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linux-next/include/linux/user_namespace.h

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#ifndef _LINUX_USER_NAMESPACE_H
#define _LINUX_USER_NAMESPACE_H
#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/ns_common.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-11-17 16:11:58 +08:00
#define UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS 5
struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
u32 nr_extents;
struct uid_gid_extent {
u32 first;
u32 lower_first;
u32 count;
} extent[UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS];
};
2014-12-03 02:27:26 +08:00
#define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL
#define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED
struct ucounts;
enum ucount_type {
UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES,
UCOUNT_PID_NAMESPACES,
UCOUNT_UTS_NAMESPACES,
UCOUNT_IPC_NAMESPACES,
UCOUNT_NET_NAMESPACES,
UCOUNT_MNT_NAMESPACES,
UCOUNT_CGROUP_NAMESPACES,
#ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
UCOUNT_INOTIFY_INSTANCES,
UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES,
#endif
UCOUNT_COUNTS,
};
struct user_namespace {
userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-11-17 16:11:58 +08:00
struct uid_gid_map uid_map;
struct uid_gid_map gid_map;
struct uid_gid_map projid_map;
atomic_t count;
struct user_namespace *parent;
int level;
kuid_t owner;
kgid_t group;
struct ns_common ns;
2014-12-03 02:27:26 +08:00
unsigned long flags;
KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos caches held within the kernel. This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's processes so that the user's cron jobs can work. The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 big_key - A ccache blob \___ tkt12345 big_key - Another ccache blob Or possibly: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 keyring - A ccache \___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key \___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key \___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace. Kernel support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want. The user asks for their Kerberos cache by: krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring); The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to mess with the cache. The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read, search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to. Active LSMs get a chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link. Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring goes away after a while. The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to three days. Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the register. The cache keyrings are added to it. This means that standard key search and garbage collection facilities are available. The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left in it is then automatically gc'd. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-09-24 17:35:19 +08:00
/* Register of per-UID persistent keyrings for this namespace */
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
struct key *persistent_keyring_register;
struct rw_semaphore persistent_keyring_register_sem;
#endif
struct work_struct work;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
struct ctl_table_set set;
struct ctl_table_header *sysctls;
#endif
struct ucounts *ucounts;
int ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS];
};
struct ucounts {
struct hlist_node node;
struct user_namespace *ns;
kuid_t uid;
atomic_t count;
atomic_t ucount[UCOUNT_COUNTS];
};
extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
bool setup_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns);
void retire_userns_sysctls(struct user_namespace *ns);
struct ucounts *inc_ucount(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, enum ucount_type type);
void dec_ucount(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type);
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
if (ns)
atomic_inc(&ns->count);
return ns;
}
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
extern int create_user_ns(struct cred *new);
extern int unshare_userns(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct cred **new_cred);
extern void __put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns);
static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
if (ns && atomic_dec_and_test(&ns->count))
__put_user_ns(ns);
}
userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-11-17 16:11:58 +08:00
struct seq_operations;
extern const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations;
extern const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations;
extern const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations;
userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-11-17 16:11:58 +08:00
extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
2014-12-03 02:27:26 +08:00
extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
extern bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns);
#else
static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
return &init_user_ns;
}
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
static inline int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
{
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-10-16 05:38:45 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
static inline int unshare_userns(unsigned long unshare_flags,
struct cred **new_cred)
{
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
}
static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
{
return true;
}
static inline bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
{
return true;
}
static inline struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
{
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-11-17 16:11:58 +08:00
#endif
#endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */