License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| reg_ld_str.c |
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| All of the functions which transfer data between user memory and FPU_REGs.|
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| Copyright (C) 1992,1993,1994,1996,1997 |
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| W. Metzenthen, 22 Parker St, Ormond, Vic 3163, Australia |
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| E-mail billm@suburbia.net |
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+---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
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/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| Note: |
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| The file contains code which accesses user memory. |
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| Emulator static data may change when user memory is accessed, due to |
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| other processes using the emulator while swapping is in progress. |
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+---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
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#include "fpu_emu.h"
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2016-12-25 03:46:01 +08:00
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#include "fpu_system.h"
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#include "exception.h"
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#include "reg_constant.h"
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#include "control_w.h"
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#include "status_w.h"
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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#define DOUBLE_Emax 1023 /* largest valid exponent */
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#define DOUBLE_Ebias 1023
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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#define DOUBLE_Emin (-1022) /* smallest valid exponent */
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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#define SINGLE_Emax 127 /* largest valid exponent */
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#define SINGLE_Ebias 127
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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#define SINGLE_Emin (-126) /* smallest valid exponent */
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
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static u_char normalize_no_excep(FPU_REG *r, int exp, int sign)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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u_char tag;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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setexponent16(r, exp);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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tag = FPU_normalize_nuo(r);
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stdexp(r);
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if (sign)
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setnegative(r);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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return tag;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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}
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2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
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int FPU_tagof(FPU_REG *ptr)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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int exp;
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exp = exponent16(ptr) & 0x7fff;
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if (exp == 0) {
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if (!(ptr->sigh | ptr->sigl)) {
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return TAG_Zero;
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}
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/* The number is a de-normal or pseudodenormal. */
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return TAG_Special;
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}
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if (exp == 0x7fff) {
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/* Is an Infinity, a NaN, or an unsupported data type. */
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return TAG_Special;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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}
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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if (!(ptr->sigh & 0x80000000)) {
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/* Unsupported data type. */
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/* Valid numbers have the ms bit set to 1. */
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/* Unnormal. */
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return TAG_Special;
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}
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return TAG_Valid;
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}
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/* Get a long double from user memory */
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2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
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int FPU_load_extended(long double __user *s, int stnr)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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FPU_REG *sti_ptr = &st(stnr);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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FPU_access_ok(s, 10);
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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__copy_from_user(sti_ptr, s, 10);
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RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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return FPU_tagof(sti_ptr);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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}
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/* Get a double from user memory */
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2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
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int FPU_load_double(double __user *dfloat, FPU_REG *loaded_data)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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int exp, tag, negative;
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unsigned m64, l64;
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RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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FPU_access_ok(dfloat, 8);
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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FPU_get_user(m64, 1 + (unsigned long __user *)dfloat);
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FPU_get_user(l64, (unsigned long __user *)dfloat);
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RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
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negative = (m64 & 0x80000000) ? SIGN_Negative : SIGN_Positive;
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exp = ((m64 & 0x7ff00000) >> 20) - DOUBLE_Ebias + EXTENDED_Ebias;
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m64 &= 0xfffff;
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if (exp > DOUBLE_Emax + EXTENDED_Ebias) {
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/* Infinity or NaN */
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if ((m64 == 0) && (l64 == 0)) {
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/* +- infinity */
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loaded_data->sigh = 0x80000000;
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loaded_data->sigl = 0x00000000;
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exp = EXP_Infinity + EXTENDED_Ebias;
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tag = TAG_Special;
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} else {
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/* Must be a signaling or quiet NaN */
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exp = EXP_NaN + EXTENDED_Ebias;
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loaded_data->sigh = (m64 << 11) | 0x80000000;
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loaded_data->sigh |= l64 >> 21;
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loaded_data->sigl = l64 << 11;
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tag = TAG_Special; /* The calling function must look for NaNs */
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}
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} else if (exp < DOUBLE_Emin + EXTENDED_Ebias) {
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/* Zero or de-normal */
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if ((m64 == 0) && (l64 == 0)) {
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/* Zero */
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reg_copy(&CONST_Z, loaded_data);
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exp = 0;
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tag = TAG_Zero;
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} else {
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/* De-normal */
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loaded_data->sigh = m64 << 11;
