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linux-next/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_SPECIAL_INSNS_H
#define _ASM_X86_SPECIAL_INSNS_H
#ifdef __KERNEL__
x86/asm: Add support for the pcommit instruction Add support for the new pcommit (persistent commit) instruction. This instruction was announced in the document "Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference" with reference number 319433-022: https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/0d/53/319433-022.pdf The pcommit instruction ensures that data that has been flushed from the processor's cache hierarchy with clwb, clflushopt or clflush is accepted to memory and is durable on the DIMM. The primary use case for this is persistent memory. This function shows how to properly use clwb/clflushopt/clflush and pcommit with appropriate fencing: void flush_and_commit_buffer(void *vaddr, unsigned int size) { void *vend = vaddr + size - 1; for (; vaddr < vend; vaddr += boot_cpu_data.x86_clflush_size) clwb(vaddr); /* Flush any possible final partial cacheline */ clwb(vend); /* * sfence to order clwb/clflushopt/clflush cache flushes * mfence via mb() also works */ wmb(); /* pcommit and the required sfence for ordering */ pcommit_sfence(); } After this function completes the data pointed to by vaddr is has been accepted to memory and will be durable if the vaddr points to persistent memory. Pcommit must always be ordered by an mfence or sfence, so to help simplify things we include both the pcommit and the required sfence in the alternatives generated by pcommit_sfence(). The other option is to keep them separated, but on platforms that don't support pcommit this would then turn into: void flush_and_commit_buffer(void *vaddr, unsigned int size) { void *vend = vaddr + size - 1; for (; vaddr < vend; vaddr += boot_cpu_data.x86_clflush_size) clwb(vaddr); /* Flush any possible final partial cacheline */ clwb(vend); /* * sfence to order clwb/clflushopt/clflush cache flushes * mfence via mb() also works */ wmb(); nop(); /* from pcommit(), via alternatives */ /* * sfence to order pcommit * mfence via mb() also works */ wmb(); } This is still correct, but now you've got two fences separated by only a nop. With the commit and the fence together in pcommit_sfence() you avoid the final unneeded fence. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1424367448-24254-1-git-send-email-ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-20 01:37:28 +08:00
#include <asm/nops.h>
x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits Several recent exploits have used direct calls to the native_write_cr4() function to disable SMEP and SMAP before then continuing their exploits using userspace memory access. Direct calls of this form can be mitigate by pinning bits of CR4 so that they cannot be changed through a common function. This is not intended to be a general ROP protection (which would require CFI to defend against properly), but rather a way to avoid trivial direct function calling (or CFI bypasses via a matching function prototype) as seen in: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html (https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-7308) The goals of this change: - Pin specific bits (SMEP, SMAP, and UMIP) when writing CR4. - Avoid setting the bits too early (they must become pinned only after CPU feature detection and selection has finished). - Pinning mask needs to be read-only during normal runtime. - Pinning needs to be checked after write to validate the cr4 state Using __ro_after_init on the mask is done so it can't be first disabled with a malicious write. Since these bits are global state (once established by the boot CPU and kernel boot parameters), they are safe to write to secondary CPUs before those CPUs have finished feature detection. As such, the bits are set at the first cr4 write, so that cr4 write bugs can be detected (instead of silently papered over). This uses a few bytes less storage of a location we don't have: read-only per-CPU data. A check is performed after the register write because an attack could just skip directly to the register write. Such a direct jump is possible because of how this function may be built by the compiler (especially due to the removal of frame pointers) where it doesn't add a stack frame (function exit may only be a retq without pops) which is sufficient for trivial exploitation like in the timer overwrites mentioned above). The asm argument constraints gain the "+" modifier to convince the compiler that it shouldn't make ordering assumptions about the arguments or memory, and treat them as changed. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190618045503.39105-3-keescook@chromium.org
2019-06-18 12:55:02 +08:00
