2
0
mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-27 06:34:11 +08:00
linux-next/drivers/misc/cxl/context.c

362 lines
8.9 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* Copyright 2014 IBM Corp.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/bitmap.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <asm/cputable.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/copro.h>
#include "cxl.h"
/*
* Allocates space for a CXL context.
*/
struct cxl_context *cxl_context_alloc(void)
{
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct cxl_context), GFP_KERNEL);
}
/*
* Initialises a CXL context.
*/
cxl: Fix coredump generation when cxl_get_fd() is used If a process dumps core while owning a cxl file descriptor obtained from an AFU driver (e.g. cxlflash) through the cxl_get_fd() API, the following error occurs: [ 868.027591] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address ... [ 868.027778] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000035edb0 cpu 0x8c: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000003c688275e0] pc: c00000000035edb0: elf_core_dump+0xd60/0x1300 lr: c00000000035ed80: elf_core_dump+0xd30/0x1300 sp: c000003c68827860 msr: 9000000100009033 dar: c dsisr: 40000000 current = 0xc000003c68780000 paca = 0xc000000001b73200 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 46725, comm = hxesurelock enter ? for help [c000003c68827a60] c00000000036948c do_coredump+0xcec/0x11e0 [c000003c68827c20] c0000000000ce9e0 get_signal+0x540/0x7b0 [c000003c68827d10] c000000000017354 do_signal+0x54/0x2b0 [c000003c68827e00] c00000000001777c do_notify_resume+0xbc/0xd0 [c000003c68827e30] c000000000009838 ret_from_except_lite+0x64/0x68 --- Exception: 300 (Data Access) at 00003fff98ad2918 The root cause is that the address_space structure for the file doesn't define a 'host' member. When cxl allocates a file descriptor, it's using the anonymous inode to back the file, but allocates a private address_space for each context. The private address_space allows to track memory allocation for each context. cxl doesn't define the 'host' member of the address space, i.e. the inode. We don't want to define it as the anonymous inode, since there's no longer a 1-to-1 relation between address_space and inode. To fix it, instead of using the anonymous inode, we introduce a simple pseudo filesystem so that cxl can allocate its own inodes. So we now have one inode for each file and address_space. The pseudo filesystem is only mounted on the first allocation of a file descriptor by cxl_get_fd(). Tested with cxlflash. Signed-off-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-11-18 20:00:31 +08:00
int cxl_context_init(struct cxl_context *ctx, struct cxl_afu *afu, bool master)
{
int i;
ctx->afu = afu;
ctx->master = master;
ctx->pid = NULL; /* Set in start work ioctl */
mutex_init(&ctx->mapping_lock);
cxl: Fix coredump generation when cxl_get_fd() is used If a process dumps core while owning a cxl file descriptor obtained from an AFU driver (e.g. cxlflash) through the cxl_get_fd() API, the following error occurs: [ 868.027591] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address ... [ 868.027778] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000035edb0 cpu 0x8c: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000003c688275e0] pc: c00000000035edb0: elf_core_dump+0xd60/0x1300 lr: c00000000035ed80: elf_core_dump+0xd30/0x1300 sp: c000003c68827860 msr: 9000000100009033 dar: c dsisr: 40000000 current = 0xc000003c68780000 paca = 0xc000000001b73200 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 46725, comm = hxesurelock enter ? for help [c000003c68827a60] c00000000036948c do_coredump+0xcec/0x11e0 [c000003c68827c20] c0000000000ce9e0 get_signal+0x540/0x7b0 [c000003c68827d10] c000000000017354 do_signal+0x54/0x2b0 [c000003c68827e00] c00000000001777c do_notify_resume+0xbc/0xd0 [c000003c68827e30] c000000000009838 ret_from_except_lite+0x64/0x68 --- Exception: 300 (Data Access) at 00003fff98ad2918 The root cause is that the address_space structure for the file doesn't define a 'host' member. When cxl allocates a file descriptor, it's using the anonymous inode to back the file, but allocates a private address_space for each context. The private address_space allows to track memory allocation for each context. cxl doesn't define the 'host' member of the address space, i.e. the inode. We don't want to define it as the anonymous inode, since there's no longer a 1-to-1 relation between address_space and inode. To fix it, instead of using the anonymous inode, we introduce a simple pseudo filesystem so that cxl can allocate its own inodes. So we now have one inode for each file and address_space. The pseudo filesystem is only mounted on the first allocation of a file descriptor by cxl_get_fd(). Tested with cxlflash. Signed-off-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-11-18 20:00:31 +08:00
ctx->mapping = NULL;
if (cxl_is_power8()) {
spin_lock_init(&ctx->sste_lock);
/*
* Allocate the segment table before we put it in the IDR so that we
* can always access it when dereferenced from IDR. For the same
* reason, the segment table is only destroyed after the context is
* removed from the IDR. Access to this in the IOCTL is protected by
* Linux filesytem symantics (can't IOCTL until open is complete).
