPU 2. I nicely got shown stack traces in the kernel log for all CPUs including CPU 0, which was running 'PID: 111 Comm: kworker/0:1H' and was in the middle of __mmc_switch(). I then ended up at the kdb prompt where switched over to kgdb to try to look at local variables of the process on CPU 0. I found that I couldn't. Digging more, I found that I had no info on any tasks running on CPUs other than CPU 2 and that asking kdb for help showed me "Error: no saved data for this cpu". This was because all the CPUs were offline. Let's move the entry of kdb/kgdb to a direct call from panic() and stop using the generic notifier. Putting a direct call in allows us to order things more properly and it also doesn't seem like we're breaking any abstractions by calling into the debugger from the panic function. Daniel said: : This patch changes the way kdump and kgdb interact with each other. : However it would seem rather odd to have both tools simultaneously armed : and, even if they were, the user still has the option to use panic_timeout : to force a kdump to happen. Thus I think the change of order is : acceptable. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190703170354.217312-1-dianders@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-26 07:47:45 +08:00
/*
* If kgdb is enabled, give it a chance to run before we stop all
* the other CPUs or else we won't be able to debug processes left
* running on them.
*/
kgdb_panic(buf);
/*
* If we have crashed and we have a crash kernel loaded let it handle
* everything else.
* If we want to run this after calling panic_notifiers, pass
* the "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option to the kernel.
kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:11 +08:00
*
* Bypass the panic_cpu check and call __crash_kexec directly.
*/
if (!_crash_kexec_post_notifiers) {
kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:11 +08:00
__crash_kexec(NULL);
x86/panic: replace smp_send_stop() with kdump friendly version in panic path Daniel Walker reported problems which happens when crash_kexec_post_notifiers kernel option is enabled (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/24/44). In that case, smp_send_stop() is called before entering kdump routines which assume other CPUs are still online. As the result, for x86, kdump routines fail to save other CPUs' registers and disable virtualization extensions. To fix this problem, call a new kdump friendly function, crash_smp_send_stop(), instead of the smp_send_stop() when crash_kexec_post_notifiers is enabled. crash_smp_send_stop() is a weak function, and it just call smp_send_stop(). Architecture codes should override it so that kdump can work appropriately. This patch only provides x86-specific version. For Xen's PV kernel, just keep the current behavior. NOTES: - Right solution would be to place crash_smp_send_stop() before __crash_kexec() invocation in all cases and remove smp_send_stop(), but we can't do that until all architectures implement own crash_smp_send_stop() - crash_smp_send_stop()-like work is still needed by machine_crash_shutdown() because crash_kexec() can be called without entering panic() Fixes: f06e5153f4ae (kernel/panic.c: add "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160810080948.11028.15344.stgit@sysi4-13.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Reported-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com> Cc: Xunlei Pang <xpang@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Cc: "Steven J. Hill" <steven.hill@cavium.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-12 04:54:23 +08:00
/*
* Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which
* unfortunately means it may not be hardened to work in a
* panic situation.
*/
smp_send_stop();
} else {
/*
* If we want to do crash dump after notifier calls and
* kmsg_dump, we will need architecture dependent extra
* works in addition to stopping other CPUs.
*/
crash_smp_send_stop();
}
/*
* Run any panic handlers, including those that might need to
* add information to the kmsg dump output.
*/
[PATCH] Notifier chain update: API changes The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2 We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage classes: "Blocking" chains are always called from a process context and the callout routines are allowed to sleep; "Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and the callout routines are not allowed to sleep. We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in kernel/sys.c. With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to handle these things in their own way.) There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code had to be changed to avoid it.) Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much less frequent that calling a chain. Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder. ATOMIC CHAINS ------------- arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain BLOCKING CHAINS --------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain kernel/module.c module_notify_list kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list net/core/dev.c netdev_chain net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are, please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems. (However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be atomic.) The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew Morton. [jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 17:16:30 +08:00
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&panic_notifier_list, 0, buf);
kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_PANIC);
/*
* If you doubt kdump always works fine in any situation,
* "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" offers you a chance to run
* panic_notifiers and dumping kmsg before kdump.