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loaded_data->sigh |= l64 >> 21;
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loaded_data->sigl = l64 << 11;
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return normalize_no_excep(loaded_data, DOUBLE_Emin,
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negative)
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| (denormal_operand() < 0 ? FPU_Exception : 0);
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}
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} else {
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loaded_data->sigh = (m64 << 11) | 0x80000000;
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loaded_data->sigh |= l64 >> 21;
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loaded_data->sigl = l64 << 11;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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tag = TAG_Valid;
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}
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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setexponent16(loaded_data, exp | negative);
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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return tag;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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}
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/* Get a float from user memory */
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2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
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int FPU_load_single(float __user *single, FPU_REG *loaded_data)
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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{
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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unsigned m32;
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int exp, tag, negative;
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RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
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FPU_access_ok(single, 4);
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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FPU_get_user(m32, (unsigned long __user *)single);
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RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
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negative = (m32 & 0x80000000) ? SIGN_Negative : SIGN_Positive;
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if (!(m32 & 0x7fffffff)) {
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/* Zero */
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reg_copy(&CONST_Z, loaded_data);
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addexponent(loaded_data, negative);
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return TAG_Zero;
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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}
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2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
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exp = ((m32 & 0x7f800000) >> 23) - SINGLE_Ebias + EXTENDED_Ebias;
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m32 = (m32 & 0x7fffff) << 8;
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if (exp < SINGLE_Emin + EXTENDED_Ebias) {
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/* De-normals */
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loaded_data->sigh = m32;
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loaded_data->sigl = 0;
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return normalize_no_excep(loaded_data, SINGLE_Emin, negative)
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| (denormal_operand() < 0 ? FPU_Exception : 0);
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} else if (exp > SINGLE_Emax + EXTENDED_Ebias) {
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/* Infinity or NaN */
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if (m32 == 0) {
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/* +- infinity */
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loaded_data->sigh = 0x80000000;
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loaded_data->sigl = 0x00000000;
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exp = EXP_Infinity + EXTENDED_Ebias;
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|
|
|
tag = TAG_Special;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Must be a signaling or quiet NaN */
|
|
|
|
exp = EXP_NaN + EXTENDED_Ebias;
|
|
|
|
loaded_data->sigh = m32 | 0x80000000;
|
|
|
|
loaded_data->sigl = 0;
|
|
|
|
tag = TAG_Special; /* The calling function must look for NaNs */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
loaded_data->sigh = m32 | 0x80000000;
|
|
|
|
loaded_data->sigl = 0;
|
|
|
|
tag = TAG_Valid;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
setexponent16(loaded_data, exp | negative); /* Set the sign. */
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return tag;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get a long long from user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_load_int64(long long __user *_s)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
long long s;
|
|
|
|
int sign;
|
|
|
|
FPU_REG *st0_ptr = &st(0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(_s, 8);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&s, _s, 8))
|
|
|
|
FPU_abort;
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s == 0) {
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(&CONST_Z, st0_ptr);
|
|
|
|
return TAG_Zero;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s > 0)
|
|
|
|
sign = SIGN_Positive;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
s = -s;
|
|
|
|
sign = SIGN_Negative;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
significand(st0_ptr) = s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return normalize_no_excep(st0_ptr, 63, sign);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get a long from user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_load_int32(long __user *_s, FPU_REG *loaded_data)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
long s;
|
|
|
|
int negative;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(_s, 4);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(s, _s);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s == 0) {
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(&CONST_Z, loaded_data);
|
|
|
|
return TAG_Zero;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s > 0)
|
|
|
|
negative = SIGN_Positive;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
s = -s;
|
|
|
|
negative = SIGN_Negative;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
loaded_data->sigh = s;
|
|
|
|
loaded_data->sigl = 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return normalize_no_excep(loaded_data, 31, negative);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get a short from user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_load_int16(short __user *_s, FPU_REG *loaded_data)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
int s, negative;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(_s, 2);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Cast as short to get the sign extended. */
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(s, _s);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s == 0) {
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(&CONST_Z, loaded_data);
|
|
|
|
return TAG_Zero;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s > 0)
|
|
|
|
negative = SIGN_Positive;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
s = -s;
|
|
|
|
negative = SIGN_Negative;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
loaded_data->sigh = s << 16;
|
|
|
|
loaded_data->sigl = 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return normalize_no_excep(loaded_data, 15, negative);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get a packed bcd array from user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_load_bcd(u_char __user *s)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_REG *st0_ptr = &st(0);
|
|
|
|
int pos;
|
|
|
|
u_char bcd;
|
|
|
|
long long l = 0;
|
|
|
|
int sign;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(s, 10);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
for (pos = 8; pos >= 0; pos--) {
|
|
|
|
l *= 10;
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(bcd, s + pos);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
l += bcd >> 4;
|
|
|
|
l *= 10;
|
|
|
|
l += bcd & 0x0f;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(sign, s + 9);
|
|
|
|
sign = sign & 0x80 ? SIGN_Negative : SIGN_Positive;
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (l == 0) {
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(&CONST_Z, st0_ptr);
|
|
|
|
addexponent(st0_ptr, sign); /* Set the sign. */
|
|
|
|
return TAG_Zero;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
significand(st0_ptr) = l;
|
|
|
|
return normalize_no_excep(st0_ptr, 63, sign);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*===========================================================================*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put a long double into user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_store_extended(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag,
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
long double __user * d)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
The only exception raised by an attempt to store to an
|
|
|
|
extended format is the Invalid Stack exception, i.e.
