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linux-next/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
*
* This header defines architecture specific interfaces, x86 version
*/
#ifndef _ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H
#define _ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/irq_work.h>
x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq(). Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header dependencies like asm/smp.h asm/apic.h asm/hardirq.h linux/irq.h linux/topology.h linux/smp.h asm/smp.h or linux/gfp.h linux/mmzone.h asm/mmzone.h asm/mmzone_64.h asm/smp.h asm/apic.h asm/hardirq.h linux/irq.h linux/irqdesc.h linux/kobject.h linux/sysfs.h linux/kernfs.h linux/idr.h linux/gfp.h and others. This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain anymore. A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and asm/apic.h. However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their asm/hardirq.h. Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h. Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c files as needed. Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if at all. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-07-29 18:15:33 +08:00
#include <linux/irq.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
#include <linux/clocksource.h>
#include <linux/irqbypass.h>
kvm/x86: Hyper-V synthetic interrupt controller SynIC (synthetic interrupt controller) is a lapic extension, which is controlled via MSRs and maintains for each vCPU - 16 synthetic interrupt "lines" (SINT's); each can be configured to trigger a specific interrupt vector optionally with auto-EOI semantics - a message page in the guest memory with 16 256-byte per-SINT message slots - an event flag page in the guest memory with 16 2048-bit per-SINT event flag areas The host triggers a SINT whenever it delivers a new message to the corresponding slot or flips an event flag bit in the corresponding area. The guest informs the host that it can try delivering a message by explicitly asserting EOI in lapic or writing to End-Of-Message (EOM) MSR. The userspace (qemu) triggers interrupts and receives EOM notifications via irqfd with resampler; for that, a GSI is allocated for each configured SINT, and irq_routing api is extended to support GSI-SINT mapping. Changes v4: * added activation of SynIC by vcpu KVM_ENABLE_CAP * added per SynIC active flag * added deactivation of APICv upon SynIC activation Changes v3: * added KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC and KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT notes into docs Changes v2: * do not use posted interrupts for Hyper-V SynIC AutoEOI vectors * add Hyper-V SynIC vectors into EOI exit bitmap * Hyper-V SyniIC SINT msr write logic simplified Signed-off-by: Andrey Smetanin <asmetanin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> CC: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> CC: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> CC: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> CC: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2015-11-10 20:36:34 +08:00
#include <linux/hyperv.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/pvclock-abi.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_page_track.h>
#include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
#include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
#define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_VCPU_DEBUGFS
#define KVM_MAX_VCPUS 288
#define KVM_SOFT_MAX_VCPUS 240
#define KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID 1023
#define KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS 509
/* memory slots that are not exposed to userspace */
#define KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS 3
#define KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM (KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS + KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS)
#define KVM_HALT_POLL_NS_DEFAULT 200000
#define KVM_IRQCHIP_NUM_PINS KVM_IOAPIC_NUM_PINS
#define KVM_DIRTY_LOG_MANUAL_CAPS (KVM_DIRTY_LOG_MANUAL_PROTECT_ENABLE | \
KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET)
/* x86-specific vcpu->requests bit members */
#define KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER KVM_ARCH_REQ(0)
#define KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS KVM_ARCH_REQ(1)
#define KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT KVM_ARCH_REQ(2)
#define KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC KVM_ARCH_REQ(3)
#define KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE KVM_ARCH_REQ(4)
#define KVM_REQ_LOAD_MMU_PGD KVM_ARCH_REQ(5)
#define KVM_REQ_EVENT KVM_ARCH_REQ(6)
#define KVM_REQ_APF_HALT KVM_ARCH_REQ(7)
#define KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE KVM_ARCH_REQ(8)
#define KVM_REQ_NMI KVM_ARCH_REQ(9)
#define KVM_REQ_PMU KVM_ARCH_REQ(10)
#define KVM_REQ_PMI KVM_ARCH_REQ(11)
#define KVM_REQ_SMI KVM_ARCH_REQ(12)
#define KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE KVM_ARCH_REQ(13)
#define KVM_REQ_MCLOCK_INPROGRESS \
KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(14, KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
#define KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC \
KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(15, KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
#define KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE KVM_ARCH_REQ(16)
#define KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD \
KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(17, KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
#define KVM_REQ_HV_CRASH KVM_ARCH_REQ(18)
#define KVM_REQ_IOAPIC_EOI_EXIT KVM_ARCH_REQ(19)
#define KVM_REQ_HV_RESET KVM_ARCH_REQ(20)
#define KVM_REQ_HV_EXIT KVM_ARCH_REQ(21)
#define KVM_REQ_HV_STIMER KVM_ARCH_REQ(22)
KVM: nVMX: Do not load EOI-exitmap while running L2 When L1 IOAPIC redirection-table is written, a request of KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC is set on all vCPUs. This is done such that all vCPUs will now recalc their IOAPIC handled vectors and load it to their EOI-exitmap. However, it could be that one of the vCPUs is currently running L2. In this case, load_eoi_exitmap() will be called which would write to vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap, which is wrong because vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap should always be equal to vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap. Furthermore, at this point KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC was already consumed and therefore we will never update vmcs01->eoi_exit_bitmap. This could lead to remote_irr of some IOAPIC level-triggered entry to remain set forever. Fix this issue by delaying the load of EOI-exitmap to when vCPU is running L1. One may wonder why not just delay entire KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC processing to when vCPU is running L1. This is done in order to handle correctly the case where LAPIC & IO-APIC of L1 is pass-throughed into L2. In this case, vmcs12->virtual_interrupt_delivery should be 0. In current nVMX implementation, that results in vmcs02->virtual_interrupt_delivery to also be 0. Thus, vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap is not used. Therefore, every L2 EOI cause a #VMExit into L0 (either on MSR_WRITE to x2APIC MSR or APIC_ACCESS/APIC_WRITE/EPT_MISCONFIG to APIC MMIO page). In order for such L2 EOI to be broadcasted, if needed, from LAPIC to IO-APIC, vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors must be updated while L2 is running. Therefore, patch makes sure to delay only the loading of EOI-exitmap but not the update of vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors. Reviewed-by: Arbel Moshe <arbel.moshe@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-21 08:50:31 +08:00
#define KVM_REQ_LOAD_EOI_EXITMAP KVM_ARCH_REQ(23)
#define KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGES KVM_ARCH_REQ(24)
#define KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE \
KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(25, KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
#define KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT KVM_ARCH_REQ(26)
#define KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH \
KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(27, KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
#define KVM_REQ_APF_READY KVM_ARCH_REQ(28)
#define CR0_RESERVED_BITS \
(~(unsigned long)(X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_MP | X86_CR0_EM | X86_CR0_TS \
| X86_CR0_ET | X86_CR0_NE | X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_AM \
| X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_PG))
#define CR4_RESERVED_BITS \
(~(unsigned long)(X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_TSD | X86_CR4_DE\
| X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE \
| X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_PCIDE \
| X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \
| X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_VMXE \
| X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE | X86_CR4_UMIP))
#define CR8_RESERVED_BITS (~(unsigned long)X86_CR8_TPR)
#define INVALID_PAGE (~(hpa_t)0)
#define VALID_PAGE(x) ((x) != INVALID_PAGE)
#define UNMAPPED_GVA (~(gpa_t)0)
/* KVM Hugepage definitions for x86 */
#define KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL PG_LEVEL_1G
#define KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL - PG_LEVEL_4K + 1)
#define KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(x) (((x) - 1) * 9)
#define KVM_HPAGE_SHIFT(x) (PAGE_SHIFT + KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(x))
#define KVM_HPAGE_SIZE(x) (1UL << KVM_HPAGE_SHIFT(x))
#define KVM_HPAGE_MASK(x) (~(KVM_HPAGE_SIZE(x) - 1))
#define KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(x) (KVM_HPAGE_SIZE(x) / PAGE_SIZE)
static inline gfn_t gfn_to_index(gfn_t gfn, gfn_t base_gfn, int level)
{
/* KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K) must be 0. */
return (gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level)) -
(base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
}
#define KVM_PERMILLE_MMU_PAGES 20
#define KVM_MIN_ALLOC_MMU_PAGES 64UL
kvm: x86: reduce collisions in mmu_page_hash When using two-dimensional paging, the mmu_page_hash (which provides lookups for existing kvm_mmu_page structs), becomes imbalanced; with too many collisions in buckets 0 and 512. This has been seen to cause mmu_lock to be held for multiple milliseconds in kvm_mmu_get_page on VMs with a large amount of RAM mapped with 4K pages. The current hash function uses the lower 10 bits of gfn to index into mmu_page_hash. When doing shadow paging, gfn is the address of the guest page table being shadow. These tables are 4K-aligned, which makes the low bits of gfn a good hash. However, with two-dimensional paging, no guest page tables are being shadowed, so gfn is the base address that is mapped by the table. Thus page tables (level=1) have a 2MB aligned gfn, page directories (level=2) have a 1GB aligned gfn, etc. This means hashes will only differ in their 10th bit. hash_64() provides a better hash. For example, on a VM with ~200G (99458 direct=1 kvm_mmu_page structs): hash max_mmu_page_hash_collisions -------------------------------------------- low 10 bits 49847 hash_64 105 perfect 97 While we're changing the hash, increase the table size by 4x to better support large VMs (further reduces number of collisions in 200G VM to 29). Note that hash_64() does not provide a good distribution prior to commit ef703f49a6c5 ("Eliminate bad hash multipliers from hash_32() and hash_64()"). Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Change-Id: I5aa6b13c834722813c6cca46b8b1ed6f53368ade Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-12-20 05:58:25 +08:00
#define KVM_MMU_HASH_SHIFT 12
#define KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES (1 << KVM_MMU_HASH_SHIFT)
#define KVM_MIN_FREE_MMU_PAGES 5
#define KVM_REFILL_PAGES 25
#define KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES 80
#define KVM_NR_FIXED_MTRR_REGION 88
#define KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR 8
#define ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU 64
enum kvm_reg {
VCPU_REGS_RAX = __VCPU_REGS_RAX,
VCPU_REGS_RCX = __VCPU_REGS_RCX,
VCPU_REGS_RDX = __VCPU_REGS_RDX,
VCPU_REGS_RBX = __VCPU_REGS_RBX,
VCPU_REGS_RSP = __VCPU_REGS_RSP,
VCPU_REGS_RBP = __VCPU_REGS_RBP,
VCPU_REGS_RSI = __VCPU_REGS_RSI,
VCPU_REGS_RDI = __VCPU_REGS_RDI,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
VCPU_REGS_R8 = __VCPU_REGS_R8,
VCPU_REGS_R9 = __VCPU_REGS_R9,
VCPU_REGS_R10 = __VCPU_REGS_R10,
VCPU_REGS_R11 = __VCPU_REGS_R11,
VCPU_REGS_R12 = __VCPU_REGS_R12,
VCPU_REGS_R13 = __VCPU_REGS_R13,
VCPU_REGS_R14 = __VCPU_REGS_R14,
VCPU_REGS_R15 = __VCPU_REGS_R15,
#endif
VCPU_REGS_RIP,
NR_VCPU_REGS,
VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR = NR_VCPU_REGS,
VCPU_EXREG_CR0,
VCPU_EXREG_CR3,
VCPU_EXREG_CR4,
VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS,
VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS,
VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_1,
VCPU_EXREG_EXIT_INFO_2,
};
enum {
VCPU_SREG_ES,
VCPU_SREG_CS,
VCPU_SREG_SS,
VCPU_SREG_DS,
VCPU_SREG_FS,
VCPU_SREG_GS,
VCPU_SREG_TR,
VCPU_SREG_LDTR,
};
KVM: VMX: FIXED+PHYSICAL mode single target IPI fastpath ICR and TSCDEADLINE MSRs write cause the main MSRs write vmexits in our product observation, multicast IPIs are not as common as unicast IPI like RESCHEDULE_VECTOR and CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR etc. This patch introduce a mechanism to handle certain performance-critical WRMSRs in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler. This mechanism is specifically used for accelerating writes to x2APIC ICR that attempt to send a virtual IPI with physical destination-mode, fixed delivery-mode and single target. Which was found as one of the main causes of VMExits for Linux workloads. The reason this mechanism significantly reduce the latency of such virtual IPIs is by sending the physical IPI to the target vCPU in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler, before host interrupts are enabled and before expensive operations such as reacquiring KVM’s SRCU lock. Latency is reduced even more when KVM is able to use APICv posted-interrupt mechanism (which allows to deliver the virtual IPI directly to target vCPU without the need to kick it to host). Testing on Xeon Skylake server: The virtual IPI latency from sender send to receiver receive reduces more than 200+ cpu cycles. Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 11:17:11 +08:00
enum exit_fastpath_completion {
EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE,
EXIT_FASTPATH_REENTER_GUEST,
EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_HANDLED,
KVM: VMX: FIXED+PHYSICAL mode single target IPI fastpath ICR and TSCDEADLINE MSRs write cause the main MSRs write vmexits in our product observation, multicast IPIs are not as common as unicast IPI like RESCHEDULE_VECTOR and CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR etc. This patch introduce a mechanism to handle certain performance-critical WRMSRs in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler. This mechanism is specifically used for accelerating writes to x2APIC ICR that attempt to send a virtual IPI with physical destination-mode, fixed delivery-mode and single target. Which was found as one of the main causes of VMExits for Linux workloads. The reason this mechanism significantly reduce the latency of such virtual IPIs is by sending the physical IPI to the target vCPU in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler, before host interrupts are enabled and before expensive operations such as reacquiring KVM’s SRCU lock. Latency is reduced even more when KVM is able to use APICv posted-interrupt mechanism (which allows to deliver the virtual IPI directly to target vCPU without the need to kick it to host). Testing on Xeon Skylake server: The virtual IPI latency from sender send to receiver receive reduces more than 200+ cpu cycles. Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 11:17:11 +08:00
};
typedef enum exit_fastpath_completion fastpath_t;
KVM: VMX: FIXED+PHYSICAL mode single target IPI fastpath ICR and TSCDEADLINE MSRs write cause the main MSRs write vmexits in our product observation, multicast IPIs are not as common as unicast IPI like RESCHEDULE_VECTOR and CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR etc. This patch introduce a mechanism to handle certain performance-critical WRMSRs in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler. This mechanism is specifically used for accelerating writes to x2APIC ICR that attempt to send a virtual IPI with physical destination-mode, fixed delivery-mode and single target. Which was found as one of the main causes of VMExits for Linux workloads. The reason this mechanism significantly reduce the latency of such virtual IPIs is by sending the physical IPI to the target vCPU in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler, before host interrupts are enabled and before expensive operations such as reacquiring KVM’s SRCU lock. Latency is reduced even more when KVM is able to use APICv posted-interrupt mechanism (which allows to deliver the virtual IPI directly to target vCPU without the need to kick it to host). Testing on Xeon Skylake server: The virtual IPI latency from sender send to receiver receive reduces more than 200+ cpu cycles. Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 11:17:11 +08:00
struct x86_emulate_ctxt;
struct x86_exception;
enum x86_intercept;
enum x86_intercept_stage;
#define KVM_NR_MEM_OBJS 40
#define KVM_NR_DB_REGS 4
#define DR6_BD (1 << 13)
#define DR6_BS (1 << 14)
#define DR6_BT (1 << 15)
#define DR6_RTM (1 << 16)
#define DR6_FIXED_1 0xfffe0ff0
#define DR6_INIT 0xffff0ff0
#define DR6_VOLATILE 0x0001e00f
#define DR7_BP_EN_MASK 0x000000ff
#define DR7_GE (1 << 9)
#define DR7_GD (1 << 13)
#define DR7_FIXED_1 0x00000400
#define DR7_VOLATILE 0xffff2bff
#define PFERR_PRESENT_BIT 0
#define PFERR_WRITE_BIT 1
#define PFERR_USER_BIT 2
#define PFERR_RSVD_BIT 3
#define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4
#define PFERR_PK_BIT 5
kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes AMD hardware adds two additional bits to aid in nested page fault handling. Bit 32 - NPF occurred while translating the guest's final physical address Bit 33 - NPF occurred while translating the guest page tables The guest page tables fault indicator can be used as an aid for nested virtualization. Using V0 for the host, V1 for the first level guest and V2 for the second level guest, when both V1 and V2 are using nested paging there are currently a number of unnecessary instruction emulations. When V2 is launched shadow paging is used in V1 for the nested tables of V2. As a result, KVM marks these pages as RO in the host nested page tables. When V2 exits and we resume V1, these pages are still marked RO. Every nested walk for a guest page table is treated as a user-level write access and this causes a lot of NPFs because the V1 page tables are marked RO in the V0 nested tables. While executing V1, when these NPFs occur KVM sees a write to a read-only page, emulates the V1 instruction and unprotects the page (marking it RW). This patch looks for cases where we get a NPF due to a guest page table walk where the page was marked RO. It immediately unprotects the page and resumes the guest, leading to far fewer instruction emulations when nested virtualization is used. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2016-11-24 01:01:38 +08:00
#define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT 32
#define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT 33
#define PFERR_PRESENT_MASK (1U << PFERR_PRESENT_BIT)
#define PFERR_WRITE_MASK (1U << PFERR_WRITE_BIT)
#define PFERR_USER_MASK (1U << PFERR_USER_BIT)
#define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << PFERR_RSVD_BIT)
#define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << PFERR_FETCH_BIT)
#define PFERR_PK_MASK (1U << PFERR_PK_BIT)
kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes AMD hardware adds two additional bits to aid in nested page fault handling. Bit 32 - NPF occurred while translating the guest's final physical address Bit 33 - NPF occurred while translating the guest page tables The guest page tables fault indicator can be used as an aid for nested virtualization. Using V0 for the host, V1 for the first level guest and V2 for the second level guest, when both V1 and V2 are using nested paging there are currently a number of unnecessary instruction emulations. When V2 is launched shadow paging is used in V1 for the nested tables of V2. As a result, KVM marks these pages as RO in the host nested page tables. When V2 exits and we resume V1, these pages are still marked RO. Every nested walk for a guest page table is treated as a user-level write access and this causes a lot of NPFs because the V1 page tables are marked RO in the V0 nested tables. While executing V1, when these NPFs occur KVM sees a write to a read-only page, emulates the V1 instruction and unprotects the page (marking it RW). This patch looks for cases where we get a NPF due to a guest page table walk where the page was marked RO. It immediately unprotects the page and resumes the guest, leading to far fewer instruction emulations when nested virtualization is used. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2016-11-24 01:01:38 +08:00
#define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT)
#define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT)
#define PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK | \
PFERR_WRITE_MASK | \
PFERR_PRESENT_MASK)
/* apic attention bits */
#define KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC 0
/*
* The following bit is set with PV-EOI, unset on EOI.