*/
i = cxl_alloc_sst(ctx);
if (i)
return i;
}
INIT_WORK(&ctx->fault_work, cxl_handle_fault);
init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->wq);
spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
ctx->irq_bitmap = NULL;
ctx->pending_irq = false;
ctx->pending_fault = false;
ctx->pending_afu_err = false;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->irq_names);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->extra_irq_contexts);
/*
* When we have to destroy all contexts in cxl_context_detach_all() we
* end up with afu_release_irqs() called from inside a
* idr_for_each_entry(). Hence we need to make sure that anything
* dereferenced from this IDR is ok before we allocate the IDR here.
* This clears out the IRQ ranges to ensure this.
*/
for (i = 0; i < CXL_IRQ_RANGES; i++)
ctx->irqs.range[i] = 0;
mutex_init(&ctx->status_mutex);
ctx->status = OPENED;
/*
* Allocating IDR! We better make sure everything's setup that
* dereferences from it.
*/
mutex_lock(&afu->contexts_lock);
idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
i = idr_alloc(&ctx->afu->contexts_idr, ctx, ctx->afu->adapter->min_pe,
ctx->afu->num_procs, GFP_NOWAIT);
idr_preload_end();
mutex_unlock(&afu->contexts_lock);
if (i < 0)
return i;
ctx->pe = i;
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) {
ctx->elem = &ctx->afu->native->spa[i];
ctx->external_pe = ctx->pe;
} else {
ctx->external_pe = -1; /* assigned when attaching */
}
ctx->pe_inserted = false;
2015-11-16 12:03:45 +08:00
/*
* take a ref on the afu so that it stays alive at-least till
* this context is reclaimed inside reclaim_ctx.