|
|
|
|
attempting to store from an empty register.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (st0_tag != TAG_Empty) {
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 10);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(st0_ptr->sigl, (unsigned long __user *)d);
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(st0_ptr->sigh,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long __user *)((u_char __user *) d + 4));
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(exponent16(st0_ptr),
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)((u_char __user *) d +
|
|
|
|
8));
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Empty register (stack underflow) */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_StackUnder);
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & CW_Invalid) {
|
|
|
|
/* The masked response */
|
|
|
|
/* Put out the QNaN indefinite */
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 10);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)d);
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0xc0000000, 1 + (unsigned long __user *)d);
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0xffff, 4 + (short __user *)d);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put a double into user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_store_double(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, double __user *dfloat)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long l[2];
|
|
|
|
unsigned long increment = 0; /* avoid gcc warnings */
|
|
|
|
int precision_loss;
|
|
|
|
int exp;
|
|
|
|
FPU_REG tmp;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-03-19 09:54:45 +08:00
|
|
|
l[0] = 0;
|
|
|
|
l[1] = 0;
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (st0_tag == TAG_Valid) {
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(st0_ptr, &tmp);
|
|
|
|
exp = exponent(&tmp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (exp < DOUBLE_Emin) { /* It may be a denormal */
|
|
|
|
addexponent(&tmp, -DOUBLE_Emin + 52); /* largest exp to be 51 */
|
2008-03-19 09:54:45 +08:00
|
|
|
denormal_arg:
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((precision_loss = FPU_round_to_int(&tmp, st0_tag))) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PECULIAR_486
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Did it round to a non-denormal ? */
|
|
|
|
/* This behaviour might be regarded as peculiar, it appears
|
|
|
|
that the 80486 rounds to the dest precision, then
|
|
|
|
converts to decide underflow. */
|
|
|
|
if (!
|
|
|
|
((tmp.sigh == 0x00100000) && (tmp.sigl == 0)
|
|
|
|
&& (st0_ptr->sigl & 0x000007ff)))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* PECULIAR_486 */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Underflow);
|
|
|
|
/* This is a special case: see sec 16.2.5.1 of
|
|
|
|
the 80486 book */
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Underflow))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(precision_loss);
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Precision))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
l[0] = tmp.sigl;
|
|
|
|
l[1] = tmp.sigh;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (tmp.sigl & 0x000007ff) {
|
|
|
|
precision_loss = 1;
|
|
|
|
switch (control_word & CW_RC) {
|
|
|
|
case RC_RND:
|
|
|
|
/* Rounding can get a little messy.. */
|
|
|
|
increment = ((tmp.sigl & 0x7ff) > 0x400) | /* nearest */
|
|
|
|
((tmp.sigl & 0xc00) == 0xc00); /* odd -> even */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_DOWN: /* towards -infinity */
|
|
|
|
increment =
|
|
|
|
signpositive(&tmp) ? 0 : tmp.
|
|
|
|
sigl & 0x7ff;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_UP: /* towards +infinity */
|
|
|
|
increment =
|
|
|
|
signpositive(&tmp) ? tmp.