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <linux/irqflags.h>
x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits Several recent exploits have used direct calls to the native_write_cr4() function to disable SMEP and SMAP before then continuing their exploits using userspace memory access. Direct calls of this form can be mitigate by pinning bits of CR4 so that they cannot be changed through a common function. This is not intended to be a general ROP protection (which would require CFI to defend against properly), but rather a way to avoid trivial direct function calling (or CFI bypasses via a matching function prototype) as seen in: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html (https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-7308) The goals of this change: - Pin specific bits (SMEP, SMAP, and UMIP) when writing CR4. - Avoid setting the bits too early (they must become pinned only after CPU feature detection and selection has finished). - Pinning mask needs to be read-only during normal runtime. - Pinning needs to be checked after write to validate the cr4 state Using __ro_after_init on the mask is done so it can't be first disabled with a malicious write. Since these bits are global state (once established by the boot CPU and kernel boot parameters), they are safe to write to secondary CPUs before those CPUs have finished feature detection. As such, the bits are set at the first cr4 write, so that cr4 write bugs can be detected (instead of silently papered over). This uses a few bytes less storage of a location we don't have: read-only per-CPU data. A check is performed after the register write because an attack could just skip directly to the register write. Such a direct jump is possible because of how this function may be built by the compiler (especially due to the removal of frame pointers) where it doesn't add a stack frame (function exit may only be a retq without pops) which is sufficient for trivial exploitation like in the timer overwrites mentioned above). The asm argument constraints gain the "+" modifier to convince the compiler that it shouldn't make ordering assumptions about the arguments or memory, and treat them as changed. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190618045503.39105-3-keescook@chromium.org
2019-06-18 12:55:02 +08:00
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
x86/asm: Add support for the pcommit instruction Add support for the new pcommit (persistent commit) instruction. This instruction was announced in the document "Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference" with reference number 319433-022: https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/0d/53/319433-022.pdf The pcommit instruction ensures that data that has been flushed from the processor's cache hierarchy with clwb, clflushopt or clflush is accepted to memory and is durable on the DIMM. The primary use case for this is persistent memory. This function shows how to properly use clwb/clflushopt/clflush and pcommit with appropriate fencing: void flush_and_commit_buffer(void *vaddr, unsigned int size) { void *vend = vaddr + size - 1; for (; vaddr < vend; vaddr += boot_cpu_data.x86_clflush_size) clwb(vaddr); /* Flush any possible final partial cacheline */ clwb(vend); /* * sfence to order clwb/clflushopt/clflush cache flushes * mfence via mb() also works */ wmb(); /* pcommit and the required sfence for ordering */ pcommit_sfence(); } After this function completes the data pointed to by vaddr is has been accepted to memory and will be durable if the vaddr points to persistent memory. Pcommit must always be ordered by an mfence or sfence, so to help simplify things we include both the pcommit and the required sfence in the alternatives generated by pcommit_sfence(). The other option is to keep them separated, but on platforms that don't support pcommit this would then turn into: void flush_and_commit_buffer(void *vaddr, unsigned int size) { void *vend = vaddr + size - 1; for (; vaddr < vend; vaddr += boot_cpu_data.x86_clflush_size) clwb(vaddr); /* Flush any possible final partial cacheline */ clwb(vend); /* * sfence to order clwb/clflushopt/clflush cache flushes * mfence via mb() also works */ wmb(); nop(); /* from pcommit(), via alternatives */ /* * sfence to order pcommit * mfence via mb() also works */ wmb(); } This is still correct, but now you've got two fences separated by only a nop. With the commit and the fence together in pcommit_sfence() you avoid the final unneeded fence. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1424367448-24254-1-git-send-email-ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-02-20 01:37:28 +08:00
/*
* Volatile isn't enough to prevent the compiler from reordering the
* read/write functions for the control registers and messing everything up.
* A memory clobber would solve the problem, but would prevent reordering of
* all loads stores around it, which can hurt performance. Solution is to
* use a variable and mimic reads and writes to it to enforce serialization
*/
extern unsigned long __force_order;
2019-07-11 03:42:46 +08:00
void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val);
x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits Several recent exploits have used direct calls to the native_write_cr4() function to disable SMEP and SMAP before then continuing their exploits using userspace memory access. Direct calls of this form can be mitigate by pinning bits of CR4 so that they cannot be changed through a common function. This is not intended to be a general ROP protection (which would require CFI to defend against properly), but rather a way to avoid trivial direct function calling (or CFI bypasses via a matching function prototype) as seen in: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html (https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-7308) The goals of this change: - Pin specific bits (SMEP, SMAP, and UMIP) when writing CR4. - Avoid setting the bits too early (they must become pinned only after CPU feature detection and selection has finished). - Pinning mask needs to be read-only during normal runtime. - Pinning needs to be checked after write to validate the cr4 state Using __ro_after_init on the mask is done so it can't be first disabled with a malicious write. Since these bits are global state (once established by the boot CPU and kernel boot parameters), they are safe to write to secondary CPUs before those CPUs have finished feature detection. As such, the bits are set at the first cr4 write, so that cr4 write bugs can be detected (instead of silently papered over). This uses a few bytes less storage of a location we don't have: read-only per-CPU data. A check is performed after the register write because an attack could just skip directly to the register write. Such a direct jump is possible because of how this function may be built by the compiler (especially due to the removal of frame pointers) where it doesn't add a stack frame (function exit may only be a retq without pops) which is sufficient for trivial exploitation like in the timer overwrites mentioned above). The asm argument constraints gain the "+" modifier to convince the compiler that it shouldn't make ordering assumptions about the arguments or memory, and treat them as changed. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190618045503.39105-3-keescook@chromium.org
2019-06-18 12:55:02 +08:00
static inline unsigned long native_read_cr0(void)
{
unsigned long val;
asm volatile("mov %%cr0,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
return val;
}
static __always_inline unsigned long native_read_cr2(void)
{
unsigned long val;
asm volatile("mov %%cr2,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
return val;
}
static __always_inline void native_write_cr2(unsigned long val)
{
asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr2": : "r" (val), "m" (__force_order));
}
static inline unsigned long __native_read_cr3(void)
{
unsigned long val;
asm volatile("mov %%cr3,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
return val;
}
static inline void native_write_cr3(unsigned long val)
{
asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr3": : "r" (val), "m" (__force_order));
}
static inline unsigned long native_read_cr4(void)
{
unsigned long val;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* This could fault if CR4 does not exist. Non-existent CR4
* is functionally equivalent to CR4 == 0. Keep it simple and pretend
* that CR4 == 0 on CPUs that don't have CR4.
*/
asm volatile("1: mov %%cr4, %0\n"
"2:\n"
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b)
: "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order) : "0" (0));
#else
/* CR4 always exists on x86_64. */
asm volatile("mov %%cr4,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
#endif
return val;
}
2019-07-11 03:42:46 +08:00
void native_write_cr4(unsigned long val);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
static inline u32 rdpkru(void)
{
u32 ecx = 0;
u32 edx, pkru;
/*
* "rdpkru" instruction. Places PKRU contents in to EAX,
* clears EDX and requires that ecx=0.
*/
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
: "=a" (pkru), "=d" (edx)
: "c" (ecx));
return pkru;
}
static inline void wrpkru(u32 pkru)
{
u32 ecx = 0, edx = 0;
/*
* "wrpkru" instruction. Loads contents in EAX to PKRU,
* requires that ecx = edx = 0.
*/
asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
: : "a" (pkru), "c"(ecx), "d"(edx));
}
static inline void __write_pkru(u32 pkru)
{
/*
* WRPKRU is relatively expensive compared to RDPKRU.
* Avoid WRPKRU when it would not change the value.