* We detect PV-EOI changes by guest by comparing
* this bit with PV-EOI in guest memory.
* See the implementation in apic_update_pv_eoi.
*/
#define KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING 1
struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry;
/*
* We don't want allocation failures within the mmu code, so we preallocate
* enough memory for a single page fault in a cache.
*/
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache {
int nobjs;
void *objects[KVM_NR_MEM_OBJS];
};
/*
* the pages used as guest page table on soft mmu are tracked by
* kvm_memory_slot.arch.gfn_track which is 16 bits, so the role bits used
* by indirect shadow page can not be more than 15 bits.
*
KVM: x86: fix handling of role.cr4_pae and rename it to 'gpte_size' The cr4_pae flag is a bit of a misnomer, its purpose is really to track whether the guest PTE that is being shadowed is a 4-byte entry or an 8-byte entry. Prior to supporting nested EPT, the size of the gpte was reflected purely by CR4.PAE. KVM fudged things a bit for direct sptes, but it was mostly harmless since the size of the gpte never mattered. Now that a spte may be tracking an indirect EPT entry, relying on CR4.PAE is wrong and ill-named. For direct shadow pages, force the gpte_size to '1' as they are always 8-byte entries; EPT entries can only be 8-bytes and KVM always uses 8-byte entries for NPT and its identity map (when running with EPT but not unrestricted guest). Likewise, nested EPT entries are always 8-bytes. Nested EPT presents a unique scenario as the size of the entries are not dictated by CR4.PAE, but neither is the shadow page a direct map. To handle this scenario, set cr0_wp=1 and smap_andnot_wp=1, an otherwise impossible combination, to denote a nested EPT shadow page. Use the information to avoid incorrectly zapping an unsync'd indirect page in __kvm_sync_page(). Providing a consistent and accurate gpte_size fixes a bug reported by Vitaly where fast_cr3_switch() always fails when switching from L2 to L1 as kvm_mmu_get_page() would force role.cr4_pae=0 for direct pages, whereas kvm_calc_mmu_role_common() would set it according to CR4.PAE. Fixes: 7dcd575520082 ("x86/kvm/mmu: check if tdp/shadow MMU reconfiguration is needed") Reported-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-03-08 07:27:44 +08:00
* Currently, we used 14 bits that are @level, @gpte_is_8_bytes, @quadrant, @access,
* @nxe, @cr0_wp, @smep_andnot_wp and @smap_andnot_wp.
*/
union kvm_mmu_page_role {
u32 word;
struct {
unsigned level:4;
KVM: x86: fix handling of role.cr4_pae and rename it to 'gpte_size' The cr4_pae flag is a bit of a misnomer, its purpose is really to track whether the guest PTE that is being shadowed is a 4-byte entry or an 8-byte entry. Prior to supporting nested EPT, the size of the gpte was reflected purely by CR4.PAE. KVM fudged things a bit for direct sptes, but it was mostly harmless since the size of the gpte never mattered. Now that a spte may be tracking an indirect EPT entry, relying on CR4.PAE is wrong and ill-named. For direct shadow pages, force the gpte_size to '1' as they are always 8-byte entries; EPT entries can only be 8-bytes and KVM always uses 8-byte entries for NPT and its identity map (when running with EPT but not unrestricted guest). Likewise, nested EPT entries are always 8-bytes. Nested EPT presents a unique scenario as the size of the entries are not dictated by CR4.PAE, but neither is the shadow page a direct map. To handle this scenario, set cr0_wp=1 and smap_andnot_wp=1, an otherwise impossible combination, to denote a nested EPT shadow page. Use the information to avoid incorrectly zapping an unsync'd indirect page in __kvm_sync_page(). Providing a consistent and accurate gpte_size fixes a bug reported by Vitaly where fast_cr3_switch() always fails when switching from L2 to L1 as kvm_mmu_get_page() would force role.cr4_pae=0 for direct pages, whereas kvm_calc_mmu_role_common() would set it according to CR4.PAE. Fixes: 7dcd575520082 ("x86/kvm/mmu: check if tdp/shadow MMU reconfiguration is needed") Reported-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-03-08 07:27:44 +08:00
unsigned gpte_is_8_bytes:1;
unsigned quadrant:2;
unsigned direct:1;
unsigned access:3;
unsigned invalid:1;
unsigned nxe:1;
unsigned cr0_wp:1;
unsigned smep_andnot_wp:1;
unsigned smap_andnot_wp:1;
unsigned ad_disabled:1;
unsigned guest_mode:1;
unsigned :6;
/*
* This is left at the top of the word so that
* kvm_memslots_for_spte_role can extract it with a
* simple shift. While there is room, give it a whole
* byte so it is also faster to load it from memory.
*/
unsigned smm:8;
};
};
union kvm_mmu_extended_role {
/*
* This structure complements kvm_mmu_page_role caching everything needed for
* MMU configuration. If nothing in both these structures changed, MMU
* re-configuration can be skipped. @valid bit is set on first usage so we don't
* treat all-zero structure as valid data.
*/
u32 word;
struct {
unsigned int valid:1;
unsigned int execonly:1;
unsigned int cr0_pg:1;
unsigned int cr4_pae:1;
unsigned int cr4_pse:1;
unsigned int cr4_pke:1;
unsigned int cr4_smap:1;
unsigned int cr4_smep:1;
unsigned int maxphyaddr:6;
};
};
union kvm_mmu_role {
u64 as_u64;
struct {
union kvm_mmu_page_role base;
union kvm_mmu_extended_role ext;
};
};
struct kvm_rmap_head {
unsigned long val;
};
struct kvm_mmu_page {
struct list_head link;
struct hlist_node hash_link;
struct list_head lpage_disallowed_link;
bool unsync;
u8 mmu_valid_gen;
bool mmio_cached;
bool lpage_disallowed; /* Can't be replaced by an equiv large page */
/*
* The following two entries are used to key the shadow page in the
* hash table.
*/
union kvm_mmu_page_role role;
gfn_t gfn;
u64 *spt;
/* hold the gfn of each spte inside spt */
gfn_t *gfns;
int root_count; /* Currently serving as active root */
unsigned int unsync_children;
struct kvm_rmap_head parent_ptes; /* rmap pointers to parent sptes */
DECLARE_BITMAP(unsync_child_bitmap, 512);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Used out of the mmu-lock to avoid reading spte values while an
* update is in progress; see the comments in __get_spte_lockless().
*/
int clear_spte_count;
#endif
/* Number of writes since the last time traversal visited this page. */
atomic_t write_flooding_count;
};
struct kvm_pio_request {
KVM: x86: update %rip after emulating IO Most (all?) x86 platforms provide a port IO based reset mechanism, e.g. OUT 92h or CF9h. Userspace may emulate said mechanism, i.e. reset a vCPU in response to KVM_EXIT_IO, without explicitly announcing to KVM that it is doing a reset, e.g. Qemu jams vCPU state and resumes running. To avoid corruping %rip after such a reset, commit 0967b7bf1c22 ("KVM: Skip pio instruction when it is emulated, not executed") changed the behavior of PIO handlers, i.e. today's "fast" PIO handling to skip the instruction prior to exiting to userspace. Full emulation doesn't need such tricks becase re-emulating the instruction will naturally handle %rip being changed to point at the reset vector. Updating %rip prior to executing to userspace has several drawbacks: - Userspace sees the wrong %rip on the exit, e.g. if PIO emulation fails it will likely yell about the wrong address. - Single step exits to userspace for are effectively dropped as KVM_EXIT_DEBUG is overwritten with KVM_EXIT_IO. - Behavior of PIO emulation is different depending on whether it goes down the fast path or the slow path. Rather than skip the PIO instruction before exiting to userspace, snapshot the linear %rip and cancel PIO completion if the current value does not match the snapshot. For a 64-bit vCPU, i.e. the most common scenario, the snapshot and comparison has negligible overhead as VMCS.GUEST_RIP will be cached regardless, i.e. there is no extra VMREAD in this case. All other alternatives to snapshotting the linear %rip that don't rely on an explicit reset announcenment suffer from one corner case or another. For example, canceling PIO completion on any write to %rip fails if userspace does a save/restore of %rip, and attempting to avoid that issue by canceling PIO only if %rip changed then fails if PIO collides with the reset %rip. Attempting to zero in on the exact reset vector won't work for APs, which means adding more hooks such as the vCPU's MP_STATE, and so on and so forth. Checking for a linear %rip match technically suffers from corner cases, e.g. userspace could theoretically rewrite the underlying code page and expect a different instruction to execute, or the guest hardcodes a PIO reset at 0xfffffff0, but those are far, far outside of what can be considered normal operation. Fixes: 432baf60eee3 ("KVM: VMX: use kvm_fast_pio_in for handling IN I/O") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-03-12 11:01:05 +08:00
unsigned long linear_rip;
unsigned long count;
int in;
int port;
int size;
};
#define PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL 5
struct rsvd_bits_validate {
u64 rsvd_bits_mask[2][PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL];
u64 bad_mt_xwr;
};
struct kvm_mmu_root_info {
gpa_t pgd;
hpa_t hpa;
};
#define KVM_MMU_ROOT_INFO_INVALID \
((struct kvm_mmu_root_info) { .pgd = INVALID_PAGE, .hpa = INVALID_PAGE })
#define KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS 3
/*
* x86 supports 4 paging modes (5-level 64-bit, 4-level 64-bit, 3-level 32-bit,
* and 2-level 32-bit). The kvm_mmu structure abstracts the details of the
* current mmu mode.