*/
cxl_afu_get(afu);
return 0;
}
cxl: Fix coredump generation when cxl_get_fd() is used If a process dumps core while owning a cxl file descriptor obtained from an AFU driver (e.g. cxlflash) through the cxl_get_fd() API, the following error occurs: [ 868.027591] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address ... [ 868.027778] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000035edb0 cpu 0x8c: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000003c688275e0] pc: c00000000035edb0: elf_core_dump+0xd60/0x1300 lr: c00000000035ed80: elf_core_dump+0xd30/0x1300 sp: c000003c68827860 msr: 9000000100009033 dar: c dsisr: 40000000 current = 0xc000003c68780000 paca = 0xc000000001b73200 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 46725, comm = hxesurelock enter ? for help [c000003c68827a60] c00000000036948c do_coredump+0xcec/0x11e0 [c000003c68827c20] c0000000000ce9e0 get_signal+0x540/0x7b0 [c000003c68827d10] c000000000017354 do_signal+0x54/0x2b0 [c000003c68827e00] c00000000001777c do_notify_resume+0xbc/0xd0 [c000003c68827e30] c000000000009838 ret_from_except_lite+0x64/0x68 --- Exception: 300 (Data Access) at 00003fff98ad2918 The root cause is that the address_space structure for the file doesn't define a 'host' member. When cxl allocates a file descriptor, it's using the anonymous inode to back the file, but allocates a private address_space for each context. The private address_space allows to track memory allocation for each context. cxl doesn't define the 'host' member of the address space, i.e. the inode. We don't want to define it as the anonymous inode, since there's no longer a 1-to-1 relation between address_space and inode. To fix it, instead of using the anonymous inode, we introduce a simple pseudo filesystem so that cxl can allocate its own inodes. So we now have one inode for each file and address_space. The pseudo filesystem is only mounted on the first allocation of a file descriptor by cxl_get_fd(). Tested with cxlflash. Signed-off-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-11-18 20:00:31 +08:00
void cxl_context_set_mapping(struct cxl_context *ctx,
struct address_space *mapping)
{
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
ctx->mapping = mapping;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
}
static int cxl_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
struct cxl_context *ctx = vma->vm_file->private_data;
u64 area, offset;
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
pr_devel("%s: pe: %i address: 0x%lx offset: 0x%llx\n",
__func__, ctx->pe, vmf->address, offset);
if (ctx->afu->current_mode == CXL_MODE_DEDICATED) {
area = ctx->afu->psn_phys;
if (offset >= ctx->afu->adapter->ps_size)
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
} else {
area = ctx->psn_phys;
if (offset >= ctx->psn_size)
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
mutex_lock(&ctx->status_mutex);
if (ctx->status != STARTED) {
mutex_unlock(&ctx->status_mutex);
pr_devel("%s: Context not started, failing problem state access\n", __func__);
cxl: Add alternate MMIO error handling userspace programs using cxl currently have to use two strategies for dealing with MMIO errors simultaneously. They have to check every read for a return of all Fs in case the adapter has gone away and the kernel has not yet noticed, and they have to deal with SIGBUS in case the kernel has already noticed, invalidated the mapping and marked the context as failed. In order to simplify things, this patch adds an alternative approach where the kernel will return a page filled with Fs instead of delivering a SIGBUS. This allows userspace to only need to deal with one of these two error paths, and is intended for use in libraries that use cxl transparently and may not be able to safely install a signal handler. This approach will only work if certain constraints are met. Namely, if the application is both reading and writing to an address in the problem state area it cannot assume that a non-FF read is OK, as it may just be reading out a value it has previously written. Further - since only one page is used per context a write to a given offset would be visible when reading the same offset from a different page in the mapping (this only applies within a single context, not between contexts). An application could deal with this by e.g. making sure it also reads from a read-only offset after any reads to a read/write offset. Due to these constraints, this functionality must be explicitly requested by userspace when starting the context by passing in the CXL_START_WORK_ERR_FF flag. Signed-off-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-07-23 14:43:56 +08:00
if (ctx->mmio_err_ff) {
if (!ctx->ff_page) {
ctx->ff_page = alloc_page(GFP_USER);
if (!ctx->ff_page)
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
memset(page_address(ctx->ff_page), 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
}
get_page(ctx->ff_page);
vmf->page = ctx->ff_page;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_cached(vma->vm_page_prot);
return 0;
}
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
}
vm_insert_pfn(vma, vmf->address, (area + offset) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->status_mutex);
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct cxl_mmap_vmops = {
.fault = cxl_mmap_fault,
};
/*
* Map a per-context mmio space into the given vma.
*/
int cxl_context_iomap(struct cxl_context *ctx, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
u64 start = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
u64 len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
if (ctx->afu->current_mode == CXL_MODE_DEDICATED) {
if (start + len > ctx->afu->adapter->ps_size)
return -EINVAL;
if (cxl_is_power9()) {
/*
* Make sure there is a valid problem state
* area space for this AFU.
*/
if (ctx->master && !ctx->afu->psa) {
pr_devel("AFU doesn't support mmio space\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Can't mmap until the AFU is enabled */
if (!ctx->afu->enabled)
return -EBUSY;
}
} else {
if (start + len > ctx->psn_size)
return -EINVAL;
/* Make sure there is a valid per process space for this AFU */
if ((ctx->master && !ctx->afu->psa) || (!ctx->afu->pp_psa)) {
pr_devel("AFU doesn't support mmio space\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Can't mmap until the AFU is enabled */
if (!ctx->afu->enabled)
return -EBUSY;
}
pr_devel("%s: mmio physical: %llx pe: %i master:%i\n", __func__,
ctx->psn_phys, ctx->pe , ctx->master);
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_ops = &cxl_mmap_vmops;
return 0;
}
/*
* Detach a context from the hardware. This disables interrupts and doesn't
* return until all outstanding interrupts for this context have completed. The
* hardware should no longer access *ctx after this has returned.
*/
int __detach_context(struct cxl_context *ctx)
{
enum cxl_context_status status;
mutex_lock(&ctx->status_mutex);
status = ctx->status;
ctx->status = CLOSED;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->status_mutex);
if (status != STARTED)
return -EBUSY;
/* Only warn if we detached while the link was OK.
* If detach fails when hw is down, we don't care.
*/
WARN_ON(cxl_ops->detach_process(ctx) &&
cxl_ops->link_ok(ctx->afu->adapter, ctx->afu));
flush_work(&ctx->fault_work); /* Only needed for dedicated process */
cxl: Fix DSI misses when the context owning task exits Presently when a user-space process issues CXL_IOCTL_START_WORK ioctl we store the pid of the current task_struct and use it to get pointer to the mm_struct of the process, while processing page or segment faults from the capi card. However this causes issues when the thread that had originally issued the start-work ioctl exits in which case the stored pid is no more valid and the cxl driver is unable to handle faults as the mm_struct corresponding to process is no more accessible. This patch fixes this issue by using the mm_struct of the next alive task in the thread group. This is done by iterating over all the tasks in the thread group starting from thread group leader and calling get_task_mm on each one of them. When a valid mm_struct is obtained the pid of the associated task is stored in the context replacing the exiting one for handling future faults. The patch introduces a new function named get_mem_context that checks if the current task pointed to by ctx->pid is dead? If yes it performs the steps described above. Also a new variable cxl_context.glpid is introduced which stores the pid of the thread group leader associated with the context owning task. Reported-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: Frank Haverkamp <HAVERKAM@de.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-11-24 18:56:18 +08:00
/*
* Wait until no further interrupts are presented by the PSL
* for this context.
*/
if (cxl_ops->irq_wait)
cxl_ops->irq_wait(ctx);
cxl: Fix DSI misses when the context owning task exits Presently when a user-space process issues CXL_IOCTL_START_WORK ioctl we store the pid of the current task_struct and use it to get pointer to the mm_struct of the process, while processing page or segment faults from the capi card. However this causes issues when the thread that had originally issued the start-work ioctl exits in which case the stored pid is no more valid and the cxl driver is unable to handle faults as the mm_struct corresponding to process is no more accessible. This patch fixes this issue by using the mm_struct of the next alive task in the thread group. This is done by iterating over all the tasks in the thread group starting from thread group leader and calling get_task_mm on each one of them. When a valid mm_struct is obtained the pid of the associated task is stored in the context replacing the exiting one for handling future faults. The patch introduces a new function named get_mem_context that checks if the current task pointed to by ctx->pid is dead? If yes it performs the steps described above. Also a new variable cxl_context.glpid is introduced which stores the pid of the thread group leader associated with the context owning task. Reported-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: Frank Haverkamp <HAVERKAM@de.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-11-24 18:56:18 +08:00
