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linux-next/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H
#define _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm-generic/set_memory.h>
/*
* The set_memory_* API can be used to change various attributes of a virtual
* address range. The attributes include:
* Cachability : UnCached, WriteCombining, WriteThrough, WriteBack
* Executability : eXeutable, NoteXecutable
* Read/Write : ReadOnly, ReadWrite
* Presence : NotPresent
x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute for one or more memory pages. This will be useful when we have to change the AP trampoline area to not be encrypted. Or when we need to change the SWIOTLB area to not be encrypted in support of devices that can't support the encryption mask range. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/924ae0d1f6d4c90c5a0e366c291b90a2d86aa79e.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:19 +08:00
* Encryption : Encrypted, Decrypted
*
* Within a category, the attributes are mutually exclusive.
*
* The implementation of this API will take care of various aspects that
* are associated with changing such attributes, such as:
* - Flushing TLBs
* - Flushing CPU caches
* - Making sure aliases of the memory behind the mapping don't violate
* coherency rules as defined by the CPU in the system.
*
* What this API does not do:
* - Provide exclusion between various callers - including callers that
* operation on other mappings of the same physical page
* - Restore default attributes when a page is freed
* - Guarantee that mappings other than the requested one are
* in any state, other than that these do not violate rules for
* the CPU you have. Do not depend on any effects on other mappings,
* CPUs other than the one you have may have more relaxed rules.
* The caller is required to take care of these.
*/
int _set_memory_uc(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int _set_memory_wc(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int _set_memory_wt(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int _set_memory_wb(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_uc(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_wc(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_wb(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_np(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute for one or more memory pages. This will be useful when we have to change the AP trampoline area to not be encrypted. Or when we need to change the SWIOTLB area to not be encrypted in support of devices that can't support the encryption mask range. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/924ae0d1f6d4c90c5a0e366c291b90a2d86aa79e.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 05:10:19 +08:00
int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping The kernel image is mapped into two places in the virtual address space (addresses without KASLR, of course): 1. The kernel direct map (0xffff880000000000) 2. The "high kernel map" (0xffffffff81000000) We actually execute out of #2. If we get the address of a kernel symbol, it points to #2, but almost all physical-to-virtual translations point to Parts of the "high kernel map" alias are mapped in the userspace page tables with the Global bit for performance reasons. The parts that we map to userspace do not (er, should not) have secrets. When PTI is enabled then the global bit is usually not set in the high mapping and just used to compensate for poor performance on systems which lack PCID. This is fine, except that some areas in the kernel image that are adjacent to the non-secret-containing areas are unused holes. We free these holes back into the normal page allocator and reuse them as normal kernel memory. The memory will, of course, get *used* via the normal map, but the alias mapping is kept. This otherwise unused alias mapping of the holes will, by default keep the Global bit, be mapped out to userspace, and be vulnerable to Meltdown. Remove the alias mapping of these pages entirely. This is likely to fracture the 2M page mapping the kernel image near these areas, but this should affect a minority of the area. The pageattr code changes *all* aliases mapping the physical pages that it operates on (by default). We only want to modify a single alias, so we need to tweak its behavior. This unmapping behavior is currently dependent on PTI being in place. Going forward, we should at least consider doing this for all configurations. Having an extra read-write alias for memory is not exactly ideal for debugging things like random memory corruption and this does undercut features like DEBUG_PAGEALLOC or future work like eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO). Before this patch: current_kernel:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]--- current_kernel-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte current_kernel-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K RW NX pte current_kernel-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000 6M ro PSE GLB NX pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffff82c00000 6M RW PSE NX pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82e00000 2M RW NX pte current_kernel-0xffffffff82e00000-0xffffffff83200000 4M RW PSE NX pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffa0000000 462M pmd current_user:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]--- current_user-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd current_user-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd current_user-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte current_user-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K RW NX pte current_user-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82600000 6M ro PSE GLB NX pmd current_user-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffffa0000000 474M pmd After this patch: current_kernel:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]--- current_kernel-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte current_kernel-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K pte current_kernel-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82400000 4M ro PSE GLB NX pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff82488000 544K ro NX pte current_kernel-0xffffffff82488000-0xffffffff82600000 1504K pte current_kernel-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffff82c00000 6M RW PSE NX pmd current_kernel-0xffffffff82c00000-0xffffffff82c0d000 52K RW NX pte current_kernel-0xffffffff82c0d000-0xffffffff82dc0000 1740K pte current_user:---[ High Kernel Mapping ]--- current_user-0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd current_user-0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81e00000 14M ro PSE GLB x pmd current_user-0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e11000 68K ro GLB x pte current_user-0xffffffff81e11000-0xffffffff82000000 1980K pte current_user-0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82400000 4M ro PSE GLB NX pmd current_user-0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff82488000 544K ro NX pte current_user-0xffffffff82488000-0xffffffff82600000 1504K pte current_user-0xffffffff82600000-0xffffffffa0000000 474M pmd [ tglx: Do not unmap on 32bit as there is only one mapping ] Fixes: 0f561fce4d69 ("x86/pti: Enable global pages for shared areas") Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802225831.5F6A2BFC@viggo.jf.intel.com
2018-08-03 06:58:31 +08:00
int set_memory_np_noalias(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_pages_array_uc(struct page **pages, int addrinarray);
int set_pages_array_wc(struct page **pages, int addrinarray);
int set_pages_array_wt(struct page **pages, int addrinarray);
int set_pages_array_wb(struct page **pages, int addrinarray);
/*
* For legacy compatibility with the old APIs, a few functions
* are provided that work on a "struct page".
* These functions operate ONLY on the 1:1 kernel mapping of the
* memory that the struct page represents, and internally just
* call the set_memory_* function. See the description of the
* set_memory_* function for more details on conventions.
*
* These APIs should be considered *deprecated* and are likely going to
* be removed in the future.
* The reason for this is the implicit operation on the 1:1 mapping only,
* making this not a generally useful API.
*
* Specifically, many users of the old APIs had a virtual address,
* called virt_to_page() or vmalloc_to_page() on that address to
* get a struct page* that the old API required.
* To convert these cases, use set_memory_*() on the original
* virtual address, do not use these functions.
*/
int set_pages_uc(struct page *page, int numpages);
int set_pages_wb(struct page *page, int numpages);
int set_pages_ro(struct page *page, int numpages);
int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages);
int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
{
unsigned long decoy_addr;
int rc;
/*
* Mark the linear address as UC to make sure we don't log more
* errors because of speculative access to the page.
* We would like to just call:
* set_memory_uc((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
* but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
* speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
* the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
* around in registers.
* Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
* that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
* This relies on set_memory_uc() properly sanitizing any __pa()
* results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
*/
decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
if (rc)
pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
return rc;
}
#define set_mce_nospec set_mce_nospec
/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */
static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
{
return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
}
#define clear_mce_nospec clear_mce_nospec
#else
/*
* Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports
* recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit.
*/
#endif
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H */