*/
struct kvm_mmu {
unsigned long (*get_guest_pgd)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
u64 (*get_pdptr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index);
KVM: x86: Use gpa_t for cr2/gpa to fix TDP support on 32-bit KVM Convert a plethora of parameters and variables in the MMU and page fault flows from type gva_t to gpa_t to properly handle TDP on 32-bit KVM. Thanks to PSE and PAE paging, 32-bit kernels can access 64-bit physical addresses. When TDP is enabled, the fault address is a guest physical address and thus can be a 64-bit value, even when both KVM and its guest are using 32-bit virtual addressing, e.g. VMX's VMCS.GUEST_PHYSICAL is a 64-bit field, not a natural width field. Using a gva_t for the fault address means KVM will incorrectly drop the upper 32-bits of the GPA. Ditto for gva_to_gpa() when it is used to translate L2 GPAs to L1 GPAs. Opportunistically rename variables and parameters to better reflect the dual address modes, e.g. use "cr2_or_gpa" for fault addresses and plain "addr" instead of "vaddr" when the address may be either a GVA or an L2 GPA. Similarly, use "gpa" in the nonpaging_page_fault() flows to avoid a confusing "gpa_t gva" declaration; this also sets the stage for a future patch to combing nonpaging_page_fault() and tdp_page_fault() with minimal churn. Sprinkle in a few comments to document flows where an address is known to be a GVA and thus can be safely truncated to a 32-bit value. Add WARNs in kvm_handle_page_fault() and FNAME(gva_to_gpa_nested)() to help document such cases and detect bugs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-12-07 07:57:14 +08:00
int (*page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u32 err,
bool prefault);
void (*inject_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_exception *fault);
KVM: x86: Use gpa_t for cr2/gpa to fix TDP support on 32-bit KVM Convert a plethora of parameters and variables in the MMU and page fault flows from type gva_t to gpa_t to properly handle TDP on 32-bit KVM. Thanks to PSE and PAE paging, 32-bit kernels can access 64-bit physical addresses. When TDP is enabled, the fault address is a guest physical address and thus can be a 64-bit value, even when both KVM and its guest are using 32-bit virtual addressing, e.g. VMX's VMCS.GUEST_PHYSICAL is a 64-bit field, not a natural width field. Using a gva_t for the fault address means KVM will incorrectly drop the upper 32-bits of the GPA. Ditto for gva_to_gpa() when it is used to translate L2 GPAs to L1 GPAs. Opportunistically rename variables and parameters to better reflect the dual address modes, e.g. use "cr2_or_gpa" for fault addresses and plain "addr" instead of "vaddr" when the address may be either a GVA or an L2 GPA. Similarly, use "gpa" in the nonpaging_page_fault() flows to avoid a confusing "gpa_t gva" declaration; this also sets the stage for a future patch to combing nonpaging_page_fault() and tdp_page_fault() with minimal churn. Sprinkle in a few comments to document flows where an address is known to be a GVA and thus can be safely truncated to a 32-bit value. Add WARNs in kvm_handle_page_fault() and FNAME(gva_to_gpa_nested)() to help document such cases and detect bugs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-12-07 07:57:14 +08:00
gpa_t (*gva_to_gpa)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gva_or_gpa,
u32 access, struct x86_exception *exception);
gpa_t (*translate_gpa)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u32 access,
struct x86_exception *exception);
int (*sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp);
void (*invlpg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, hpa_t root_hpa);
void (*update_pte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
u64 *spte, const void *pte);
hpa_t root_hpa;
gpa_t root_pgd;
union kvm_mmu_role mmu_role;
u8 root_level;
u8 shadow_root_level;
u8 ept_ad;
bool direct_map;
struct kvm_mmu_root_info prev_roots[KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS];
/*
* Bitmap; bit set = permission fault
* Byte index: page fault error code [4:1]
* Bit index: pte permissions in ACC_* format
*/
u8 permissions[16];
/*
* The pkru_mask indicates if protection key checks are needed. It
* consists of 16 domains indexed by page fault error code bits [4:1],
* with PFEC.RSVD replaced by ACC_USER_MASK from the page tables.
* Each domain has 2 bits which are ANDed with AD and WD from PKRU.
*/
u32 pkru_mask;
u64 *pae_root;
u64 *lm_root;
/*
* check zero bits on shadow page table entries, these
* bits include not only hardware reserved bits but also
* the bits spte never used.
*/
struct rsvd_bits_validate shadow_zero_check;
struct rsvd_bits_validate guest_rsvd_check;
/* Can have large pages at levels 2..last_nonleaf_level-1. */
u8 last_nonleaf_level;
bool nx;
u64 pdptrs[4]; /* pae */
};
struct kvm_tlb_range {
u64 start_gfn;
u64 pages;
};
enum pmc_type {
KVM_PMC_GP = 0,
KVM_PMC_FIXED,
};
struct kvm_pmc {
enum pmc_type type;
u8 idx;
u64 counter;
u64 eventsel;
struct perf_event *perf_event;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
KVM: x86/vPMU: Reuse perf_event to avoid unnecessary pmc_reprogram_counter The perf_event_create_kernel_counter() in the pmc_reprogram_counter() is a heavyweight and high-frequency operation, especially when host disables the watchdog (maximum 21000000 ns) which leads to an unacceptable latency of the guest NMI handler. It limits the use of vPMUs in the guest. When a vPMC is fully enabled, the legacy reprogram_*_counter() would stop and release its existing perf_event (if any) every time EVEN in most cases almost the same requested perf_event will be created and configured again. For each vPMC, if the reuqested config ('u64 eventsel' for gp and 'u8 ctrl' for fixed) is the same as its current config AND a new sample period based on pmc->counter is accepted by host perf interface, the current event could be reused safely as a new created one does. Otherwise, do release the undesirable perf_event and reprogram a new one as usual. It's light-weight to call pmc_pause_counter (disable, read and reset event) and pmc_resume_counter (recalibrate period and re-enable event) as guest expects instead of release-and-create again on any condition. Compared to use the filterable event->attr or hw.config, a new 'u64 current_config' field is added to save the last original programed config for each vPMC. Based on this implementation, the number of calls to pmc_reprogram_counter is reduced by ~82.5% for a gp sampling event and ~99.9% for a fixed event. In the usage of multiplexing perf sampling mode, the average latency of the guest NMI handler is reduced from 104923 ns to 48393 ns (~2.16x speed up). If host disables watchdog, the minimum latecy of guest NMI handler could be speed up at ~3413x (from 20407603 to 5979 ns) and at ~786x in the average. Suggested-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-10-27 18:52:42 +08:00
/*
* eventsel value for general purpose counters,
* ctrl value for fixed counters.
*/
u64 current_config;
};
struct kvm_pmu {
unsigned nr_arch_gp_counters;
unsigned nr_arch_fixed_counters;
unsigned available_event_types;
u64 fixed_ctr_ctrl;
u64 global_ctrl;
u64 global_status;
u64 global_ovf_ctrl;
u64 counter_bitmask[2];
u64 global_ctrl_mask;
u64 global_ovf_ctrl_mask;
u64 reserved_bits;
u8 version;
struct kvm_pmc gp_counters[INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC];
struct kvm_pmc fixed_counters[INTEL_PMC_MAX_FIXED];
struct irq_work irq_work;
DECLARE_BITMAP(reprogram_pmi, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX);
DECLARE_BITMAP(all_valid_pmc_idx, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX);
DECLARE_BITMAP(pmc_in_use, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX);
/*
* The gate to release perf_events not marked in
* pmc_in_use only once in a vcpu time slice.
*/
bool need_cleanup;
/*
* The total number of programmed perf_events and it helps to avoid
* redundant check before cleanup if guest don't use vPMU at all.
*/
u8 event_count;
};
struct kvm_pmu_ops;
enum {
KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED = 1,
KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT = 2,
KVM_DEBUGREG_RELOAD = 4,
};
struct kvm_mtrr_range {
u64 base;
u64 mask;
struct list_head node;
};
struct kvm_mtrr {
struct kvm_mtrr_range var_ranges[KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR];
mtrr_type fixed_ranges[KVM_NR_FIXED_MTRR_REGION];
u64 deftype;
struct list_head head;
};
/* Hyper-V SynIC timer */
struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer {
struct hrtimer timer;
int index;
union hv_stimer_config config;
u64 count;
u64 exp_time;
struct hv_message msg;
bool msg_pending;
};
kvm/x86: Hyper-V synthetic interrupt controller SynIC (synthetic interrupt controller) is a lapic extension, which is controlled via MSRs and maintains for each vCPU - 16 synthetic interrupt "lines" (SINT's); each can be configured to trigger a specific interrupt vector optionally with auto-EOI semantics - a message page in the guest memory with 16 256-byte per-SINT message slots - an event flag page in the guest memory with 16 2048-bit per-SINT event flag areas The host triggers a SINT whenever it delivers a new message to the corresponding slot or flips an event flag bit in the corresponding area. The guest informs the host that it can try delivering a message by explicitly asserting EOI in lapic or writing to End-Of-Message (EOM) MSR. The userspace (qemu) triggers interrupts and receives EOM notifications via irqfd with resampler; for that, a GSI is allocated for each configured SINT, and irq_routing api is extended to support GSI-SINT mapping. Changes v4: * added activation of SynIC by vcpu KVM_ENABLE_CAP * added per SynIC active flag * added deactivation of APICv upon SynIC activation Changes v3: * added KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC and KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT notes into docs Changes v2: * do not use posted interrupts for Hyper-V SynIC AutoEOI vectors * add Hyper-V SynIC vectors into EOI exit bitmap * Hyper-V SyniIC SINT msr write logic simplified Signed-off-by: Andrey Smetanin <asmetanin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> CC: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> CC: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> CC: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> CC: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2015-11-10 20:36:34 +08:00
/* Hyper-V synthetic interrupt controller (SynIC)*/
struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic {
u64 version;
u64 control;
u64 msg_page;
u64 evt_page;
atomic64_t sint[HV_SYNIC_SINT_COUNT];
atomic_t sint_to_gsi[HV_SYNIC_SINT_COUNT];
DECLARE_BITMAP(auto_eoi_bitmap, 256);
DECLARE_BITMAP(vec_bitmap, 256);
bool active;
bool dont_zero_synic_pages;
kvm/x86: Hyper-V synthetic interrupt controller SynIC (synthetic interrupt controller) is a lapic extension, which is controlled via MSRs and maintains for each vCPU - 16 synthetic interrupt "lines" (SINT's); each can be configured to trigger a specific interrupt vector optionally with auto-EOI semantics - a message page in the guest memory with 16 256-byte per-SINT message slots - an event flag page in the guest memory with 16 2048-bit per-SINT event flag areas The host triggers a SINT whenever it delivers a new message to the corresponding slot or flips an event flag bit in the corresponding area. The guest informs the host that it can try delivering a message by explicitly asserting EOI in lapic or writing to End-Of-Message (EOM) MSR. The userspace (qemu) triggers interrupts and receives EOM notifications via irqfd with resampler; for that, a GSI is allocated for each configured SINT, and irq_routing api is extended to support GSI-SINT mapping. Changes v4: * added activation of SynIC by vcpu KVM_ENABLE_CAP * added per SynIC active flag * added deactivation of APICv upon SynIC activation Changes v3: * added KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC and KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT notes into docs Changes v2: * do not use posted interrupts for Hyper-V SynIC AutoEOI vectors * add Hyper-V SynIC vectors into EOI exit bitmap * Hyper-V SyniIC SINT msr write logic simplified Signed-off-by: Andrey Smetanin <asmetanin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> CC: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> CC: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> CC: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> CC: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2015-11-10 20:36:34 +08:00
};
/* Hyper-V per vcpu emulation context */
struct kvm_vcpu_hv {
u32 vp_index;
u64 hv_vapic;
s64 runtime_offset;
kvm/x86: Hyper-V synthetic interrupt controller SynIC (synthetic interrupt controller) is a lapic extension, which is controlled via MSRs and maintains for each vCPU - 16 synthetic interrupt "lines" (SINT's); each can be configured to trigger a specific interrupt vector optionally with auto-EOI semantics - a message page in the guest memory with 16 256-byte per-SINT message slots - an event flag page in the guest memory with 16 2048-bit per-SINT event flag areas The host triggers a SINT whenever it delivers a new message to the corresponding slot or flips an event flag bit in the corresponding area. The guest informs the host that it can try delivering a message by explicitly asserting EOI in lapic or writing to End-Of-Message (EOM) MSR. The userspace (qemu) triggers interrupts and receives EOM notifications via irqfd with resampler; for that, a GSI is allocated for each configured SINT, and irq_routing api is extended to support GSI-SINT mapping. Changes v4: * added activation of SynIC by vcpu KVM_ENABLE_CAP * added per SynIC active flag * added deactivation of APICv upon SynIC activation Changes v3: * added KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC and KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_HV_SINT notes into docs Changes v2: * do not use posted interrupts for Hyper-V SynIC AutoEOI vectors * add Hyper-V SynIC vectors into EOI exit bitmap * Hyper-V SyniIC SINT msr write logic simplified Signed-off-by: Andrey Smetanin <asmetanin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> CC: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> CC: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> CC: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> CC: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2015-11-10 20:36:34 +08:00
struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic synic;
struct kvm_hyperv_exit exit;
struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer stimer[HV_SYNIC_STIMER_COUNT];
DECLARE_BITMAP(stimer_pending_bitmap, HV_SYNIC_STIMER_COUNT);
cpumask_t tlb_flush;
};
struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
/*
* rip and regs accesses must go through
* kvm_{register,rip}_{read,write} functions.
*/
unsigned long regs[NR_VCPU_REGS];
u32 regs_avail;
u32 regs_dirty;
unsigned long cr0;
unsigned long cr0_guest_owned_bits;
unsigned long cr2;
unsigned long cr3;
unsigned long cr4;
unsigned long cr4_guest_owned_bits;
unsigned long cr8;
u32 host_pkru;
u32 pkru;
u32 hflags;
u64 efer;
u64 apic_base;
struct kvm_lapic *apic; /* kernel irqchip context */
bool apicv_active;
KVM: nVMX: Do not load EOI-exitmap while running L2 When L1 IOAPIC redirection-table is written, a request of KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC is set on all vCPUs. This is done such that all vCPUs will now recalc their IOAPIC handled vectors and load it to their EOI-exitmap. However, it could be that one of the vCPUs is currently running L2. In this case, load_eoi_exitmap() will be called which would write to vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap, which is wrong because vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap should always be equal to vmcs12->eoi_exit_bitmap. Furthermore, at this point KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC was already consumed and therefore we will never update vmcs01->eoi_exit_bitmap. This could lead to remote_irr of some IOAPIC level-triggered entry to remain set forever. Fix this issue by delaying the load of EOI-exitmap to when vCPU is running L1. One may wonder why not just delay entire KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC processing to when vCPU is running L1. This is done in order to handle correctly the case where LAPIC & IO-APIC of L1 is pass-throughed into L2. In this case, vmcs12->virtual_interrupt_delivery should be 0. In current nVMX implementation, that results in vmcs02->virtual_interrupt_delivery to also be 0. Thus, vmcs02->eoi_exit_bitmap is not used. Therefore, every L2 EOI cause a #VMExit into L0 (either on MSR_WRITE to x2APIC MSR or APIC_ACCESS/APIC_WRITE/EPT_MISCONFIG to APIC MMIO page). In order for such L2 EOI to be broadcasted, if needed, from LAPIC to IO-APIC, vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors must be updated while L2 is running. Therefore, patch makes sure to delay only the loading of EOI-exitmap but not the update of vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors. Reviewed-by: Arbel Moshe <arbel.moshe@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-21 08:50:31 +08:00
bool load_eoi_exitmap_pending;
DECLARE_BITMAP(ioapic_handled_vectors, 256);
unsigned long apic_attention;
int32_t apic_arb_prio;
int mp_state;
u64 ia32_misc_enable_msr;
u64 smbase;
u64 smi_count;
bool tpr_access_reporting;
bool xsaves_enabled;
u64 ia32_xss;
u64 microcode_version;
u64 arch_capabilities;
u64 perf_capabilities;
/*
* Paging state of the vcpu
*
* If the vcpu runs in guest mode with two level paging this still saves
* the paging mode of the l1 guest. This context is always used to
* handle faults.
*/
struct kvm_mmu *mmu;
/* Non-nested MMU for L1 */
struct kvm_mmu root_mmu;
/* L1 MMU when running nested */
struct kvm_mmu guest_mmu;
/*
* Paging state of an L2 guest (used for nested npt)
*
* This context will save all necessary information to walk page tables
* of an L2 guest. This context is only initialized for page table
* walking and not for faulting since we never handle l2 page faults on
* the host.
*/
struct kvm_mmu nested_mmu;
/*
* Pointer to the mmu context currently used for
* gva_to_gpa translations.
*/
struct kvm_mmu *walk_mmu;
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_pte_list_desc_cache;
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_page_cache;
struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache mmu_page_header_cache;
x86,kvm: move qemu/guest FPU switching out to vcpu_run Currently, every time a VCPU is scheduled out, the host kernel will first save the guest FPU/xstate context, then load the qemu userspace FPU context, only to then immediately save the qemu userspace FPU context back to memory. When scheduling in a VCPU, the same extraneous FPU loads and saves are done. This could be avoided by moving from a model where the guest FPU is loaded and stored with preemption disabled, to a model where the qemu userspace FPU is swapped out for the guest FPU context for the duration of the KVM_RUN ioctl. This is done under the VCPU mutex, which is also taken when other tasks inspect the VCPU FPU context, so the code should already be safe for this change. That should come as no surprise, given that s390 already has this optimization. This can fix a bug where KVM calls get_user_pages while owning the FPU, and the file system ends up requesting the FPU again: [258270.527947] __warn+0xcb/0xf0 [258270.527948] warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20 [258270.527951] kernel_fpu_disable+0x3f/0x50 [258270.527953] __kernel_fpu_begin+0x49/0x100 [258270.527955] kernel_fpu_begin+0xe/0x10 [258270.527958] crc32c_pcl_intel_update+0x84/0xb0 [258270.527961] crypto_shash_update+0x3f/0x110 [258270.527968] crc32c+0x63/0x8a [libcrc32c] [258270.527975] dm_bm_checksum+0x1b/0x20 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527978] node_prepare_for_write+0x44/0x70 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527985] dm_block_manager_write_callback+0x41/0x50 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527988] submit_io+0x170/0x1b0 [dm_bufio] [258270.527992] __write_dirty_buffer+0x89/0x90 [dm_bufio] [258270.527994] __make_buffer_clean+0x4f/0x80 [dm_bufio] [258270.527996] __try_evict_buffer+0x42/0x60 [dm_bufio] [258270.527998] dm_bufio_shrink_scan+0xc0/0x130 [dm_bufio] [258270.528002] shrink_slab.part.40+0x1f5/0x420 [258270.528004] shrink_node+0x22c/0x320 [258270.528006] do_try_to_free_pages+0xf5/0x330 [258270.528008] try_to_free_pages+0xe9/0x190 [258270.528009] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x40f/0xba0 [258270.528011] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x209/0x260 [258270.528014] alloc_pages_vma+0x1f1/0x250 [258270.528017] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x123/0x660 [258270.528021] handle_mm_fault+0xfd3/0x1330 [258270.528025] __get_user_pages+0x113/0x640 [258270.528027] get_user_pages+0x4f/0x60 [258270.528063] __gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x120/0x3f0 [kvm] [258270.528108] try_async_pf+0x66/0x230 [kvm] [258270.528135] tdp_page_fault+0x130/0x280 [kvm] [258270.528149] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x60/0x120 [kvm] [258270.528158] handle_ept_violation+0x91/0x170 [kvm_intel] [258270.528162] vmx_handle_exit+0x1ca/0x1400 [kvm_intel] No performance changes were detected in quick ping-pong tests on my 4 socket system, which is expected since an FPU+xstate load is on the order of 0.1us, while ping-ponging between CPUs is on the order of 20us, and somewhat noisy. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [Fixed a bug where reset_vcpu called put_fpu without preceding load_fpu, which happened inside from KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl. - Radim] Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-11-15 05:54:23 +08:00
/*
* QEMU userspace and the guest each have their own FPU state.
* In vcpu_run, we switch between the user and guest FPU contexts.
* While running a VCPU, the VCPU thread will have the guest FPU
* context.
x86,kvm: move qemu/guest FPU switching out to vcpu_run Currently, every time a VCPU is scheduled out, the host kernel will first save the guest FPU/xstate context, then load the qemu userspace FPU context, only to then immediately save the qemu userspace FPU context back to memory. When scheduling in a VCPU, the same extraneous FPU loads and saves are done. This could be avoided by moving from a model where the guest FPU is loaded and stored with preemption disabled, to a model where the qemu userspace FPU is swapped out for the guest FPU context for the duration of the KVM_RUN ioctl. This is done under the VCPU mutex, which is also taken when other tasks inspect the VCPU FPU context, so the code should already be safe for this change. That should come as no surprise, given that s390 already has this optimization. This can fix a bug where KVM calls get_user_pages while owning the FPU, and the file system ends up requesting the FPU again: [258270.527947] __warn+0xcb/0xf0 [258270.527948] warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20 [258270.527951] kernel_fpu_disable+0x3f/0x50 [258270.527953] __kernel_fpu_begin+0x49/0x100 [258270.527955] kernel_fpu_begin+0xe/0x10 [258270.527958] crc32c_pcl_intel_update+0x84/0xb0 [258270.527961] crypto_shash_update+0x3f/0x110 [258270.527968] crc32c+0x63/0x8a [libcrc32c] [258270.527975] dm_bm_checksum+0x1b/0x20 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527978] node_prepare_for_write+0x44/0x70 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527985] dm_block_manager_write_callback+0x41/0x50 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527988] submit_io+0x170/0x1b0 [dm_bufio] [258270.527992] __write_dirty_buffer+0x89/0x90 [dm_bufio] [258270.527994] __make_buffer_clean+0x4f/0x80 [dm_bufio] [258270.527996] __try_evict_buffer+0x42/0x60 [dm_bufio] [258270.527998] dm_bufio_shrink_scan+0xc0/0x130 [dm_bufio] [258270.528002] shrink_slab.part.40+0x1f5/0x420 [258270.528004] shrink_node+0x22c/0x320 [258270.528006] do_try_to_free_pages+0xf5/0x330 [258270.528008] try_to_free_pages+0xe9/0x190 [258270.528009] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x40f/0xba0 [258270.528011] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x209/0x260 [258270.528014] alloc_pages_vma+0x1f1/0x250 [258270.528017] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x123/0x660 [258270.528021] handle_mm_fault+0xfd3/0x1330 [258270.528025] __get_user_pages+0x113/0x640 [258270.528027] get_user_pages+0x4f/0x60 [258270.528063] __gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x120/0x3f0 [kvm] [258270.528108] try_async_pf+0x66/0x230 [kvm] [258270.528135] tdp_page_fault+0x130/0x280 [kvm] [258270.528149] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x60/0x120 [kvm] [258270.528158] handle_ept_violation+0x91/0x170 [kvm_intel] [258270.528162] vmx_handle_exit+0x1ca/0x1400 [kvm_intel] No performance changes were detected in quick ping-pong tests on my 4 socket system, which is expected since an FPU+xstate load is on the order of 0.1us, while ping-ponging between CPUs is on the order of 20us, and somewhat noisy. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [Fixed a bug where reset_vcpu called put_fpu without preceding load_fpu, which happened inside from KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl. - Radim] Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-11-15 05:54:23 +08:00
*
* Note that while the PKRU state lives inside the fpu registers,
* it is switched out separately at VMENTER and VMEXIT time. The
* "guest_fpu" state here contains the guest FPU context, with the
* host PRKU bits.
*/
struct fpu *user_fpu;
struct fpu *guest_fpu;
x86,kvm: move qemu/guest FPU switching out to vcpu_run Currently, every time a VCPU is scheduled out, the host kernel will first save the guest FPU/xstate context, then load the qemu userspace FPU context, only to then immediately save the qemu userspace FPU context back to memory. When scheduling in a VCPU, the same extraneous FPU loads and saves are done. This could be avoided by moving from a model where the guest FPU is loaded and stored with preemption disabled, to a model where the qemu userspace FPU is swapped out for the guest FPU context for the duration of the KVM_RUN ioctl. This is done under the VCPU mutex, which is also taken when other tasks inspect the VCPU FPU context, so the code should already be safe for this change. That should come as no surprise, given that s390 already has this optimization. This can fix a bug where KVM calls get_user_pages while owning the FPU, and the file system ends up requesting the FPU again: [258270.527947] __warn+0xcb/0xf0 [258270.527948] warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20 [258270.527951] kernel_fpu_disable+0x3f/0x50 [258270.527953] __kernel_fpu_begin+0x49/0x100 [258270.527955] kernel_fpu_begin+0xe/0x10 [258270.527958] crc32c_pcl_intel_update+0x84/0xb0 [258270.527961] crypto_shash_update+0x3f/0x110 [258270.527968] crc32c+0x63/0x8a [libcrc32c] [258270.527975] dm_bm_checksum+0x1b/0x20 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527978] node_prepare_for_write+0x44/0x70 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527985] dm_block_manager_write_callback+0x41/0x50 [dm_persistent_data] [258270.527988] submit_io+0x170/0x1b0 [dm_bufio] [258270.527992] __write_dirty_buffer+0x89/0x90 [dm_bufio] [258270.527994] __make_buffer_clean+0x4f/0x80 [dm_bufio] [258270.527996] __try_evict_buffer+0x42/0x60 [dm_bufio] [258270.527998] dm_bufio_shrink_scan+0xc0/0x130 [dm_bufio] [258270.528002] shrink_slab.part.40+0x1f5/0x420 [258270.528004] shrink_node+0x22c/0x320 [258270.528006] do_try_to_free_pages+0xf5/0x330 [258270.528008] try_to_free_pages+0xe9/0x190 [258270.528009] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x40f/0xba0 [258270.528011] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x209/0x260 [258270.528014] alloc_pages_vma+0x1f1/0x250 [258270.528017] do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x123/0x660 [258270.528021] handle_mm_fault+0xfd3/0x1330 [258270.528025] __get_user_pages+0x113/0x640 [258270.528027] get_user_pages+0x4f/0x60 [258270.528063] __gfn_to_pfn_memslot+0x120/0x3f0 [kvm] [258270.528108] try_async_pf+0x66/0x230 [kvm] [258270.528135] tdp_page_fault+0x130/0x280 [kvm] [258270.528149] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x60/0x120 [kvm] [258270.528158] handle_ept_violation+0x91/0x170 [kvm_intel] [258270.528162] vmx_handle_exit+0x1ca/0x1400 [kvm_intel] No performance changes were detected in quick ping-pong tests on my 4 socket system, which is expected since an FPU+xstate load is on the order of 0.1us, while ping-ponging between CPUs is on the order of 20us, and somewhat noisy. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [Fixed a bug where reset_vcpu called put_fpu without preceding load_fpu, which happened inside from KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl. - Radim] Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-11-15 05:54:23 +08:00
u64 xcr0;
u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
struct kvm_pio_request pio;
void *pio_data;
u8 event_exit_inst_len;
struct kvm_queued_exception {
bool pending;
bool injected;
bool has_error_code;
u8 nr;
u32 error_code;
unsigned long payload;
bool has_payload;
u8 nested_apf;
} exception;
struct kvm_queued_interrupt {
KVM: x86: Rename interrupt.pending to interrupt.injected For exceptions & NMIs events, KVM code use the following coding convention: *) "pending" represents an event that should be injected to guest at some point but it's side-effects have not yet occurred. *) "injected" represents an event that it's side-effects have already occurred. However, interrupts don't conform to this coding convention. All current code flows mark interrupt.pending when it's side-effects have already taken place (For example, bit moved from LAPIC IRR to ISR). Therefore, it makes sense to just rename interrupt.pending to interrupt.injected. This change follows logic of previous commit 664f8e26b00c ("KVM: X86: Fix loss of exception which has not yet been injected") which changed exception to follow this coding convention as well. It is important to note that in case !lapic_in_kernel(vcpu), interrupt.pending usage was and still incorrect. In this case, interrrupt.pending can only be set using one of the following ioctls: KVM_INTERRUPT, KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS and KVM_SET_SREGS. Looking at how QEMU uses these ioctls, one can see that QEMU uses them either to re-set an "interrupt.pending" state it has received from KVM (via KVM_GET_VCPU_EVENTS interrupt.pending or via KVM_GET_SREGS interrupt_bitmap) or by dispatching a new interrupt from QEMU's emulated LAPIC which reset bit in IRR and set bit in ISR before sending ioctl to KVM. So it seems that indeed "interrupt.pending" in this case is also suppose to represent "interrupt.injected". However, kvm_cpu_has_interrupt() & kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr() is misusing (now named) interrupt.injected in order to return if there is a pending interrupt. This leads to nVMX/nSVM not be able to distinguish if it should exit from L2 to L1 on EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT on pending interrupt or should re-inject an injected interrupt. Therefore, add a FIXME at these functions for handling this issue. This patch introduce no semantics change. Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2018-03-23 08:01:31 +08:00
bool injected;
bool soft;
u8 nr;
} interrupt;
int halt_request; /* real mode on Intel only */
int cpuid_nent;
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 cpuid_entries[KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES];
int maxphyaddr;
int tdp_level;
/* emulate context */
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *emulate_ctxt;
bool emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu;
bool emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu;
int (*complete_userspace_io)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
gpa_t time;
struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info hv_clock;
unsigned int hw_tsc_khz;
struct gfn_to_hva_cache pv_time;
bool pv_time_enabled;
/* set guest stopped flag in pvclock flags field */
bool pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request;
struct {
u8 preempted;
u64 msr_val;
u64 last_steal;
struct gfn_to_pfn_cache cache;
} st;
u64 l1_tsc_offset;
u64 tsc_offset;
u64 last_guest_tsc;
u64 last_host_tsc;
u64 tsc_offset_adjustment;
u64 this_tsc_nsec;
u64 this_tsc_write;
KVM: x86: fix TSC matching I've observed kvmclock being marked as unstable on a modern single-socket system with a stable TSC and qemu-1.6.2 or qemu-2.0.0. The culprit was failure in TSC matching because of overflow of kvm_arch::nr_vcpus_matched_tsc in case there were multiple TSC writes in a single synchronization cycle. Turns out that qemu does multiple TSC writes during init, below is the evidence of that (qemu-2.0.0): The first one: 0xffffffffa08ff2b4 : vmx_write_tsc_offset+0xa4/0xb0 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04c9c05 : kvm_write_tsc+0x1a5/0x360 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04cfd6b : kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate+0x4b/0x80 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04b8188 : kvm_vm_ioctl+0x418/0x750 [kvm] The second one: 0xffffffffa08ff2b4 : vmx_write_tsc_offset+0xa4/0xb0 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04c9c05 : kvm_write_tsc+0x1a5/0x360 [kvm] 0xffffffffa090610d : vmx_set_msr+0x29d/0x350 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04be83b : do_set_msr+0x3b/0x60 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04c10a8 : msr_io+0xc8/0x160 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04caeb6 : kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xc86/0x1060 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04b6797 : kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xc7/0x5a0 [kvm] #0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/kvm-all.c:1780 #1 kvm_put_msrs at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/target-i386/kvm.c:1270 #2 kvm_arch_put_registers at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/target-i386/kvm.c:1909 #3 kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/kvm-all.c:1641 #4 cpu_synchronize_post_init at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/include/sysemu/kvm.h:330 #5 cpu_synchronize_all_post_init () at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/cpus.c:521 #6 main at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/vl.c:4390 The third one: 0xffffffffa08ff2b4 : vmx_write_tsc_offset+0xa4/0xb0 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04c9c05 : kvm_write_tsc+0x1a5/0x360 [kvm] 0xffffffffa090610d : vmx_set_msr+0x29d/0x350 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04be83b : do_set_msr+0x3b/0x60 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04c10a8 : msr_io+0xc8/0x160 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04caeb6 : kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xc86/0x1060 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04b6797 : kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xc7/0x5a0 [kvm] #0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/kvm-all.c:1780 #1 kvm_put_msrs at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/target-i386/kvm.c:1270 #2 kvm_arch_put_registers at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/target-i386/kvm.c:1909 #3 kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_reset at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/kvm-all.c:1635 #4 cpu_synchronize_post_reset at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/include/sysemu/kvm.h:323 #5 cpu_synchronize_all_post_reset () at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/cpus.c:512 #6 main at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/vl.c:4482 The fix is to count each vCPU only once when matched, so that nr_vcpus_matched_tsc holds the size of the matched set. This is achieved by reusing generation counters. Every vCPU with this_tsc_generation == cur_tsc_generation is in the matched set. The match set is cleared by setting cur_tsc_generation to a value which no other vCPU is set to (by incrementing it). I needed to bump up the counter size form u8 to u64 to ensure it never overflows. Otherwise in cases TSC is not written the same number of times on each vCPU the counter could overflow and incorrectly indicate some vCPUs as being in the matched set. This scenario seems unlikely but I'm not sure if it can be disregarded. Signed-off-by: Tomasz Grabiec <tgrabiec@cloudius-systems.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2014-06-24 15:42:43 +08:00