* Note: since some panic_notifiers can make crashed kernel
* more unstable, it can increase risks of the kdump failure too.
kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:11 +08:00
*
* Bypass the panic_cpu check and call __crash_kexec directly.
*/
if (_crash_kexec_post_notifiers)
kexec: Fix race between panic() and crash_kexec() Currently, panic() and crash_kexec() can be called at the same time. For example (x86 case): CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired nmi_shootdown_cpus() // stop other CPUs CPU 1: panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire smp_send_stop() // stop other CPUs infinite loop If CPU 1 calls smp_send_stop() before nmi_shootdown_cpus(), kdump fails. In another case: CPU 0: oops_end() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // acquired <NMI> io_check_error() panic() crash_kexec() mutex_trylock() // failed to acquire infinite loop Clearly, this is an undesirable result. To fix this problem, this patch changes crash_kexec() to exclude others by using the panic_cpu atomic. Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Minfei Huang <mnfhuang@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014630.25437.94161.stgit@softrs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-12-14 18:19:11 +08:00
__crash_kexec(NULL);
panic: avoid deadlocks in re-entrant console drivers From printk()/serial console point of view panic() is special, because it may force CPU to re-enter printk() or/and serial console driver. Therefore, some of serial consoles drivers are re-entrant. E.g. 8250: serial8250_console_write() { if (port->sysrq) locked = 0; else if (oops_in_progress) locked = spin_trylock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags); else spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags); ... } panic() does set oops_in_progress via bust_spinlocks(1), so in theory we should be able to re-enter serial console driver from panic(): CPU0 <NMI> uart_console_write() serial8250_console_write() // if (oops_in_progress) // spin_trylock_irqsave() call_console_drivers() console_unlock() console_flush_on_panic() bust_spinlocks(1) // oops_in_progress++ panic() <NMI/> spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags) // spin_lock_irqsave() serial8250_console_write() call_console_drivers() console_unlock() printk() ... However, this does not happen and we deadlock in serial console on port->lock spinlock. And the problem is that console_flush_on_panic() called after bust_spinlocks(0): void panic(const char *fmt, ...) { bust_spinlocks(1); ... bust_spinlocks(0); console_flush_on_panic(); ... } bust_spinlocks(0) decrements oops_in_progress, so oops_in_progress can go back to zero. Thus even re-entrant console drivers will simply spin on port->lock spinlock. Given that port->lock may already be locked either by a stopped CPU, or by the very same CPU we execute panic() on (for instance, NMI panic() on printing CPU) the system deadlocks and does not reboot. Fix this by removing bust_spinlocks(0), so oops_in_progress is always set in panic() now and, thus, re-entrant console drivers will trylock the port->lock instead of spinning on it forever, when we call them from console_flush_on_panic(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181025101036.6823-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Daniel Wang <wonderfly@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
2018-10-25 18:10:36 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_VT
unblank_screen();
#endif
console_unblank();
panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-07 08:32:58 +08:00
/*
* We may have ended up stopping the CPU holding the lock (in
* smp_send_stop()) while still having some valuable data in the console
* buffer. Try to acquire the lock then release it regardless of the
* result. The release will also print the buffers out. Locks debug
* should be disabled to avoid reporting bad unlock balance when
* panic() is not being callled from OOPS.
panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-07 08:32:58 +08:00
*/
debug_locks_off();
console_flush_on_panic(CONSOLE_FLUSH_PENDING);
panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out In some cases we may end up killing the CPU holding the console lock while still having valuable data in logbuf. E.g. I'm observing the following: - A crash is happening on one CPU and console_unlock() is being called on some other. - console_unlock() tries to print out the buffer before releasing the lock and on slow console it takes time. - in the meanwhile crashing CPU does lots of printk()-s with valuable data (which go to the logbuf) and sends IPIs to all other CPUs. - console_unlock() finishes printing previous chunk and enables interrupts before trying to print out the rest, the CPU catches the IPI and never releases console lock. This is not the only possible case: in VT/fb subsystems we have many other console_lock()/console_unlock() users. Non-masked interrupts (or receiving NMI in case of extreme slowness) will have the same result. Getting the whole console buffer printed out on crash should be top priority. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment text] Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-07 08:32:58 +08:00
panic_print_sys_info();
if (!panic_blink)
panic_blink = no_blink;
if (panic_timeout > 0) {
/*
* Delay timeout seconds before rebooting the machine.
* We can't use the "normal" timers since we just panicked.
*/
pr_emerg("Rebooting in %d seconds..\n", panic_timeout);
for (i = 0; i < panic_timeout * 1000; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) {
touch_nmi_watchdog();
if (i >= i_next) {
i += panic_blink(state ^= 1);
i_next = i + 3600 / PANIC_BLINK_SPD;
}
mdelay(PANIC_TIMER_STEP);
}
}
if (panic_timeout != 0) {
/*
* This will not be a clean reboot, with everything
* shutting down. But if there is a chance of
* rebooting the system it will be rebooted.
*/
if (panic_reboot_mode != REBOOT_UNDEFINED)
reboot_mode = panic_reboot_mode;
emergency_restart();
}
#ifdef __sparc__
{
extern int stop_a_enabled;
/* Make sure the user can actually press Stop-A (L1-A) */
stop_a_enabled = 1;
pr_emerg("Press Stop-A (L1-A) from sun keyboard or send break\n"
"twice on console to return to the boot prom\n");
}
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_S390)
disabled_wait();
#endif
pr_emerg("---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: %s ]---\n", buf);
panic: avoid the extra noise dmesg When kernel panic happens, it will first print the panic call stack, then the ending msg like: [ 35.743249] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 35.749975] ------------[ cut here ]------------ The above message are very useful for debugging. But if system is configured to not reboot on panic, say the "panic_timeout" parameter equals 0, it will likely print out many noisy message like WARN() call stack for each and every CPU except the panic one, messages like below: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 280 at kernel/sched/core.c:1198 set_task_cpu+0x183/0x190 Call Trace: <IRQ> try_to_wake_up default_wake_function autoremove_wake_function __wake_up_common __wake_up_common_lock __wake_up wake_up_klogd_work_func irq_work_run_list irq_work_tick update_process_times tick_sched_timer __hrtimer_run_queues hrtimer_interrupt smp_apic_timer_interrupt apic_timer_interrupt For people working in console mode, the screen will first show the panic call stack, but immediately overridden by these noisy extra messages, which makes debugging much more difficult, as the original context gets lost on screen. Also these noisy messages will confuse some users, as I have seen many bug reporters posted the noisy message into bugzilla, instead of the real panic call stack and context. Adding a flag "suppress_printk" which gets set in panic() to avoid those noisy messages, without changing current kernel behavior that both panic blinking and sysrq magic key can work as is, suggested by Petr Mladek. To verify this, make sure kernel is not configured to reboot on panic and in console # echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger to see if console only prints out the panic call stack. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1551430186-24169-1-git-send-email-feng.tang@intel.com Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Suggested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-15 06:45:34 +08:00
/* Do not scroll important messages printed above */
suppress_printk = 1;
local_irq_enable();
for (i = 0; ; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) {
touch_softlockup_watchdog();
if (i >= i_next) {
i += panic_blink(state ^= 1);
i_next = i + 3600 / PANIC_BLINK_SPD;
}
mdelay(PANIC_TIMER_STEP);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic);
taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling The commit 66cc69e34e86a231 ("Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE") updated module_taint_flags() to potentially print one more character. But it did not increase the size of the corresponding buffers in m_show() and print_modules(). We have recently done the same mistake when adding a taint flag for livepatching, see https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfba2c823bb984690b73572aaae1db596b54a082.1472137475.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Also struct module uses an incompatible type for mod-taints flags. It survived from the commit 2bc2d61a9638dab670d ("[PATCH] list module taint flags in Oops/panic"). There was used "int" for the global taint flags at these times. But only the global tain flags was later changed to "unsigned long" by the commit 25ddbb18aae33ad2 ("Make the taint flags reliable"). This patch defines TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT that can be used to create arrays and buffers of the right size. Note that we could not use enum because the taint flag indexes are used also in assembly code. Then it reworks the table that describes the taint flags. The TAINT_* numbers can be used as the index. Instead, we add information if the taint flag is also shown per-module. Finally, it uses "unsigned long", bit operations, and the updated taint_flags table also for mod->taints. It is not optimal because only few taint flags can be printed by module_taint_flags(). But better be on the safe side. IMHO, it is not worth the optimization and this is a good compromise. Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474458442-21581-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com [jeyu@redhat.com: fix broken lkml link in changelog] Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
2016-09-21 19:47:22 +08:00
/*
* TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD could be a per-module flag but the module
* is being removed anyway.