|
|
|
|
sigl & 0x7ff : 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_CHOP:
|
|
|
|
increment = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Truncate the mantissa */
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigl &= 0xfffff800;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (increment) {
|
|
|
|
if (tmp.sigl >= 0xfffff800) {
|
|
|
|
/* the sigl part overflows */
|
|
|
|
if (tmp.sigh == 0xffffffff) {
|
|
|
|
/* The sigh part overflows */
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigh = 0x80000000;
|
|
|
|
exp++;
|
|
|
|
if (exp >= EXP_OVER)
|
|
|
|
goto overflow;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigh++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigl = 0x00000000;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* We only need to increment sigl */
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigl += 0x00000800;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
precision_loss = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l[0] = (tmp.sigl >> 11) | (tmp.sigh << 21);
|
|
|
|
l[1] = ((tmp.sigh >> 11) & 0xfffff);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (exp > DOUBLE_Emax) {
|
|
|
|
overflow:
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Overflow);
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Overflow))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag_up();
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Precision))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is a special case: see sec 16.2.5.1 of the 80486 book */
|
|
|
|
/* Overflow to infinity */
|
2008-03-19 09:54:45 +08:00
|
|
|
l[1] = 0x7ff00000; /* Set to + INF */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (precision_loss) {
|
|
|
|
if (increment)
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag_up();
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag_down();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add the exponent */
|
|
|
|
l[1] |= (((exp + DOUBLE_Ebias) & 0x7ff) << 20);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Zero) {
|
|
|
|
/* Number is zero */
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Special) {
|
|
|
|
st0_tag = FPU_Special(st0_ptr);
|
|
|
|
if (st0_tag == TW_Denormal) {
|
|
|
|
/* A denormal will always underflow. */
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef PECULIAR_486
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* An 80486 is supposed to be able to generate
|
|
|
|
a denormal exception here, but... */
|
|
|
|
/* Underflow has priority. */
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & CW_Underflow)
|
|
|
|
denormal_operand();
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* PECULIAR_486 */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
reg_copy(st0_ptr, &tmp);
|
|
|
|
goto denormal_arg;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TW_Infinity) {
|
|
|
|
l[1] = 0x7ff00000;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TW_NaN) {
|
|
|
|
/* Is it really a NaN ? */
|
|
|
|
if ((exponent(st0_ptr) == EXP_OVER)
|
|
|
|
&& (st0_ptr->sigh & 0x80000000)) {
|
|
|
|
/* See if we can get a valid NaN from the FPU_REG */
|
|
|
|
l[0] =
|
|
|
|
(st0_ptr->sigl >> 11) | (st0_ptr->
|
|
|
|
sigh << 21);
|
|
|
|
l[1] = ((st0_ptr->sigh >> 11) & 0xfffff);
|
|
|
|
if (!(st0_ptr->sigh & 0x40000000)) {
|
|
|
|
/* It is a signalling NaN */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Invalid))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
l[1] |= (0x40000000 >> 11);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l[1] |= 0x7ff00000;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* It is an unsupported data type */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Invalid))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
l[1] = 0xfff80000;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Empty) {
|
|
|
|
/* Empty register (stack underflow) */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_StackUnder);
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & CW_Invalid) {
|
|
|
|
/* The masked response */
|
|
|
|
/* Put out the QNaN indefinite */
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(dfloat, 8);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)dfloat);
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0xfff80000,
|
|
|
|
1 + (unsigned long __user *)dfloat);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (getsign(st0_ptr))
|
|
|
|
l[1] |= 0x80000000;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(dfloat, 8);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(l[0], (unsigned long __user *)dfloat);
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(l[1], 1 + (unsigned long __user *)dfloat);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put a float into user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_store_single(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, float __user *single)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
long templ = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long increment = 0; /* avoid gcc warnings */
|
|
|
|
int precision_loss;
|
|
|
|
int exp;
|
|
|
|
FPU_REG tmp;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (st0_tag == TAG_Valid) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
reg_copy(st0_ptr, &tmp);
|
|
|
|
exp = exponent(&tmp);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (exp < SINGLE_Emin) {
|
|
|
|
addexponent(&tmp, -SINGLE_Emin + 23); /* largest exp to be 22 */
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
denormal_arg:
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((precision_loss = FPU_round_to_int(&tmp, st0_tag))) {
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PECULIAR_486
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Did it round to a non-denormal ? */
|
|
|
|
/* This behaviour might be regarded as peculiar, it appears
|
|
|
|
that the 80486 rounds to the dest precision, then
|
|
|
|
converts to decide underflow. */
|
|
|
|
if (!((tmp.sigl == 0x00800000) &&
|
|
|
|
((st0_ptr->sigh & 0x000000ff)
|
|
|
|
|| st0_ptr->sigl)))
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* PECULIAR_486 */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Underflow);
|
|
|
|
/* This is a special case: see sec 16.2.5.1 of
|
|
|
|
the 80486 book */
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Underflow))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(precision_loss);
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Precision))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