u64 this_tsc_generation;
bool tsc_catchup;
2012-02-04 01:43:50 +08:00
bool tsc_always_catchup;
s8 virtual_tsc_shift;
u32 virtual_tsc_mult;
u32 virtual_tsc_khz;
KVM: x86: Emulate IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR CPUID.7.0.EBX[1]=1 indicates IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR 0x3b is supported Basic design is to emulate the MSR by allowing reads and writes to a guest vcpu specific location to store the value of the emulated MSR while adding the value to the vmcs tsc_offset. In this way the IA32_TSC_ADJUST value will be included in all reads to the TSC MSR whether through rdmsr or rdtsc. This is of course as long as the "use TSC counter offsetting" VM-execution control is enabled as well as the IA32_TSC_ADJUST control. However, because hardware will only return the TSC + IA32_TSC_ADJUST + vmsc tsc_offset for a guest process when it does and rdtsc (with the correct settings) the value of our virtualized IA32_TSC_ADJUST must be stored in one of these three locations. The argument against storing it in the actual MSR is performance. This is likely to be seldom used while the save/restore is required on every transition. IA32_TSC_ADJUST was created as a way to solve some issues with writing TSC itself so that is not an option either. The remaining option, defined above as our solution has the problem of returning incorrect vmcs tsc_offset values (unless we intercept and fix, not done here) as mentioned above. However, more problematic is that storing the data in vmcs tsc_offset will have a different semantic effect on the system than does using the actual MSR. This is illustrated in the following example: The hypervisor set the IA32_TSC_ADJUST, then the guest sets it and a guest process performs a rdtsc. In this case the guest process will get TSC + IA32_TSC_ADJUST_hyperviser + vmsc tsc_offset including IA32_TSC_ADJUST_guest. While the total system semantics changed the semantics as seen by the guest do not and hence this will not cause a problem. Signed-off-by: Will Auld <will.auld@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
2012-11-30 04:42:50 +08:00
s64 ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
u64 msr_ia32_power_ctl;
u64 tsc_scaling_ratio;
atomic_t nmi_queued; /* unprocessed asynchronous NMIs */
unsigned nmi_pending; /* NMI queued after currently running handler */
bool nmi_injected; /* Trying to inject an NMI this entry */
bool smi_pending; /* SMI queued after currently running handler */
struct kvm_mtrr mtrr_state;
u64 pat;
unsigned switch_db_regs;
unsigned long db[KVM_NR_DB_REGS];
unsigned long dr6;
unsigned long dr7;
unsigned long eff_db[KVM_NR_DB_REGS];
unsigned long guest_debug_dr7;
u64 msr_platform_info;
u64 msr_misc_features_enables;
u64 mcg_cap;
u64 mcg_status;
u64 mcg_ctl;
u64 mcg_ext_ctl;
u64 *mce_banks;
/* Cache MMIO info */
u64 mmio_gva;
unsigned mmio_access;
gfn_t mmio_gfn;
u64 mmio_gen;
struct kvm_pmu pmu;
/* used for guest single stepping over the given code position */
unsigned long singlestep_rip;
struct kvm_vcpu_hv hyperv;
cpumask_var_t wbinvd_dirty_mask;
unsigned long last_retry_eip;
unsigned long last_retry_addr;
struct {
bool halted;
gfn_t gfns[ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU];
struct gfn_to_hva_cache data;
u64 msr_en_val; /* MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN */
u64 msr_int_val; /* MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT */
u16 vec;
u32 id;
bool send_user_only;
u32 host_apf_flags;
unsigned long nested_apf_token;
bool delivery_as_pf_vmexit;
bool pageready_pending;
} apf;
/* OSVW MSRs (AMD only) */
struct {
u64 length;
u64 status;
} osvw;
struct {
u64 msr_val;
struct gfn_to_hva_cache data;
} pv_eoi;
u64 msr_kvm_poll_control;
/*
* Indicates the guest is trying to write a gfn that contains one or
* more of the PTEs used to translate the write itself, i.e. the access
* is changing its own translation in the guest page tables. KVM exits
* to userspace if emulation of the faulting instruction fails and this
* flag is set, as KVM cannot make forward progress.
*
* If emulation fails for a write to guest page tables, KVM unprotects
* (zaps) the shadow page for the target gfn and resumes the guest to
* retry the non-emulatable instruction (on hardware). Unprotecting the
* gfn doesn't allow forward progress for a self-changing access because
* doing so also zaps the translation for the gfn, i.e. retrying the
* instruction will hit a !PRESENT fault, which results in a new shadow
* page and sends KVM back to square one.
*/
bool write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable;
/* set at EPT violation at this point */
unsigned long exit_qualification;
/* pv related host specific info */
struct {
bool pv_unhalted;
} pv;
int pending_ioapic_eoi;
int pending_external_vector;
/* be preempted when it's in kernel-mode(cpl=0) */
bool preempted_in_kernel;
/* Flush the L1 Data cache for L1TF mitigation on VMENTER */
bool l1tf_flush_l1d;
/* AMD MSRC001_0015 Hardware Configuration */
u64 msr_hwcr;
};
struct kvm_lpage_info {
int disallow_lpage;
};
struct kvm_arch_memory_slot {
struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap[KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES];
struct kvm_lpage_info *lpage_info[KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1];
unsigned short *gfn_track[KVM_PAGE_TRACK_MAX];
};
/*
* We use as the mode the number of bits allocated in the LDR for the
* logical processor ID. It happens that these are all powers of two.
* This makes it is very easy to detect cases where the APICs are
* configured for multiple modes; in that case, we cannot use the map and
* hence cannot use kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast either.
*/
#define KVM_APIC_MODE_XAPIC_CLUSTER 4
#define KVM_APIC_MODE_XAPIC_FLAT 8
#define KVM_APIC_MODE_X2APIC 16
struct kvm_apic_map {
struct rcu_head rcu;
u8 mode;
u32 max_apic_id;
union {
struct kvm_lapic *xapic_flat_map[8];
struct kvm_lapic *xapic_cluster_map[16][4];
};
struct kvm_lapic *phys_map[];
};
/* Hyper-V synthetic debugger (SynDbg)*/
struct kvm_hv_syndbg {
struct {
u64 control;
u64 status;
u64 send_page;
u64 recv_page;
u64 pending_page;
} control;
u64 options;
};
/* Hyper-V emulation context */
struct kvm_hv {
struct mutex hv_lock;
u64 hv_guest_os_id;
u64 hv_hypercall;
u64 hv_tsc_page;
/* Hyper-v based guest crash (NT kernel bugcheck) parameters */
u64 hv_crash_param[HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_PARAMS];
u64 hv_crash_ctl;
struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page tsc_ref;
struct idr conn_to_evt;
u64 hv_reenlightenment_control;
u64 hv_tsc_emulation_control;
u64 hv_tsc_emulation_status;
/* How many vCPUs have VP index != vCPU index */
atomic_t num_mismatched_vp_indexes;
struct hv_partition_assist_pg *hv_pa_pg;
struct kvm_hv_syndbg hv_syndbg;
};
enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
KVM_IRQCHIP_NONE,
KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL, /* created with KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP */
KVM_IRQCHIP_SPLIT, /* created with KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP */
};
#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_DISABLE 0
#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV 1
#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_NESTED 2
#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN 3
#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_PIT_REINJ 4
#define APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_X2APIC 5
struct kvm_arch {
unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;
unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;
unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;
unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
u8 mmu_valid_gen;
struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES];
/*
* Hash table of struct kvm_mmu_page.
*/
struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
struct list_head zapped_obsolete_pages;
struct list_head lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages;
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node mmu_sp_tracker;
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head track_notifier_head;
struct list_head assigned_dev_head;
struct iommu_domain *iommu_domain;
bool iommu_noncoherent;
#define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_NONCOHERENT_DMA
atomic_t noncoherent_dma_count;
#define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_ASSIGNED_DEVICE
atomic_t assigned_device_count;
struct kvm_pic *vpic;
struct kvm_ioapic *vioapic;
struct kvm_pit *vpit;
atomic_t vapics_in_nmi_mode;
struct mutex apic_map_lock;
struct kvm_apic_map *apic_map;
bool apic_map_dirty;
bool apic_access_page_done;
unsigned long apicv_inhibit_reasons;
gpa_t wall_clock;
bool mwait_in_guest;
bool hlt_in_guest;
bool pause_in_guest;
bool cstate_in_guest;
unsigned long irq_sources_bitmap;
s64 kvmclock_offset;
raw_spinlock_t tsc_write_lock;
u64 last_tsc_nsec;
u64 last_tsc_write;
u32 last_tsc_khz;
u64 cur_tsc_nsec;
u64 cur_tsc_write;
u64 cur_tsc_offset;
KVM: x86: fix TSC matching I've observed kvmclock being marked as unstable on a modern single-socket system with a stable TSC and qemu-1.6.2 or qemu-2.0.0. The culprit was failure in TSC matching because of overflow of kvm_arch::nr_vcpus_matched_tsc in case there were multiple TSC writes in a single synchronization cycle. Turns out that qemu does multiple TSC writes during init, below is the evidence of that (qemu-2.0.0): The first one: 0xffffffffa08ff2b4 : vmx_write_tsc_offset+0xa4/0xb0 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04c9c05 : kvm_write_tsc+0x1a5/0x360 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04cfd6b : kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate+0x4b/0x80 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04b8188 : kvm_vm_ioctl+0x418/0x750 [kvm] The second one: 0xffffffffa08ff2b4 : vmx_write_tsc_offset+0xa4/0xb0 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04c9c05 : kvm_write_tsc+0x1a5/0x360 [kvm] 0xffffffffa090610d : vmx_set_msr+0x29d/0x350 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04be83b : do_set_msr+0x3b/0x60 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04c10a8 : msr_io+0xc8/0x160 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04caeb6 : kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xc86/0x1060 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04b6797 : kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xc7/0x5a0 [kvm] #0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/kvm-all.c:1780 #1 kvm_put_msrs at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/target-i386/kvm.c:1270 #2 kvm_arch_put_registers at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/target-i386/kvm.c:1909 #3 kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/kvm-all.c:1641 #4 cpu_synchronize_post_init at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/include/sysemu/kvm.h:330 #5 cpu_synchronize_all_post_init () at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/cpus.c:521 #6 main at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/vl.c:4390 The third one: 0xffffffffa08ff2b4 : vmx_write_tsc_offset+0xa4/0xb0 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04c9c05 : kvm_write_tsc+0x1a5/0x360 [kvm] 0xffffffffa090610d : vmx_set_msr+0x29d/0x350 [kvm_intel] 0xffffffffa04be83b : do_set_msr+0x3b/0x60 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04c10a8 : msr_io+0xc8/0x160 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04caeb6 : kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xc86/0x1060 [kvm] 0xffffffffa04b6797 : kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xc7/0x5a0 [kvm] #0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/kvm-all.c:1780 #1 kvm_put_msrs at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/target-i386/kvm.c:1270 #2 kvm_arch_put_registers at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/target-i386/kvm.c:1909 #3 kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_reset at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/kvm-all.c:1635 #4 cpu_synchronize_post_reset at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/include/sysemu/kvm.h:323 #5 cpu_synchronize_all_post_reset () at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/cpus.c:512 #6 main at /build/buildd/qemu-2.0.0+dfsg/vl.c:4482 The fix is to count each vCPU only once when matched, so that nr_vcpus_matched_tsc holds the size of the matched set. This is achieved by reusing generation counters. Every vCPU with this_tsc_generation == cur_tsc_generation is in the matched set. The match set is cleared by setting cur_tsc_generation to a value which no other vCPU is set to (by incrementing it). I needed to bump up the counter size form u8 to u64 to ensure it never overflows. Otherwise in cases TSC is not written the same number of times on each vCPU the counter could overflow and incorrectly indicate some vCPUs as being in the matched set. This scenario seems unlikely but I'm not sure if it can be disregarded. Signed-off-by: Tomasz Grabiec <tgrabiec@cloudius-systems.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2014-06-24 15:42:43 +08:00
u64 cur_tsc_generation;
int nr_vcpus_matched_tsc;
spinlock_t pvclock_gtod_sync_lock;
bool use_master_clock;
u64 master_kernel_ns;
u64 master_cycle_now;
struct delayed_work kvmclock_update_work;
struct delayed_work kvmclock_sync_work;
struct kvm_xen_hvm_config xen_hvm_config;
/* reads protected by irq_srcu, writes by irq_lock */
struct hlist_head mask_notifier_list;
struct kvm_hv hyperv;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MMU_AUDIT
int audit_point;
#endif
bool backwards_tsc_observed;
bool boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock;
u32 bsp_vcpu_id;
u64 disabled_quirks;
enum kvm_irqchip_mode irqchip_mode;
u8 nr_reserved_ioapic_pins;
bool disabled_lapic_found;
bool x2apic_format;
bool x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled;
bool guest_can_read_msr_platform_info;
bool exception_payload_enabled;
struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter;
struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
};
struct kvm_vm_stat {
ulong mmu_shadow_zapped;
ulong mmu_pte_write;
ulong mmu_pte_updated;
ulong mmu_pde_zapped;
ulong mmu_flooded;
ulong mmu_recycled;
ulong mmu_cache_miss;
ulong mmu_unsync;
ulong remote_tlb_flush;
ulong lpages;
ulong nx_lpage_splits;
ulong max_mmu_page_hash_collisions;
};
struct kvm_vcpu_stat {
u64 pf_fixed;
u64 pf_guest;
u64 tlb_flush;
u64 invlpg;
u64 exits;
u64 io_exits;
u64 mmio_exits;
u64 signal_exits;
u64 irq_window_exits;
u64 nmi_window_exits;
u64 l1d_flush;
u64 halt_exits;
u64 halt_successful_poll;
u64 halt_attempted_poll;
u64 halt_poll_invalid;
u64 halt_wakeup;
u64 request_irq_exits;
u64 irq_exits;
u64 host_state_reload;
u64 fpu_reload;
u64 insn_emulation;
u64 insn_emulation_fail;
u64 hypercalls;
u64 irq_injections;
u64 nmi_injections;
u64 req_event;
u64 halt_poll_success_ns;
u64 halt_poll_fail_ns;
};
struct x86_instruction_info;
struct msr_data {
bool host_initiated;
u32 index;
u64 data;
};
struct kvm_lapic_irq {
u32 vector;
u16 delivery_mode;
u16 dest_mode;
bool level;
u16 trig_mode;
u32 shorthand;
u32 dest_id;
bool msi_redir_hint;
};
static inline u16 kvm_lapic_irq_dest_mode(bool dest_mode_logical)
{
return dest_mode_logical ? APIC_DEST_LOGICAL : APIC_DEST_PHYSICAL;
}
struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*hardware_enable)(void);
void (*hardware_disable)(void);
void (*hardware_unsetup)(void);
bool (*cpu_has_accelerated_tpr)(void);
bool (*has_emulated_msr)(u32 index);
void (*cpuid_update)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
unsigned int vm_size;
int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
void (*vm_destroy)(struct kvm *kvm);
/* Create, but do not attach this VCPU */
int (*vcpu_create)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*vcpu_free)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*vcpu_reset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
void (*prepare_guest_switch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*vcpu_load)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu);
void (*vcpu_put)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*update_bp_intercept)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*get_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
int (*set_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
u64 (*get_segment_base)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg);
void (*get_segment)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
int (*get_cpl)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_segment)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
void (*get_cs_db_l_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l);
void (*set_cr0)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
int (*set_cr4)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
void (*set_efer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
void (*get_idt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*set_idt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*get_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*set_gdt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void (*sync_dirty_debug_regs)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_dr7)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value);
void (*cache_reg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
unsigned long (*get_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_rflags)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
void (*tlb_flush_all)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*tlb_flush_current)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*tlb_remote_flush)(struct kvm *kvm);
int (*tlb_remote_flush_with_range)(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_tlb_range *range);
/*
* Flush any TLB entries associated with the given GVA.