*/
const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = {
[ TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ] = { 'P', 'G', true },
[ TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ] = { 'F', ' ', true },
[ TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC ] = { 'S', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ] = { 'R', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ] = { 'M', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_BAD_PAGE ] = { 'B', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_USER ] = { 'U', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_DIE ] = { 'D', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE ] = { 'A', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_WARN ] = { 'W', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_CRAP ] = { 'C', ' ', true },
[ TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND ] = { 'I', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_OOT_MODULE ] = { 'O', ' ', true },
[ TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE ] = { 'E', ' ', true },
[ TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP ] = { 'L', ' ', false },
[ TAINT_LIVEPATCH ] = { 'K', ' ', true },
[ TAINT_AUX ] = { 'X', ' ', true },
[ TAINT_RANDSTRUCT ] = { 'T', ' ', true },
};
/**
* print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state.
*
* For individual taint flag meanings, see Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
*
* The string is overwritten by the next call to print_tainted(),
* but is always NULL terminated.
*/
const char *print_tainted(void)
{
taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling The commit 66cc69e34e86a231 ("Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE") updated module_taint_flags() to potentially print one more character. But it did not increase the size of the corresponding buffers in m_show() and print_modules(). We have recently done the same mistake when adding a taint flag for livepatching, see https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfba2c823bb984690b73572aaae1db596b54a082.1472137475.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Also struct module uses an incompatible type for mod-taints flags. It survived from the commit 2bc2d61a9638dab670d ("[PATCH] list module taint flags in Oops/panic"). There was used "int" for the global taint flags at these times. But only the global tain flags was later changed to "unsigned long" by the commit 25ddbb18aae33ad2 ("Make the taint flags reliable"). This patch defines TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT that can be used to create arrays and buffers of the right size. Note that we could not use enum because the taint flag indexes are used also in assembly code. Then it reworks the table that describes the taint flags. The TAINT_* numbers can be used as the index. Instead, we add information if the taint flag is also shown per-module. Finally, it uses "unsigned long", bit operations, and the updated taint_flags table also for mod->taints. It is not optimal because only few taint flags can be printed by module_taint_flags(). But better be on the safe side. IMHO, it is not worth the optimization and this is a good compromise. Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474458442-21581-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com [jeyu@redhat.com: fix broken lkml link in changelog] Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
2016-09-21 19:47:22 +08:00
static char buf[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT + sizeof("Tainted: ")];
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(taint_flags) != TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT);
if (tainted_mask) {
char *s;
int i;
s = buf + sprintf(buf, "Tainted: ");
taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling The commit 66cc69e34e86a231 ("Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE") updated module_taint_flags() to potentially print one more character. But it did not increase the size of the corresponding buffers in m_show() and print_modules(). We have recently done the same mistake when adding a taint flag for livepatching, see https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfba2c823bb984690b73572aaae1db596b54a082.1472137475.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Also struct module uses an incompatible type for mod-taints flags. It survived from the commit 2bc2d61a9638dab670d ("[PATCH] list module taint flags in Oops/panic"). There was used "int" for the global taint flags at these times. But only the global tain flags was later changed to "unsigned long" by the commit 25ddbb18aae33ad2 ("Make the taint flags reliable"). This patch defines TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT that can be used to create arrays and buffers of the right size. Note that we could not use enum because the taint flag indexes are used also in assembly code. Then it reworks the table that describes the taint flags. The TAINT_* numbers can be used as the index. Instead, we add information if the taint flag is also shown per-module. Finally, it uses "unsigned long", bit operations, and the updated taint_flags table also for mod->taints. It is not optimal because only few taint flags can be printed by module_taint_flags(). But better be on the safe side. IMHO, it is not worth the optimization and this is a good compromise. Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474458442-21581-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com [jeyu@redhat.com: fix broken lkml link in changelog] Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
2016-09-21 19:47:22 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) {
const struct taint_flag *t = &taint_flags[i];
*s++ = test_bit(i, &tainted_mask) ?