templ = tmp.sigl;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (tmp.sigl | (tmp.sigh & 0x000000ff)) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long sigh = tmp.sigh;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long sigl = tmp.sigl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
precision_loss = 1;
|
|
|
|
switch (control_word & CW_RC) {
|
|
|
|
case RC_RND:
|
|
|
|
increment = ((sigh & 0xff) > 0x80) /* more than half */
|
|
|
|
||(((sigh & 0xff) == 0x80) && sigl) /* more than half */
|
|
|
|
||((sigh & 0x180) == 0x180); /* round to even */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_DOWN: /* towards -infinity */
|
|
|
|
increment = signpositive(&tmp)
|
|
|
|
? 0 : (sigl | (sigh & 0xff));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_UP: /* towards +infinity */
|
|
|
|
increment = signpositive(&tmp)
|
|
|
|
? (sigl | (sigh & 0xff)) : 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_CHOP:
|
|
|
|
increment = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Truncate part of the mantissa */
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigl = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (increment) {
|
|
|
|
if (sigh >= 0xffffff00) {
|
|
|
|
/* The sigh part overflows */
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigh = 0x80000000;
|
|
|
|
exp++;
|
|
|
|
if (exp >= EXP_OVER)
|
|
|
|
goto overflow;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigh &= 0xffffff00;
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigh += 0x100;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
tmp.sigh &= 0xffffff00; /* Finish the truncation */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
precision_loss = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
templ = (tmp.sigh >> 8) & 0x007fffff;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (exp > SINGLE_Emax) {
|
|
|
|
overflow:
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Overflow);
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Overflow))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag_up();
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Precision))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is a special case: see sec 16.2.5.1 of the 80486 book. */
|
|
|
|
/* Masked response is overflow to infinity. */
|
|
|
|
templ = 0x7f800000;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (precision_loss) {
|
|
|
|
if (increment)
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag_up();
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag_down();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add the exponent */
|
|
|
|
templ |= ((exp + SINGLE_Ebias) & 0xff) << 23;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Zero) {
|
|
|
|
templ = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Special) {
|
|
|
|
st0_tag = FPU_Special(st0_ptr);
|
|
|
|
if (st0_tag == TW_Denormal) {
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(st0_ptr, &tmp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* A denormal will always underflow. */
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef PECULIAR_486
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* An 80486 is supposed to be able to generate
|
|
|
|
a denormal exception here, but... */
|
|
|
|
/* Underflow has priority. */
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & CW_Underflow)
|
|
|
|
denormal_operand();
|
|
|
|
#endif /* PECULIAR_486 */
|
|
|
|
goto denormal_arg;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TW_Infinity) {
|
|
|
|
templ = 0x7f800000;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TW_NaN) {
|
|
|
|
/* Is it really a NaN ? */
|
|
|
|
if ((exponent(st0_ptr) == EXP_OVER)
|
|
|
|
&& (st0_ptr->sigh & 0x80000000)) {
|
|
|
|
/* See if we can get a valid NaN from the FPU_REG */
|
|
|
|
templ = st0_ptr->sigh >> 8;
|
|
|
|
if (!(st0_ptr->sigh & 0x40000000)) {
|
|
|
|
/* It is a signalling NaN */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Invalid))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
templ |= (0x40000000 >> 8);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
templ |= 0x7f800000;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* It is an unsupported data type */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
if (!(control_word & CW_Invalid))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
templ = 0xffc00000;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef PARANOID
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_INTERNAL | 0x164);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Empty) {
|
|
|
|
/* Empty register (stack underflow) */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_StackUnder);
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & EX_Invalid) {
|
|
|
|
/* The masked response */
|
|
|
|
/* Put out the QNaN indefinite */
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(single, 4);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0xffc00000,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long __user *)single);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef PARANOID
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_INTERNAL | 0x163);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (getsign(st0_ptr))
|
|
|
|
templ |= 0x80000000;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(single, 4);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(templ, (unsigned long __user *)single);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put a long long into user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_store_int64(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, long long __user *d)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_REG t;
|
|
|
|
long long tll;
|
|
|
|
int precision_loss;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (st0_tag == TAG_Empty) {
|
|
|
|
/* Empty register (stack underflow) */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_StackUnder);
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_operand;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Special) {
|
|
|
|
st0_tag = FPU_Special(st0_ptr);
|
|
|
|
if ((st0_tag == TW_Infinity) || (st0_tag == TW_NaN)) {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_operand;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(st0_ptr, &t);
|
|
|
|
precision_loss = FPU_round_to_int(&t, st0_tag);
|
|
|
|
((long *)&tll)[0] = t.sigl;
|
|
|
|
((long *)&tll)[1] = t.sigh;
|
|
|
|
if ((precision_loss == 1) ||
|
|
|
|
((t.sigh & 0x80000000) &&
|
|
|
|
!((t.sigh == 0x80000000) && (t.sigl == 0) && signnegative(&t)))) {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
/* This is a special case: see sec 16.2.5.1 of the 80486 book */
|
|
|
|
invalid_operand:
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & EX_Invalid) {