* Does not need to flush GPA->HPA mappings.
* Can potentially get non-canonical addresses through INVLPGs, which
* the implementation may choose to ignore if appropriate.
*/
void (*tlb_flush_gva)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr);
KVM: x86: Move "flush guest's TLB" logic to separate kvm_x86_ops hook Add a dedicated hook to handle flushing TLB entries on behalf of the guest, i.e. for a paravirtualized TLB flush, and use it directly instead of bouncing through kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb(). For VMX, change the effective implementation implementation to never do INVEPT and flush only the current context, i.e. to always flush via INVVPID(SINGLE_CONTEXT). The INVEPT performed by __vmx_flush_tlb() when @invalidate_gpa=false and enable_vpid=0 is unnecessary, as it will only flush guest-physical mappings; linear and combined mappings are flushed by VM-Enter when VPID is disabled, and changes in the guest pages tables do not affect guest-physical mappings. When EPT and VPID are enabled, doing INVVPID is not required (by Intel's architecture) to invalidate guest-physical mappings, i.e. TLB entries that cache guest-physical mappings can live across INVVPID as the mappings are associated with an EPTP, not a VPID. The intent of @invalidate_gpa is to inform vmx_flush_tlb() that it must "invalidate gpa mappings", i.e. do INVEPT and not simply INVVPID. Other than nested VPID handling, which now calls vpid_sync_context() directly, the only scenario where KVM can safely do INVVPID instead of INVEPT (when EPT is enabled) is if KVM is flushing TLB entries from the guest's perspective, i.e. is only required to invalidate linear mappings. For SVM, flushing TLB entries from the guest's perspective can be done by flushing the current ASID, as changes to the guest's page tables are associated only with the current ASID. Adding a dedicated ->tlb_flush_guest() paves the way toward removing @invalidate_gpa, which is a potentially dangerous control flag as its meaning is not exactly crystal clear, even for those who are familiar with the subtleties of what mappings Intel CPUs are/aren't allowed to keep across various invalidation scenarios. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200320212833.3507-15-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-03-21 05:28:10 +08:00
/*
* Flush any TLB entries created by the guest. Like tlb_flush_gva(),
* does not need to flush GPA->HPA mappings.
*/
void (*tlb_flush_guest)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
enum exit_fastpath_completion (*run)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
KVM: VMX: FIXED+PHYSICAL mode single target IPI fastpath ICR and TSCDEADLINE MSRs write cause the main MSRs write vmexits in our product observation, multicast IPIs are not as common as unicast IPI like RESCHEDULE_VECTOR and CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR etc. This patch introduce a mechanism to handle certain performance-critical WRMSRs in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler. This mechanism is specifically used for accelerating writes to x2APIC ICR that attempt to send a virtual IPI with physical destination-mode, fixed delivery-mode and single target. Which was found as one of the main causes of VMExits for Linux workloads. The reason this mechanism significantly reduce the latency of such virtual IPIs is by sending the physical IPI to the target vCPU in a very early stage of KVM VMExit handler, before host interrupts are enabled and before expensive operations such as reacquiring KVM’s SRCU lock. Latency is reduced even more when KVM is able to use APICv posted-interrupt mechanism (which allows to deliver the virtual IPI directly to target vCPU without the need to kick it to host). Testing on Xeon Skylake server: The virtual IPI latency from sender send to receiver receive reduces more than 200+ cpu cycles. Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 11:17:11 +08:00
int (*handle_exit)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
enum exit_fastpath_completion exit_fastpath);
int (*skip_emulated_instruction)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*update_emulated_instruction)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_interrupt_shadow)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask);
u32 (*get_interrupt_shadow)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*patch_hypercall)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned char *hypercall_addr);
void (*set_irq)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_nmi)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*queue_exception)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*cancel_injection)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
KVM: x86: enable event window in inject_pending_event In case an interrupt arrives after nested.check_events but before the call to kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr, we could end up enabling the interrupt window even if the interrupt is actually going to be a vmexit. This is useless rather than harmful, but it really complicates reasoning about SVM's handling of the VINTR intercept. We'd like to never bother with the VINTR intercept if V_INTR_MASKING=1 && INTERCEPT_INTR=1, because in that case there is no interrupt window and we can just exit the nested guest whenever we want. This patch moves the opening of the interrupt window inside inject_pending_event. This consolidates the check for pending interrupt/NMI/SMI in one place, and makes KVM's usage of immediate exits more consistent, extending it beyond just nested virtualization. There are two functional changes here. They only affect corner cases, but overall they simplify the inject_pending_event. - re-injection of still-pending events will also use req_immediate_exit instead of using interrupt-window intercepts. This should have no impact on performance on Intel since it simply replaces an interrupt-window or NMI-window exit for a preemption-timer exit. On AMD, which has no equivalent of the preemption time, it may incur some overhead but an actual effect on performance should only be visible in pathological cases. - kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed and kvm_vcpu_has_events will return true if an interrupt, NMI or SMI is blocked by nested_run_pending. This makes sense because entering the VM will allow it to make progress and deliver the event. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-05-22 23:21:49 +08:00
int (*interrupt_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
int (*nmi_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
bool (*get_nmi_mask)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_nmi_mask)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
void (*enable_nmi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*enable_irq_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*update_cr8_intercept)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr);
bool (*check_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(ulong bit);
void (*pre_update_apicv_exec_ctrl)(struct kvm *kvm, bool activate);
void (*refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*hwapic_irr_update)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr);
void (*hwapic_isr_update)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int isr);
KVM: nVMX: Wake blocked vCPU in guest-mode if pending interrupt in virtual APICv In case L1 do not intercept L2 HLT or enter L2 in HLT activity-state, it is possible for a vCPU to be blocked while it is in guest-mode. According to Intel SDM 26.6.5 Interrupt-Window Exiting and Virtual-Interrupt Delivery: "These events wake the logical processor if it just entered the HLT state because of a VM entry". Therefore, if L1 enters L2 in HLT activity-state and L2 has a pending deliverable interrupt in vmcs12->guest_intr_status.RVI, then the vCPU should be waken from the HLT state and injected with the interrupt. In addition, if while the vCPU is blocked (while it is in guest-mode), it receives a nested posted-interrupt, then the vCPU should also be waken and injected with the posted interrupt. To handle these cases, this patch enhances kvm_vcpu_has_events() to also check if there is a pending interrupt in L2 virtual APICv provided by L1. That is, it evaluates if there is a pending virtual interrupt for L2 by checking RVI[7:4] > VPPR[7:4] as specified in Intel SDM 29.2.1 Evaluation of Pending Interrupts. Note that this also handles the case of nested posted-interrupt by the fact RVI is updated in vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() which is called from kvm_vcpu_check_block() -> kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable() -> kvm_vcpu_running() -> vmx_check_nested_events() -> vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt(). Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-09-04 15:56:52 +08:00
bool (*guest_apic_has_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*load_eoi_exitmap)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap);
void (*set_virtual_apic_mode)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_apic_access_page_addr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*deliver_posted_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector);
int (*sync_pir_to_irr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*set_tss_addr)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr);
int (*set_identity_map_addr)(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr);
int (*get_tdp_level)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
u64 (*get_mt_mask)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio);
void (*load_mmu_pgd)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3);
bool (*has_wbinvd_exit)(void);
2018-11-06 18:14:25 +08:00
/* Returns actual tsc_offset set in active VMCS */
u64 (*write_l1_tsc_offset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset);
void (*get_exit_info)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *info1, u64 *info2);
int (*check_intercept)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_instruction_info *info,
enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
struct x86_exception *exception);
void (*handle_exit_irqoff)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
KVM: VMX: use preemption timer to force immediate VMExit A VMX preemption timer value of '0' is guaranteed to cause a VMExit prior to the CPU executing any instructions in the guest. Use the preemption timer (if it's supported) to trigger immediate VMExit in place of the current method of sending a self-IPI. This ensures that pending VMExit injection to L1 occurs prior to executing any instructions in the guest (regardless of nesting level). When deferring VMExit injection, KVM generates an immediate VMExit from the (possibly nested) guest by sending itself an IPI. Because hardware interrupts are blocked prior to VMEnter and are unblocked (in hardware) after VMEnter, this results in taking a VMExit(INTR) before any guest instruction is executed. But, as this approach relies on the IPI being received before VMEnter executes, it only works as intended when KVM is running as L0. Because there are no architectural guarantees regarding when IPIs are delivered, when running nested the INTR may "arrive" long after L2 is running e.g. L0 KVM doesn't force an immediate switch to L1 to deliver an INTR. For the most part, this unintended delay is not an issue since the events being injected to L1 also do not have architectural guarantees regarding their timing. The notable exception is the VMX preemption timer[1], which is architecturally guaranteed to cause a VMExit prior to executing any instructions in the guest if the timer value is '0' at VMEnter. Specifically, the delay in injecting the VMExit causes the preemption timer KVM unit test to fail when run in a nested guest. Note: this approach is viable even on CPUs with a broken preemption timer, as broken in this context only means the timer counts at the wrong rate. There are no known errata affecting timer value of '0'. [1] I/O SMIs also have guarantees on when they arrive, but I have no idea if/how those are emulated in KVM. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> [Use a hook for SVM instead of leaving the default in x86.c - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-08-28 06:21:12 +08:00
void (*request_immediate_exit)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*sched_in)(struct kvm_vcpu *kvm, int cpu);
/*
* Arch-specific dirty logging hooks. These hooks are only supposed to
* be valid if the specific arch has hardware-accelerated dirty logging
* mechanism. Currently only for PML on VMX.
*
* - slot_enable_log_dirty:
* called when enabling log dirty mode for the slot.
* - slot_disable_log_dirty:
* called when disabling log dirty mode for the slot.
* also called when slot is created with log dirty disabled.
* - flush_log_dirty:
* called before reporting dirty_bitmap to userspace.
* - enable_log_dirty_pt_masked:
* called when reenabling log dirty for the GFNs in the mask after
* corresponding bits are cleared in slot->dirty_bitmap.
*/
void (*slot_enable_log_dirty)(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
void (*slot_disable_log_dirty)(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
void (*flush_log_dirty)(struct kvm *kvm);
void (*enable_log_dirty_pt_masked)(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
gfn_t offset, unsigned long mask);
int (*write_log_dirty)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
/* pmu operations of sub-arch */
const struct kvm_pmu_ops *pmu_ops;
const struct kvm_x86_nested_ops *nested_ops;
/*
* Architecture specific hooks for vCPU blocking due to
* HLT instruction.
* Returns for .pre_block():
* - 0 means continue to block the vCPU.
* - 1 means we cannot block the vCPU since some event
* happens during this period, such as, 'ON' bit in
* posted-interrupts descriptor is set.