t->c_true : t->c_false;
}
*s = 0;
} else
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted");
return buf;
}
int test_taint(unsigned flag)
{
return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(test_taint);
unsigned long get_taint(void)
{
return tainted_mask;
}
/**
* add_taint: add a taint flag if not already set.
* @flag: one of the TAINT_* constants.
* @lockdep_ok: whether lock debugging is still OK.
*
* If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want @lockdebug_ok = false, but for
* some notewortht-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to true.
*/
void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
{
if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off())
pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
kernel: add panic_on_taint Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given flag. This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids having to rebuild the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() into the code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest. For instance, if one is interested in proceeding with a post-mortem analysis at the point a given code path is hitting a bad page (i.e. unaccount_page_cache_page(), or slab_bug()), a coredump can be collected by rebooting the kernel with 'panic_on_taint=0x20' amended to the command line. Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be as a means for assuring a security policy case where only a subset of taints, or no single taint (in paranoid mode), is allowed for the running system. The optional switch 'nousertaint' is handy in this particular scenario, as it will avoid userspace induced crashes by writes to sysctl interface /proc/sys/kernel/tainted causing false positive hits for such policies. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak kernel-parameters.txt wording] Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200515175502.146720-1-aquini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 12:40:17 +08:00
if (tainted_mask & panic_on_taint) {
panic_on_taint = 0;
panic("panic_on_taint set ...");
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
static void spin_msec(int msecs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < msecs; i++) {
touch_nmi_watchdog();
mdelay(1);
}
}
/*
* It just happens that oops_enter() and oops_exit() are identically
* implemented...
*/
static void do_oops_enter_exit(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
static int spin_counter;
if (!pause_on_oops)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags);
if (pause_on_oops_flag == 0) {
/* This CPU may now print the oops message */
pause_on_oops_flag = 1;
} else {
/* We need to stall this CPU */
if (!spin_counter) {
/* This CPU gets to do the counting */
spin_counter = pause_on_oops;
do {
spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
spin_msec(MSEC_PER_SEC);
spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
} while (--spin_counter);
pause_on_oops_flag = 0;
} else {
/* This CPU waits for a different one */
while (spin_counter) {
spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
spin_msec(1);
spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
}
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags);
}
/*
* Return true if the calling CPU is allowed to print oops-related info.
* This is a bit racy..
*/
bool oops_may_print(void)
{
return pause_on_oops_flag == 0;
}
/*
* Called when the architecture enters its oops handler, before it prints
* anything. If this is the first CPU to oops, and it's oopsing the first
* time then let it proceed.
*
* This is all enabled by the pause_on_oops kernel boot option. We do all
* this to ensure that oopses don't scroll off the screen. It has the
* side-effect of preventing later-oopsing CPUs from mucking up the display,
* too.
*
* It turns out that the CPU which is allowed to print ends up pausing for
* the right duration, whereas all the other CPUs pause for twice as long:
* once in oops_enter(), once in oops_exit().