|
|
|
|
/* Produce something like QNaN "indefinite" */
|
|
|
|
tll = 0x8000000000000000LL;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (precision_loss)
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag(precision_loss);
|
|
|
|
if (signnegative(&t))
|
|
|
|
tll = -tll;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 8);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(d, &tll, 8))
|
|
|
|
FPU_abort;
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put a long into user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_store_int32(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, long __user *d)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_REG t;
|
|
|
|
int precision_loss;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (st0_tag == TAG_Empty) {
|
|
|
|
/* Empty register (stack underflow) */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_StackUnder);
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_operand;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Special) {
|
|
|
|
st0_tag = FPU_Special(st0_ptr);
|
|
|
|
if ((st0_tag == TW_Infinity) || (st0_tag == TW_NaN)) {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_operand;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(st0_ptr, &t);
|
|
|
|
precision_loss = FPU_round_to_int(&t, st0_tag);
|
|
|
|
if (t.sigh ||
|
|
|
|
((t.sigl & 0x80000000) &&
|
|
|
|
!((t.sigl == 0x80000000) && signnegative(&t)))) {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
/* This is a special case: see sec 16.2.5.1 of the 80486 book */
|
|
|
|
invalid_operand:
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & EX_Invalid) {
|
|
|
|
/* Produce something like QNaN "indefinite" */
|
|
|
|
t.sigl = 0x80000000;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (precision_loss)
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag(precision_loss);
|
|
|
|
if (signnegative(&t))
|
|
|
|
t.sigl = -(long)t.sigl;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 4);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(t.sigl, (unsigned long __user *)d);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put a short into user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_store_int16(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, short __user *d)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_REG t;
|
|
|
|
int precision_loss;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (st0_tag == TAG_Empty) {
|
|
|
|
/* Empty register (stack underflow) */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_StackUnder);
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_operand;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Special) {
|
|
|
|
st0_tag = FPU_Special(st0_ptr);
|
|
|
|
if ((st0_tag == TW_Infinity) || (st0_tag == TW_NaN)) {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_operand;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(st0_ptr, &t);
|
|
|
|
precision_loss = FPU_round_to_int(&t, st0_tag);
|
|
|
|
if (t.sigh ||
|
|
|
|
((t.sigl & 0xffff8000) &&
|
|
|
|
!((t.sigl == 0x8000) && signnegative(&t)))) {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
/* This is a special case: see sec 16.2.5.1 of the 80486 book */
|
|
|
|
invalid_operand:
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & EX_Invalid) {
|
|
|
|
/* Produce something like QNaN "indefinite" */
|
|
|
|
t.sigl = 0x8000;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (precision_loss)
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag(precision_loss);
|
|
|
|
if (signnegative(&t))
|
|
|
|
t.sigl = -t.sigl;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 2);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user((short)t.sigl, d);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put a packed bcd array into user memory */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_store_bcd(FPU_REG *st0_ptr, u_char st0_tag, u_char __user *d)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_REG t;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long long ll;
|
|
|
|
u_char b;
|
|
|
|
int i, precision_loss;
|
|
|
|
u_char sign = (getsign(st0_ptr) == SIGN_NEG) ? 0x80 : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (st0_tag == TAG_Empty) {
|
|
|
|
/* Empty register (stack underflow) */
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_StackUnder);
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_operand;
|
|
|
|
} else if (st0_tag == TAG_Special) {
|
|
|
|
st0_tag = FPU_Special(st0_ptr);
|
|
|
|
if ((st0_tag == TW_Infinity) || (st0_tag == TW_NaN)) {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
goto invalid_operand;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reg_copy(st0_ptr, &t);
|
|
|
|
precision_loss = FPU_round_to_int(&t, st0_tag);
|
|
|
|
ll = significand(&t);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check for overflow, by comparing with 999999999999999999 decimal. */
|
|
|
|
if ((t.sigh > 0x0de0b6b3) ||
|
|
|
|
((t.sigh == 0x0de0b6b3) && (t.sigl > 0xa763ffff))) {
|
|
|
|
EXCEPTION(EX_Invalid);
|
|
|
|
/* This is a special case: see sec 16.2.5.1 of the 80486 book */
|
|
|
|
invalid_operand:
|
|
|
|
if (control_word & CW_Invalid) {
|
|
|
|
/* Produce the QNaN "indefinite" */
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 10);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0, d + i); /* These bytes "undefined" */
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0xc0, d + 7); /* This byte "undefined" */
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0xff, d + 8);
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(0xff, d + 9);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else if (precision_loss) {
|
|
|
|
/* Precision loss doesn't stop the data transfer */
|
|
|
|
set_precision_flag(precision_loss);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 10);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) {
|
|
|
|
b = FPU_div_small(&ll, 10);
|
|
|
|
b |= (FPU_div_small(&ll, 10)) << 4;
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(b, d + i);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(sign, d + 9);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*===========================================================================*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* r gets mangled such that sig is int, sign:
|
|
|
|
it is NOT normalized */
|
|
|
|
/* The return value (in eax) is zero if the result is exact,
|
|
|
|
if bits are changed due to rounding, truncation, etc, then
|
|
|
|
a non-zero value is returned */
|
|
|
|
/* Overflow is signalled by a non-zero return value (in eax).
