2
0
mirror of https://github.com/edk2-porting/linux-next.git synced 2024-12-29 15:43:59 +08:00
linux-next/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c

242 lines
5.7 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* linux/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
*/
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/cachetype.h>
#define COLOUR_ALIGN(addr,pgoff) \
((((addr)+SHMLBA-1)&~(SHMLBA-1)) + \
(((pgoff)<<PAGE_SHIFT) & (SHMLBA-1)))
/* gap between mmap and stack */
#define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024UL)
#define MAX_GAP ((TASK_SIZE)/6*5)
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
static int mmap_is_legacy(struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
{
if (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT)
return 1;
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
if (rlim_stack->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
return 1;
return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
}
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd, struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
{
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
unsigned long gap = rlim_stack->rlim_cur;
if (gap < MIN_GAP)
gap = MIN_GAP;
else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
gap = MAX_GAP;
return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - rnd);
}
/*
* We need to ensure that shared mappings are correctly aligned to
* avoid aliasing issues with VIPT caches. We need to ensure that
* a specific page of an object is always mapped at a multiple of
* SHMLBA bytes.
*
* We unconditionally provide this function for all cases, however
* in the VIVT case, we optimise out the alignment rules.
*/
unsigned long
arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int do_align = 0;
int aliasing = cache_is_vipt_aliasing();
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
/*
* We only need to do colour alignment if either the I or D
* caches alias.
*/
if (aliasing)
do_align = filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED);
/*
* We enforce the MAP_FIXED case.
*/
if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
if (aliasing && flags & MAP_SHARED &&
(addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1))
return -EINVAL;
return addr;
}
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
if (addr) {
if (do_align)
addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
else
addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-06-19 19:03:24 +08:00
(!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)))
return addr;
}
info.flags = 0;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
info.align_mask = do_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0;
info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
unsigned long
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
const unsigned long flags)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
unsigned long addr = addr0;
int do_align = 0;
int aliasing = cache_is_vipt_aliasing();
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
/*
* We only need to do colour alignment if either the I or D
* caches alias.
*/
if (aliasing)
do_align = filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED);
/* requested length too big for entire address space */
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
if (aliasing && flags & MAP_SHARED &&
(addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT)) & (SHMLBA - 1))
return -EINVAL;
return addr;
}
/* requesting a specific address */
if (addr) {
if (do_align)
addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
else
addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-06-19 19:03:24 +08:00
(!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)))
return addr;
}
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = FIRST_USER_ADDRESS;
info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base;
info.align_mask = do_align ? (PAGE_MASK & (SHMLBA - 1)) : 0;
info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
/*
* A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
* so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
* can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
* allocations.
*/
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
info.flags = 0;
info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
return addr;
}
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:48:00 +08:00
unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures, arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well. This is an alternative to the solutions in: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442 I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy with building the rest. [1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html This patch (of 10): In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86. This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:41 +08:00
{
unsigned long rnd;
rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures, arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well. This is an alternative to the solutions in: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442 I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy with building the rest. [1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html This patch (of 10): In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86. This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:41 +08:00
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm, struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
{
unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;
arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures, arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well. This is an alternative to the solutions in: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442 I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy with building the rest. [1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html This patch (of 10): In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86. This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:47:41 +08:00
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 06:48:00 +08:00
random_factor = arch_mmap_rnd();
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
if (mmap_is_legacy(rlim_stack)) {
mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor;
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
} else {
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 07:34:53 +08:00
mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor, rlim_stack);
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
}
}
/*
* You really shouldn't be using read() or write() on /dev/mem. This
* might go away in the future.
*/
int valid_phys_addr_range(phys_addr_t addr, size_t size)
{
if (addr < PHYS_OFFSET)
return 0;
if (addr + size > __pa(high_memory - 1) + 1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Do not allow /dev/mem mappings beyond the supported physical range.
*/
int valid_mmap_phys_addr_range(unsigned long pfn, size_t size)
{
return (pfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) <= (1 + (PHYS_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
#include <linux/ioport.h>
/*
* devmem_is_allowed() checks to see if /dev/mem access to a certain
* address is valid. The argument is a physical page number.
* We mimic x86 here by disallowing access to system RAM as well as
* device-exclusive MMIO regions. This effectively disable read()/write()
* on /dev/mem.
*/
int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn)
{
if (iomem_is_exclusive(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
return 0;
if (!page_is_ram(pfn))
return 1;
return 0;
}
#endif