*/
void oops_enter(void)
{
tracing_off();
/* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */
debug_locks_off();
do_oops_enter_exit();
panic: add sysctl to dump all CPUs backtraces on oops event Usually when the kernel reaches an oops condition, it's a point of no return; in case not enough debug information is available in the kernel splat, one of the last resorts would be to collect a kernel crash dump and analyze it. The problem with this approach is that in order to collect the dump, a panic is required (to kexec-load the crash kernel). When in an environment of multiple virtual machines, users may prefer to try living with the oops, at least until being able to properly shutdown their VMs / finish their important tasks. This patch implements a way to collect a bit more debug details when an oops event is reached, by printing all the CPUs backtraces through the usage of NMIs (on architectures that support that). The sysctl added (and documented) here was called "oops_all_cpu_backtrace", and when set will (as the name suggests) dump all CPUs backtraces. Far from ideal, this may be the last option though for users that for some reason cannot panic on oops. Most of times oopses are clear enough to indicate the kernel portion that must be investigated, but in virtual environments it's possible to observe hypervisor/KVM issues that could lead to oopses shown in other guests CPUs (like virtual APIC crashes). This patch hence aims to help debug such complex issues without resorting to kdump. Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200327224116.21030-1-gpiccoli@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 12:40:48 +08:00
if (sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace)
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace();
}
static void print_oops_end_marker(void)
{
pr_warn("---[ end trace %016llx ]---\n", 0ULL);
}
/*
* Called when the architecture exits its oops handler, after printing
* everything.
*/
void oops_exit(void)
{
do_oops_enter_exit();
print_oops_end_marker();
kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_OOPS);
}
struct warn_args {
const char *fmt;
va_list args;
};
void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
struct pt_regs *regs, struct warn_args *args)
{
disable_trace_on_warning();
if (file)
pr_warn("WARNING: CPU: %d PID: %d at %s:%d %pS\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(), current->pid, file, line,
caller);
else
pr_warn("WARNING: CPU: %d PID: %d at %pS\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(), current->pid, caller);
if (args)
vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
print_modules();
if (regs)
show_regs(regs);
kernel: add panic_on_warn There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-11 07:45:50 +08:00
if (panic_on_warn) {
/*
* This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
* Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
* system on this thread. Other threads are blocked by the
* panic_mutex in panic().
*/
panic_on_warn = 0;
panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
}
panic: don't dump stack twice on warn Before commit 3f388f28639f ("panic: dump registers on panic_on_warn"), __warn() was calling show_regs() when regs was not NULL, and show_stack() otherwise. After that commit, show_stack() is called regardless of whether show_regs() has been called or not, leading to duplicated Call Trace: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/8xx.c:186 mmu_mark_initmem_nx+0x24/0x94 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.10.0-rc2-s3k-dev-01375-gf46ec0d3ecbd-dirty #4092 NIP: c00128b4 LR: c0010228 CTR: 00000000 REGS: c9023e40 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.10.0-rc2-s3k-dev-01375-gf46ec0d3ecbd-dirty) MSR: 00029032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24000424 XER: 00000000 GPR00: c0010228 c9023ef8 c2100000 0074c000 ffffffff 00000000 c2151000 c07b3880 GPR08: ff000900 0074c000 c8000000 c33b53a8 24000822 00000000 c0003a20 00000000 GPR16: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 GPR24: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 NIP [c00128b4] mmu_mark_initmem_nx+0x24/0x94 LR [c0010228] free_initmem+0x20/0x58 Call Trace: free_initmem+0x20/0x58 kernel_init+0x1c/0x114 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c Instruction dump: 7d291850 7d234b78 4e800020 9421ffe0 7c0802a6 bfc10018 3fe0c060 3bff0000 3fff4080 3bffffff 90010024 57ff0010 <0fe00000> 392001cd 7c3e0b78 953e0008 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.10.0-rc2-s3k-dev-01375-gf46ec0d3ecbd-dirty #4092 Call Trace: __warn+0x8c/0xd8 (unreliable) report_bug+0x11c/0x154 program_check_exception+0x1dc/0x6e0 ret_from_except_full+0x0/0x4 --- interrupt: 700 at mmu_mark_initmem_nx+0x24/0x94 LR = free_initmem+0x20/0x58 free_initmem+0x20/0x58 kernel_init+0x1c/0x114 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c ---[ end trace 31702cd2a9570752 ]--- Only call show_stack() when regs is NULL. Fixes: 3f388f28639f ("panic: dump registers on panic_on_warn") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e8c055458b080707f1bc1a98ff8bea79d0cec445.1604748361.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-11-14 14:52:20 +08:00