|
|
|
|
In the case of overflow, the returned significand always has the
|
|
|
|
largest possible value */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
int FPU_round_to_int(FPU_REG *r, u_char tag)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
u_char very_big;
|
|
|
|
unsigned eax;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tag == TAG_Zero) {
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure that zero is returned */
|
|
|
|
significand(r) = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* o.k. */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (exponent(r) > 63) {
|
|
|
|
r->sigl = r->sigh = ~0; /* The largest representable number */
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* overflow */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
eax = FPU_shrxs(&r->sigl, 63 - exponent(r));
|
|
|
|
very_big = !(~(r->sigh) | ~(r->sigl)); /* test for 0xfff...fff */
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#define half_or_more (eax & 0x80000000)
|
|
|
|
#define frac_part (eax)
|
|
|
|
#define more_than_half ((eax & 0x80000001) == 0x80000001)
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (control_word & CW_RC) {
|
|
|
|
case RC_RND:
|
|
|
|
if (more_than_half /* nearest */
|
|
|
|
|| (half_or_more && (r->sigl & 1))) { /* odd -> even */
|
|
|
|
if (very_big)
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* overflow */
|
|
|
|
significand(r)++;
|
|
|
|
return PRECISION_LOST_UP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_DOWN:
|
|
|
|
if (frac_part && getsign(r)) {
|
|
|
|
if (very_big)
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* overflow */
|
|
|
|
significand(r)++;
|
|
|
|
return PRECISION_LOST_UP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_UP:
|
|
|
|
if (frac_part && !getsign(r)) {
|
|
|
|
if (very_big)
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* overflow */
|
|
|
|
significand(r)++;
|
|
|
|
return PRECISION_LOST_UP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RC_CHOP:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return eax ? PRECISION_LOST_DOWN : 0;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*===========================================================================*/
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
u_char __user *fldenv(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *s)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned short tag_word = 0;
|
|
|
|
u_char tag;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((addr_modes.default_mode == VM86) ||
|
|
|
|
((addr_modes.default_mode == PM16)
|
|
|
|
^ (addr_modes.override.operand_size == OP_SIZE_PREFIX))) {
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(s, 0x0e);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(control_word, (unsigned short __user *)s);
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(partial_status, (unsigned short __user *)(s + 2));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(tag_word, (unsigned short __user *)(s + 4));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(instruction_address.offset,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(s + 6));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(instruction_address.selector,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(s + 8));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(operand_address.offset,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(s + 0x0a));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(operand_address.selector,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(s + 0x0c));
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
s += 0x0e;
|
|
|
|
if (addr_modes.default_mode == VM86) {
|
|
|
|
instruction_address.offset
|
|
|
|
+= (instruction_address.selector & 0xf000) << 4;
|
|
|
|
operand_address.offset +=
|
|
|
|
(operand_address.selector & 0xf000) << 4;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(s, 0x1c);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(control_word, (unsigned short __user *)s);
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(partial_status, (unsigned short __user *)(s + 4));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(tag_word, (unsigned short __user *)(s + 8));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(instruction_address.offset,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long __user *)(s + 0x0c));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(instruction_address.selector,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(s + 0x10));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(instruction_address.opcode,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(s + 0x12));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(operand_address.offset,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long __user *)(s + 0x14));
|
|
|
|
FPU_get_user(operand_address.selector,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long __user *)(s + 0x18));
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
s += 0x1c;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef PECULIAR_486
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
control_word &= ~0xe080;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* PECULIAR_486 */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
top = (partial_status >> SW_Top_Shift) & 7;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (partial_status & ~control_word & CW_Exceptions)
|
|
|
|
partial_status |= (SW_Summary | SW_Backward);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
partial_status &= ~(SW_Summary | SW_Backward);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
|
|
|
|
tag = tag_word & 3;
|
|
|
|
tag_word >>= 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tag == TAG_Empty)
|
|
|
|
/* New tag is empty. Accept it */
|
|
|
|
FPU_settag(i, TAG_Empty);
|
|
|
|
else if (FPU_gettag(i) == TAG_Empty) {
|
|
|
|
/* Old tag is empty and new tag is not empty. New tag is determined
|
|
|
|
by old reg contents */
|
|
|
|
if (exponent(&fpu_register(i)) == -EXTENDED_Ebias) {
|
|
|
|
if (!