/* release the reference to the group leader and mm handling pid */
put_pid(ctx->pid);
cxl: Fix DSI misses when the context owning task exits Presently when a user-space process issues CXL_IOCTL_START_WORK ioctl we store the pid of the current task_struct and use it to get pointer to the mm_struct of the process, while processing page or segment faults from the capi card. However this causes issues when the thread that had originally issued the start-work ioctl exits in which case the stored pid is no more valid and the cxl driver is unable to handle faults as the mm_struct corresponding to process is no more accessible. This patch fixes this issue by using the mm_struct of the next alive task in the thread group. This is done by iterating over all the tasks in the thread group starting from thread group leader and calling get_task_mm on each one of them. When a valid mm_struct is obtained the pid of the associated task is stored in the context replacing the exiting one for handling future faults. The patch introduces a new function named get_mem_context that checks if the current task pointed to by ctx->pid is dead? If yes it performs the steps described above. Also a new variable cxl_context.glpid is introduced which stores the pid of the thread group leader associated with the context owning task. Reported-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: Frank Haverkamp <HAVERKAM@de.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-11-24 18:56:18 +08:00
cxl_ctx_put();
cxl: Prevent adapter reset if an active context exists This patch prevents resetting the cxl adapter via sysfs in presence of one or more active cxl_context on it. This protects against an unrecoverable error caused by PSL owning a dirty cache line even after reset and host tries to touch the same cache line. In case a force reset of the card is required irrespective of any active contexts, the int value -1 can be stored in the 'reset' sysfs attribute of the card. The patch introduces a new atomic_t member named contexts_num inside struct cxl that holds the number of active context attached to the card , which is checked against '0' before proceeding with the reset. To prevent against a race condition where a context is activated just after reset check is performed, the contexts_num is atomically set to '-1' after reset-check to indicate that no more contexts can be activated on the card anymore. Before activating a context we atomically test if contexts_num is non-negative and if so, increment its value by one. In case the value of contexts_num is negative then it indicates that the card is about to be reset and context activation is error-ed out at that point. Fixes: 62fa19d4b4fd ("cxl: Add ability to reset the card") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.0+ Acked-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-10-14 17:38:36 +08:00
/* Decrease the attached context count on the adapter */
cxl_adapter_context_put(ctx->afu->adapter);
/* Decrease the mm count on the context */
cxl_context_mm_count_put(ctx);
ctx->mm = NULL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Detach the given context from the AFU. This doesn't actually
* free the context but it should stop the context running in hardware
* (ie. prevent this context from generating any further interrupts
* so that it can be freed).
*/
void cxl_context_detach(struct cxl_context *ctx)
{
int rc;
rc = __detach_context(ctx);
if (rc)
return;
afu_release_irqs(ctx, ctx);
wake_up_all(&ctx->wq);
}
/*
* Detach all contexts on the given AFU.
*/
void cxl_context_detach_all(struct cxl_afu *afu)
{
struct cxl_context *ctx;
int tmp;
mutex_lock(&afu->contexts_lock);
idr_for_each_entry(&afu->contexts_idr, ctx, tmp) {
/*
* Anything done in here needs to be setup before the IDR is
* created and torn down after the IDR removed
*/
cxl_context_detach(ctx);
/*
* We are force detaching - remove any active PSA mappings so
* userspace cannot interfere with the card if it comes back.
* Easiest way to exercise this is to unbind and rebind the
* driver via sysfs while it is in use.