if (!regs)
dump_stack();
print_irqtrace_events(current);
print_oops_end_marker();
trace_error_report_end(ERROR_DETECTOR_WARN, (unsigned long)caller);
/* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
#ifndef __WARN_FLAGS
bug: refactor away warn_slowpath_fmt_taint() Patch series "Clean up WARN() "cut here" handling", v2. Christophe Leroy noticed that the fix for missing "cut here" in the WARN() case was adding explicit printk() calls instead of teaching the exception handler to add it. This refactors the bug/warn infrastructure to pass this information as a new BUGFLAG. Longer details repeated from the last patch in the series: bug: move WARN_ON() "cut here" into exception handler The original cleanup of "cut here" missed the WARN_ON() case (that does not have a printk message), which was fixed recently by adding an explicit printk of "cut here". This had the downside of adding a printk() to every WARN_ON() caller, which reduces the utility of using an instruction exception to streamline the resulting code. By making this a new BUGFLAG, all of these can be removed and "cut here" can be handled by the exception handler. This was very pronounced on PowerPC, but the effect can be seen on x86 as well. The resulting text size of a defconfig build shows some small savings from this patch: text data bss dec hex filename 19691167 5134320 1646664 26472151 193eed7 vmlinux.before 19676362 5134260 1663048 26473670 193f4c6 vmlinux.after This change also opens the door for creating something like BUG_MSG(), where a custom printk() before issuing BUG(), without confusing the "cut here" line. This patch (of 7): There's no reason to have specialized helpers for passing the warn taint down to __warn(). Consolidate and refactor helper macros, removing __WARN_printf() and warn_slowpath_fmt_taint(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190819234111.9019-2-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Drew Davenport <ddavenport@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-26 07:47:52 +08:00
void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, unsigned taint,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct warn_args args;
pr_warn(CUT_HERE);
if (!fmt) {
__warn(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), taint,
NULL, NULL);
return;
}
args.fmt = fmt;
va_start(args.args, fmt);
__warn(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), taint, NULL, &args);
va_end(args.args);
}
bug: refactor away warn_slowpath_fmt_taint() Patch series "Clean up WARN() "cut here" handling", v2. Christophe Leroy noticed that the fix for missing "cut here" in the WARN() case was adding explicit printk() calls instead of teaching the exception handler to add it. This refactors the bug/warn infrastructure to pass this information as a new BUGFLAG. Longer details repeated from the last patch in the series: bug: move WARN_ON() "cut here" into exception handler The original cleanup of "cut here" missed the WARN_ON() case (that does not have a printk message), which was fixed recently by adding an explicit printk of "cut here". This had the downside of adding a printk() to every WARN_ON() caller, which reduces the utility of using an instruction exception to streamline the resulting code. By making this a new BUGFLAG, all of these can be removed and "cut here" can be handled by the exception handler. This was very pronounced on PowerPC, but the effect can be seen on x86 as well. The resulting text size of a defconfig build shows some small savings from this patch: text data bss dec hex filename 19691167 5134320 1646664 26472151 193eed7 vmlinux.before 19676362 5134260 1663048 26473670 193f4c6 vmlinux.after This change also opens the door for creating something like BUG_MSG(), where a custom printk() before issuing BUG(), without confusing the "cut here" line. This patch (of 7): There's no reason to have specialized helpers for passing the warn taint down to __warn(). Consolidate and refactor helper macros, removing __WARN_printf() and warn_slowpath_fmt_taint(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190819234111.9019-2-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Drew Davenport <ddavenport@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-26 07:47:52 +08:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_fmt);