|
|
|
|
(fpu_register(i).sigl | fpu_register(i).
|
|
|
|
sigh))
|
|
|
|
FPU_settag(i, TAG_Zero);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
FPU_settag(i, TAG_Special);
|
|
|
|
} else if (exponent(&fpu_register(i)) ==
|
|
|
|
0x7fff - EXTENDED_Ebias) {
|
|
|
|
FPU_settag(i, TAG_Special);
|
|
|
|
} else if (fpu_register(i).sigh & 0x80000000)
|
|
|
|
FPU_settag(i, TAG_Valid);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
FPU_settag(i, TAG_Special); /* An Un-normal */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Else old tag is not empty and new tag is not empty. Old tag
|
|
|
|
remains correct */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return s;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
void frstor(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *data_address)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
int i, regnr;
|
|
|
|
u_char __user *s = fldenv(addr_modes, data_address);
|
|
|
|
int offset = (top & 7) * 10, other = 80 - offset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy all registers in stack order. */
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(s, 80);
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
__copy_from_user(register_base + offset, s, other);
|
|
|
|
if (offset)
|
|
|
|
__copy_from_user(register_base, s + other, offset);
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
|
|
|
|
regnr = (i + top) & 7;
|
|
|
|
if (FPU_gettag(regnr) != TAG_Empty)
|
|
|
|
/* The loaded data over-rides all other cases. */
|
|
|
|
FPU_settag(regnr, FPU_tagof(&st(i)));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
u_char __user *fstenv(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *d)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((addr_modes.default_mode == VM86) ||
|
|
|
|
((addr_modes.default_mode == PM16)
|
|
|
|
^ (addr_modes.override.operand_size == OP_SIZE_PREFIX))) {
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 14);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PECULIAR_486
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(control_word & ~0xe080, (unsigned long __user *)d);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(control_word, (unsigned short __user *)d);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* PECULIAR_486 */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(status_word(), (unsigned short __user *)(d + 2));
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(fpu_tag_word, (unsigned short __user *)(d + 4));
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(instruction_address.offset,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(d + 6));
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(operand_address.offset,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(d + 0x0a));
|
|
|
|
if (addr_modes.default_mode == VM86) {
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user((instruction_address.
|
|
|
|
offset & 0xf0000) >> 4,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(d + 8));
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user((operand_address.offset & 0xf0000) >> 4,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(d + 0x0c));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(instruction_address.selector,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(d + 8));
|
|
|
|
FPU_put_user(operand_address.selector,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned short __user *)(d + 0x0c));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
d += 0x0e;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 7 * 4);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PECULIAR_486
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
control_word &= ~0xe080;
|
|
|
|
/* An 80486 sets nearly all of the reserved bits to 1. */
|
|
|
|
control_word |= 0xffff0040;
|
|
|
|
partial_status = status_word() | 0xffff0000;
|
|
|
|
fpu_tag_word |= 0xffff0000;
|
2008-03-11 06:28:04 +08:00
|
|
|
I387->soft.fcs &= ~0xf8000000;
|
|
|
|
I387->soft.fos |= 0xffff0000;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* PECULIAR_486 */
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (__copy_to_user(d, &control_word, 7 * 4))
|
|
|
|
FPU_abort;
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
|
|
|
d += 0x1c;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
control_word |= CW_Exceptions;
|
|
|
|
partial_status &= ~(SW_Summary | SW_Backward);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return d;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:12 +08:00
|
|
|
void fsave(fpu_addr_modes addr_modes, u_char __user *data_address)
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
u_char __user *d;
|
|
|
|
int offset = (top & 7) * 10, other = 80 - offset;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
d = fstenv(addr_modes, data_address);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_OFF;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 10:57:57 +08:00
|
|
|
FPU_access_ok(d, 80);
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Copy all registers in stack order. */
|
|
|
|
if (__copy_to_user(d, register_base + offset, other))
|
|
|
|
FPU_abort;
|
|
|
|
if (offset)
|
|
|
|
if (__copy_to_user(d + other, register_base, offset))
|
|
|
|
FPU_abort;
|
|
|
|
RE_ENTRANT_CHECK_ON;
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-30 20:30:11 +08:00
|
|
|
finit();
|
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*===========================================================================*/
|