*/
if (pkru == rdpkru())
return;
wrpkru(pkru);
}
#else
static inline u32 rdpkru(void)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void __write_pkru(u32 pkru)
{
}
#endif
static inline void native_wbinvd(void)
{
asm volatile("wbinvd": : :"memory");
}
extern asmlinkage void asm_load_gs_index(unsigned int selector);
static inline void native_load_gs_index(unsigned int selector)
{
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
asm_load_gs_index(selector);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
static inline unsigned long __read_cr4(void)
{
return native_read_cr4();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#else
static inline unsigned long read_cr0(void)
{
return native_read_cr0();
}
static inline void write_cr0(unsigned long x)
{
native_write_cr0(x);
}
static __always_inline unsigned long read_cr2(void)
{
return native_read_cr2();
}
static __always_inline void write_cr2(unsigned long x)
{
native_write_cr2(x);
}
/*
* Careful! CR3 contains more than just an address. You probably want
* read_cr3_pa() instead.
*/
static inline unsigned long __read_cr3(void)
{
return __native_read_cr3();
}
static inline void write_cr3(unsigned long x)
{
native_write_cr3(x);
}
static inline void __write_cr4(unsigned long x)
{
native_write_cr4(x);
}
static inline void wbinvd(void)
{
native_wbinvd();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static inline void load_gs_index(unsigned int selector)
{
native_load_gs_index(selector);
}
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL */
static inline void clflush(volatile void *__p)
{
asm volatile("clflush %0" : "+m" (*(volatile char __force *)__p));
}
static inline void clflushopt(volatile void *__p)
{
alternative_io(".byte " __stringify(NOP_DS_PREFIX) "; clflush %P0",
".byte 0x66; clflush %P0",
X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT,
"+m" (*(volatile char __force *)__p));
}
x86/asm: Add support for the CLWB instruction Add support for the new CLWB (cache line write back) instruction. This instruction was announced in the document "Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference" with reference number 319433-022. https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/0d/53/319433-022.pdf The CLWB instruction is used to write back the contents of dirtied cache lines to memory without evicting the cache lines from the processor's cache hierarchy. This should be used in favor of clflushopt or clflush in cases where you require the cache line to be written to memory but plan to access the data again in the near future. One of the main use cases for this is with persistent memory where CLWB can be used with PCOMMIT to ensure that data has been accepted to memory and is durable on the DIMM. This function shows how to properly use CLWB/CLFLUSHOPT/CLFLUSH and PCOMMIT with appropriate fencing: void flush_and_commit_buffer(void *vaddr, unsigned int size) { void *vend = vaddr + size - 1; for (; vaddr < vend; vaddr += boot_cpu_data.x86_clflush_size) clwb(vaddr); /* Flush any possible final partial cacheline */ clwb(vend); /* * Use SFENCE to order CLWB/CLFLUSHOPT/CLFLUSH cache flushes. * (MFENCE via mb() also works) */ wmb(); /* PCOMMIT and the required SFENCE for ordering */ pcommit_sfence(); } After this function completes the data pointed to by vaddr is has been accepted to memory and will be durable if the vaddr points to persistent memory. Regarding the details of how the alternatives assembly is set up, we need one additional byte at the beginning of the CLFLUSH so that we can flip it into a CLFLUSHOPT by changing that byte into a 0x66 prefix. Two options are to either insert a 1 byte ASM_NOP1, or to add a 1 byte NOP_DS_PREFIX. Both have no functional effect with the plain CLFLUSH, but I've been told that executing a CLFLUSH + prefix should be faster than executing a CLFLUSH + NOP. We had to hard code the assembly for CLWB because, lacking the ability to assemble the CLWB instruction itself, the next closest thing is to have an xsaveopt instruction with a 0x66 prefix. Unfortunately XSAVEOPT itself is also relatively new, and isn't included by all the GCC versions that the kernel needs to support. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422377631-8986-3-git-send-email-ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-01-28 00:53:51 +08:00
static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
{
volatile struct { char x[64]; } *p = __p;
asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE_2(
".byte " __stringify(NOP_DS_PREFIX) "; clflush (%[pax])",
".byte 0x66; clflush (%[pax])", /* clflushopt (%%rax) */
X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT,
".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0xae, 0x30", /* clwb (%%rax) */
X86_FEATURE_CLWB)
: [p] "+m" (*p)
: [pax] "a" (p));
}
#define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SPECIAL_INSNS_H */