bug: fix "cut here" location for __WARN_TAINT architectures Prior to v4.11, x86 used warn_slowpath_fmt() for handling WARN()s. After WARN() was moved to using UD0 on x86, the warning text started appearing _before_ the "cut here" line. This appears to have been a long-standing bug on architectures that used __WARN_TAINT, but it didn't get fixed. v4.11 and earlier on x86: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2956 at drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c:65 lkdtm_WARNING+0x21/0x30 This is a warning message Modules linked in: v4.12 and later on x86: This is a warning message ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2982 at drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c:68 lkdtm_WARNING+0x15/0x20 Modules linked in: With this fix: ------------[ cut here ]------------ This is a warning message WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3009 at drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c:67 lkdtm_WARNING+0x15/0x20 Since the __FILE__ reporting happens as part of the UD0 handler, it isn't trivial to move the message to after the WARNING line, but at least we can fix the position of the "cut here" line so all the various logging tools will start including the actual runtime warning message again, when they follow the instruction and "cut here". Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510100869-73751-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Fixes: 9a93848fe787 ("x86/debug: Implement __WARN() using UD0") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-18 07:27:24 +08:00
#else
void __warn_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
pr_warn(CUT_HERE);
va_start(args, fmt);
vprintk(fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__warn_printk);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BUG
/* Support resetting WARN*_ONCE state */
static int clear_warn_once_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
generic_bug_clear_once();
memset(__start_once, 0, __end_once - __start_once);
return 0;
}
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(clear_warn_once_fops, NULL, clear_warn_once_set,
"%lld\n");
static __init int register_warn_debugfs(void)
{
/* Don't care about failure */
debugfs_create_file_unsafe("clear_warn_once", 0200, NULL, NULL,
&clear_warn_once_fops);
return 0;
}
device_initcall(register_warn_debugfs);
#endif
Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 11:21:18 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
/*
* Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and
* gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value
*/
__visible noinstr void __stack_chk_fail(void)
{
instrumentation_begin();
panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %pB",
__builtin_return_address(0));
instrumentation_end();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
#endif
core_param(panic, panic_timeout, int, 0644);
core_param(panic_print, panic_print, ulong, 0644);
core_param(pause_on_oops, pause_on_oops, int, 0644);
kernel: add panic_on_warn There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-11 07:45:50 +08:00
core_param(panic_on_warn, panic_on_warn, int, 0644);
core_param(crash_kexec_post_notifiers, crash_kexec_post_notifiers, bool, 0644);
static int __init oops_setup(char *s)
{
if (!s)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcmp(s, "panic"))
panic_on_oops = 1;
return 0;
}
early_param("oops", oops_setup);
kernel: add panic_on_taint Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given flag. This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids having to rebuild the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() into the code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest. For instance, if one is interested in proceeding with a post-mortem analysis at the point a given code path is hitting a bad page (i.e. unaccount_page_cache_page(), or slab_bug()), a coredump can be collected by rebooting the kernel with 'panic_on_taint=0x20' amended to the command line. Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be as a means for assuring a security policy case where only a subset of taints, or no single taint (in paranoid mode), is allowed for the running system. The optional switch 'nousertaint' is handy in this particular scenario, as it will avoid userspace induced crashes by writes to sysctl interface /proc/sys/kernel/tainted causing false positive hits for such policies. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak kernel-parameters.txt wording] Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200515175502.146720-1-aquini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 12:40:17 +08:00
static int __init panic_on_taint_setup(char *s)
{
char *taint_str;
if (!s)
return -EINVAL;
taint_str = strsep(&s, ",");
if (kstrtoul(taint_str, 16, &panic_on_taint))
return -EINVAL;
/* make sure panic_on_taint doesn't hold out-of-range TAINT flags */
panic_on_taint &= TAINT_FLAGS_MAX;
if (!panic_on_taint)
return -EINVAL;
if (s && !strcmp(s, "nousertaint"))
panic_on_taint_nousertaint = true;
pr_info("panic_on_taint: bitmask=0x%lx nousertaint_mode=%sabled\n",
panic_on_taint, panic_on_taint_nousertaint ? "en" : "dis");
return 0;
}
early_param("panic_on_taint", panic_on_taint_setup);