*/
int (*pre_block)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*post_block)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*vcpu_blocking)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*vcpu_unblocking)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*update_pi_irte)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
uint32_t guest_irq, bool set);
void (*apicv_post_state_restore)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
2019-08-05 10:03:19 +08:00
bool (*dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*set_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
bool *expired);
void (*cancel_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
KVM: x86: enable event window in inject_pending_event In case an interrupt arrives after nested.check_events but before the call to kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr, we could end up enabling the interrupt window even if the interrupt is actually going to be a vmexit. This is useless rather than harmful, but it really complicates reasoning about SVM's handling of the VINTR intercept. We'd like to never bother with the VINTR intercept if V_INTR_MASKING=1 && INTERCEPT_INTR=1, because in that case there is no interrupt window and we can just exit the nested guest whenever we want. This patch moves the opening of the interrupt window inside inject_pending_event. This consolidates the check for pending interrupt/NMI/SMI in one place, and makes KVM's usage of immediate exits more consistent, extending it beyond just nested virtualization. There are two functional changes here. They only affect corner cases, but overall they simplify the inject_pending_event. - re-injection of still-pending events will also use req_immediate_exit instead of using interrupt-window intercepts. This should have no impact on performance on Intel since it simply replaces an interrupt-window or NMI-window exit for a preemption-timer exit. On AMD, which has no equivalent of the preemption time, it may incur some overhead but an actual effect on performance should only be visible in pathological cases. - kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed and kvm_vcpu_has_events will return true if an interrupt, NMI or SMI is blocked by nested_run_pending. This makes sense because entering the VM will allow it to make progress and deliver the event. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-05-22 23:21:49 +08:00
int (*smi_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection);
int (*pre_enter_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate);
int (*pre_leave_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate);
KVM: x86: enable event window in inject_pending_event In case an interrupt arrives after nested.check_events but before the call to kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr, we could end up enabling the interrupt window even if the interrupt is actually going to be a vmexit. This is useless rather than harmful, but it really complicates reasoning about SVM's handling of the VINTR intercept. We'd like to never bother with the VINTR intercept if V_INTR_MASKING=1 && INTERCEPT_INTR=1, because in that case there is no interrupt window and we can just exit the nested guest whenever we want. This patch moves the opening of the interrupt window inside inject_pending_event. This consolidates the check for pending interrupt/NMI/SMI in one place, and makes KVM's usage of immediate exits more consistent, extending it beyond just nested virtualization. There are two functional changes here. They only affect corner cases, but overall they simplify the inject_pending_event. - re-injection of still-pending events will also use req_immediate_exit instead of using interrupt-window intercepts. This should have no impact on performance on Intel since it simply replaces an interrupt-window or NMI-window exit for a preemption-timer exit. On AMD, which has no equivalent of the preemption time, it may incur some overhead but an actual effect on performance should only be visible in pathological cases. - kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed and kvm_vcpu_has_events will return true if an interrupt, NMI or SMI is blocked by nested_run_pending. This makes sense because entering the VM will allow it to make progress and deliver the event. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-05-22 23:21:49 +08:00
void (*enable_smi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*mem_enc_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
int (*mem_enc_reg_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
int (*mem_enc_unreg_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
int (*get_msr_feature)(struct kvm_msr_entry *entry);
bool (*need_emulation_on_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states Commit cd7764fe9f73 ("KVM: x86: latch INITs while in system management mode") changed code to latch INIT while vCPU is in SMM and process latched INIT when leaving SMM. It left a subtle remark in commit message that similar treatment should also be done while vCPU is in VMX non-root-mode. However, INIT signals should actually be latched in various vCPU states: (*) For both Intel and AMD, INIT signals should be latched while vCPU is in SMM. (*) For Intel, INIT should also be latched while vCPU is in VMX operation and later processed when vCPU leaves VMX operation by executing VMXOFF. (*) For AMD, INIT should also be latched while vCPU runs with GIF=0 or in guest-mode with intercept defined on INIT signal. To fix this: 1) Add kvm_x86_ops->apic_init_signal_blocked() such that each CPU vendor can define the various CPU states in which INIT signals should be blocked and modify kvm_apic_accept_events() to use it. 2) Modify vmx_check_nested_events() to check for pending INIT signal while vCPU in guest-mode. If so, emualte vmexit on EXIT_REASON_INIT_SIGNAL. Note that nSVM should have similar behaviour but is currently left as a TODO comment to implement in the future because nSVM don't yet implement svm_check_nested_events(). Note: Currently KVM nVMX implementation don't support VMX wait-for-SIPI activity state as specified in MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC bits 6:8 exposed to guest (See nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs()). If and when support for this activity state will be implemented, kvm_check_nested_events() would need to avoid emulating vmexit on INIT signal in case activity-state is wait-for-SIPI. In addition, kvm_apic_accept_events() would need to be modified to avoid discarding SIPI in case VMX activity-state is wait-for-SIPI but instead delay SIPI processing to vmx_check_nested_events() that would clear pending APIC events and emulate vmexit on SIPI. Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Co-developed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-08-26 18:24:49 +08:00
bool (*apic_init_signal_blocked)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*enable_direct_tlbflush)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*migrate_timers)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
};
struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
int (*check_events)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool (*hv_timer_pending)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*get_state)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state,
unsigned user_data_size);
int (*set_state)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_nested_state __user *user_kvm_nested_state,
struct kvm_nested_state *kvm_state);
bool (*get_vmcs12_pages)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*enable_evmcs)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
uint16_t *vmcs_version);
uint16_t (*get_evmcs_version)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
};
struct kvm_x86_init_ops {
int (*cpu_has_kvm_support)(void);
int (*disabled_by_bios)(void);
int (*check_processor_compatibility)(void);
int (*hardware_setup)(void);
struct kvm_x86_ops *runtime_ops;
};
struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
u32 token;
gfn_t gfn;
unsigned long cr3;
bool direct_map;
};
extern u64 __read_mostly host_efer;
extern struct kvm_x86_ops kvm_x86_ops;
extern struct kmem_cache *x86_fpu_cache;
#define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_VM_ALLOC
static inline struct kvm *kvm_arch_alloc_vm(void)
{
2020-06-02 12:51:40 +08:00
return __vmalloc(kvm_x86_ops.vm_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
}
void kvm_arch_free_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
#define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_FLUSH_REMOTE_TLB
static inline int kvm_arch_flush_remote_tlb(struct kvm *kvm)
{
if (kvm_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush &&
!kvm_x86_ops.tlb_remote_flush(kvm))
return 0;
else
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
int kvm_mmu_module_init(void);
void kvm_mmu_module_exit(void);
void kvm_mmu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 p_mask,
kvm/x86/svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Update the KVM support to work with SME. The VMCB has a number of fields where physical addresses are used and these addresses must contain the memory encryption mask in order to properly access the encrypted memory. Also, use the memory encryption mask when creating and using the nested page tables. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/89146eccfa50334409801ff20acd52a90fb5efcf.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:27 +08:00
u64 acc_track_mask, u64 me_mask);
void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
int start_level);
void kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot);
void kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot);
void kvm_mmu_slot_largepage_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot);
void kvm_mmu_slot_set_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot);
void kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
gfn_t gfn_offset, unsigned long mask);
void kvm_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen);
unsigned long kvm_mmu_calculate_default_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long kvm_nr_mmu_pages);
int load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned long cr3);
bool pdptrs_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int emulator_write_phys(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
const void *val, int bytes);
struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier {
void (*func)(struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier *kimn, bool masked);
int irq;
struct hlist_node link;
};
void kvm_register_irq_mask_notifier(struct kvm *kvm, int irq,
struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier *kimn);
void kvm_unregister_irq_mask_notifier(struct kvm *kvm, int irq,
struct kvm_irq_mask_notifier *kimn);
void kvm_fire_mask_notifiers(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned irqchip, unsigned pin,
bool mask);
extern bool tdp_enabled;
u64 vcpu_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
/* control of guest tsc rate supported? */
extern bool kvm_has_tsc_control;
/* maximum supported tsc_khz for guests */
extern u32 kvm_max_guest_tsc_khz;
/* number of bits of the fractional part of the TSC scaling ratio */
extern u8 kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
/* maximum allowed value of TSC scaling ratio */
extern u64 kvm_max_tsc_scaling_ratio;
/* 1ull << kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits */
extern u64 kvm_default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
extern u64 kvm_mce_cap_supported;
/*
* EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE - Set when re-emulating an instruction (after completing
* userspace I/O) to indicate that the emulation context
* should be resued as is, i.e. skip initialization of
* emulation context, instruction fetch and decode.
*
* EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD - Set when emulating an intercepted #UD from hardware.
* Indicates that only select instructions (tagged with
* EmulateOnUD) should be emulated (to minimize the emulator
* attack surface). See also EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED.
*
* EMULTYPE_SKIP - Set when emulating solely to skip an instruction, i.e. to
* decode the instruction length. For use *only* by
* kvm_x86_ops.skip_emulated_instruction() implementations.
*
* EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF - Set when the emulator should resume the guest to
* retry native execution under certain conditions,
* Can only be set in conjunction with EMULTYPE_PF.
*
* EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED - Set when emulating an intercepted #UD that was
* triggered by KVM's magic "force emulation" prefix,
* which is opt in via module param (off by default).
* Bypasses EmulateOnUD restriction despite emulating
* due to an intercepted #UD (see EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD).
* Used to test the full emulator from userspace.
*
* EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP - Set when emulating an intercepted #GP for VMware
* backdoor emulation, which is opt in via module param.
* VMware backoor emulation handles select instructions
* and reinjects the #GP for all other cases.
*
* EMULTYPE_PF - Set when emulating MMIO by way of an intercepted #PF, in which
* case the CR2/GPA value pass on the stack is valid.
*/
#define EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE (1 << 0)
#define EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD (1 << 1)
#define EMULTYPE_SKIP (1 << 2)
#define EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF (1 << 3)
#define EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED (1 << 4)
#define EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP (1 << 5)
#define EMULTYPE_PF (1 << 6)
int kvm_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type);
int kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
void *insn, int insn_len);
void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64);
bool kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data, bool host_initiated);
int kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data);
int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data);
int kvm_emulate_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_emulate_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_fast_pio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int size, unsigned short port, int in);
int kvm_emulate_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_emulate_halt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_vcpu_halt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_emulate_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
int kvm_load_segment_descriptor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 selector, int seg);
void kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int idt_index,
int reason, bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
int kvm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
int kvm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3);
int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
int kvm_set_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr8);
int kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val);
int kvm_get_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long *val);
unsigned long kvm_get_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_lmsw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long msw);
void kvm_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l);
int kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr);
int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr);
unsigned long kvm_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags);
bool kvm_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, unsigned long payload);
void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
void kvm_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault);
bool kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_exception *fault);
int kvm_read_guest_page_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
gfn_t gfn, void *data, int offset, int len,
u32 access);
bool kvm_require_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int required_cpl);
bool kvm_require_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr);
static inline int __kvm_irq_line_state(unsigned long *irq_state,
int irq_source_id, int level)
{
/* Logical OR for level trig interrupt */
if (level)
__set_bit(irq_source_id, irq_state);
else
__clear_bit(irq_source_id, irq_state);
return !!(*irq_state);
}
#define KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT BIT(0)
#define KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i) BIT(1+i)
#define KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL (~0UL)
int kvm_pic_set_irq(struct kvm_pic *pic, int irq, int irq_source_id, int level);
void kvm_pic_clear_all(struct kvm_pic *pic, int irq_source_id);
void kvm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_update_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn);
int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva);
void __kvm_mmu_free_some_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_free_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
ulong roots_to_free);
gpa_t translate_nested_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u32 access,
struct x86_exception *exception);
gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
struct x86_exception *exception);
gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_fetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
struct x86_exception *exception);
gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
struct x86_exception *exception);
gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
struct x86_exception *exception);
bool kvm_apicv_activated(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_apicv_init(struct kvm *kvm, bool enable);
void kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_request_apicv_update(struct kvm *kvm, bool activate,
unsigned long bit);
int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
KVM: x86: Use gpa_t for cr2/gpa to fix TDP support on 32-bit KVM Convert a plethora of parameters and variables in the MMU and page fault flows from type gva_t to gpa_t to properly handle TDP on 32-bit KVM. Thanks to PSE and PAE paging, 32-bit kernels can access 64-bit physical addresses. When TDP is enabled, the fault address is a guest physical address and thus can be a 64-bit value, even when both KVM and its guest are using 32-bit virtual addressing, e.g. VMX's VMCS.GUEST_PHYSICAL is a 64-bit field, not a natural width field. Using a gva_t for the fault address means KVM will incorrectly drop the upper 32-bits of the GPA. Ditto for gva_to_gpa() when it is used to translate L2 GPAs to L1 GPAs. Opportunistically rename variables and parameters to better reflect the dual address modes, e.g. use "cr2_or_gpa" for fault addresses and plain "addr" instead of "vaddr" when the address may be either a GVA or an L2 GPA. Similarly, use "gpa" in the nonpaging_page_fault() flows to avoid a confusing "gpa_t gva" declaration; this also sets the stage for a future patch to combing nonpaging_page_fault() and tdp_page_fault() with minimal churn. Sprinkle in a few comments to document flows where an address is known to be a GVA and thus can be safely truncated to a 32-bit value. Add WARNs in kvm_handle_page_fault() and FNAME(gva_to_gpa_nested)() to help document such cases and detect bugs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-12-07 07:57:14 +08:00
int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code,
void *insn, int insn_len);
void kvm_mmu_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva);
void kvm_mmu_invalidate_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
gva_t gva, hpa_t root_hpa);
void kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned long pcid);
void kvm_mmu_new_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t new_pgd, bool skip_tlb_flush,
bool skip_mmu_sync);
void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_page_level);
static inline gpa_t translate_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u32 access,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
return gpa;
}
static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *page_header(hpa_t shadow_page)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(shadow_page >> PAGE_SHIFT);
return (struct kvm_mmu_page *)page_private(page);
}
static inline u16 kvm_read_ldt(void)
{
u16 ldt;
asm("sldt %0" : "=g"(ldt));
return ldt;
}
static inline void kvm_load_ldt(u16 sel)
{
asm("lldt %0" : : "rm"(sel));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static inline unsigned long read_msr(unsigned long msr)
{
u64 value;
rdmsrl(msr, value);
return value;
}
#endif
static inline u32 get_rdx_init_val(void)
{
return 0x600; /* P6 family */
}
static inline void kvm_inject_gp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 error_code)
{
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
}
#define TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET 0x66
#define TSS_BASE_SIZE 0x68
#define TSS_IOPB_SIZE (65536 / 8)
#define TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE (256 / 8)
#define RMODE_TSS_SIZE \
(TSS_BASE_SIZE + TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE + TSS_IOPB_SIZE + 1)
enum {
TASK_SWITCH_CALL = 0,
TASK_SWITCH_IRET = 1,
TASK_SWITCH_JMP = 2,
TASK_SWITCH_GATE = 3,
};
#define HF_GIF_MASK (1 << 0)
#define HF_NMI_MASK (1 << 3)
#define HF_IRET_MASK (1 << 4)
#define HF_GUEST_MASK (1 << 5) /* VCPU is in guest-mode */
#define HF_SMM_MASK (1 << 6)
#define HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK (1 << 7)
#define __KVM_VCPU_MULTIPLE_ADDRESS_SPACE
#define KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM 2
#define kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(vcpu) ((vcpu)->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK ? 1 : 0)
#define kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, role) __kvm_memslots(kvm, (role).smm)
asmlinkage void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
x86/kvm: Don't call kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup After making a change to improve objtool's sibling call detection, it started showing the following warning: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.o: warning: objtool: .fixup+0x15: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame The problem is the ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() macro. It does a fake call by pushing a fake RIP and doing a jump. That tricks the unwinder into printing the function which triggered the exception, rather than the .fixup code. Instead of the hack to make it look like the original function made the call, just change the macro so that the original function actually does make the call. This allows removal of the hack, and also makes objtool happy. I triggered a vmx instruction exception and verified that the stack trace is still sane: kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:358! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 28 PID: 4096 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 5.2.0+ #16 Hardware name: Lenovo THINKSYSTEM SD530 -[7X2106Z000]-/-[7X2106Z000]-, BIOS -[TEE113Z-1.00]- 07/17/2017 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 Code: 00 00 00 00 00 8b 44 24 10 89 d2 45 89 c9 48 89 44 24 10 8b 44 24 08 48 89 44 24 08 e9 d4 40 22 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41 RSP: 0018:ffffbf91c683bd00 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000061f040000000 RBX: ffff9e159c77bba0 RCX: ffff9e15a5c87000 RDX: 0000000665c87000 RSI: ffff9e15a5c87000 RDI: ffff9e159c77bba0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e15a5c87000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fffff8f2d99721c0 R12: ffff9e159c77bba0 R13: ffffbf91c671d960 R14: ffff9e159c778000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa341cbe700(0000) GS:ffff9e15b7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fdd38356804 CR3: 00000006759de003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: loaded_vmcs_init+0x4f/0xe0 alloc_loaded_vmcs+0x38/0xd0 vmx_create_vcpu+0xf7/0x600 kvm_vm_ioctl+0x5e9/0x980 ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 ? free_one_page+0x13f/0x4e0 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x630 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fa349b1ee5b Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/64a9b64d127e87b6920a97afde8e96ea76f6524e.1563413318.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-07-18 09:36:39 +08:00
/*
* Hardware virtualization extension instructions may fault if a
* reboot turns off virtualization while processes are running.