*/
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (ctx->mapping)
unmap_mapping_range(ctx->mapping, 0, 0, 1);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
}
mutex_unlock(&afu->contexts_lock);
}
static void reclaim_ctx(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct cxl_context *ctx = container_of(rcu, struct cxl_context, rcu);
if (cxl_is_power8())
free_page((u64)ctx->sstp);
cxl: Add alternate MMIO error handling userspace programs using cxl currently have to use two strategies for dealing with MMIO errors simultaneously. They have to check every read for a return of all Fs in case the adapter has gone away and the kernel has not yet noticed, and they have to deal with SIGBUS in case the kernel has already noticed, invalidated the mapping and marked the context as failed. In order to simplify things, this patch adds an alternative approach where the kernel will return a page filled with Fs instead of delivering a SIGBUS. This allows userspace to only need to deal with one of these two error paths, and is intended for use in libraries that use cxl transparently and may not be able to safely install a signal handler. This approach will only work if certain constraints are met. Namely, if the application is both reading and writing to an address in the problem state area it cannot assume that a non-FF read is OK, as it may just be reading out a value it has previously written. Further - since only one page is used per context a write to a given offset would be visible when reading the same offset from a different page in the mapping (this only applies within a single context, not between contexts). An application could deal with this by e.g. making sure it also reads from a read-only offset after any reads to a read/write offset. Due to these constraints, this functionality must be explicitly requested by userspace when starting the context by passing in the CXL_START_WORK_ERR_FF flag. Signed-off-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-07-23 14:43:56 +08:00
if (ctx->ff_page)
__free_page(ctx->ff_page);
ctx->sstp = NULL;
kfree(ctx->irq_bitmap);
2015-11-16 12:03:45 +08:00
/* Drop ref to the afu device taken during cxl_context_init */
cxl_afu_put(ctx->afu);
kfree(ctx);
}
void cxl_context_free(struct cxl_context *ctx)
{
cxl: Fix coredump generation when cxl_get_fd() is used If a process dumps core while owning a cxl file descriptor obtained from an AFU driver (e.g. cxlflash) through the cxl_get_fd() API, the following error occurs: [ 868.027591] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address ... [ 868.027778] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000035edb0 cpu 0x8c: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000003c688275e0] pc: c00000000035edb0: elf_core_dump+0xd60/0x1300 lr: c00000000035ed80: elf_core_dump+0xd30/0x1300 sp: c000003c68827860 msr: 9000000100009033 dar: c dsisr: 40000000 current = 0xc000003c68780000 paca = 0xc000000001b73200 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 46725, comm = hxesurelock enter ? for help [c000003c68827a60] c00000000036948c do_coredump+0xcec/0x11e0 [c000003c68827c20] c0000000000ce9e0 get_signal+0x540/0x7b0 [c000003c68827d10] c000000000017354 do_signal+0x54/0x2b0 [c000003c68827e00] c00000000001777c do_notify_resume+0xbc/0xd0 [c000003c68827e30] c000000000009838 ret_from_except_lite+0x64/0x68 --- Exception: 300 (Data Access) at 00003fff98ad2918 The root cause is that the address_space structure for the file doesn't define a 'host' member. When cxl allocates a file descriptor, it's using the anonymous inode to back the file, but allocates a private address_space for each context. The private address_space allows to track memory allocation for each context. cxl doesn't define the 'host' member of the address space, i.e. the inode. We don't want to define it as the anonymous inode, since there's no longer a 1-to-1 relation between address_space and inode. To fix it, instead of using the anonymous inode, we introduce a simple pseudo filesystem so that cxl can allocate its own inodes. So we now have one inode for each file and address_space. The pseudo filesystem is only mounted on the first allocation of a file descriptor by cxl_get_fd(). Tested with cxlflash. Signed-off-by: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mrochs@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-11-18 20:00:31 +08:00
if (ctx->kernelapi && ctx->mapping)
cxl_release_mapping(ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->afu->contexts_lock);
idr_remove(&ctx->afu->contexts_idr, ctx->pe);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->afu->contexts_lock);
call_rcu(&ctx->rcu, reclaim_ctx);
}
void cxl_context_mm_count_get(struct cxl_context *ctx)
{
if (ctx->mm)
atomic_inc(&ctx->mm->mm_count);
}
void cxl_context_mm_count_put(struct cxl_context *ctx)
{
if (ctx->mm)
mmdrop(ctx->mm);
}