x86/kvm: Don't call kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup After making a change to improve objtool's sibling call detection, it started showing the following warning: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.o: warning: objtool: .fixup+0x15: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame The problem is the ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() macro. It does a fake call by pushing a fake RIP and doing a jump. That tricks the unwinder into printing the function which triggered the exception, rather than the .fixup code. Instead of the hack to make it look like the original function made the call, just change the macro so that the original function actually does make the call. This allows removal of the hack, and also makes objtool happy. I triggered a vmx instruction exception and verified that the stack trace is still sane: kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:358! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 28 PID: 4096 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 5.2.0+ #16 Hardware name: Lenovo THINKSYSTEM SD530 -[7X2106Z000]-/-[7X2106Z000]-, BIOS -[TEE113Z-1.00]- 07/17/2017 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 Code: 00 00 00 00 00 8b 44 24 10 89 d2 45 89 c9 48 89 44 24 10 8b 44 24 08 48 89 44 24 08 e9 d4 40 22 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41 RSP: 0018:ffffbf91c683bd00 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000061f040000000 RBX: ffff9e159c77bba0 RCX: ffff9e15a5c87000 RDX: 0000000665c87000 RSI: ffff9e15a5c87000 RDI: ffff9e159c77bba0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e15a5c87000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fffff8f2d99721c0 R12: ffff9e159c77bba0 R13: ffffbf91c671d960 R14: ffff9e159c778000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa341cbe700(0000) GS:ffff9e15b7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fdd38356804 CR3: 00000006759de003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: loaded_vmcs_init+0x4f/0xe0 alloc_loaded_vmcs+0x38/0xd0 vmx_create_vcpu+0xf7/0x600 kvm_vm_ioctl+0x5e9/0x980 ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 ? free_one_page+0x13f/0x4e0 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x630 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fa349b1ee5b Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/64a9b64d127e87b6920a97afde8e96ea76f6524e.1563413318.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-07-18 09:36:39 +08:00
* Usually after catching the fault we just panic; during reboot
* instead the instruction is ignored.
*/
#define __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(insn) \
x86/kvm: Don't call kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup After making a change to improve objtool's sibling call detection, it started showing the following warning: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.o: warning: objtool: .fixup+0x15: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame The problem is the ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() macro. It does a fake call by pushing a fake RIP and doing a jump. That tricks the unwinder into printing the function which triggered the exception, rather than the .fixup code. Instead of the hack to make it look like the original function made the call, just change the macro so that the original function actually does make the call. This allows removal of the hack, and also makes objtool happy. I triggered a vmx instruction exception and verified that the stack trace is still sane: kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:358! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 28 PID: 4096 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 5.2.0+ #16 Hardware name: Lenovo THINKSYSTEM SD530 -[7X2106Z000]-/-[7X2106Z000]-, BIOS -[TEE113Z-1.00]- 07/17/2017 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0x5/0x10 Code: 00 00 00 00 00 8b 44 24 10 89 d2 45 89 c9 48 89 44 24 10 8b 44 24 08 48 89 44 24 08 e9 d4 40 22 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 55 49 89 fd 41 RSP: 0018:ffffbf91c683bd00 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000061f040000000 RBX: ffff9e159c77bba0 RCX: ffff9e15a5c87000 RDX: 0000000665c87000 RSI: ffff9e15a5c87000 RDI: ffff9e159c77bba0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e15a5c87000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: fffff8f2d99721c0 R12: ffff9e159c77bba0 R13: ffffbf91c671d960 R14: ffff9e159c778000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa341cbe700(0000) GS:ffff9e15b7400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fdd38356804 CR3: 00000006759de003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: loaded_vmcs_init+0x4f/0xe0 alloc_loaded_vmcs+0x38/0xd0 vmx_create_vcpu+0xf7/0x600 kvm_vm_ioctl+0x5e9/0x980 ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 ? free_one_page+0x13f/0x4e0 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x630 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fa349b1ee5b Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/64a9b64d127e87b6920a97afde8e96ea76f6524e.1563413318.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-07-18 09:36:39 +08:00
"666: \n\t" \
insn "\n\t" \
"jmp 668f \n\t" \
"667: \n\t" \
"call kvm_spurious_fault \n\t" \
"668: \n\t" \
_ASM_EXTABLE(666b, 667b)
#define KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER
int kvm_unmap_hva_range(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
int kvm_age_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
int kvm_test_age_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva);
int kvm_set_spte_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hva, pte_t pte);
int kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *v);
int kvm_cpu_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_cpu_get_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *v);
void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
KVM: X86: Implement "send IPI" hypercall Using hypercall to send IPIs by one vmexit instead of one by one for xAPIC/x2APIC physical mode and one vmexit per-cluster for x2APIC cluster mode. Intel guest can enter x2apic cluster mode when interrupt remmaping is enabled in qemu, however, latest AMD EPYC still just supports xapic mode which can get great improvement by Exit-less IPIs. This patchset lets a guest send multicast IPIs, with at most 128 destinations per hypercall in 64-bit mode and 64 vCPUs per hypercall in 32-bit mode. Hardware: Xeon Skylake 2.5GHz, 2 sockets, 40 cores, 80 threads, the VM is 80 vCPUs, IPI microbenchmark(https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/141): x2apic cluster mode, vanilla Dry-run: 0, 2392199 ns Self-IPI: 6907514, 15027589 ns Normal IPI: 223910476, 251301666 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 9282161150 ns Broadcast lock: 0, 8812934104 ns x2apic cluster mode, pv-ipi Dry-run: 0, 2449341 ns Self-IPI: 6720360, 15028732 ns Normal IPI: 228643307, 255708477 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 7572293590 ns => 22% performance boost Broadcast lock: 0, 8316124651 ns x2apic physical mode, vanilla Dry-run: 0, 3135933 ns Self-IPI: 8572670, 17901757 ns Normal IPI: 226444334, 255421709 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 19845070887 ns Broadcast lock: 0, 19827383656 ns x2apic physical mode, pv-ipi Dry-run: 0, 2446381 ns Self-IPI: 6788217, 15021056 ns Normal IPI: 219454441, 249583458 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 7806540019 ns => 154% performance boost Broadcast lock: 0, 9143618799 ns Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-07-23 14:39:54 +08:00
int kvm_pv_send_ipi(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long ipi_bitmap_low,
unsigned long ipi_bitmap_high, u32 min,
KVM: X86: Implement "send IPI" hypercall Using hypercall to send IPIs by one vmexit instead of one by one for xAPIC/x2APIC physical mode and one vmexit per-cluster for x2APIC cluster mode. Intel guest can enter x2apic cluster mode when interrupt remmaping is enabled in qemu, however, latest AMD EPYC still just supports xapic mode which can get great improvement by Exit-less IPIs. This patchset lets a guest send multicast IPIs, with at most 128 destinations per hypercall in 64-bit mode and 64 vCPUs per hypercall in 32-bit mode. Hardware: Xeon Skylake 2.5GHz, 2 sockets, 40 cores, 80 threads, the VM is 80 vCPUs, IPI microbenchmark(https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/141): x2apic cluster mode, vanilla Dry-run: 0, 2392199 ns Self-IPI: 6907514, 15027589 ns Normal IPI: 223910476, 251301666 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 9282161150 ns Broadcast lock: 0, 8812934104 ns x2apic cluster mode, pv-ipi Dry-run: 0, 2449341 ns Self-IPI: 6720360, 15028732 ns Normal IPI: 228643307, 255708477 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 7572293590 ns => 22% performance boost Broadcast lock: 0, 8316124651 ns x2apic physical mode, vanilla Dry-run: 0, 3135933 ns Self-IPI: 8572670, 17901757 ns Normal IPI: 226444334, 255421709 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 19845070887 ns Broadcast lock: 0, 19827383656 ns x2apic physical mode, pv-ipi Dry-run: 0, 2446381 ns Self-IPI: 6788217, 15021056 ns Normal IPI: 219454441, 249583458 ns Broadcast IPI: 0, 7806540019 ns => 154% performance boost Broadcast lock: 0, 9143618799 ns Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-07-23 14:39:54 +08:00
unsigned long icr, int op_64_bit);
void kvm_define_shared_msr(unsigned index, u32 msr);
int kvm_set_shared_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
u64 kvm_scale_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 tsc);
u64 kvm_read_l1_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 host_tsc);
unsigned long kvm_get_linear_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool kvm_is_linear_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long linear_rip);
void kvm_make_mclock_inprogress_request(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request_mask(struct kvm *kvm,
unsigned long *vcpu_bitmap);
void kvm_arch_async_page_not_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_async_pf *work);
void kvm_arch_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_async_pf *work);
void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_async_pf *work);
void kvm_arch_async_page_present_queued(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool kvm_arch_can_dequeue_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
extern bool kvm_find_async_pf_gfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn);
int kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_complete_insn_gp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err);
KVM: VMX: use preemption timer to force immediate VMExit A VMX preemption timer value of '0' is guaranteed to cause a VMExit prior to the CPU executing any instructions in the guest. Use the preemption timer (if it's supported) to trigger immediate VMExit in place of the current method of sending a self-IPI. This ensures that pending VMExit injection to L1 occurs prior to executing any instructions in the guest (regardless of nesting level). When deferring VMExit injection, KVM generates an immediate VMExit from the (possibly nested) guest by sending itself an IPI. Because hardware interrupts are blocked prior to VMEnter and are unblocked (in hardware) after VMEnter, this results in taking a VMExit(INTR) before any guest instruction is executed. But, as this approach relies on the IPI being received before VMEnter executes, it only works as intended when KVM is running as L0. Because there are no architectural guarantees regarding when IPIs are delivered, when running nested the INTR may "arrive" long after L2 is running e.g. L0 KVM doesn't force an immediate switch to L1 to deliver an INTR. For the most part, this unintended delay is not an issue since the events being injected to L1 also do not have architectural guarantees regarding their timing. The notable exception is the VMX preemption timer[1], which is architecturally guaranteed to cause a VMExit prior to executing any instructions in the guest if the timer value is '0' at VMEnter. Specifically, the delay in injecting the VMExit causes the preemption timer KVM unit test to fail when run in a nested guest. Note: this approach is viable even on CPUs with a broken preemption timer, as broken in this context only means the timer counts at the wrong rate. There are no known errata affecting timer value of '0'. [1] I/O SMIs also have guarantees on when they arrive, but I have no idea if/how those are emulated in KVM. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> [Use a hook for SVM instead of leaving the default in x86.c - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-08-28 06:21:12 +08:00
void __kvm_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_is_in_guest(void);
int __x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa, u32 size);
bool kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
struct kvm_vcpu **dest_vcpu);
void kvm_set_msi_irq(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq);
static inline bool kvm_irq_is_postable(struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq)
{
/* We can only post Fixed and LowPrio IRQs */
return (irq->delivery_mode == APIC_DM_FIXED ||
irq->delivery_mode == APIC_DM_LOWEST);
}
static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_blocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_blocking)
kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_blocking(vcpu);
}
static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_unblocking)
kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_unblocking(vcpu);
}
KVM: halt_polling: provide a way to qualify wakeups during poll Some wakeups should not be considered a sucessful poll. For example on s390 I/O interrupts are usually floating, which means that _ALL_ CPUs would be considered runnable - letting all vCPUs poll all the time for transactional like workload, even if one vCPU would be enough. This can result in huge CPU usage for large guests. This patch lets architectures provide a way to qualify wakeups if they should be considered a good/bad wakeups in regard to polls. For s390 the implementation will fence of halt polling for anything but known good, single vCPU events. The s390 implementation for floating interrupts does a wakeup for one vCPU, but the interrupt will be delivered by whatever CPU checks first for a pending interrupt. We prefer the woken up CPU by marking the poll of this CPU as "good" poll. This code will also mark several other wakeup reasons like IPI or expired timers as "good". This will of course also mark some events as not sucessful. As KVM on z runs always as a 2nd level hypervisor, we prefer to not poll, unless we are really sure, though. This patch successfully limits the CPU usage for cases like uperf 1byte transactional ping pong workload or wakeup heavy workload like OLTP while still providing a proper speedup. This also introduced a new vcpu stat "halt_poll_no_tuning" that marks wakeups that are considered not good for polling. Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> (for an earlier version) Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@gmail.com> [Rename config symbol. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-13 18:16:35 +08:00
static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_block_finish(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline int kvm_cpu_get_apicid(int mps_cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
return default_cpu_present_to_apicid(mps_cpu);
#else
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return BAD_APICID;
#endif
}
#define put_smstate(type, buf, offset, val) \
*(type *)((buf) + (offset) - 0x7e00) = val
#define GET_SMSTATE(type, buf, offset) \
(*(type *)((buf) + (offset) - 0x7e00))
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_HOST_H */